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This book is a selection of VoxEU.org columns that deal with the ongoing global 
financial crisis.  VoxEU.org is a portal for research-based policy analysis and 
commentary written by leading economists. It was launched in June 2007 with the aim of 
enriching the economic policy debate by making it easier for serious researchers to 
contribute and to make their contributions more accessible to the public. 
Just as newspapers pride themselves on being “first drafts of history,” the contributions to 
Vox on the ongoing global financial crisis have proven to be the first drafts of the 
economics profession’s understanding of these events.  Mainstream media’s limits (800 
words written for the average newspaper reader) just did not work for an event of this 
complexity. Vox provided commentators with the space to explain the situation using 
standard economic terminology. It raised the level of the public debate and this attracted 
researchers who had also been at the cutting edge of policy-making, such as: Willem 
Buiter (professor at LSE and former member of the Bank of England’s rate-setting 
Monetary Policy Committee), Charles Wyplosz (professor at the Graduate Institute, 
Geneva and adviser to central banks), Guillermo Calvo (professor at Columbia University 
and former chief economist at the Interamerican Development Bank), Marco Onado 
(professor at Bocconi and former Commissioner of the Italian public authority 
responsible for regulating the Italian securities market, CONSOB), and Luigi Spaventa 
(professor in Rome and former Chairman of CONSOB). 
Initial contributions on the subject were compiled into a volume edited by Andrew Felton 
and Carmen Reinhart and published by the Centre for Economic Policy Research in June 
2008.  The crisis did not end then, it deepened and spread, and neither did the efforts of 
Vox contributors.  Andrew and Carmen agreed to edit this second volume of compilation 
of columns.  On behalf of CEPR and the Vox editorial board, I would like to thank them 
for producing this primer on what is probably the worst financial crisis of our generation. 
 





Sadly, our previous compilation of VoxEU columns, "The First Global Financial Crisis 
of the 21st Century," was not the last word on the subject.  Since the publication of that 
volume in June 2008, the global crisis has both deepened and widened. The industrial 
world has seen the largest bank failures in its history, and many governments have 
intervened in the financial system in a manner that would once have been unthinkable.  
Wall Street and the City of London, along with most other financial centers, have been 
changed forever.  Many storied financial firms have failed or been merged away, and 
others are left with significant ownership positions of national governments.  The 
economy of Iceland has suffered a collapse just as sizable as any of Latin America or 
East Asia during the last few decades.  
Vox authors have kept up their prolific pace of commenting on unfolding events.  In 
keeping with the mission of Vox, columnists both applied existing economic research to 
understand events and pointed the way to new avenues for research.  These articles, it has 
to be understood, were written “in the moment” over the past six months and so 
incorporate to a varying extend the history we have lived through.  To help place 
individual contributions within this historical sequence, an appendix updates the timeline 
of events from our June publication through December.  Another appendix provides a 
glossary of technical terms.   
As we did last time, we have divided the Vox columns into three thematic groupings.  
Columns in the first group describe how the crisis spread around the world and 
necessitated international coordination.  The next group is about how the ciris has 
upended traditional thinking about financial economics.  The final group of columns 
includes a plethora of policy critiques and proposals. 
1. The spread of the crisis to the rest of the world 
Perhaps the most notable recent development has been how quickly and forcefully the 
crisis has spread to the rest of the world.  Danielsson provided a comprehensive account 
of the country hit hardest by the crisis, Iceland.  The krona fell by more than 95 percent 
against the dollar and the nation’s banking system is devastated.  Lane thought that these 
events will propel Iceland into the arms of the European Union, a policy that Zoega 
thought was the only sensible prescription.  Buiter and Sibert, who have been writing 
about Iceland for more than a year, called its downfall the “predictable end of a non-
viable business model.” 
Reisen predicted that emerging markets are still vulnerable to contagion and that they 
would try to rely less on private debt in the future.  Reinhart and Reinhart identified a 
systematic predictor of a variety of crises in a large set of countries over the past few 
decades.  Economies receiving large inflows of capital, termed “capital flow bonanzas,” 
often run aground when those flows stall.  Calvo and Loo-Kung wanted a preemptive 
bailout of emerging markets to cut off calls for protectionism and nationalization.  As 
equity markets plunge in unison around the world, Hesse examined how the wealth effect 
differs among countries, and found that the stock market wealth effect is smaller but still 
significant in emerging economies.  Freytag and Pehnelt wanted to use the financial crisis 
to spur reform in emerging-market debt relief programs.  In two articles, Subramanian 
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discussed the credit crunch’s impact on India and suggested that the government use its 
foreign exchange reserves to stabilize the economy. 
Several columns discussed the need for coordinated international action.  Muellbauer 
argued forcefully for a large, internationally coordinated interest rate cut.  Others focused 
on intra-Europe cooperation.  Gros and Micossi called for a European Financial Stability 
Fund to issue euro bonds to recapitalize the financial system.  Di Noia suggested that 
Europe create a new financial regulatory system based on the four objectives of 
macroeconomic stability, microeconomic stability, investor protection and competition.  
Pagano’s article was also in favor of a Euro-area bank supervisory authority.  Taking a 
broad view, Rossi’s philosophical piece discussed the impact of financial globalization on 
the role of the state and regulation. 
Gros pointed out that many European banks are too large for their national governments 
to save and floats a few ideas about how to improve cross-border financial regulation.  
Persaud pointed out that the inability of national governments to save their banks will 
likely increase fiscal integration in the euro area.  Gros and Micossi suggested that the 
ECB obtain the power to directly support large European banks and that Europe develop 
a cross-border rescue fund.  Laeven and Levine were more skeptical of one-size-fits-all 
plans, demonstrating how banks adapt to their local environments, especially with regard 
to corporate governance laws.  Bertola and Lo Prete discussed how financial 
globalization and the current crisis will negatively impact welfare programs around the 
world. 
Although the 2005-era concerns about current account deficits now seem like a distant 
memory, Forbes reminded us that the dollar remains vulnerable and reliant on external 
funding.  Reinhart and Reinhart pointed out that this foreign funding continued this year, 
even though the United States has been the epicenter of the financial crisis.  This follows 
because large foreign official holdings of U.S. government debt has made the United 
States too big to fail, lessening external discipline on the policy response.  Eichengreen 
questioned whether the IMF will have a useful role to play in this crisis – and if it does 
not, what that portends for its future status.  He suggested that the Fund increase its 
lending to middle-income countries to help them through the current liquidity squeeze. 
2. What is wrong with the traditional economic/financial viewpoint and 
models? 
To many Vox columnists, the ongoing crisis has highlighted glaring omissions in 
economists’ understanding of financial markets and institutions.  The view that asset 
prices should equal their risk-adjusted expected return means that the smartest minds, 
with huge incentives, mispriced a huge variety of securities.  The Vox contributors 
pointed out a number of current events that undermine traditional theories of finance; as 
Dale quipped, the current crisis “is an academic crisis too.” 
Many of the problems had to do with transparency, principal-agent problems, and other 
forces keeping the purchaser of assets from understanding their underlying properties.  
Kiff, Mills, and Spackman discussed a number of problems with the European 
securitization market.  Pagano explained how the opacity created by securitization led to 
surprisingly high systemic costs.  Cohen focused on agency problems, which he said lead 
8 
 
to a “Panglossian” attitude in the financial sector.  Sinn blamed limited liability laws, 
which he said encourage excessive risk taking, especially in the financial sector. 
Mariano discussed transparency of ratings agencies, and found that their reputation 
concerns might not be enough to assure accurate ratings.  Instead, reputation effects could 
cause ratings to be too conformist, too conservative, or too bold, and it is difficult a priori 
to find out which of these will result.  Goodhart presented the view of the Financial 
Economists Roundtable on a variety of proposed reforms of the ratings industry. 
Another aspect of financial markets brought to the forefront by the current crisis is that of 
liquidity: how easy it is to trade an asset.  Pedersen explained asset liquidity – a concept 
not incorporated into most economic theories based on expected value.  Persaud also 
wrote about liquidity and how a problem in subprime mortgages, less than 1 percent of 
the world’s debt stock, caused a cascade of failures throughout the financial system.  
González-Hermosillo, and Hesse examine various liquidity channels through which the 
problems spread beginning in 2007, including ABCP, SIVs, and interbank lending.  
Freixas and Parigi said that the increased importance of liquidity and interconnection of 
banks makes the central bank’s role as a lender of last resort even more important.  
Persaud argued against suspending mark-to-market accounting and proposes mark-to-
funding accounting instead, which would weight market prices of assets by the durations 
of their off-setting liabilities. 
The complexity, rapid growth, and interconnection of markets has prevented analysts 
from producing either a simple explanation of the crisis or a simple way to restart 
economic growth.  Heinemann discussesed the crisis in light of recent theoretical work on 
the possibility of asset price bubbles and game theory, particularly that of Princeton’s 
Markus Brunnermeier.  The work implied that a coordinated global signal is needed to 
get investors buying again.   
Danielsson discussed the role of complexity in the crisis and tells regulators to focus on 
simple variables, like the leverage ratio.  Bloom argues in two articles that the previous 
goodwill toward complexity has morphed into risk aversion and uncertainty, which will 
deter investment and likely lead to a severe recession that monetary and fiscal policy are 
powerless to avoid.  One of the driving regulatory forces toward complexity was Basel II, 
which Repullo and Suarez found reinforced pro-cyclical capital requirements.  Goodhart 
agreed that counter-cyclical policy is needed, although he focuses on the role of central 
bank policy.  Giovannini said that a single regulatory policy cannot apply to universal 
banks, and advocated splitting them into “client servicers” and “capital managers.” 
Coutert and Gex looked back to 2005, when the bankruptcy of auto parts supplier Delphi 
caused a minor crisis in the credit default swap market, for lessons applicable today.  The 
show that correlations on CDS spreads rose during the crisis, leading to potential 
contagion issues today after the recent bankruptcies of Lehman Brothers, etc.. 
Giavazzi discussed the puzzling spread between LIBOR and the expected path of policy 
interest rates, which was implying default rates far higher than even the most determined 
bear would predict.  He pointed out that some banks may be deliberately withholding 
funds from the market in order to weaken competitors. 
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3. The proper governmental response 
Eichengreen emphasized that, despite the temptation to blame the crisis on greed and 
corruption, policy has an important role to play in both explaining the cause and getting 
world markets out of it.  Calomiris provided a useful overview of both private and public 
actions that precipitated the turmoil.  Rancière urged policymakers not to throw out the 
baby of innovation and risk-taking out with the bathwater of systemic risk.  Berglöf and 
Rosenthal warned Europe not to proclaim the end of capitalism too quickly, pointing out 
that many of the modern U.S. problems have their roots in policies enacted in the wake of 
earlier crises.   
Corsetti and Müller provided an overview of theory and simulations on the effectiveness 
of different types of fiscal policy versus monetary policy.  Gros argued that governments 
should prefer to implement fiscal policy via tax cuts rather than infrastructure 
development.  Castanheira advocated fiscal stimulus combined with explicit targeting of 
expanding future budgets deficits in order to manipulate expectations.  Boltho and Carlin 
focused on Germany, which they said needs a large financial stimulus despite being in 
better shape to weather the crisis than many other countries. 
A number of columns discussed the United States’ Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) and related government bailouts and guarantees.  Zingales stated flatly that it 
wouldn’t work.  The problems of the banking sector were too large to pay for without 
cutting other necessary spending to prop up the real economy and provide debt relief to 
underwater homeowners.  Wyplosz provided a half-hearted defense of the plan, however, 
as did Spaventa.   
When the TARP was first announced, a flurry of columns came to a similar conclusion: 
the real need was to recapitalize the banks rather than buy illiquid assets.  Persaud 
advocated a debt-for-equity swap.  Buiter similarly focused on the need to recapitalize the 
banks.  Acharya discussed the pros and cons of various recapitalization approaches, as 
well as related regulatory infrastructure improvements.  Zingales discussed why existing 
bankruptcy procedures might exacerbate the problem, but mentioned some game-
theoretic problems with a pure recapitalization.  Calomiris also wanted purchases of 
preferred shares to recapitalize the banks.  Frankel summed up the “emerging consensus.”  
Onado discussed bank recapitalization through the metaphor of Achilles and the turtle: 
banks losses were rising more quickly than capital could be acquired. 
Cesari advocated the creation of an alternative to the TARP focused on debt relief and 
increased regulation.  Boeri suggested three ways of broadening the bank bailout plans to 
ensure more benefits for the general public: increase competition in the financial 
industry, reduce low-income tax rates, and provide mortgage debt relief. 
Other discussion centered around how much to pay for troubled assets or charge for 
guarantees.  Pagano discussed the theory of reverse auctions, which were to be the main 
policy tool of the TARP.  Gros used option theory to show that if homeowners exercise 
their default options ruthlessly enough, then subprime mortgage securities could be 
mostly worthless. 
Suarez discussed the necessity of government guarantees of bank debt just as a number of 
countries were launching similar programs.  Acharya and Sundaram focused on how the 
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United States and United Kingdom were pricing their bank debt guarantees and found 
that the U.S. guarantee was much more favorable to the banks than the U.K. guarantee 
was.  Gros and Micossi discussed the impact of direct bailouts, such as of AIG, and how 
European banks were too big for any one national government to save. 
Wyplosz contrasted the “Larry Summers” approach, keeping investors from taking flight, 
with the “Willem Buiter” approach to making investors stomach the risks they knew they 
were taking.  de la Dehesa alerted us to the difference between a credit “crunch,” in 
which the quantity of credit is lessened, with a “squeeze,” in which the adjustment is on 
the price side, and concluded that the euro area—at least in July–was suffering neither. 
Some columns discussed governmental responses to past crises.  Claessens et al found 
that recessions instigated by financial crises are usually much longer and deeper than 
those from other causes.  Laeven, who collected results mostly from prior studies, 
reported that the average crisis costs about 15 percent of GDP – which would be more 
than $2 trillion in the United States alone.  Kobayashi recapped some of the mistakes that 
Japan made during the 1990s, specifically with regard to the choice about recapitalizing 
“zombie” banks.  Similar to Gros and Micossi, he called for a global “Financial System 
Stabilisation Fund.”  Eichengreen compared the current situation to the Great Depression 
and finds sobering similarities.  Hughson and Weidenmier discussed the importance of a 
lender of last resort in the historical context of seasonal liquidity crises before the Federal 
Reserve. 
Finally, Duflo managed to find a potential silver lining to the crisis: high salaries in the 
financial sector have attracted many of society’s brightest minds, which will now have to 




The spread of the crisis to the rest of the world 
Danielsson: The first casualty of the crisis: Iceland 
12 November 2008  
Iceland’s banking system is ruined. GDP is down 65% in euro terms. Many companies 
face bankruptcy; others think of moving abroad. A third of the population is considering 
emigration. The British and Dutch governments demand compensation, amounting to 
over 100% of Icelandic GDP, for their citizens who held high-interest deposits in local 
branches of Icelandic banks. Europe’s leaders urgently need to take step to prevent 
similar things from happening to small nations with big banking sectors.  
Iceland experienced the deepest and most rapid financial crisis recorded in peacetime 
when its three major banks all collapsed in the same week in October 2008. It is the first 
developed country to request assistance from the IMF in 30 years. 
Following the use of anti-terror laws by the UK authorities against the Icelandic bank 
Landsbanki and the Icelandic authorities on 7 October, the Icelandic payment system 
effectively came to a standstill, with extreme difficulties in transferring money between 
Iceland and abroad. For an economy as dependent on imports and exports as Iceland this 
has been catastrophic. 
While it is now possible to transfer money with some difficulty, the Icelandic currency 
market is now operating under capital controls while the government seeks funding to re-
float the Icelandic krona under the supervision of the IMF. There are still multiple 
simultaneous exchange rates for the krona. 
Negotiations with the IMF have finished, but at the time of writing the IMF has delayed a 
formal decision. Icelandic authorities claim this is due to pressure from the UK and 
Netherlands to compensate the citizens who deposited money in British and Dutch 
branches of the Icelandic bank Icesave. The net losses on those accounts may exceed the 
Icelandic GDP, and the two governments are demanding that the Icelandic government 
pay a substantial portion of that. The likely outcome would be sovereign default. 
How did we get here? Inflation targeting gone wrong 
The original reasons for Iceland’s failure are series of policy mistakes dating back to the 
beginning of the decade. 
The first main cause of the crisis was the use of inflation targeting. Throughout the period 
of inflation targeting, inflation was generally above its target rate. In response, the central 
bank kept rates high, exceeding 15% at times.  
In a small economy like Iceland, high interest rates encourage domestic firms and 
households to borrow in foreign currency; it also attracts carry traders speculating against 
‘uncovered interest parity’. The result was a large foreign-currency inflow. This lead to a 
sharp exchange rate appreciation that gave Icelanders an illusion of wealth and doubly 
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rewarding the carry traders. The currency inflows also encouraged economic growth and 
inflation; outcomes that induced the Central Bank to raise interest rates further.  
The end result was a bubble caused by the interaction of high domestic interest rates, 
currency appreciation, and capital inflows. While the stylized facts about currency 
inflows suggest that they should lead to lower domestic prices, in Iceland the impact was 
opposite.  
Why did inflation targeting fail?  
The reasons for the failure of inflation targeting are not completely clear. A key reason 
seems to be that foreign currency effectively became a part of the local money supply and 
the rapidly appreciating exchange-rate lead directly to the creation of new sectors of the 
economy. 
The exchange rate became increasingly out of touch with economic fundamentals, with a 
rapid depreciation of the currency inevitable. This should have been clear to the Central 
Bank, which wasted several good opportunities to prevent exchange rate appreciations 
and build up reserves.  
Peculiar Central Bank governance structure  
Adding to this is the peculiar governance structure of the Central Bank of Iceland. 
Uniquely, it does not have one but three governors. One or more of those has generally 
been a former politician. Consequently, the governance of the Central Bank of Iceland 
has always been perceived to be closely tied to the central government, raising doubts 
about its independence. Currently, the chairman of the board of governors is a former 
long-standing Prime Minister. Central bank governors should of course be absolutely 
impartial, and having a politician as a governor creates a perception of politicization of 
central bank decisions. 
In addition, such governance structure carries with it unfortunate consequences that 
become especially visible in the financial crisis. By choosing governors based on their 
political background rather than economic or financial expertise, the Central Bank may 
be perceived to be ill-equipped to deal with an economy in crisis.  
Oversized banking sector  
The second factor in the implosion of the Icelandic economy was the size of its banking 
sector. Before the crisis, the Icelandic banks had foreign assets worth around 10 times the 
Icelandic GDP, with debts to match. In normal economic circumstances this is not a 
cause for worry, so long as the banks are prudently run. Indeed, the Icelandic banks were 
better capitalized and with a lower exposure to high risk assets than many of their 
European counterparts. 
If banks are too big to save, failure is a self-fulfilling prophecy 
In this crisis, the strength of a bank’s balance sheet is of little consequence. What matters 
is the explicit or implicit guarantee provided by the state to the banks to back up their 
assets and provide liquidity. Therefore, the size of the state relative to the size of the 
banks becomes the crucial factor. If the banks become too big to save, their failure 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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The relative size of the Icelandic banking system means that the government was in no 
position to guarantee the banks, unlike in other European countries. This effect was 
further escalated and the collapse brought forward by the failure of the Central Bank to 
extend its foreign currency reserves. 
The final collapse was brought on by the bankruptcy of almost the entire Icelandic 
banking system. We may never know if the collapse of the banks was inevitable, but the 
manner in which they went into bankruptcy turned out to be extremely damaging to the 
Icelandic economy, and indeed damaging to the economy of the United Kingdom and 
other European countries. The final damage to both Iceland and the rest of the European 
economies would have been preventable if the authorities of these countries have acted 
more prudently. 
While at the time of writing it is somewhat difficult to estimate the recovery rate from the 
sale of private sector assets, a common estimate for the net loss to foreign creditors 
because of private debt of Icelandic entities is in excess of $40 billion. 
The Icelandic authorities did not appreciate the seriousness of the situation in spite of 
being repeatedly warned, both in domestic and foreign reports. One prominent but typical 
example is Buiter and Sibert (2008).   In addition, the Icelandic authorities communicated 
badly with their international counterparts, leading to an atmosphere of mistrust.  
The UK authorities, exasperated with responses from Iceland overreacted, using 
antiterrorist laws to take over Icelandic assets, and causing the bankruptcy of the 
remaining Icelandic bank. Ultimately, this led to Iceland’s pariah status in the financial 
system. 
British and Dutch claims on the Icelandic government 
The current difficulties facing Iceland relate to its dispute with the Netherlands and the 
UK over high interest savings accounts, Icesave. Landsbanki set these savings accounts 
up as a branch of the Icelandic entity, meaning they were regulated and insured in 
Iceland, not in the UK or the Netherlands. 
Icesave offered interest rates much above those prevailing in the market at the time, often 
50% more than offered by British high street banks. In turn, this attracted £4.5 billion in 
the UK with close to £1 billion in the Netherlands. Landsbanki operated these saving 
accounts under local UK and Dutch branches of the Icelandic entity, meaning they were 
primarily regulated and insured in Iceland, although also falling under local authorities in 
the UK and the Netherlands. Hence the Icelandic, British and Dutch regulators approved 
its operations and allowed it to continue attracting substantial inflows of money. Since 
the difficulties facing Landsbanki were well documented, the financial regulators of the 
three countries are at fault for allowing it to continue attracting funds. 
Landsbanki went into administration following the emergency legislation in Iceland. The 
final losses related to Icesave are not available at the time of writing, but recovery rates 
are expected to be low, with total losses expected to be close to £5 billion. The amount in 
the Icelandic deposit insurance fund only covers a small fraction of these losses.  
Both the Dutch and the UK governments have sought to recover the losses to their savers 
from the Icelandic government. Their demands are threefold. First, that it use the deposit 
insurance fund to compensate deposit holders in Icesave. Second, that it make good on 
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the amounts promised by the insurance fund, around EUR 20,000. Finally, that it make 
good on all losses. The last claim is based on emergency legislation passed in Iceland 
October 6, and the fact that the government of Iceland has promised to compensate 
Icelandic deposit holders the full amount, and it cannot discriminate between Icelandic 
and European deposit holders.  
Murky legal situation 
The legal picture however is unclear. Under European law 1% of deposits go into a 
deposit insurance fund, providing savers with a protection of €20,000 in case of bank 
failure. Apparently, the European law did not foresee the possibility of a whole banking 
system collapsing nor spell out the legal obligation of governments to top up the deposit 
insurance fund. Furthermore, the legal impact of the Icelandic emergency law is unclear. 
Consequently, the Icelandic government is disputing some of the British and Dutch 
claims. 
Blood out of a rock 
Regardless of the legal issues, the ability of the Icelandic Government to meet these 
claims is very limited. The damage to the Icelandic economy is extensive.   The economy 
is expected to contract by around 15% and the exchange rate has fallen sharply. By using 
exchange rates obtained from the ECB November 7 the Icelandic GDP is about EUR 5.5 
billion, at 200 kronas per euro. In euro terms GDP has fallen by 65%. (This calculation is 
based on the Icelandic GDP falling from 1,300 billion Icelandic kronas to 1,105 and a 
Euro exchange rate of 200. One year ago, the exchange rate was 83. In domestic currency 
terms the Icelandic GDP has contracted by 15% due to the crisis, in Euro terms 65%.)1 
The total losses to Icesave may therefore exceed the Icelandic GDP. While the amount 
being claimed by the UK and the Netherlands governments is unclear, it may 
approximate 100% of the Icelandic GDP. By comparison, the total amount of reparations 
payments demanded of Germany following World War I was around 85% of GDP.2 
Resolution and the way forward 
Any resolution of the immediate problems facing Iceland is dependent on the UK and the 
Netherlands settling with Iceland. Unfortunately, the ability of the Icelandic government 
to meet their current demands is very much in doubt. 
Opinion polls in Iceland indicate that one third of the population is considering 
emigration. Further economic hardship due to Icesave obligations may make that 
expression of opinion a reality. Meanwhile, many companies are facing bankruptcy and 
others are contemplating moving their headquarters and operations abroad. 
                                                 
1 This calculation is based on the Icelandic GDP falling from 1,300 billion Icelandic 
krona to 1,105 and a Euro exchange rate of 200. One year ago, the exchange rate was 83. 
In domestic currency terms the Icelandic GDP has contracted by 15% due to the crisis, in 
Euro terms 65%. 
2 Initial reparation demands from Germany were close to 200% of GDP, but quickly 
lowered to around 85%. See e.g. Webb (1988) for comparisons of   German reparation 
payments and emerging market debt repayments. 
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With the youngest and most highly educated part of the population emigrating along with 
many of its successful manufacturing and export companies, it is hard to see how the 
Icelandic State could service the debt created by the Icesave obligations to the UK and 
the Netherlands, making government default likely.  
The economic rationale for continuing to pursue the Icesave case with the current vigor is 
therefore very much in doubt. If a reasonable settlement cannot be reached, and with the 
legal questions still uncertain, it would be better for all three parties to have this dispute 
settled by the courts rather than by force as now.  
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Lane: Iceland: The future is in the EU 
6 November 2008 
Iceland is undergoing a traumatic financial crisis. This column argues that the main 
anchor for its recovery strategy should be EU membership and entry into the euro area. 
Iceland is undergoing a traumatic financial crisis. In just a few weeks, it has seen the 
collapse of its currency and its banking system, plus a spectacular decline in its 
international reputation and its diplomatic relations with long-standing international 
partners. Much of the current debate revolves around the attribution of blame for its 
predicament, and there is certainly much to be learned from a rigorous forensic enquiry 
into the origins and mechanics of the crisis. Although Iceland ultimately proved unable to 
ensure the survival of a banking system with a balance sheet that was ten times the size of 
its GDP, the debate about whether its demise was inevitable is sure to remain intensely 
contested.3,4 
                                                 
3 Buiter and Sibert (2008) provide an excellent account of the vulnerability of the 
Icelandic banking system in view of the limited capacity of the Icelandic authorities to act 
as a lender of last resort in respect of the Icelandic banks’ considerable foreign-currency 
positions. Portes (2008) argues that better crisis management by the Icelandic authorities 
may have avoided the collapse. 
4 This article is based on a presentation to the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee 
conference held in Reykjavik on October 28th 2008 “Testing Times for the International 




However, this debate should not overshadow the important process of setting a strategy 
for the recovery of the Icelandic economy and ensuring that the risks of a future crisis are 
minimised. 
To this end, it seems clear from the outside (and also to many in Iceland) that the main 
anchor for its future strategy should be membership of the EU and, once the Maastricht 
criteria are fulfilled, entry into the euro area. 
This is not to claim that membership of the EU and the euro area is a panacea. 
Indeed, the current members of the euro area are not immune to the international 
financial crisis and important weaknesses in the financial stability framework for the euro 
area have been vividly highlighted by recent events. 
In particular, the combination of international banking with national-level supervisory 
and stability systems has been shown to represent substantial risks to European taxpayers. 
Indeed, Iceland and the existing members of the monetary union would have much to 
gain from the promotion of cross-national consolidation in the banking sector, delivering 
a smaller number of large banks that would hold more diversified loan books, reducing 
exposure to country-specific and sector-specific shocks. For this to happen, national 
governments will have to agree ex ante on burden sharing rules in order to ensure that 
such banks would be backed by a sufficiently large fiscal base. In related fashion, the 
supervision and regulation of such banks would have to be designed in order to ensure 
that such banks are operated on a truly pan-European basis rather than being organised as 
a hierarchy of a parent national bank that takes precedence over its international branches 
and affiliates in the event of a crisis. 
Membership of the euro area also involves macroeconomic policy challenges for member 
countries. The absence of a flexible exchange rate has the potential to make the 
adjustment to country-specific asymmetric shocks more difficult. For countries such as 
Iceland that are highly reliant on a small number of export sectors, this can be a non-
trivial problem. However, the flexibility of the Icelandic labour market is a key 
compensating factor, with a coordinated approach to wage setting allowing real wages to 
fall during downturns and rising international labour mobility providing an additional 
adjustment mechanism. 
Moreover, the potential gains from a flexible exchange rate are surely dominated by the 
capacity for financial shocks to drive currencies away from the values that would be 
justified by current macroeconomic fundamentals. While the role of risk premium shocks 
is most dramatic during crisis episodes, it is also an ever-present factor during more 
tranquil periods, especially for small currencies that are thinly traded in less-liquid 
markets. The consequences of such shocks have been scaled up by the rapid growth in 
cross-border investment positions over the last decade: the balance sheet impact of 
currency fluctuations in many cases dominates their impact on trade volumes. 
The current crisis has also illustrated that banking supervision and crisis management are 
very demanding tasks that pose a challenge even to the largest countries that have deep 
talent pools. It is plausible that very small countries do not attain the “minimum efficient 
scale” to run these systems in an effective manner. 
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For these reasons, the logic of very small countries participating in monetary unions is 
compelling. The rationale of membership is even stronger for a country - such as Iceland 
- that has suffered damage to its credibility as the sponsor of a national currency. 
It is important to emphasise that there is no close substitute for membership of the euro 
area. In particular, unilateral euroisation or the adoption of a currency board would 
represent much weaker forms of monetary discipline, since such regimes are more easily 
reversed in the event of a crisis. These routes are much more expensive from a fiscal 
viewpoint relative to joining a multilateral monetary union as a fully-integrated member. 
Moreover, the importance of EU membership should not be discounted, even in the 
narrow context of a discussion about the monetary regime. In particular, the multi-
dimensional commitments that are involved in EU membership have the effect of 
embedding each member country in a deep institutional and inter-governmental network 
set of relations with other EU member countries. The current crisis has highlighted that 
Iceland’s relations with other European countries proved to be relatively weak under the 
stress of a crisis situation and many problems could have been avoided if it had enjoyed a 
better level of comprehension and empathy among its European neighbours. 
Although membership of the EU and the euro area cannot be achieved in the very short 
run, announcing an intention to enter the process of applying for membership would have 
an immediate stabilising benefit for the Icelandic economy. In addition, the anchor of 
medium-term entry into the EMU would enable the Icelandic central bank to pursue a 
managed float system during the transition period in an environment in which it need not 
prove its capacity to independently deliver a long-term nominal anchor for the Icelandic 
economy. 
The current crisis also raises questions about the appropriateness of the “exchange rate 
stability” criterion in determining whether a country is ready to join the euro area. Under 
the existing rules, a country must spend two years inside the ERM II mechanism before it 
can enter the EMU. Recent weeks have shown that even countries with excellent 
macroeconomic fundamentals are vulnerable to major currency shocks. In this new 
environment, it seems expensive to impose a two-year currency stability test on countries 
that wish to join the euro. 
Finally, Iceland’s entry into the EU and the euro area should be welcomed by the existing 
member countries. In particular, the Icelandic financial collapse has imposed heavy 
losses on many investors across Europe and contributed to the instability of international 
credit markets. All member countries stand to gain from a better-integrated financial 
system. 
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Zoega: Iceland faces the music 
27 November 2008 
Iceland’s meltdown was caused by the rapid emergence of an oversized banking sector 
and accompanying domestic credit creation, asset bubbles and excessive indebtedness 
that all this encouraged. This column draws lessons from this crisis and suggests Iceland 
should join the EU if it wants to stand a chance at keeping its well-educated young 
people from emigrating. 
Iceland’s borrowing in international credit markets during the period 2003-2007 
propelled a macroeconomic expansion as well as the very rapid expansion of the banking 
sector.5 Borrowing was also undertaken to fund leveraged buy-outs of foreign companies 
as well as the buying of domestic assets. There developed the biggest stock market 
bubble in the OECD while house prices doubled. 
The banking development was ominous. No visible measures were taken to limit the 
banks’ growth during the expansionary phase. The size of the banking sector at the end of 
this period was such that it dwarfed the capacity of the central bank to act as a lender of 
last resort6 as well as the state’s ability to replenish its capital. The banking system was 
also vulnerable because of its rapid expansion and the bursting of the domestic asset price 
bubble. 
The end 
The end came quickly. In the otherwise quiet city of Reykjavik, suspicious movements of 
government ministers and central bank governors were detected on Saturday morning, 27 
September. On Monday it was explained that Glitnir, the smallest of the three larger 
banks, had approached the central bank for help because of an anticipated liquidity 
problem in the middle of October. Lacking confidence in the collateral offered, the 
central bank had decided to buy 75% of its shares at a very low price. 
Like the banks themselves, the government had claimed for months that all three banks 
were liquid as well as solvent, yet when push came to shove it tackled a pending liquidity 
squeeze by wiping out the shareholders of Glitnir. Credit lines were now withdrawn from 
the two remaining banks. There followed an old-fashioned bank run on the Icesave 
branch of the Landsbanki in the UK The Landsbanki fell when it was unable to make 
payments to creditors. 
The responses were chaotic. The governors of the central bank announced a 4 billion 
euros loan from Russia but then had to retract the story within hours. They also decided 
to fix the exchange rate but without the requisite foreign currency reserves this was an 
impossible task so the bank gave up within two days. One of the governors appeared on 
                                                 
5 See Gylfi Zoega (2008), “Icelandic turbulence: A spending spree ends,” VoxEU, 9 
April. 
6 See Willem Buiter and Anne Sibert (2008), “The Icelandic banking crisis and what to 
do about it,” CEPR Policy Insight No. 26; and “The collapse of Iceland’s banks: the 
predictable end of a non-viable business model,” VoxEU, 30 October; also Jon 
Danielsson, (2008), “The first casualty of the crisis: Iceland,” VoxEU, 12 November. 
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television and stated that the Icelandic state would not honour the foreign debt of the 
banks without distinguishing deposits from loans. Telephone conversations between 
government ministers in Iceland and the UK appear not to have clarified the situation.7 
The British government then seized the British operations of both the Landsbanki and 
Kaupthing in London. The seizure of Kaupthing’s Singer and Friedlander automatically 
brought Kaupthing into default. All three banks were now in receivership. 
The foreign exchange market collapsed on October 8th. Following a period of sporadic 
trading the central bank started to auction off foreign currency on October 15th. There are 
plans to let it float again. 
The real economy is currently responding to the turmoil; unemployment is rising and 
there have been several bankruptcies and many more are imminent. There is the 
realisation that not just the banks but a significant fraction of non-financial firms are 
heavily leveraged; have used borrowing, mostly in foreign currency, to fund investment 
and acquisitions. The Icelandic business model appears to have involved transforming 
firms into investment funds, be they shipping companies such as Eimskip (established 
1914), airlines such as Icelandair (established in 1943), or fish-exporting companies, to 
name just a few examples. Exporting firms, however, are benefiting from lower exchange 
rates. The future belongs to them. 
Lessons 
The proximate cause of the economic meltdown in Iceland is the rapid emergence of an 
oversized banking sector and the accompanying domestic credit creation, asset price 
bubbles and high levels of indebtedness. At this point it is important to consider the 
reasons why this was allowed to happen. 
Monetary policy technically flawed 
A sequence of interest rate rises, bringing the central bank interest rate up from 5.3% in 
2003 to 15.25% in 2007 did not prevent the boom and the bubbles that preceded the 
current crash. On the contrary, they appear to have fuelled the bubble economy. 
But surely it was apparent to anyone in the latter stages of the boom that it was driven by 
unsustainable borrowing and that a financial crisis was fast becoming inevitable. Iceland 
would have faced the music soon even in the absence of turmoil in international credit 
markets. However, in spite of many observers pointing this out8 (including the central 
                                                 
7 See report by David Ibison in the Financial Times, 24 October 2008, titled “Transcript 
challenges Darling's claim over Iceland compensation.” 
8 See, amongst others, Robert Wade, “Iceland pays price for financial excess,” Financial 
Times, 1 July 2008; Robert Wade, “IMF reports uncertain outlook for Iceland,” Financial 
Times, 15 July 2008; Thorvaldur Gylfason, “Events in Iceland: Skating on thin ice?” 
VoxEU, 7 April 2008; Gylfi Zoega, “A spending spree,” VoxEU 9 April 2008; Robert 
Aliber, “ Monetary turbulence and the Icelandic economy”, lecture, University of 
Iceland, 5 May 2008; Thorvaldur Gylfason, “Hvernig finnst þér Ísland?”, Herdubreid, 27 
July 2007; Gylfi Zoega (2007), “Stofnanaumhverfi, frumkvöðlakraftur og vægi 
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bank itself!9), the course of economic policy was not changed. There were clearly other, 
more profound, reasons for this inertia and passivity in the face of peril. 
Belief in own abilities and good luck 
History is full of examples of nations gripped by euphoria when experiencing rapidly 
rising asset prices. During the economic boom it was tempting to come up with stories to 
explain the apparent success, such as the notion of superior business acumen. However, 
this is a normally distributed variable and its mean does not differ much between nations. 
The ability to govern a modern economy is unfortunately also a normally distributed. 
The normal distribution and the division of labour 
When there are not too many people to choose from, it becomes doubly important to pick 
the best candidate for every job. While the private sector has, as if led by an invisible 
hand, a strong incentive to pick the most competent people for every position, the same 
can not be said of certain areas within the public sector. The appointment of former 
politicians to the position of central bank governor, to take just one example, reduces the 
bank’s effectiveness and credibility. The danger is that the individual in question has 
interests and policies that exceed those fitting a central bank governor in addition to 
lacking many job-specific skills. And this one example is just the tip of the iceberg! 
In addition, Adam Smith’s dictum that the scale of the division of labour is determined by 
the size of the market also applies to the government. There are scale economies when it 
comes to running the state and small nations might benefit from the sharing of a 
government, as well as the central bank! 
Social pressures 
We now come to an equally profound problem, which is that the small size of the 
population makes it inevitable that personal relationships matter more than elsewhere. 
One of the keys to success for an individual starting and sustaining his or her career in 
Icelandic society has been to pledge allegiance to one of the political parties – more 
recently business empires – and act in accordance with its interests. It follows that society 
rewards conformity and subservience instead of independent, critical thinking. Many 
players in the banking saga have interwoven personal histories going back many decades. 
The privatisation of the banks, not so many years ago, appears also to have been driven 
by personal affections and relationships rather than an attempt to find competent, 
responsible owners. 
Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action, first published in 1965,10 describes the 
difficulties of inducing members of large groups to behave in the group’s interests. 
                                                                                                                                                 
grundvallaratvinnuvega,” in Endurmótun íslenskrar utanríkisstefnu 1991-2007, ed. Valur 
Ingimundarson. 
9 See Central Bank of Iceland, Monetary Bulletin, years 2005-2007 
(http://www.sedlabanki.is/?PageID=234). 
10 Mancur Olson (1971), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups, Harvard University Press. 
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Clearly, political parties need to reward their members in order to motivate them and 
ensure their loyalty. The same applies to labour unions and business empires. But the 
smaller the country, the smaller the total surplus income that can be used in this way, 
while the amount needed to guarantee the loyalty of any given individual may not be any 
smaller. It follows from Olson’s analysis that the smaller the nation, the more likely it is 
that society will be uni-polar. As a matter of fact, powerful individuals or parties that 
often rule small nations. Such a society usually does not encourage dissent or critical 
thinking. 
It follows that one individual’s criticism – be that of banks or the political or economic 
situation – may put him in a precarious position vis-à-vis the dominant group. The private 
marginal benefit of voicing your concerns and criticising is in this case negative and 
much smaller than the social marginal benefit. 
The same logic explains why the media may not criticise the ruling powers. During the 
boom years, the media, different commentators and even some academics lavished praise 
on the Icelandic bankers and other capitalists who profited from the asset bubble. This 
then is the root of the problem; a cosy relationship between businesses, politics and the 
media and limited checks and balances. Everybody knows everything but no one does 
anything about anything! 
Relations with Europe 
Membership of the European Economic Areas, involving market integration and the free 
mobility of factors without the participation in a common currency and joint decision-
making, made economic policy in Iceland difficult, even impossible, to implement. The 
local central bank was no match for the vast flows of funds that came into the country. 
Membership of the EU might help remedy many of the problems described above. The 
sharing of certain areas of government may improve the quality of decision-making. 
Having greater contact with decision makers in Europe may provide stimulus, criticism 
and points of comparison that may improve the quality of decisions. The rule of law may 
be strengthened. The adoption of the euro will provide monetary stability and lower 
interest rates.11  
Iceland either has to move backwards to the time of capital controls or forwards into the 
EU. It needs to choose the latter option if it wants to stand a chance at keeping its well-
educated young people from emigrating. 
 
Buiter and Sibert: The collapse of Iceland’s banks: the predictable end 
of a non-viable business model 
30 October 2008 
In the first half of 2008, Buiter and Sibert were invited to study Iceland’s financial 
problems. They identified the “vulnerable quartet” of (1) a small country with (2) a large 
                                                 
11 See Philip Lane (2008), “Iceland: The future is in the EU,” VoxEU, 6 November. 
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banking sector, (3) its own currency and (4) limited fiscal capacity – a quartet that meant 
Iceland’s banking model was not viable. How right they were. This column summarises 
the report, which is now available as CEPR Policy Insight No. 26 with an October 2008 
update. 
Early in 2008 we were asked by the Icelandic bank Landsbanki (now in receivership) to 
write a paper on the causes of the financial problems faced by Iceland and its banks, and 
on the available policy options for the banks and the Icelandic authorities. 
We sent the paper to the bank towards the end of April 2008; it was titled: 
“The Icelandic banking crisis and what to do about it: the lender of last 
resort theory of optimal currency areas.” 
On July 11, 2008, we presented a slightly updated version of the paper in Reykjavik 
before an audience of economists from the central bank, the ministry of finance, the 
private sector and the academic community. 
It is this version of the paper that is now being made available as CEPR Policy Insight No 
26. In April and July 2008, our Icelandic interlocutors considered our paper to be too 
market-sensitive to be put in the public domain and we agreed to keep it confidential. 
Because the worst possible outcome has now materialised, both for the banks and for 
Iceland, there is no reason not to circulate the paper more widely, as some of its lessons 
have wider relevance. 
A banking business model that was not viable for Iceland 
Our April/July paper noted that Iceland had, in a very short period of time, created an 
internationally active banking sector that was vast relative to the size of its very small 
economy. Iceland also has its own currency. Our central point was that this ‘business 
model’ for Iceland was not viable. 
With most of the banking system’s assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currency, 
and with a large amount of short-maturity foreign-currency liabilities, Iceland needed a 
foreign currency lender of last resort and market maker of last resort to prevent funding 
illiquidity or market illiquidity from bringing down the banking system. Without an 
effective lender of last resort and market maker of last resort – one capable of providing 
sufficient liquidity in the currency in which it is needed, even fundamentally solvent 
banking systems can be brought down through either conventional bank runs by 
depositors and other creditors (funding liquidity crises) or through illiquidity in the 
markets for its assets (market liquidity crises). 
Iceland’s two options 
Iceland therefore had two options. First, it could join the EU and the EMU, making the 
Eurosystem the lender of last resort and market maker of last resort. In this case it can 
keep its international banking activities domiciled in Iceland. Second, it could keep its 
own currency. In that case it should relocate its foreign currency banking activities to the 
euro area.  
The paper was written well before the latest intensification of the global financial crisis 
that started with Lehman Brothers seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on 
September 15, 2008. It does therefore not cover the final speculative attacks on the three 
23 
 
internationally active Icelandic banks - Glitnir, Landsbanki and Kaupthing – and on the 
Icelandic currency. These attacks resulted, during October 2008, in all three banks being 
put into receivership and the Icelandic authorities requesting a $2 bn loan from the IMF 
and a $4 bn loan from its four Nordic neighbours. 
Policy mistakes Iceland made 
During the final death throes of Iceland as an international banking nation, a number of 
policy mistakes were made by the Icelandic authorities, especially by the governor of the 
Central Bank of Iceland, David Oddsson. The decision of the government to take a 75 
percent equity stake in Glitnir on September 29 risked turning a bank debt crisis into a 
sovereign debt crisis. Fortunately, Glitnir went into receivership before its shareholders 
had time to approve the government takeover. Then, on October 7, the Central Bank of 
Iceland announced a currency peg for the króna without having the reserves to support. It 
was one of the shortest-lived currency pegs in history. At the time of writing (28 October 
2008) there is no functioning foreign exchange market for the Icelandic króna. 
In addition, outrageous bullying behaviour by the UK authorities (who invoked the 2001 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, passed after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks in the USA, to justify the freezing of the UK assets of the of Landsbanki and 
Kaupthing) probably precipitated the collapse of Kaupthing – the last Icelandic bank still 
standing at the time. The official excuse of the British government for its thuggish 
behaviour was that the Icelandic authorities had informed it that they would not honour 
Iceland’s deposit guarantees for the UK subsidiaries of its banks. Transcripts of the key 
conversation on the issue between British and Icelandic authorities suggest that, if the 
story of Pinocchio is anything to go by, a lot of people in HM Treasury today have noses 
that are rather longer than they used to be. 
The main message of our paper is, however, that it was not the drama and 
mismanagement of the last three months that brought down Iceland’s banks. Instead it 
was absolutely obvious, as soon as we began, during January 2008, to study Iceland’s 
problems, that its banking model was not viable. The fundamental reason was that 
Iceland was the most extreme example in the world of a very small country, with its own 
currency, and with an internationally active and internationally exposed financial sector 
that is very large relative to its GDP and relative to its fiscal capacity. 
Even if the banks are fundamentally solvent (in the sense that their assets, if held to 
maturity, would be sufficient to cover their obligations), such a small country – small 
currency configuration makes it highly unlikely that the central bank can act as an 
effective foreign currency lender of last resort/market maker of last resort. Without a 
credit foreign currency lender of last resort and market maker of last resort, there is 
always an equilibrium in which a run brings down a solvent system through a funding 
liquidity and market liquidity crisis. The only way for a small country like Iceland to 
have a large internationally active banking sector that is immune to the risk of insolvency 
triggered by illiquidity caused by either traditional or modern bank runs, is for Iceland to 
join the EU and become a full member of the euro area. If Iceland had a global reserve 
currency as its national currency, and with the full liquidity facilities of the Eurosystem at 
its disposal, no Icelandic bank could be brought down by illiquidity alone. If Iceland was 
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unwilling to take than step, it should not have grown a massive on-shore internationally 
exposed banking sector. 
This was clear in July 2008, as it was in April 2008 and in January 2008 when we first 
considered these issues. We are pretty sure this ought to have been clear in 2006, 2004 or 
2000. The Icelandic banks’ business model and Iceland’s global banking ambitions were 
incompatible with its tiny size and minor-league currency, even if the banks did not have 
any fundamental insolvency problems. 
Were the banks solvent? 
Because of lack of information, we have no strong views on how fundamentally sound 
the balance sheets of the three Icelandic banks were. It may be true, as argued by Richard 
Portes in his Financial Times Column of 13 October 2008, that “Like fellow Icelandic 
banks Landsbanki and Kaupthing, Glitnir was solvent. All posted good first-half results, 
all had healthy capital adequacy ratios, and their dependence on market funding was no 
greater than their peers’. None held any toxic securities.”1 
The only parties likely to have substantive knowledge of the quality of a bank’s assets are 
its management, for whom truth telling may not be a dominant strategy and, possibly, the 
regulator/supervisor. In this recent crisis, however, regulators and supervisors have 
tended to be uninformed and out of their depth. We doubt Iceland is an exception to this 
rule. The quality of the balance sheet of the three Icelandic banks has to be viewed by 
outsiders as unknown. 
If there is a bank solvency problem, even membership in the euro area would not help. 
Only the strength of the fiscal authority standing behind the national banks (and its 
willingness to put its fiscal capacity in the service of a rescue effort for the banks) 
determines the banks’ chances of survival in this case. If there were a serious banking 
sector solvency problem in Iceland, then with a banking sector balance sheet to annual 
GDP ratio of around 900 percent, it is unlikely that the fiscal authorities would be able to 
come up with the necessary capital to restore solvency to the banking sector. 
The required combined internal transfer of resources (now and in the future, from tax 
payers and beneficiaries of public spending to the government) and external transfer of 
resources (from domestic residents to foreign residents, through present and future 
primary external surpluses) could easily overwhelm the economic and political capacities 
of the country. Shifting resources from the non-traded sectors into the traded sectors 
(exporting and import-competing) will require a depreciation of the real exchange rate 
and may well also require a worsening of the external terms of trade. Both are painful 
adjustments. 
If the solvency gap of the banking system exceeds the unused fiscal capacity of the 
authorities, the only choice that remains is that between banking sector insolvency and 
sovereign insolvency. The Icelandic government has rightly decided that its tax payers 
and the beneficiaries of its public spending programmes (who will be hard hit in any 
case) deserve priority over the external and domestic creditors of the banks (except for 
the insured depositors). 
Conclusions, lessons and others who might be vulnerable 
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Iceland’s circumstances were extreme, but there are other countries suffering from milder 
versions of the same fundamental inconsistent – or at least vulnerable - quartet:  
(1) A small country with (2) a large, internationally exposed banking sector, (3) its own 
currency and (4) limited fiscal spare capacity relative to the possible size of the banking 
sector solvency gap. 




and even to some extent the UK, although it is significantly larger than the others and has 
a minor-league legacy reserve currency. 
Ireland, Belgium, the Netherland and Luxembourg possess the advantage of having the 
euro, a global reserve currency, as their national currency. Illiquidity alone should 
therefore not become a fatal problem for their banking sectors. But with limited fiscal 
spare capacity, their ability to address serious fundamental banking sector insolvency 
issues may well be in doubt. 
 
Reisen: The fallout from the global credit crisis: Contagion - emerging 
markets under stress 
6 December 2008 
The global credit crisis is testing the resilience and sustainability of emerging markets’ 
policies, this column warns. Even strong performers are not shielded against pure 
financial contagion, although they may well recover quickly once confidence is restored. 
In the future, development finance is likely to rely less on private debt. 
The global credit crisis has taken some time to spread from the industrialised countries to 
the emerging markets. But in October 2008, the contagion spread rapidly, afflicting all 
emerging markets, without any distinction or regard to their so-called ' fundamentals'. For 
believers in ‘decoupling’, the high growth rates, massive foreign exchange (FX) reserves, 
balanced budgets and rising consumerism in the emerging markets at first reassured 
investors. Alas, the final diagnosis was contagion. In the end all emerging market asset 
classes were hit – stocks, bonds and currencies. 
This column reflects on early policy lessons from the current financial crisis for 
• the diagnosis of emerging market policy performance, 
• the channels of crisis contagion, and 
• the future of private and official development finance. 
Assessing emerging markets’ performance 
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It is now clear that the diagnosis of emerging-market policy performance suffered from 
hyperbole. Many observers ignored the fact that all that glitters in emerging markets may 
not be gold,12 underplaying as they did the cyclicality and endogeneity of important 
policy performance indicators. 
Emerging-market growth rates: Much of the recent growth has been driven by an 
extraordinary bonanza in raw material prices and low-cost financing. Many analysts 
forgot that growth rates can only be sustained over the long-run when supported by 
cyclically-adjusted productivity growth. Arguably, from this perspective, many Asian 
countries have more sustainable growth rates than emerging markets in other regions. 
Foreign exchange reserve levels: Their durability depends very much on the exchange 
rate regime. Authorities may wish to avoid a currency slump and may need to recapitalise 
their banking system. But if both foreign and domestic investors lose confidence, even 
very impressive levels of foreign exchange reserves can melt away quickly, as witnessed 
recently in Russia. As long as reserves are below the liabilities of the banking system 
(M2), individuals may rush to convert their domestic currency deposits into foreign 
currency and cause a currency slump once reserves are down. 
Public budgets: A misjudgement common to rating agencies13 is based on the monitoring 
of debt-GDP ratios and public deficits. Both debt and deficits are low during booms, but 
they can shoot up quickly during crises. Tax collection flourishes when exports and raw 
material prices boom but tumbles during the bust, currency appreciation leads to the 
collapse of foreign-currency-denominated debt ratios but gives way to an endogenous 
rise in debt ratios as currencies and GDP growth weaken. 
Not everything is negative, however. To the extent that fuel and food prices fall due to 
the crisis, government budgets in many low-income countries that highly subsidise fuel 
and food consumption may benefit as costly price subsidies can be reduced (though this 
positive effect may be mitigated by currency depreciation). And public debt management 
has improved: Brazil, for example now has a net long position in dollars, such that a 
currency depreciation actually improves its net worth. 
Contagion transmission 
Preventing, managing and resolving financial crises requires distilling policy lessons 
from recent emerging market crises that had less to do with domestic factors and were 
more related to do with crisis contagion from elsewhere. Furthermore, such policy 
lessons need to inform debates regarding the construction of a new international (or 
                                                 
12 Izquierdo, A and E. Talvi, “All that glitters may not be gold: assessing Latin America’s 
recent macroeconomic performance”, Inter-American Development Bank, 2008 
13 Reisen, H. and J. von Maltzahn, “Boom and Bust and Sovereign Ratings”, 1999, 
International Finance, 1999, 2(2), 273-93. 
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regional) financial architecture.14 Crisis contagion in principle occurs through three 
channels: 
• Through foreign trade (sometimes known as the ' monsoon effect'): the monsoon 
effects hit small open economies easily through merchandise trade precisely 
because they are both small and open to trade. Low-income countries will be 
mostly hit through the monsoon channel as OECD recessions deepen. 
• Through financial contagion, when money invested is repatriated, as happened 
during the Asian crisis when weakly capitalised Japanese banks cancelled credit 
lines of up to 10% of GDP at once. The process of global deleveraging hits 
developing and emerging countries through financial contagion, if currency 
mismatches in corporate and bank balance sheets cause widespread company and 
bank failures. 
• Through 'pure' contagion, as happened in October 2008, when a systemic and 
simultaneous breakdown of money and bank markets leads to generalised risk 
aversion and the shedding of all assets that fail to carry public guarantees. 
Financial crises that are caused by the monsoon effect or by financial contagion can in 
principle be predicted through the monitoring of macroeconomic variables common to 
economically integrated countries. Pure contagion, by contrast, hits countries regardless 
of the level of economic integration. Pure contagion is hard to predict or to quantify. A 
wave of pure contagion, however, can be stopped more easily by decisive policies.15 As 
long as the fundamentals are not permanently damaged by pure contagion, it is sufficient 
to switch expectations back from red to green. 
Financing development 
As a mid-term consequence of the global credit crisis, private debt will be financed only 
reluctantly and capital costs are bound to rise to incorporate higher risk. Instead, solvent 
governments and public institutions will become the lenders of last resort. The 
consequences for development finance and the global financial architecture will be 
important. Figure 1 shows clearly how development loans by the World Bank, the IMF, 
and the regional development banks had been crowded out by private-sector lending 
throughout the boom decade. The supply of public development finance will rise and 
regain some of the attractiveness to poor countries that it lost during the boom period. 
Figure 1. Percentage share in lending to developing countries 
                                                 
14 Reisen, H. , "After the Great Asian Slump: Towards a Coherent Approach to Global 
Capital Flows," OECD Development Centre Policy Briefs 16, OECD Development 
Centre 1999. 





Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2008 
However, the firepower of the international financial institutions is quite limited and 
unlikely to stop ‘pure’ contagion and the global crisis. Causing a precautionary rush by 
vulnerable countries to ask the international financial institutions for help, their limited 
firepower paves the way for one-way bets on emerging-market currencies. It is therefore 
important that these institutions finance a capital increase. 
China and India could provide a small part of their foreign exchange reserves to the 
regional development banks - provided they are granted more voting rights. Foreign 
exchange reserves, invested through the regional development banks, could be leveraged 
as soft loans. Such action might alleviate African leaders' concern that the global credit 
crisis will reduce finance available to poor countries rather than the systemically 




Reinhart and Reinhart: From capital flow bonanza to financial crash 
23 October 2008 
The standard pattern: capital flows into the new “hot” nation, but then stop or reverses 
forcing painful adjustment. This column presents research based on such episodes from 
181 nations during 1980-2007 and for a subset of 66 nations for the 1960-2007 period. If 
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the pattern of the past few decades holds true, emerging market economies may be facing 
a darkening future. 
A pattern has often been repeated in the modern era of global finance. Global investors 
turn with interest toward the latest “foreign” market. Capital flows in volume into the 
“hot” financial market. The exchange rate tends to appreciate, asset prices to rally, and 
local commodity prices to boom. These favourable asset price movements improve 
national fiscal indicators and encourage domestic credit expansion. These, in turn, 
exacerbate structural weaknesses in the domestic banking sector even as those local 
institutions are courted by global financial institutions seeking entry into a hot market. 
But tides also go out when the fancy of global investors shift and the “new paradigm” 
looks shop worn. Flows reverse or suddenly stop à la Calvo16 and asset prices give back 
their gains, often forcing a painful adjustment on the economy. 
In a recent paper, we examined the macroeconomic adjustments surrounding episodes of 
sizable capital inflows in a large set of countries.17 Identifying these “capital flow 
bonanzas” turns out to be a useful organising device for understanding the swings in 
investor interest in foreign markets as reflected in asset price booms and crashes and for 
predicting sovereign defaults and other crises. 
The bonanza episodes 
For each of 181 countries, we defined a capital flow bonanza as an episode in which there 
are larger-than-normal net inflows (operationally, those inflows bigger than the 80th 
percentile of the entire sample). As can be seen in the share of countries experiencing a 
capital bonanza year by year plotted in the figure below, bonanzas are clustered in time 
even though they were defined using country-specific cutoffs.18 
There were two eras of booms of boons over the past three decades. The first ran from 
1975 to 1982 and the world is living through the second—which appears to be partially 
unwinding. In both, real interest rates in the financial centres of the world were low and 
often negative, growth in advanced economies was sluggish, and commodity prices were 
rising rapidly. Statistical evidence suggests that these three variables are important 
systematic determinants of capital flow bonanzas. If the historical pattern plays out again, 
capital flows may remain elevated for the next few years, encouraged by the lagged 
effects of low real interest rates. 
Figure 1: Capital Flow Bonanzas 
                                                 
16 Calvo, Guillermo A., “Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises: The Simple 
Economics of Sudden Stops,” Journal of Applied Economics 1, no. 1 (1998): 35-54. 
17 “Capital Flow Bonanzas: An Encompassing View of the Past and Present,” CEPR 
Discussion Paper 6996, October 2008. 
18 The charts and tables below have been updated with the recently released IMF, World 




The initial wave of bonanzas had a distinct Latin American flavour, including such 
countries as Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. This is an ominous precedent, in that the first 
great wave of inflows in recent memory ended in the emerging market debt crisis of the 
1980s. This shows through systematically over time. Over a longer period, capital flow 
bonanzas appear to help predict government defaults and other financial crises. 
Recent bonanza episodes 
As for the recent experience, the table below lists the countries experiencing capital flow 
bonanzas over the past three years. We applied the technique described in our paper to 
the IMF forecast made earlier this month. As is evident, two main groups of countries 
have been beneficiaries of outsized net inflows in recent years: Industrial countries with 
house-price booms (such as Ireland, Spain, the UK, and the US) and nations in Central 
and Eastern Europe expected to converge to the centre with the enlargement of the EU 
(such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia). 
Countries with recent notable capital inflows 2006 2007 2008 
Bulgaria √ √ √ 
Iceland √ √ √ 
Italy √ √ √ 
Jamaica √ √ √ 
Latvia √ √ √ 
New Zealand √ √ √ 
Pakistan √ √ √ 
Romania √ √ √ 
Slovenia √ √ √ 
South Africa √ √ √ 
Spain √ √ √ 
Turkey √ √ √ 
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United Kingdom √ √ √ 
United States √ √ √ 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (10/08) and authors' calculations. 
Notes: For the full list of recent bonanza episodes see the paper. 
Cross-checking this list with recent headlines in the financial news supports the 
contention that the concept of a capital-flow bonanza may be a useful device for 
identifying countries likely to undergo significant macroeconomic adjustment—perhaps 
even a crisis, an issue we turn to next. 
Capital flow bonanzas and financial crises 
To examine the potential links with financial crises of various stripes, we constructed a 
family of country-specific probabilities. For each of the 64 countries, this implies four 
unconditional crisis probabilities, that of: default (or restructuring) on external sovereign 
debt, a currency crash, and a banking crisis.19 We also constructed the probability of each 
type of crisis within a window of three years before and after the bonanza year or years, 
this we refer to as the conditional probability of a crisis. If capital flow bonanzas make 
countries more crises prone, the conditional probability should be greater than the 
unconditional probability of a crisis. 
We summarise the main results and then provide illustrative examples. For the full 
sample, the probability of any of the three varieties of crises conditional on a capital flow 
bonanza is significantly higher than the unconditional probability. Put differently, the 
incidence of a financial crisis is higher around a capital inflow bonanza. However, 
separating the high income countries from the rest qualifies the general result. As for the 
high income group, there are no systematic differences between the conditional and 
unconditional probabilities in the aggregate, although there are numerous country cases 
where the crisis probabilities increase markedly around a capital flow bonanza episode. 
Also, to provide an indication of how commonplace is it across countries to see bonanzas 
associated with a more crisis-prone environment, we also calculate what share of 
countries show a higher likelihood of crisis (of each type) around bonanza episodes. For 
sovereign defaults, less than half the countries (42%) record an increase in default 
probabilities around capital flow bonanzas. (Here, it is important to recall that about one-
third of the countries in the sample are high income.) In two-thirds of the countries the 
likelihood of a currency crash is significantly higher around capital flow bonanzas in 
about 61% of the countries the probability of a banking crises is higher around capital 
flow bonanzas. 
Beyond these general results, Figures 2 to 4 for debt, currency, and banking crises, 
respectively, present a comparison of conditional and unconditional probabilities for 
individual countries, where the differences in crisis probabilities were greatest. (Hence, 
the country list varies from one figure to the next). 
                                                 
19 In the paper, we also consider inflation crises; for crisis definitions see Reinhart, 
Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight 
Centuries of Financial Crises” NBER Working Paper 13882, March 2008. 
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For external sovereign default (Figure2), it is hardly surprising that there are no high 
income country examples, as advanced economy governments do not default on their 
sovereign debts during the sample in question. The same cannot be said of Figures 3 and 
4. While the advanced economies register much lower (conditional and unconditional) 
crisis probabilities than their lower income counterparts, the likelihood of crisis is higher 
around bonanza episodes in several instances. Notably, Finland and Norway record a 
higher probability of a banking crisis around the capital flow bonanza of the late 1980s. 
Recalibrating this exercise in light of the banking crises in Iceland, Ireland, UK, Spain 
and US on the wake of their capital flow bonanza of recent years would, no doubt, add 
new high income entries to Figure 4, which graphs conditional and unconditional 
probabilities for banking crises. 
Figure 2. Are bonanza episodes more crisis prone? Sovereign external default: 66 
countries, 1960-2007 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a), and sources cited therein. 





Sources: Authors’ calculations, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a), and sources cited therein. 





Sources: Authors’ calculations, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a), and sources cited therein. 
Reflections on the current conjuncture 
Most emerging market economies have thus far been relatively immune to the slowdown 
in the US. Many are basking in the economic warmth provided by high commodity prices 
and low borrowing costs. If the pattern of the past few decades holds true, however, those 
countries may be facing a darkening future.  
 
 
Calvo and Loo-Kung: Rapid and large liquidity funding for emerging 
markets 
10 December 2008 
Emerging markets are weaker than the G7, and if they undertake expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policies like the G7, inflation and capital flight are likely surge. This column 
argues international financial institutions must take an unprecedented role in bailing out 




One can blame the G7 for incompetent financial supervision, but few would criticise 
them for the rapid and decisive action taken by their central banks and fiscal authorities 
after the crisis materialised. 
It is too early to tell if the G7 are coming out of the quagmire any time soon, but it is 
clear that the G7 have a powerful arsenal. The world is eager to buy their public bonds at 
negligible interest rates, which they can then use to pump in liquidity and bail out their 
financial sectors. 
Emerging market woes 
Unfortunately, that’s not the case in emerging market economies, or EMs in the jargon. 
JP Morgan’s EMBI+ bond index, for example, has become highly volatile and at one 
point recently it crossed the 1000 basis point mark (see Figure 1). Moreover, since the 
third quarter 2008, when it transpired that there was no decoupling, the EM stock market 
collapsed in dollar terms, and also relative to the Dow Jones. 
This shows that the EM arsenal is considerably weaker than the G7’s, and that if they 
undertake an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy like the G7, inflation and capital 
flight are likely surge.20 The instruments that are helpful in refloating advanced 
economies could prove fatal for emerging markets! 
Figure 1. Interest rates in the US, euro area and emerging markets 
 
Notes: 10-year Generic Bond rates for the US and the Euro Area. Source: Bloomberg. 
                                                 
20 For a thorough evidence about the relative disadvantage of developing economies, see 
Carmen Reinhart, Kenneth Rogoff and Miguel Savastano “Debt Intolerance,” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 
34(2003-1), pages 1-74. 
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Large reserve stocks help but aren’t sufficient 
The good news is that emerging markets have accumulated a sizable stock of 
international reserves which they could, in principle, apply to finance an expansionary 
fiscal policy for some time. To illustrate, consider the region composed by Africa, 
emerging Europe and Latin America. In 2007, gross international reserves reached 
around $1.7 trillion, while annual investment was about $1.8 trillion. 
Suppose the current crisis shrinks investment by about 18% as it did, on average, during 
the Asia/Russia crises.21 This would imply a fall in investment equivalent to 1.8´0.18 = 
$324 billion. The stock of reserves would allow the region to offset the potential fall in 
investment for an impressive 5 year period. Granted, these are gross reserves, but the 
firepower is anyhow impressive.22 The same computation for 1998, for instance, yields a 
much shorter period (about 2 years). 
A major problem in using international reserves for credit expansion is that the stock of 
reserves is usually taken by market participants as a guarantee of banking and currency 
stability. 
Data on reserves are closely followed by the private sector because, even in a reserves-
rich region like Asia, international reserves do not exceed 45% of M2, on average. For 
instance, in the above example, if reserves fall by $324 billion, the region would have to 
spend about 20% of its gross reserves – a change that will not pass unnoticed to market 
participants. Here is where the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) can make a 
difference. 
Loans from international financial institutions have the double effect of providing a seal 
of approval to the credit-expansion policy, and ensuring that the hard-currency backing of 
domestic monetary aggregates does not suffer a dramatic reduction. Both effects go in the 
direction of enhancing the trust of the private sector in domestic financial institutions. 
Loans from multilateral development banks, MDBs, to the region (i.e., Africa, emerging 
Europe and Latin America) in 2007 were slightly higher than 12% of the $324 billion 
required to offset the Sudden Stop (see Table 1). Even if all the MDBs follow the World 
                                                 
21 This is likely a conservative estimate. In the sample of Sudden Stops in countries from 
Latin America, emerging Europe and Asia, tracked in the JP Morgan’s EMBI, the 
average peak-to-through reduction in nominal investment was about 30% during the 
Asia/Russia crises. 
22 In some cases, international reserves net of government short-term liabilities can be 
substantially lower. Take for instance, the case of Brazil. As of last October, gross 
reserves totaled $203 billion while public domestic short-term debt amounted to $134 
billion (valued at the current exchange rate). Granted, most domestic debt is denominated 
in reais but the currency has already suffered a very large devaluation (almost 60% 
against the dollar), and there are concerns of an imminent inflation flare up. This makes it 
unlikely that, barring a crisis, the authorities will be inclined to let the real devalue much 




Bank’s recent announcement, and expand lending by a factor of four, the additional funds 
would raise the MDBs’ contribution to only around 50% the above amount. 
Table 1. MDBs lending to Africa, emerging Europe and Latin America (US$ billions) 
   2004 2005 2006 2007 
Africa  9.0 7.8 10.0 11.3 
Emerging Europe  7.9 8.0 8.6 9.8 
Latin America  14.8 17.1 17.8 20.1 
Total  31.7 32.9 36.4 41.2 
Note: Figures correspond to the total of approved loans and guarantees by the World 
Bank, the African Development Bank Group, the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
Andean Development Corporation and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. 
An additional difficulty is that MDB loans take a long time to be approved and disbursed. 
Thus, in the short run the MDBs are unlikely to be of much help. More promising are 
initiatives like the Fed’s currency swaps and the IMF Short-Term Liquidity Facility. It is 
essential, though, that the sums involved are large enough and cover a wide spectrum of 
emerging markets. 
The good news for emerging markets is that the G7 seem to have recognised their 
responsibility in generating the present financial turmoil and are coming forward with 
proposals to enlarge the MDBs’ lending capacity much more aggressively than in the 
past. To illustrate, during the Asia/Russian 1997/8 crises the MDBs increased lending by 
30% (instead of the 400% recently announced by the World Bank), an amount that 
represented less than 5% the fall in emerging market investment (see Figure 2). 




Note: Includes Africa, emerging Asia, emerging Europe, Latin America and the Middle 
East. MDB’s lending includes the total of approved loans and guarantees by the World 
Bank, the African Development Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. 
This, in addition to the recent and programmed G20 meetings, gives us hope that 
emerging markets will be offered a much more adequate cushion to a potential Sudden 
Stop. Optimism, however, is tempered by the fact that this time around emerging markets 
will likely be bereft of the net export channel, which played a very important role in their 
rebound from previous Sudden Stops. Unlike the 1997/98 episode, during which robust 
growth in the US and other advanced economies provided a strong external demand that 
helped the recovery in EMs, this time the global nature of the crisis will almost surely 
prevent this mechanism to take place. 
Conclusion 
Our analysis strongly suggests that, in the short run, first priority should be given to 
developing liquidity facilities aimed at stopping financial unravelling in EMs. At present, 
those facilities don’t seem to be either large enough, or cover a wide enough spectrum of 
EMs. Time is of the essence. 
As shown by the “Sudden Stop” literature, slow response from the IFIs could result in 
serious output and employment losses.23 The Fund appears to be well positioned to take 
the lead, but its effectiveness will depend very much on getting the unambiguous political 
support necessary to run the large risks that the rapid expansion of sizable liquidity 
facilities is likely to entail. 
If successful, the international financial institutions will have taken an unprecedented role 
in bailing out emerging markets, and for the first time, in a long time, we will be entitled 
to talk about a New Economic Order. 
If not, and the world does not quickly recover from this crisis, there is the serious risk 
that many key emerging markets resort to protectionism and nationalisation, a major 
backward step for their economies and the world’s. 
 
Hesse: Stock market wealth effects in emerging market countries 
16 October 2008  
This column examines the impact of stock market valuation changes on consumption and 
investment in emerging markets. Though the effects are smaller than those in advanced 
economies, emerging market policymakers ought to pay attention to how equity price 
swings will transmit business cycles and impact aggregate demand. 
There are a few channels through which asset price changes affect consumption. For 
instance, consumption depends on peoples’ expectations of wage income and equity price 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Guillermo Calvo, Emerging Capital Markets in Turmoil, MIT Press, 2005. 
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increases can signal higher income growth. Financial assets play a significant role in 
peoples’ permanent (life-cycle), income so changes in the stock market could have an 
effect on private consumption expenditure. 
Although there is a large body of literature about the effect of asset price changes on 
private consumption in advanced economies, such studies are scarce for emerging market 
economies. Estimates of stock market wealth effects for a 10% change in equity prices 
range from 0.15% - 0.3% in Japan and 0.1% - 0.3% in various European countries to 
0.3% - 0.7% in the United States (IMF 2002; Ludwig and Sløk 2004; Slacalek 2006). 
Funke (2004) presents evidence of a small but statistically significant stock market 
wealth effect in 16 emerging markets over 1985–2000 ranging from 0.2% to 0.4%. 
To shed more light on the relationship between stock market valuation changes and 
private consumption, co-authors and I estimated a simple two-step panel model covering 
1985–2007 for 22 emerging markets in the MSCI equity index (see IMF 2008 for more 
details). The findings suggest that a 10% increase in the stock market valuation would, on 
average, lead to an increase of real private per capita consumption of 0.12% in the short 
run and 0.15 % in the long run. The nominal impact amounts to 0.25% in the short run 
and 0.26% in the long run. These results are in line with Funke (2004). Restricting the 
sample period to 1997–2007, when stock market valuations exhibited large increases as a 
percentage of GDP, reveals a slightly higher real stock market wealth effect. In general 
and as expected, the impact is smaller than in advanced economies. 
It is also of interest whether the wealth effect is different for countries that have 
witnessed a stock market boom or bust. To account for this, we restricted the sample to 
observations for which the equity market had increased or decreased by more than 20% 
and 30%, respectively, in any given year. These findings suggest a slightly more 
pronounced wealth effect. 
The obtained wealth effects are rough estimates and depend on other factors that are hard 
to measure. First, using stock market returns is only an imperfect proxy for household 
wealth. Second, the model did not take into account different structures of financial 
markets and features such as its volatility or depth. Third, the magnitude is also driven by 
factors such as the leverage of consumers, duration and the degree of stock market 
participation. For instance, consumer leverage is still relatively low in many emerging 
economies compared to some developed economies. With respect to duration, recent 
stock market gains and losses in many emerging markets have occurred very quickly, so 
there has been little time for consumers to change their behaviour. If stock market 
increases had materialised over a longer time period, the wealth effect may have been 
larger. 
Overall, these findings suggest that changes in stock market valuations have a relatively 
small but significant impact on consumption in emerging economies. But consumption 
patterns are still mainly driven by disposable income, and so far, that has been resilient to 
the volatility of financial markets in many countries, especially in Asia. In addition, the 
housing wealth channel plays an important role in some emerging market countries that 
have especially seen rapid build- ups of property prices, and this channel was ignored in 
the study. 
In addition to private consumption, the wealth effects of stock market valuation changes 
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are also relevant for a number of other key macroeconomic variables, notably 
government revenues and private investment. Investment and share prices are inherently 
linked. Since equity prices are forward-looking variables that convey information about 
the expected value of firms, they affect investment. Higher stock market prices also 
reduce the cost of capital for companies, benefiting their investments. Results from 
estimating a simple model for private investment suggest that a 10% change in stock 
prices would lead to about 1% change in investment, which is a substantially stronger 
effect than on private consumption. This is in line with the results of Henry (2000), who 
utilises the same methodology. 
What are the possible implications for policy makers? With fluctuations in stock markets 
affecting private consumption and investment expenditures and therefore demand, policy 
makers need to pay attention to this relationship, especially in large build-ups of asset 
price booms and the subsequent bust. Furthermore, as domestic asset price prices are 
increasingly influenced by regional and global factors, there is a possible transmission 
mechanism of business cycle movements. 
There is no one-size-fits-all approach for dealing with the consumption stock market 
wealth effect. The approach should be country-specific and depend on domestic factors 
such as the monetary policy framework, financial regulation, the degree of consumer 
leverage (especially for retail investors), and the level of stock market participation in the 
economy. For instance, a monetary policy stance in an emerging economy that explicitly 
targets inflation might find it harder to lean against asset prices than a central bank that 
focuses more on the growth of the economy. The good news is that the consumption 
stock market wealth effect is lower in emerging market countries than in advanced 
economies – but emerging economies should not ignore its existence. 
Note: The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
those of the IMF or IMF policy. 
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Freytag and Pehnelt: The political economy of debt relief 
11 December 2008 
In a future phase of the crisis, the issue of sovereign debt relief is likely to arise. Such 
debt relief has historically been marked by political failure and short-term thinking, and 
not delivered promising results. Drawing on recent research, this column argues for 
tying debt relief to good governance goals is one way to improve the outcome. 
The global financial market crisis has fed fears that individual countries face such serious 
problems that they might go broke, with this causing a cascade of national crises.  
In particular, developing and emerging economies, which so far have been regarded as 
being decoupled from the crisis in the industrialised world, are endangered. Countries 
that may be regarded as problematic in this context are Hungary, Pakistan and Iceland. 
The IMF has loaned $15.7 billion to Hungary to help the country combat negative fallout 
from the global financial crisis. Most recently, Pakistan got into deep trouble when the 
country's foreign exchange reserves shrunk dramatically and the rupee plunged in 
October as the balance of payments deficit in the three months from July 1 widened to 
$3.95 billion from $2.27 billion a year earlier. The decision of the IMF to approve a 
US$7.6 billion credit to Pakistan to stave off a balance of payments crisis reduces for the 
time being the prospect of Islamabad defaulting on its foreign debts. Iceland received a 
bailout of almost $5 billion from the IMF and the neighbouring Nordic countries. 
The IMF also promised to help Latvia deal with its economic crisis after it assisted 
Iceland, Hungary, Ukraine, Serbia and Pakistan. 
Table 1 shows the cost of some of the bailout programmes since the mid 1990s. Not a 
few analysts believe that the worst is yet to come with respect to some transition and 
developing economies. 
Table 1: Crises and bailout-cost 
Crisis  GDP (in billions)  Cost* (in billions)  %GDP 
USA 2008  $14,312  $1.500?  >10%? 
Pakistan 2008  $130  $8?  6%? 
Hungary 2008  $170  $16?  9%? 
Argentina 2000  $299  $22  7% 
Brazil 1998  $844  $42  5% 
Russia 1998  $271  $24  9% 
Korea 1997  $527  $57  11% 
Thailand 1997  $151  $17  12% 
Indonesia 1997  $238  $21  9% 
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Mexico 1995  $421  $48  11% 
*Progressive Policy Institute, September 24, 2008, and own estimations. 
If the bailout programmes do not help quickly, one might think of an old instrument, 
namely debt relief, to overcome the problem. The question is if bailing out broke 
countries is a remedy for the tilt or rather part or even a cause of the problem. 
The rationale of debt relief 
There are three efficiency arguments for the provision of debt relief. The first is the so 
called ‘debt overhang’. It has been stated that highly indebted countries benefit very little, 
if ever, from the returns on any additional investment because of the debt service 
obligation. Large debt obligations can be seen as a high tax on investment, policy reforms 
and development, because a significant part of the gains from economic adjustment 
would go to foreign creditors and not to the country itself. Creditors should therefore 
offer debt relief to countries with large stocks of external debt in order to reduce future 
debt obligations. This would increase the share of any marginal gains from economic 
adjustments that goes to the debtor country and create incentives to make these 
adjustments. This strategy could end up in a win-win-situation by not only easing the 
debt burden of debtors but also increasing future repayments to the creditors. 
Secondly, debt relief may have a stimulating effect on investment and economic 
development. The clincher with respect to the resource position of low-income countries 
and therefore to the capacity to pay their obligations and to invest, is still the net resource 
transfer from donors, including aid. Since the reduction of multilateral debt is partly 
financed by bilateral donors (e.g. through their contributions to multilateral funds), and 
these contributions usually come from the same political reservoir, namely the donors’ 
aid budget, there might be a trade-off between debt relief and official development 
assistance. 
The third rationale for debt relief could follow different lines. If an individual country’s 
bankruptcy causes investors to withdraw their capital from other countries with similar 
but not identical problems, the crisis cascades and even countries without the structural 
problems of the country in question are endangered. 
The determinants of debt relief 
Despite these arguments, past debt relief programs have been rather ineffective. The 
determinants of debt relief obviously deviate from economic reasoning. It can be argued 
that neither absolute poverty nor lack of access to foreign exchange (through exports) 
have been criteria in allocating ODA debt relief and pure grants. If politicians and 
international bureaucrats realise that default risks become very high, they prefer to grant 
debt relief in order to conceal their imprudent past lending and to “sell” the renunciation 
of funds as an innovative poverty reduction measure, especially if lobbying by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in favour of debt relief increases their chances of 
obtaining positive public credit for the delivered debt relief. According to this reasoning, 
politicians in donor countries do not like to admit policy errors. Politically rational 
governments in creditor countries would find arguments for further debt relief measures. 
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Thus, debt relief is driven by path dependence. Debt relief then is a politically cheap, but 
economically expensive form of publicly visible development policy. 
In our study, we analysed the determinants of debt relief in more than 100 developing 
countries between the mid-1990s and 2004. On the one hand, our findings confirm the 
political rationale outlined above but are – on the other hand – somehow encouraging, as 
creditor governments indeed seem to learn. The most striking result for the 1990s is the 
strong path dependence of debt relief. At the beginning of the 21st century, this pattern 
has changed. Path dependence, though still visible to some extent, is much weaker in the 
period 2000-2004. In this period, the institutional quality became more relevant, in 
particular the change in institutional quality. The provision of debt relief in recent years 
seems to follow some prudential rules and to be conditioned on relatively decent policies 
rather than only the level of indebtedness and the amount of previous debt forgiveness. 
The results also suggest that recent debt relief has been provided in favour of poor 
countries that have shown improvements in their governance quality, of course not 
neglecting the level of indebtedness and the amount of debt relief granted in the 1990s 
(see table 2). 
Table 2: Determinants of debt relief 1995 – 2004 
Determinant  Period 1995 - 1999  Period 2000 - 2004 
Past debt relief  Positive and highly significant Positive and weakly 
significant 
Poverty  Positive and significant  Positive and highly significant
Institutions  No correlation  Positive and significant 
Change in institutions  n.a.  Positive and significant 
Controls  No significant correlation  No significant correlation 
These results suggest that the discussion of institutions in development, which has its 
roots in academic circles and has been transferred into the international development 
organisations, has not only produced political statements but also some policy measures. 
Along these lines, a debt relief for emerging economies in the current situation may also 
be based on economic rather than on political rationality. 
Conclusions 
The history of debt relief is characterised by political failure and short-term thinking. 
Consequently, so far debt relief did not deliver promising results. Neither the economic 
performance nor the governance quality has increased. Analysing the determinants of 
debt relief programs in the 1990s, we derive a standard result of international political 
economy. Governments of creditor countries have granted debt relief rather because of 
political than of economic reasoning. In particular, we can confirm a path dependence 
with respect to debt relief granted. 
However, the determinants of debt relief for highly indebted poor countries have changed 
slightly, which indicates learning processes in creditor countries. Thus, recent debt relief 
programs since 2000 seem to be positively influenced by economic and institutional 
development as well as the results of the latest research on the role of institutions for 
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growth and development. This may indeed be the result of a successful learning process 
of donor countries’ governments and a slight change in the allocation pattern of debt 
relief along with the introduction of some sensible criteria during the last decade. 
Analysing debt forgiveness within the framework of the Enhanced HIPC initiative, one 
can find a relation between debt relief and enhanced institutional quality. This is a very 
promising sign for the future. 
As a consequence of the dramatic financial crisis the world has changed. The global 
financial system will never be the same. Traditional instruments, certain financial 
products and regulations will disappear. A new order is requested, though yet to be 
developed. The determined reaction of the IMF and national governments has 
undoubtedly helped securing the savings of many people and has been necessary to 
prevent a collapse of the banking sector and whole economies. However, the question 
remains if bailing out broke countries and banks will stabilise the financial markets and 
fiscal policies in the future or rather set further incentives for irresponsible lending, 
unsound policies and business practices. Much depends on the application of the rule to 
tie debt relief to good governance for helping the emerging countries. 
 
Subramanian: India’s credit crunch conundrum 
10 November 2008 
The Indian variant of the credit crunch is different. This column outlines potential means 
of expanding India’s credit supply. Simply cutting interest rates will not suffice.  
How can India be facing credit crunch if credit continues to grow at a torrid 30%? Yet, it 
is undeniable that call rates have risen sharply to double-digit levels. What is going on? 
And how should monetary policy respond? 
First, distinguish the Indian phenomenon from what we have seen in Western credit 
markets. In the latter, the crisis was primarily about a lack of confidence in the financial 
system and the evaporation of trust between agents because of uncertainty about exposure 
to mortgage-related assets. In short, the problem was a diminished supply of credit. Even 
the inability of firms to raise capital in the commercial paper market similarly reflected 
an unwillingness of banks and the public to supply finance to firms that were believed to 
be exposed to toxic assets. 
The Indian variant is somewhat different. The private sector’s funding from foreign 
sources and from the non-bank public (through the issuance of bonds and raising equity) 
has dried up because of combination of capital outflows and declining share prices. In 
2007/08, for example, 40% of funds available to Indian industry were raised through 
external commercial borrowings and new equity issues. Funding for Indian companies 
that have borrowed abroad has also dried up because of trouble in foreign credit markets, 
forcing these companies to turn to the domestic banking system for credit. And firms’ 
own funding has declined as profits have headed south. 
This reduced supply of non-bank and foreign funding has led the private sector to turn to 
banks to make up this shortfall: that is, there has been a sharp increase in the demand for 
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domestic bank credit. Of course, with banks lending to finance the losses of oil 
companies, there has been an additional squeeze (crowding out) of credit to the private 
sector as a result of pre-emption of bank credit by the government. 
So, the answer is yes, there is a credit crunch despite torrid credit growth because the 
demand for credit has gone up. Price (the call interest rate), not quantity, is the right 
signal. 
The policy question then is – how can this additional credit be provided to the private 
sector? Or to put it in accounting terms – how can the aggregate size of the balance sheet 
of the banking system as a whole be increased? 
Five sources of credit 
Simple macroeconomic accounting suggests that additional supply of credit can come 
from five sources: government, the Reserve Bank of India, firms’ own profits, the non-
bank public, and abroad. 
If the government could reduce its deficit, more of the existing credit could be made 
available for the private sector. With oil prices declining, this channel should, unless the 
government increases its deficit for other reasons, start kicking in. 
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) could also facilitate greater credit supply by reducing 
the cash reserve ratio, allowing banks to reduce their balances at the RBI and to make 
them available to the private sector. The RBI has been using this policy tool vigorously 
and perhaps will, and should, continue doing so. Of course, there is a natural floor to the 
cash reserve ratio stemming from prudential considerations. Cutting the statutory 
liquidity ratio is more complicated. It makes additional resources available to the private 
sector only if the non-bank public is willing to hold government paper in its portfolio. If 
the result of cutting statutory liquidity ratios leads to a re-allocation of these bonds within 
the financial sector, there are no extra resources from the banking system as a whole. 
Can the non-bank public augment the supply of credit? Only if it is willing to hold more 
bank deposits, which the banks would lend to the private sector. But this would require 
making bank deposits more attractive and hence an increase in interest rates. Indeed, 
some banks have been attempting to raise deposit rates to attract customers. 
How can the rest of the world augment credit? Increases in remittances and in NRI 
deposits into the Indian banking system could help achieve this. But again this would 
require making the holding of deposits more attractive, entailing raising interest rates and 
avoiding the risk of depreciation. 
The interest rate dilemma 
Here then is the dilemma for interest rate policy. Reducing interest rates can help address 
the current credit crunch in a number of ways. First, by reducing the cost of bank’s 
funding and raising their spreads, it would increase bank profitability. Second, it could 
also help corporate profitability which has two positive effects: by increasing the own 
source of funding (profits) it reduces firms’ demand for bank credit and by improving the 
asset quality of banks it frees up resources to expand credit. Finally, lower rates helping 
corporate profitability could attract foreign capital into the equity market. This would 
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again, for the reasons discussed above, alleviate the credit crunch by increasing non-bank 
funding of firms and hence reducing their demand for bank credit. 
On the other hand, lowering rates would reduce remittances and NRI inflows, which are 
known to be interest-sensitive. It could also lead the public to take money out of the 
banking system to put in other assets or hold it as cash. Some money could also find its 
way abroad through direct and indirect (for example, trade) channels. All of these would 
reduce the supply of credit, aggravating the credit crunch. 
The policy implications are then clear for alleviating the ongoing credit squeeze. 
Unambiguous ways of helping would be to reduce government claims on credit and 
reducing the cash reserve ratio so that implicitly the central bank finances credit creation. 
On the other hand, cutting interest rates does not have an unambiguously positive effect. 
Policy makers should take note of that. Whoever said that conducting monetary policy 
would be easy? 






Subramanian: Preserving financial sector confidence, not monetary 
easing, is key 
1 November 2008 
Financially integrated India has been hit by the financial contagion. This column 
explains what Indian policymakers need to do in order to restore confidence in the 
financial system and avoid the risks of easing monetary policies. The time has come for 
the Reserve Bank of India to use its foreign exchange reserves to inject liquidity into the 
financial system. 
“Brand India” is being buffeted by the global financial crisis. India has been more 
financially integrated than was generally supposed, and hence more affected by financial 
contagion than expected. The stakes are high because policy hesitancy or missteps could 
turn mild contagion into virulent disease. 
One lesson that countries are learning is that during a crisis of confidence, policy-makers 
have to get ahead of the curve in order to reassure markets. Governments have discovered 
the hard way that responses that are reactive, piecemeal, and uncoordinated risk 
undermining rather than adding to confidence. A formidable policy arsenal needs to be 
deployed to have any chance of restoring stability. In western financial markets 
confidence is returning, slowly, only after a series of ambitious actions, boldly initiated 
by the UK and then followed by Europe and the US, as many economists advocated. 
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Between last week’s actions to shore up the financial system and Monday’s cut in interest 
rates, Indian policymakers can legitimately claim to have risen to the challenge. But will 
these actions be enough? What more will be necessary? 
Broadly, more will need to be done on the financial sector side in order to do less on the 
monetary policy side. Put differently, if confidence in the financial system is not restored, 
the easing, even substantial easing, of monetary policies that we have recently seen may 
not have enough traction, and may even entail risks. 
First and foremost, the plight of individual financial institutions should be addressed. A 
benchmark should be that no Indian bank should have credit default swap (CDS) spreads 
exceeding 300 or so basis points. It is likely that perilously elevated CDS spreads reflect 
problems with foreign funding. So, high on the action list would be to provide foreign 
currency resources from the Reserve Bank of India’s reserves. The RBI’s liquidity 
injections operations that have so far been in rupees need to be expanded to foreign 
currency. 
One way to do this would be to hold foreign currency auctions for all domestic financial 
institutions to meet either their own needs or those of their corporate clients that face 
foreign currency funding pressures. The Fed and ECB responded to dollar shortages in 
Europe through extensive swap operations that made available enormous lines of dollar 
credit in European markets. The RBI foreign currency auctions should be held quickly 
and flexibly so that liquidity can virtually be provided on tap. The RBI’s foreign 
exchange reserves have been accumulated for rainy days, and these are not just rainy but 
stormy days, justifying their liberal use today. 
If these measures prove inadequate, the government may need to step in to guarantee the 
foreign-currency debt of domestic financial institutions. This may need to be 
complemented with government re-capitalisation, especially if private banks are unable 
to raise capital from private sources within a very short period of time. India just cannot 
afford to have financial institutions that are flashing amber or red in these times. 
Moving beyond individual institutions, and given the crisis of confidence, it may be 
worth requiring all banks to raise their capital adequacy ratio (CAR) to about 15-18%, 
within a short period. If meeting this higher CAR requires additional government capital 
injection, that should be seriously considered. Ways could be found for this capital to be 
returned to the government once the crisis subsides. If all banks were seen to be meeting 
this high standard, it could have a significant impact in reassuring markets. The rationale 
for the higher ratio, apart from the confidence boosting impact, is the more substantive 
one that banks’ non-performing assets are bound to rise as the economy weakens. An 
apparently cushion-providing 15% CAR today could very easily become an 8% CAR 
within a short space of time. 
Next, it might be worth imposing additional transparency requirements on all the major 
banks to reassure investors and the public. Uncertainty in this environment leads to 
markets believing the worst. All banks should therefore be required to immediately 
clarify and publish key variables of concern, including foreign currency exposure, 
especially on the liability side, the extent and sources of wholesale funding, and exposure 
to derivatives and other such instruments. A strong transparency effort, under the RBI’s 
supervision, could have an important reassuring function. 
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Finally, what about exchange rate and monetary policies? On the former, the RBI should 
refrain from foreign exchange intervention, which at the moment sends contradictory 
signals because it sucks out liquidity at the very time that the RBI is pumping enormous 
amounts of liquidity back into the economy. Far better to use the RBI’s foreign exchange 
reserves to meet the foreign funding requirements of domestic financial institutions rather 
than to defend some level for the rupee. 
On monetary policy, the RBI has been doing the juggling act of easing interest rates and 
injecting rupee liquidity, on the one hand, while trying to encourage capital inflows and 
discourage outflows through a variety of measures such as raising interest rates on 
foreign currency deposits. Make no mistake that there is an inherent tension, even plain 
contradiction, between these actions, which the RBI has been able to avoid because 
residents, unlike foreign investors, are not fleeing rupee assets. The risk of aggressive 
easing is that it might trigger the move away from rupee holdings, at a time when 
confidence in the rupee is so shaky, when current and prospective depreciation would 
offset the favourable effects on inflation from declines in commodity prices, and when 
credit is still growing at a whopping 30%. It is worth noting that while the repo rate has 
been cut to 8%, the call rate — which reflects market conditions — is at 6%, below CPI 
inflation, resulting in negative real interest rates. 
A loss of confidence in the rupee is an outcome devoutly to be avoided. At this juncture, 
restoring confidence in individual financial institutions and the financial system is key to 
achieving that objective and to avoid unreasonably burdening monetary policy. 
“Brand India” has come to connote not just rapid growth but a reasonable ability of 
policymakers to respond to challenges. Of course, this response will be assessed by 
outcomes. But critical to this assessment will be whether processes for arriving at 
outcomes are effective, and specifically, whether all concerned institutions play their 
rightful roles and maintain their credibility. “Brand India” must pass all these tests. 




Muellbauer: The folly of the central banks of Europe 
27 October 2008 
The current financial crisis will probably lead to an unnecessarily deep recession. This 
column suggests that European central banks, misguided by outdated econometric 
models, should have cut rates faster and deeper in a coordinated fashion. They should 
now scrap these models and agree on a large, coordinated cut of 2 percentage points. 
When future economic historians look back to trace the triggers for the October 2008 
financial panic and the unnecessarily severe recession of 2009, they will likely put their 
fingers on two. 
• The failure to keep Lehman Bros functioning as a going concern. 
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• The failure of the ECB and the Bank of England to use their interest rate setting 
firepower to organise a substantial globally co-ordinated interest rate cut (the 8 
October 2008 cut was too timid). 
Economics ministries, not central banks, demonstrated decisiveness 
A convincing argument for independent central banks adopting an inflation targeting 
framework is that, where central banks are forward looking and responsive, they should 
be able to avoid deflationary slumps. The markets then should expect the central banks to 
assess clearly the global economic situation and the downside risks, and take decisive 
action. Instead, it was the European finance ministries, via the bank refinancing packages 
announced between October 8th and 14th, that demonstrated their far greater 
understanding of the risks involved. They acted in a timely and potentially effective 
internationally co-ordinated manner. It was less effective because the central banks failed 
to follow up their initial too small interest rate cut. They were persuaded into a co-
ordinated half point interest rate cut on October 8th. The central banks then sat on their 
hands, despite a daily barrage of deflationary news. 
Emerging markets and the deflationary firestorm 
By October 16th, the impact on emerging markets of the deflationary firestorm, in 
consequence of the collapse in global growth and in commodity prices, had become all 
too apparent. History shows that the resulting combination of financial and currency 
crises leaves long-lasting damage in lost output, bankruptcies and bad debts that handicap 
future recoveries. There is little chance of a significant commodity price recovery from 
recent levels in the next six months. The reason is that instead of stabilising the global 
economy, emerging market demand, such as China’s, is falling, and thus amplifying the 
shock. As I pointed out at the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Roundtable (Sept 
30th), a straightforward piece of economics underlies this idea. While consumer spending 
is closely linked with the level of income, investment is more driven by growth. It is the 
huge share of investment in national output in emerging economies that makes them, and 
their commodity demands, highly sensitive to the global slowdown. 
The dual effect of the depreciation of emerging markets’ currencies and the massive falls 
in commodity prices will induce the largest negative shock to the price level in developed 
economies since WWII. Moreover, collapsing export demand and rapidly rising 
unemployment will add domestic deflationary pressure. The deflation will in part be 
offset by the improvement in the terms of trade for the developed countries, and 
eventually also by fiscal measures undertaken to boost demand. However, with the rise in 
food and energy prices accounting for approximately 80% of the rise in inflation in 2007-
2008 in most European countries, the coming collapse of inflation in 2009 should have 
been obvious to every central banker. 
What could have been? 
As late as October 21st, the central banks of Europe still had an opportunity for credible 
and confidence boosting action on interest rates. A short-term rise in global stock markets 
gave a window for action which would not have been seen as a ‘too little, too late’ fire-
fighting reaction to market panic. An accompanying statement could have noted the 
dramatic shift in the inflation outlook. It could have acknowledged that, in effect, 
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monetary policy had involuntarily tightened with falling inflation expectations raising 
real interest rates. Policy had already been tightened through raised market interest rates 
paid by households and firms, due to widened spreads under the credit crunch. 
Would a co-ordinated 1% cut, accompanied by the promise of decisive and timely further 
action in the light of rapidly evolving news, have worked to halt the panic? Sceptics, 
perhaps including some in the central banks, were doubtful, but quite wrong. 
The most obvious impact of a cut would have been to raise the profit outlook of private 
sector banks in every country. This would have boosted the flow of investors’ funds to 
the sector and raised banks’ share prices, thereby enhancing their ability to lend and 
replenishing trust of depositors and in the interbank market. The result would have 
greatly amplified the benefits of the earlier refinancing operation of the ministries of 
finance, and lowered money market and credit spreads. 
Some of the cut in policy rates would have lowered borrowing rates faced by hard-
pressed households and firms, though more gradually for some types of debt. Where 
floating rate debt dominates (e.g. the UK), cash flow effects on consumer spending are 
large. In research (with Janine Aron and Anthony Murphy) summarised in my Jackson 
Hole paper of 2007, this effect was estimated for UK consumption. With credit now so 
restricted and debt levels so high, the size of the impact on spending of a cut in borrowing 
rates is larger than ever. Thus, had the policy rate fallen, the UK might well have 
experienced a less severe recession than Germany, which is far more exposed to the 
slump in exports of capital goods. 
Currency crises in emerging markets 
Another benefit would have been to ameliorate currency crises in emerging markets and 
smaller countries such as Denmark. Their exchange rates depend in part on interest rate 
spreads with the major currencies. A co-ordinated global interest rate cut would have 
widened spreads without these countries having to raise rates to support their currencies 
in the face of severe recessions. Moreover, as late as October 21st, many other central 
banks would have felt able to join a co-ordinated cut without exposing their currencies. 
More generally, the reduction in policy rates, and the prospect of more to follow, would 
have reduced returns on safe assets, such as government bonds, and induced investors at 
the margin to rebalance towards riskier assets, such as equity and corporate debt. The rise 
in such asset prices would eventually have helped to restore collateral values, slowing the 
spiral of rising bankruptcies. 
Following the panic beginning on October 22nd, the task of restoring confidence is far 
harder. With asset prices so much lower, the bad loan position of the banking system 
looks worse, and with it, the potential burden on tax payers. The damage for the UK 
looks particularly severe, with its debt and housing market vulnerability - reflected in the 
sudden decline in Sterling and in Treasury gilt prices. 
Conclusion: Scrap the models and agree on a big, coordinated rate cut. 
Why Europe’s key central banks made this potentially catastrophic error is a long story. 
One reason, however, rests in their econometric models, based on fashionable but 
outdated economic theory. 
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It is deeply ironic that central bankers who rightly have made much of the moral hazard 
of bailing out private bankers, have adopted central bank models excluding channels for 
real world moral hazard and credit crunches. These models are overdue for the scrap 
heap. Central banks making policy without functioning models are like aeroplanes flying 
without radar, and the consequences are now obvious. 
They now have a last chance to undo the damage of last week. They need to put aside 
short-term currency wobbles, focus on the big picture and surprise the markets with a 
much larger cut, probably of 2 percentage points. If international co-ordination is now 
harder to achieve, then leadership by the ECB and the Bank of England will have to 
suffice. 
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Gros and Micossi: Crisis management tools for the euro-area 
30 September 2008  
Europe’s largest banks are highly leveraged and thus vulnerable, as Fortis showed. But 
some of these banks are both too large to fail and too big to be rescued by a single 
government. The EU should: (1) urgently pass legislation to cover banks with significant 
cross-border presence and empower the ECB to provide direct support, and (2) create an 
EU-level rescue fund managed by an existing institution like the European Investment 
Bank.  
Europe’s universal banks were supposed to be immune to the fallout from the subprime 
crisis.  
We now discover that any financial institution – universal bank or not – is vulnerable if 
its leverage is high enough – as is the case for Europe’s largest banks. As we pointed out 
10 days ago, Europe’s banks are too big to fail but also too big to be rescued by any 
single government. The unfolding of Fortis illustrates vividly the weaknesses and hurdles 
of raising adequate defenses against a fully-fledged banking crisis in the euro-area. This 
is an area where urgent EU action is needed. 
In the case of Fortis, no European solution was possible. The ECB can only provide 
liquidity against collateral to keep the money market functioning. It has no powers to 
resolve a solvency crisis. In the absence of a European Treasury, such operations can 
only be done by national authorities. But national authorities tend to think nationally and 
are naturally reluctant to pay for the rescue of banks abroad. In the case of Fortis it was 
relatively easy to cut the bank into three pieces, but this would be more difficult with 
other large EU banking groups. 
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Foreign affiliates and banking crises 
A key difficulty is that large European banks typically have subsidiaries – separate legal 
entities – with separate balance sheets in every country where they operate. However, 
asset and liability management is centralized. Cash and liquidity reserves are also 
managed centrally and these assets may be ordered back to the mother-company at times 
of stress. In such cases, subsidiaries receive paper which can become worthless if the 
bank becomes insolvent.  
Given this, burden sharing among national treasuries is controversial in cases of bank 
failure. Disputes can delay timely decisions. Issues surrounding the equal treatment of 
creditors and depositors in the different countries can add layers of complexity. 
In the case of Fortis, the three governments – Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourgish – 
choose to inject capital into the subsidiaries on their territory, thus effectively creating 3 
separte, state-owned banks. This is no doubt a harbinger of the Balkan-isation of the EU 
banking system that might spread like a forest fire unless decisive action is taken 
immediately.  
EU policy makers need to take two steps quickly: 
• First, a new EU ‘Statute of Union’ for chartered banks should be established for 
banks in the EU/euro-area with “significant” operations in more than one member 
state. This could be done by Regulation adopted by the Council of Ministers.    
These banks would be subject to fully consolidated capital requirements and supervision. 
In exchange, they would have direct access to ECB liquidity support – support they could 
count on even in case of a severe, bank-specific crisis. By the same legislative act, a new 
supervisory authority should be created in Frankfurt – preferably at the ECB – but in any 
case it should be legally obliged to cooperate fully with the ECB in all its activities. 
• Second, an EU-level contingency fund for rescue operations should be created at 
the European investment bank (EIB).  
The EIB already is a public agency and issues publicly guaranteed bond to finance its 
operations. Its Board of Governors is made up of the ministers of finance of all EU 
members and they hold the purse strings. Given that this infrastructure is already in place, 
the rescue fund could be operative within weeks. Policy makers only need to give the EIB 
the power to take equity stakes in financial institutions under clearly defined 
circumstances. When these circumstances materialize, however, the EIB should have full 
power to act without further government interference, issuing (guaranteed) bonds as 
required to finance the operation.  
One could even go a step further. The EIB and/or ECB could be allowed to act 
preventively to stop contagion, or at least make it less likely. They could do this by 
forcing highly leveraged EU banks with significant cross border operations to recapitalize 
themselves or accept public funds. For instance, a capital injection of €280 billion would 
be sufficient to reduce the leverage ratio of the 10 largest euro area banks from its current 
value of 33 to below 20. This would underpin confidence and thus reduce the risk of 
massive liquidity withdrawals by depositors. Such an investment could be unwound once 
distressed conditions in financial markets started to ease. 
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Of course, support by the EIB must come with strings attached to preserve the value of 
the public investment and to make sure those who mismanaged pay the consequences. 
Thus, the price paid for the (preferred equity) public sector stake should fully protect the 
value of the investment, and management should be changed. Enhanced controls and 
supervisory procedures should be envisaged during the period of EIB support. 
Conclusion 
We are living in extraordinary times. The uncertainty created by the US Congress's 
rejection of the Paulson Plan will render the market environment even more forbidding 
for European banks. Policy makers in Europe cannot continue to muddle through. They 
need to rise to the occasion. The implementation of these simple proposals would put 
them ahead of events in the unfolding crisis.  
Being behind the curve is extremely costly – a fact that US taxpayers have discovered in 
a spectacular and exceedingly expensive manner over the past two weeks. 
Editors' note: This is an updated version of a column that appeared today in the Financial 
Times newspaper, 30 September 2008. 
 
Di Noia: A proposal on financial regulation in Europe for the next 
European Council 
20 October 2008 
The current crisis has exposed the poor organisation of financial supervisory 
responsibilities, as central banks, EU ministers, and treasury authorities fought to 
respond appropriately. This column argues for the reorganisation of the European 
financial regulatory apparatus using a “four peaks” approach that horizontally divides 
responsibilities according to objectives. 
World leaders, after a false start, have made decisions that at least give us a chance of 
getting past this crisis. Now is the time to start thinking about how to reduce the risk of 
finding ourselves in the same situation in the future. 
Many troubled intermediaries violated no rule or regulation. It is certainly right to replace 
greedy managers. The same decision should be taken for those responsible for designing 
the wrong rules for bank capital, rating agencies, and accounting standards. The same 
approach should be taken for supervision: those who did not abide by the rules must be 
severely punished, along with those who were not able to supervise. 
Who is in charge? 
The crisis calls into question the efficacy of both the “horizontal” allocation of 
competencies among different authorities (fragmentation in the US or the single regulator 
in many EU countries) and the “vertical” distribution of competencies, where only 
national entities appear to be in charge of supervision (in the US there is a mix of federal 
and state competencies on banks while only states supervise insurance; in Europe, 
lacking a political and fiscal union, the agencies are basically all at the member state 
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level). The central banks’ role swings from monetary policy to lender of last resort to 
policy-maker, as we have observed over the last year and more so in the past few weeks. 
In the beginning, UK central bankers panicked in the face of a textbook bank run. Then, 
all authorities hysterically moved to restrict short selling. Late night meeting of EU 
ministers to bail out transnational banks, frantic decisions across Europe to raise deposit 
insurance coverage beyond credible levels, and guarantees for all interbank loans 
followed. Looking at the ways such policies have been used for recent bailouts has raised 
doubts about their efficacy. All the traditional instruments have been exploited 
(sometimes in a creative way or mixed together): direct government intervention, central 
bank intervention, deposit insurance, and other guarantees. All kinds of intermediaries are 
involved: commercial and investment banks, investment and hedge funds, investment 
firms, and insurance firms. The traditional three-way division of the financial system into 
banks, capital markets, and insurance has been finally defeated by the events. 
The huge need for fresh capital (through direct injection of capital or loans, the purchase 
of toxic assets, new rules on deposit insurance, etc.) remind us of a simple concept: 
bailouts must ultimately be the responsibility of the government, only possibly assisted 
by the authority and the central bank (which are independent agencies). On the contrary, 
bail out decisions are often taken by central banks, as lenders of last resort, or competent 
authorities (sometimes central banks), who should have been, on the contrary, 
supervising the entity so that it did not go bankrupt. Furthermore, no lender of last resort 
has the access to the money needed for direct intervention in extreme cases: the net result 
of the Fed’s intervention in the AIG case is its loss of independence from the US 
Treasury. 
Central banks and competent authorities already have too many conflicts of interest in 
carrying out different objectives (macroeconomic stability, prudential supervision, 
investor protection or competition). They are worse if those objectives are those of the 
policy maker (national interest, bailing-out of a big intermediary). Furthermore, national 
and international coordination among authorities is slow and cumbersome, with hundreds 
of bilateral and multilateral memoranda of understanding or colleges of supervisors on 
financial conglomerates. The Level 3 Committees (Cebs, Cesr and Ceiops), in spite of 
excellent but limited permanent staff, depend wholly on their constituent authorities and 
have rigidly tripartite competence (banks, securities and insurance) according to an 
obsolescent framework. 
In spite of progress in recent years, the system is still unable to effectively respond to the 
challenges of a largely integrated market. This has two regrettable consequences. It offers 
inadequate protection for investors and citizens (taxpayers) and it creates an extra 
regulatory burden entailing a loss of competitiveness for financial industry. 
It is too early for one (or more) central regulator (s) and supervisor (s) at the European 
level. Lacking a political union, still too many different rules exist (commercial codes, 
company laws, failure procedures, corporate governance) and policy-makers and 
taxpayers remain national. But is certainly too late to keep only national authorities. 
Reorganising financial supervision into four peaks 
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Something can be done. A feasible solution, already suggested some years ago24 and 
identified as the optimal long-term regulatory structure by the Paulson report25, is the 
four-peak model (see Figure 1). Regulation and supervision should be arranged 
horizontally by objective – separate agencies should be in charge of macroeconomic 
stability, microeconomic stability, investor protection and competition for all 
intermediaries including insurers. Each of these objectives should also have a federal 
structure, with a structure similar to the one established for the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB). 
Figure 1 The proposal: a New European System of Financial Regulation 
                                                 
24 Di Noia e Di Giorgio (1999), Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks 
be Given to Different Agencies, International Finance; Di Giorgio e Di Noia (2001), 
Financial Regulation and Supervision in the Euro Area: A Four-Peak Proposal. 




The ESCB should have responsibility for macrostability issues and lending of last resort 
throughout the EU – not just the Euro area, so to avoid awkward meetings with UK 
fellows. 
Then a European System of Prudential Supervisors should be established, using possibly 
the expertise of the ECB, national central banks, Cebs and Ceiops. The system should 
denote a central entity in charge of the prudential regulation of all intermediaries and of 
the coordination of the national authorities, possibly designed by objective in each 
country. The national prudential supervision authorities should be in charge of all 
supervision but not regulation. 
The third peak should be a European System for Investor Protection. The structure should 
be similar as above. A central entity, exploiting Cesr expertise, should be in charge of all 
regulation of conduct-of-business rules of all intermediaries, including insurance and 
pension funds, transparency of all financial products (from banking deposit to insurance 
contracts), and issuers and markets. Some supervision should be exercised in case of 
multinational intermediaries or issuers. National authorities should focus only on 
supervision. 
The fourth peak, that of competition, already exists with a central entity (DG 
Competition) supervising relevant operations while national authorities supervise smaller 
operations. 
Apart from this vertical form of coordination, cooperation would be also desirable 
horizontally, at both the European and national levels. This coordination, and resolution 
of eventual controversies could be provided by special Commissions for the Supervision 
of the Financial System established at the EU Council Level (with the Commission, too) 
and at national treasuries. 
How to implement it? Many difficulties are obvious. Treaty changes are complicated (but 
why not explore the route of intergovernmental agreements?). Commission or EU 
regulation must be carefully analysed, as well as the possibility offered to the Council by 
Article 352 (ex Article 308 TEC) of the Treaty.26 The opposition of existing central bank 
and national supervisors to some centralisation and redesign of competencies at national 
level is enormous. 
The existing crisis offers the (hopefully last!) occasion to act in order to increase the 
efficacy of financial supervision, simplifying the complex architecture of existing 
authorities. In the US, Secretary Henry Paulson did not dare to put a single word of his 
Blueprint in the TARP. And in Europe? The "financial crisis" cell27 created by the 
European Council two days ago is not sufficient; let's do something more! 
                                                 
26 If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies 
defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the 
Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European 






Pagano: The European response to the crisis: Not quite there yet 
17 October 2008 
EU leaders have agreed on a bail-out plan but much is still unknown about its details. 
How will governments act as equity shareholders? Who will deal with cross-border 
banks? This column discusses the need for a Euro-area bank supervisory authority, as 
financial integration has outpaced regulatory integration. 
At last, European countries appear to have realised that the solvency problem at the heart 
of the current crisis goes well beyond their national borders and requires cooperation. 
After a week of collapsing stock markets and rising fear of widespread bank defaults, the 
leaders of the 15 euro-zone countries have reached an agreement on a plan that follows 
the broad outline of the British bail-out plan – governments will buy equity stakes in 
banks and will guarantee new borrowing to unblock the interbank market. Together with 
the announcement that the ECB will create an unsecured lending facility to purchase 
commercial paper by banks, this plan has finally managed to instil some confidence into 
the markets, as witnessed by the immediate jump of stock prices. 
Devil in the details 
Of course, while the broad lines of these interventions are clear, much is still unknown 
about their detailed design and implementation – and this is a case where the devil is in 
the details. How will each government determine the equity stakes to be bought in 
distressed banks? Clearly, governments should not bail out all banks irrespective of their 
degree of solvency. The same issue arises for the provision of loan guarantees and the 
purchase of commercial paper from banks. Presumably equity injections and loan 
guarantees should be implemented in close cooperation with the relevant banks’ main 
supervisors, as already argued by Javier Suarez.28 
But other “details” are no less important for the long-term outcome of the bail-out. What 
will ensure that these equity injections and the implied partial or total nationalisations of 
European banks will not take us back to the era of widespread state control over banks? 
In the UK, Germany, France and Italy (as well as in the US), governments are pledging 
that they will take equity stakes in the form of preferred shares and that they regard this 
as a temporary investment, to be eventually sold back to the market once the crisis is 
over. But are such pledges common to all of the Euro-area governments? And in the 
countries where governments made them, what guarantees that they will be upheld, and 
over which time horizon? 
Governments as passive investors 
A related question is whether governments will behave as passive investors or wield 
some control over the key decisions of the banks that they bail out. Historical experience 
from past crises shows that governments tend to take an active role in controlling the 
                                                 
28 See Javier Suarez, “The Need for an Emergency Bank Debt Insurance Mechanism,” 
CEPR Policy Insight No. 19, March 2008. 
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institutions that they bailed out. This applies, for instance, to the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation created by President Herbert Hoover in 1932 and to the Institute for 
Industrial Reconstruction (IRI) created in Italy during the Great Depression. It also 
applies to the more recent experience of Sweden’s financial crisis in the early 1990s, 
when the government bailed out the country’s banks, replaced their executives, and 
forced mergers among them to strengthen the survivors. But if governments are going to 
have such sweeping control rights, it would be important to indicate clearly how they will 
use them. For instance, will they be entrusted to bank surveillance authorities or will they 
rather stay directly with the governments? 
Put bluntly, what will prevent reverting to a regime where politicians extract huge rents 
from the control of banks or mismanage them, as used to happen in much of Continental 
Europe before the privatisations of the 1980s and 1990s? Clearly, this question is closely 
tied to the credibility of government’s exit as a shareholder. If we go back to a regime 
where politicians can extract control rents from banks, governments will find it hard to 
surrender such control once the crisis is over, as witnessed, for instance, by the fact that 
IRI kept controlling stakes in the largest Italian banks for over half a century after the 
Great Depression. 
The answers to these questions will shape the structure and working of European 
financial markets for a long time. 
Bailing out big, cross-border banks: Create a supra-national authority 
There is also the all-important issue that unfortunately European leaders have completely 
disregarded so far – how to deal with the bail out of large banks with extensive cross-
border activities and subsidiaries. European governments have decided to implement the 
bailout plan at the national level rather than create a common authority to attack the 
problem at a supra-national level. This is probably an efficient solution for most Euro-
area distressed banks, which are small or medium institutions with little or no cross-
border operations. But it is totally inadequate for those few large banks with extensive 
cross-border operations and subsidiaries, whose solvency is crucial for the systemic 
stability of the European credit market. If any of these banks were to experience solvency 
problems, we would need a fast and commonly agreed procedure to determine how the 
governments of the various countries involved should intervene and share the burden of 
the bail-out. 
The best way to face this formidable challenge would probably be to create a supra-
national authority to coordinate the bailout. Of course, designing the rules to determine 
when such an authority should bail out a cross-border bank and how the implied costs are 
to be shared across EU member states is no easy task. One can think of alternative 
sharing rules. For instance, the burden to be paid by each government might be set on the 
basis of the balance sheets, the share of risk-weighted assets, or the share of regulatory 
capital of the various subsidiaries. The design of these rules will have important 
implications for the incentives of the managers of these banks and, most importantly, for 
European taxpayers. But, for all their technical difficulty and political sensitivity, these 
issues can no longer be dodged. If one or more of euro area’s largest cross-border banks 




Set up an embryonic Euro-area bank supervisory authority 
Taking up this challenge would be a golden opportunity to create the embryo of a future 
Euro-area bank supervisory authority, capable of monitoring the risks being taken by the 
few large European banks with large cross-border operations, while leaving the many 
purely national banks of the Euro area under the surveillance of the corresponding 
national supervisors – an idea that has already been repeatedly proposed by Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa.29 Hopefully the crisis will induce governments to recognise that, in its 
current incompleteness, European monetary and financial integration is in a potentially 
unstable situation. We have created a single, integrated financial market where the 
operations of the main players naturally transcend national boundaries. Yet, we have so 
far failed to complement this construction with its natural counterpart – a supra-national 
surveillance authority for Europe’s supra-national banks. This half-way stop is a very 
dangerous one. Precisely because the current situation poses substantial risks for the 
European banking system, it can also become a unique opportunity to secure European 




Rossi: Finance, market, globalisation: a plot against mankind? 
20 November 2008 
Finance, the market and globalisation are at risk of being jointly demonised by the crisis. 
This column argues that the these three elements are neither good nor bad; they are just 
opportunities for individuals, for societies and for economies that must be understood 
and regulated. 
A critical rethinking of finance has been prompted by the present crisis. It is also 
implicating the very notion of the market economy and the globalised form that it has 
taken in recent years. Finance, the market and globalisation are at risk of being jointly 
demonised, including by normally moderate observers of economic affairs. Recollecting 
a few basic arguments in favour of the trio may not be useless at this juncture. 
Finance: instrumentum diaboli? 
At its core, finance is first and foremost a mechanism for shifting purchasing power over 
time. 
Lending is an ancient human activity. Embedded in it is the suspicion of immoral conduct 
on the part of the lender, seen as the one who, for personal profit, either encourages the 
borrower’s spendthrift ways or exploits the borrower’s genuine needs. Which is why in 
some human communities, at certain times in the past but also today (for example in the 
                                                 
29 See Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, “Europe Needs a Single Financial Rulebook,” 
Financial Times, 11 December 2007, p. 13. 
60 
 
Islamic world), charging interest on money loaned was/is forbidden by either law or 
religion. 
The very concept of money was probably devised at the dawn of humanity along with 
that of credit, and perhaps even at its service, as a means of transferring spending power 
over time by detaching it from any specific physical good. Money flanked and possibly 
surpassed credit as a source of negative symbols in the popular imagination. 
Yet money and credit are part of what has enabled human beings to free themselves from 
the barbarism of immanence, from the savagery of a life ruled by the consumption for 
survival, which is spent in an instant. They teach man to think about the unfolding of time 
and they do so by appealing to the most powerful of all psychological levers, that of 
desire and need. Learning how to project a desire into the future or to predict a need is a 
fundamental step in evolution. It pushes people to design a method for satisfying future 
desires or needs, and that method is saving. If everyone’s savings is lent to someone else, 
both the personal (if the loan is interest-bearing) and the social utility are augmented, 
because two ends are simultaneously met: that of investors who have in mind their future 
consumption (needs-desires) and that of those who instead require additional immediate 
purchasing power, motivated by the mere urge to consume, but possibly – and this is the 
most socially interesting case – by the desire to increase their own productive capacity, 
and therefore by a plan that is equally far-sighted and future-oriented. 
In a monetary economy, finance – consisting of markets and intermediaries whose job is 
to assure the optimal allocation of resources and risks – is what makes the saving-credit-
investment gears turn. It is one of humanity’s great intellectual achievements. Yet it does 
not enjoy the universal admiration accorded to such other intellectual watersheds as the 
wheel or the number zero. The problem is that everybody can use the wheel and the 
number zero profitably, easily and naturally, while by definition finance creates a conflict 
of interest between two major, and equally deserving, categories: lenders and borrowers. 
The first group will want to see high interest rates and broad guarantees, be they real 
collateral or based on reputation. The second group will want low interest rates and the 
possibility of providing the minimum possible guarantees. 
The unalterable fact that the objectives of these two groups are, at least in part, 
conflicting leads to tensions being inevitably offloaded onto professional intermediaries. 
They always run the risk of being seen as parasites who are happy to sit back and let 
others toil – the people who produce tangible goods and save up to ensure that they can 
retire in peace – before fleecing them mercilessly. It must be acknowledged that the 
victims of this prejudice often do practically nothing to dispel it; indeed, at times their 
conduct seems designed to lend it credence. Evident examples of this are to be found in 
the current global financial crisis. 
Yet, the pivotal role of finance in our lives has never been apparent as in the present 
turbulent days. 
Market: did it fail? 
In this crisis, who has failed, State or Market? I argue that it is more a State failure, but 
by virtue of a paradox. One firmly established conclusion of centuries of economic 
science is that the market must be “regulated” or it is no market. If the government 
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practices absolute laissez-faire, the free competitive market cannot last; it is strangled by 
the monopolistic spirit of operators. This is a law of nature, a sort of economic entropy. 
The pure competitive market is the optimal regime from the standpoint of “buyers,” i.e. 
the community as a whole, but the worst possible for the “sellers,” a powerful minority 
constantly trying hard to oppose it. Such a market is a limiting condition that the public 
authorities may seek to approximate only by virtue of unflagging effort. Clear, 
comprehensive, specific rules are essential; and farsighted, attentive regulators and 
supervisors who cannot be captured by the “sellers” are indispensable. They must 
obviously be efficient: the burden of the regulatory apparatus that inevitably weighs on 
private agents ought to be non-distorting, light and non-bureaucratic. But we cannot do 
without it. 
This forms the essence of what to my mind is the most advanced contribution of 
liberalism to economic thought. Nobody should confuse the great principles of liberty 
with the arbitrariness of complete laissez-faire. Eighty years ago, an Italian champion of 
liberalism in politics and a neatly pro-free-market economist, Luigi Einaudi, wrote: 
The maxim of economic liberalism (is) taking on a third – I would call it a religious – 
meaning. In this interpretation, “economic liberals” are those who accept the maxim of 
laissez-faire, laissez-passer almost as if it were a universal principle. (…) The whole 
subsequent history of the doctrine demonstrates that economic science (…) has nothing to 
do with the religious conception of economic liberalism.30 
The “religious” notion that Einaudi stigmatised so scathingly was resuscitated in the 
second half of last century, as the consequence of a debate on the foundations of public 
economy. The standard theory of regulation as fundamental to the public interest came 
under increasing criticism in the 60s, and gave way to an alternative view, according to 
which markets themselves, or at the most civil courts, can remedy virtually all market 
failures, whereby government is necessarily incompetent, possibly corrupt, and 
“captured” by the very interests it is supposed to regulate, so it can only make things 
worse.31 
The schools of thought backing this view are unquestionably among the high points of 
twentieth-century economics.32 Unfortunately, in the last twenty years, especially in 
                                                 
30 L. Einaudi (1931), “Dei diversi significati del concetto di liberismo economico e dei 
suoi rapporti con quello del liberalismo” in B. Croce and L. Einaudi, Liberismo e 
liberalismo (Ricciardi: Milan and Naples, 1988). English translation in Luigi Einaudi, 
Selected Economic Essays (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke and New York, 2006), pp. 
75-76. 
31 This critique is ordinarily associated with the Chicago School of Law and Economics 
and with such economists as Ronald Coase, George Stigler and Michael Posner. 
32 However, the critique has in turn been criticized both in theory and empirically. On the 
empirical side, in particular, it has been noted the strident contrast between the doctrine’s 
precepts and the reality of a world at once far wealthier and far more extensively 
regulated than a hundred years back. See A. Shleifer (2005), “Understanding 
Regulation,” European Financial Management, 11, 4, pp. 439-451. 
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Britain and America, that view has been used to forge a properly religious dogma, as 
Einaudi understood it, and the policies today under indictment were born of that religion. 
The global financial crisis of these past two years turns the empirical evidence 
overwhelmingly against it. The fundamental problem underlying the crisis has been one 
of rules and their effective application. The laissez-faire fundamentalists may be seen 
paradoxically as State interventionists, in that they wanted the government, allying with 
vested interests, to purposely deprive the competitive market of the air it breathes, 
namely rules and supervision. If this view is correct, by a twist of language we can call it 
a State failure: a failure by inaction, not excessive action, due to the refusal to see, to 
counter or to correct an evident series of market failures. 
Globalisation: the accomplice? 
In the frenzied hunt for a scapegoat during this delicate conjuncture, there has been no 
lack of anathemas proclaimed against globalisation. In past years detractors and 
enthusiasts of globalisation have squared off for some time, but the former are rapidly 
gaining ground since the outbreak of the financial crisis. 
The complaints have tended to be mixed up: the Chinese are waging unfair competition 
against me, the price of petrol has doubled, I find a toxic asset in my securities portfolio 
that I didn’t even know I had, my banks is making trouble about giving me more credit 
since it is unable to procure liquidity in a global market paralysed by mutual distrust. All 
this, most people have been thinking, should have something to do with globalisation. 
The problems are serious and concrete, but the target is too generic to be useful. 
Globalisation involves various aspects: production, trade, finance, migrations, the 
diffusion of ideas and knowledge. These aspects all have one characteristic in common: 
the heightened mobility made possible by the ICT revolution. Technology, then, is the 
prime mover, even if the trade and financial liberalisation policies adopted in many 
countries in the 1990s assisted the process. 
In effect, globalisation and innovative finance are two sides of the same coin minted by 
technological innovation. Because of that deep nature, they are neither good nor bad, they 
just represent an opportunity for individuals, for societies, for economies; they must be 
understood and governed, and cannot be stopped, except at the cost of accepting 
backwardness and marginality. 
Disclaimer: The opinions here expressed are only the author’s and do not involve, in 
particular, the Bank of Italy. An extended version, in Italian, of this note is forthcoming 
in: Il Mulino, 6, 2008. 
 
Gros: Can Europe take care of its own financial crisis? 
12 October 2008  
Europe’s new crisis plan will hopefully stop the panic. This column explores the 
remaining issues – the sharing the burden of transnational bank losses and restarting the 
inter-bank lending market. It suggests a technical change to the guarantees that would 
produce a better result.  
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The title of the press release from the emergency Euro area summit is already muddled – 
“A concerted European action plan of the euro area countries”. The outcome of this 
extraordinary summit was neither an action plan, nor was its contents really specific to 
the euro area countries. 
The limited results of two emergency summits in Europe show how much more difficult 
it is to manage a banking crisis in an area in which there is no fiscal solidarity and even 
limited regulatory convergence. One cannot just translate the lessons from past crises, 
almost all of which were at the national level, to formulate a European response to the 
current financial turmoil. 
One general lesson from past crises is that it is imperative to avoid a generalised bank 
run. Hence it was certainly useful for the euro area summit to state the obvious. European 
governments will not let any systemically important bank fail. This is not news, but its 
restatement should still contribute to reduce the sense of panic prevailing in financial 
markets.  
The real issue in Europe had always been the question of burden sharing – i.e. who pays 
for the losses at a trans-national bank. The case of Fortis does not constitute a good 
precedent, as this issue was not really settled. Moreover, the different pieces of Fortis had 
not yet been tightly integrated, so it was still relatively easy to cut the bank into three 
parts operating (now independently) in the three Benelux countries. This is one way in 
which the current situation is different from national banking crisis.  
While stopping the panic was the immediate priority, the real question is whether Europe 
can now avoid a credit crunch, i.e. a sharp slow down in bank lending. A credit crunch 
would lead to a large loss of output, but this seems unavoidable as banks will now feel 
that they first have to rebuild their capital and their liquidity before they can extend new 
credit.  
This issue is particularly acute for the inter-bank market, and its urgency is by now 
understood by all policy-makers. The inter-bank market has become dysfunctional almost 
everywhere. This market is important because it channels funds from banks that collect 
more deposits than they can usefully lend out to banks that have more credit-worthy 
customers than deposits. If this distribution mechanism does not work, banks with few 
deposits must cut lending (making the second problem much worse). 
How to revive the inter-bank market? 
How to revive the inter-bank market? The crisis has now become so acute that banks 
refuse to lend short even if they have the funding. Eurozone banks prefer to deposit 
surplus funds at the ECB’s low yielding deposit facility rather than to lend to other 
banks. The ECB has de facto become the clearing house for the collateralised inter-bank 
market in the euro area. This part of Europe is working. However, the normal, unsecured, 
inter-bank market remains frozen. 
Breaking the negative feedback: The need for European cooperation 
This issue needs to be tackled, but no country can achieve it on its own since the bulk of 
the inter-bank market is spans national borders. This is another difference between 
national banking crises and the current situation in the euro area. What is needed is a 
coordinated approach, as proposed by the UK – but at the euro area level. The ‘action 
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plan’ of the euro area countries emphasises this point, but it seems to be headed in the 
wrong direction. 
Experience has shown that under present circumstances any additional funds pumped into 
banks will be hoarded rather being lent onward in the inter-bank market. The reason is 
quite simple: banks refuse to lend to other banks even if their counterpart appears to be 
safe because in a world in which other banks do not lend even to safe banks, even safe 
banks can become illiquid very quickly. This negative feedback loop must be broken.  
Even with the vague government guarantee now extended by most governments to all 
systemically important institutions, banks will still remain reluctant to lend to each other 
even if all banks in Europe might now be “government-sponsored entities” as Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac used to be called in the US. Most inter-bank lending in Europe is 
cross-border and a guarantee by a foreign government is never perceived as good as a 
guarantee by the own government. This is yet another difference between a national bank 
crisis and the problems of the euro area.  
Moreover, even if the blanket guarantee for banks in Europe were perceived as rock-
solid, the key point remains that banks all over the world now place an extremely high 
premium on liquidity. This implies that banks are likely to hoard the additional liquidity 
they can obtain through the debt they can issue with a government guarantee. The 
experience of Japan has shown that even pumping enormous amounts of liquidity in the 
banking system may not be sufficient to get credit flowing again. 
A different approach would have been much better. Each government should guarantee 
its own banks reimbursement of inter-bank loans, including cross-border loans, if they are 
to a bank from another country that participates in this scheme. Thus this guarantee 
scheme would apply to the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. This is an important 
difference from the current thinking to guarantee the liabilities of banks. Guaranteeing 
their liabilities makes funding easier, but as argued above, is no guarantee that credit 
actually increases. 
The guarantee for inter-bank lending proposed here would presumably be valid for a 
limited time and governments could charge appropriate fees (as would also be the case in 
the guarantee of banks’ liabilities contained in the euro area approach). But given current 
levels of the cost of protection against counterparty default in the banking system, this fee 
could be substantial enough to provide a comfortable insurance premium for the 
protection of tax payers without choking off the market. 
The objection of (national) finance ministers will of course be that this exposes them to a 
risk that originates potentially in another jurisdiction. In reality this risk will be quite 
limited because the euro area leaders also decided to shore up their large banks and 
prevent bank failures.  
Moreover, losses from housing related activities seem relatively minor in Europe (except 
Spain and Ireland). This implies that the key issue in Europe is not how to make up 
massive losses, but how to resolve a coordination problem which has led to the 




Euro area countries had the chance to agree on a specific action for the euro inter-bank 
market. They got one important technical detail wrong. In principle, this should be easy 
to correct. But in reality this will be very difficult, as all national leaders now have to 
implement the common approach at home. Once one or two countries have started 
implementation, it will be extremely difficult to change tack as these countries will 
naturally not take it kindly if they have to go back to their national parliaments. Once a 
general principle has been set, it becomes extremely difficult to change. In a national 
context the direction of action can be changed much more quickly to adapt to quickly 
changing circumstances. Witness the UK (or Germany) where a national administration 
performed a complete U-turn in a very short time.  
One should thus be cautious in applying the lessons from previous crises to the European 
context. Certain issues are specific to Europe and certain solutions, which might be 
desirable, are not politically feasible in an area that adopted a common currency hoping 
that the absence of fiscal solidarity would not be tested by the markets. 
 
 
Persaud: The financial crisis may hasten European integration but slow 
global banking 
6 October 2008  
The liabilities of the biggest US bank equal half the US tax revenues; the ratios in Europe 
are bigger. Deutsche Bank’s liabilities are one and a half times Germany’s annual tax 
revenue; Barclays' are twice Britain’s. This crisis will either leave European financial 
integration in tatters or quicken the development of European fiscal capacity. European 
integration is a historical process that routinely stumbles upon crises that threaten to 
destroy it, only to find that it has been deepened by the crisis. 
One of the interesting and perhaps sad lessons of last weekend’s mini-summit of 
European leaders in Paris is that Europe’s predicament has been made worse by allowing 
financial integration to run ahead of fiscal integration. 
Financial integration got ahead of Europe’s governance capacity 
The logic at the time was that financial integration would reinforce the single market and 
facilitate economic integration. The consequence is that Europe now has financial 
institutions that are large relative to individual member states. European financial 
institutions funded the acquisition of cross-border assets through the money markets 
(since regulators make it expensive to acquire deposits). Now the money markets have 
frozen and these institutions are too large for taxpayers in their home country to rescue. 
Europe’s national leaders don’t have the tax base for a US-style bailout 
Individual European states could not agree to a US-style bail out over the weekend 
because they do not have the tax bases to do so. The liabilities of Bank of America, the 
largest US bank by balance sheet, are approximately half of the annual tax revenues of 
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the United States. That is a big ratio, but it is dwarfed by the ratio of liabilities to home 
tax revenues of Deutsche Bank at one-and-a-half times, and of Barclays at two times. 
The currency markets have followed the scent of this fiscal issue ever since the US began 
considering Treasury Secretary Paulson’s Plan. The Euro lost 5% in a little over a week 
against the US dollar. But the problem may not be as bad as the currency markets think. 
Big government can make big mistakes. Far from enviable, the US approach may prove 
to be expensive folly. It is far from clear that Paulson’s Plan will trigger private 
investment into banks, and if there is none, US Treasury purchases of troubled assets 
above market prices is an expensive way to inject new capital into the banks. I suspect 
Europe will eventually stumble towards solutions to the credit crunch that are better for 
being constrained by Europe’s national budgets, but can nevertheless operate effectively 
at the European level. 
Better than Paulson’s Plan: Capital injections and debt-equity swaps 
One idea that is emerging from the weekend discussions is for European governments to 
offer an injection of equity capital into institutions that seek assistance. I would add that 
as a condition of doing so, they should negotiate a partial debt-for-equity swap of the 
bank’s creditors. 
Getting sufficient capital is the problem that banks have today – we have moved on from 
the liquidity problem of the last eighteen months – and injecting capital is far less 
expensive than buying assets. The US is taking advantage of its tax base more than it 
should. Using the promise of an equity injection as a lever to negotiate a restructuring of 
bank debt will also help European taxpayers share this lower burden of bank rescues with 
bondholders. Recall that bondholders were paid to take the risk of bank failures. 
Addressing government control issues with European-level institutions 
Many thorny issues arise when governments start taking equity stakes in local banks. 
This is one of the reasons why the US authorities decided to be indirect and buy bank 
assets instead. But Europe has the potential to do this one step removed from national 
governments in a way that the US may not have been able. European governments can 
increase the capital subscription of the Luxembourg-based European Investment Bank to 
fund capital injections into banks. The weekend meeting already sanctioned a €30bn EIB 
fund to help small businesses hit by the credit crunch. While the process could not be de-
politicised, the EIB or a new cousin can act more independently of national governments 
and more consistently across them. 
Limits to global finance: The tax base 
But the most interesting lesson of this phase of the crisis is that there is a greater limit to 
the globalisation of finance than we thought. The constraint is in a different direction than 
previously imagined – the taxpayers' guarantee. 
This will cause a reappraisal of a few global banking brands. It also casts a new light on 
the viability of offshore financial centres. In Europe’s case, it either leaves financial 
integration plans in tatters, or it quickens the development of a European fiscal capacity. 
For good or for ill, I would bet on the latter. The history of European integration has been 
that the process routinely stumbles upon crises that threaten to destroy it, only to find that 
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it has been deepened by the crisis. The euro’s arrival probably required the near collapse 
of the European Monetary System in 1992-1995. 
 
 
Gros and Micossi: A call for a European Financial Stability Fund 
30 October 2008 
The euro is plunging and EU banks are coming under renewed pressure. There is a 
strong demand for ‘European’ bonds as well as a need for massive government capital 
infusions to prevent the crisis from getting worse in the banking sector and the European 
periphery. This is why the EU should set up a massive European Financial Stability 
Fund. 
The plunging euro 
Why is the euro plunging against the dollar and the yen? Why are European banks 
coming under renewed pressure? Should the emerging financial and foreign exchange 
crisis of countries gravitating around the euro lead to new EU policy instruments? 
The euro is plunging against the dollar because investors, in their scramble for safety and 
liquidity, are flocking to US and, also to some extent, Japanese government bonds which 
are considered safer and more liquid than other government-backed paper available in the 
market – including public debt instruments issued by European governments. In other 
words, the constellation of separate markets for sovereign debt paper of unequal quality 
issued by European governments cannot compete with the US market for the huge global 
financial flows in search of a safe harbour. Until the EU develops a unified market for 
bonds denominated in euro and backed jointly by EU member states – or, better, by euro-
area member states – its claim for the status of reserve currency for the euro will not be 
met. As a result, capital is not coming to Europe, where it is badly needed to shore up its 
shaken financial system; moreover, the US will continue to dictate the agenda in 
international monetary affairs, even now, after the colossal damage inflicted on the world 
by their misguided macro and regulatory policies. To add insult to injury the US 
government is now paying 2-3 percentage points less on its short term debt than even the 
most virtuous EU member states. 
European banks under pressure 
Second, why are European banks coming under renewed pressure, and how is this related 
to mounting pressures in countries gravitating around the euro? Worsening economic 
prospects are only part of the explanation. The deteriorating foreign exchange and 
financial conditions of satellite countries in the euro area – from the Baltic region to 
Eastern Europe, Turkey and Ukraine, not to mention the imploded Icelandic financial 
system – is also weighing heavily on EU banks’ financial solidity since they provide the 
backbone of the banking and financial system in those countries, and therefore are now 
much exposed to the consequences of mounting capital flights and currency attacks in 
those countries. European banks hold over $1,500 billion of cross-border claims on 
emerging European economies (out of a total of $1,620 billion). When all European 
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banks run for the exit, they are increasing their own losses – thus fuelling the need for 
further recapitalisation. 
There is no escape: the EU will have to take responsibility for the stabilisation of 
financial conditions in these euro-satellites and will need substantial resources to be able 
to do it – for emergency balance of payment assistance as well as direct provision of good 
government paper in exchange for flawed private claims, precisely as the US did with 
their Brady Bonds in the 1980s to resolve the Latin American debt crisis. The existing 
funds for Macro Financial Assistance that could be mobilised are much too small to have 
a substantial impact. 
European banks are also coming under renewed pressure because the national rescue 
programmes put in place following the meeting of the Heads of State and Government of 
the euro area on October 12th are starting to look insufficient. One reason is their 
prevalent case-by-case approach, which has kept banks away from their governments’ 
helping hand for fear of political interference in the choice of management or credit 
policies. This applies in particular to Italy and Germany, where the largest private banks 
have so far declined to apply for government capital infusions and guarantees because 
they fear heavy handed intervention by their national finance ministries. Another reason 
is that country-based rescue plans fail to provide convincing guarantees to depositors and 
investors in large cross-border banks where it is far from clear who will take 
responsibility for losses generated in an EU country other than that of legal residence. 
The near run on the branches of ING in Spain illustrates how deep this mistrust runs. 
The way ahead 
The way ahead has already been shown by the US and UK authorities with their de facto 
compulsory recapitalisation of all main banks – which was followed by a similar 
approach in France. The case-by-case approach must be abandoned and an ambitious 
capital target must be set for all EU main banks as was recently advocated by Wyplosz. 
Again, there is no need to tap national budgets in order to do so. EU government-backed 
bonds can provide adequate resources by making it possible to tap the gigantic global 
capital flows in search of safety; the euro and the credibility of the European financial 
markets would greatly benefit from these capital inflows. 
The overall message from financial markets is that investors everywhere have developed 
a strong preference for public debt. In the US and Japan, public debt carries no risk 
because if needed the government could always force the (national) central bank to print 
the money needed to meet its obligations. But this is not the case in Europe since no 
European government can force the ECB to print money. For international investors there 
is thus no euro area government bond in which they could invest to diversify their risk 
away from the dollar. 
We thus have at the same time strong demand for ‘European’ bonds and a need for 
massive government capital infusions to prevent the crisis from getting worse in the 
banking sector and the European periphery. This is why the EU should set up a massive 
European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF). The fund will probably have to be at least on 
the scale of the US Troubled Assets Relief Programme (TARP), say €500–700 billion. It 
would issue bonds on the international market with the explicit guarantee of member 
states. As the rationale for the EFSF is crisis management, its operations should be 
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wound down after a pre-determined period (5 years?). For global investors EFSF bonds 
would be practically riskless having the backing of all member states. 
Setting up a European Financial Stability Fund 
Setting up a fund with a common guarantee does not imply that stronger member 
countries would have to pay for the mistakes of the others since at the end of its 
operations losses could be distributed across member countries according to where they 
arose. But in all likelihood the Fund would not lose, but rather would make money, 
because its funding costs would be much lower than that of member states and because 
its existence would stabilise European financial markets. Germany, which so far has 
opposed this idea, might be the biggest beneficiary because German banks are likely to 
be its biggest customer, Germany’s automobile industry would gain most from a 
stabilisation of the European banking sector and Germany’s exporters would gain most 
from a stabilisation of the European periphery. 
This Fund could be set up quickly at the European Investment Bank, which already exists 
as a solid institution with the necessary expertise. (Technically the EIB is an agency of 
EU governments whose board of governors includes the ministers of finance of member 
countries). A fund run be a European institution would lead to a different political 
economy dynamic since national finance ministers will have an interest to see it wound 
down once financial markets operate again normally. By contrast, it will be much more 
difficult to end national support schemes since no finance minister will want to be the 
first one to withdraw support for his or her national champions. 
The resources available to the EFSF would be used mainly for bank recapitalisation, 
especially for those banks which rather ‘gamble for resurrection’ than accept the presence 
of heavy handed interference of national governments. Moreover, the EFSF could also 
beef up the funding of existing EU instruments for balance of payments assistance to the 
European neighbourhood. But a key consideration in setting up such an emergency fund 
should not be the problems that are already known. Given the unpredictable nature of this 
crisis, a key consideration should be for the EU to prepare for the ‘unknown unknowns’ 
that are certain to arrive sooner rather than later. 
President Sarkozy has recently called for the creation of an economic government for the 
euro area. Under normal circumstances one would have replied that the economic 
governance of the euro area was assured by the independence of the ECB and the 
Stability Pact. This is clearly no longer sufficient when Europe is facing the worst 
economic and financial crisis since World War II. The speed and depth of the crisis have 
clearly overwhelmed the usual decision making mechanisms. Europe needs action on a 
scale that can only be decided at the highest political level. 
 
 
Laeven and Levine: Governance of banks 
29 September 2008  
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When the storm passes, bank regulation will top the global policy agenda. This column 
presents new evidence that a bank’s private governance structure influences its reaction 
to bank regulation. Since governance structures differ systematically across countries, 
one-size-fits-all regulation may be ineffective. Bank regulations must be custom-designed 
and adapted as financial governance systems evolve. 
Banks matter.33 When banks efficiently mobilise and allocate funds, they lower the cost 
of capital to firms and accelerate capital accumulation. When banks allocate credit to 
entrepreneurs with the best ideas (rather than to those with the most accumulated wealth 
or strongest political connections) productivity growth is boosted and more people can 
pursue their economic dreams. And, when banks manage risk prudently, the likelihood of 
systemic crises is reduced.  
Of course, banks are double-edged. Banks that collect deposits with one hand and lend to 
friends and political cronies with the other stymie innovation and growth, while enriching 
the elite. And banks that gamble, protected on the downside by a generous government 
safety net, too frequently have sparked devastating crises that have exacted enormous 
human costs in virtually every country. 
In turn, bank regulations and governance matter. If official regulations and private 
governance mechanisms foster well-functioning banks, the probability of costly crises is 
reduced and economic growth is accelerated along with the expansion of economic 
opportunities.  
Unfortunately, regulations and governance systems too often fail to promote sound 
banking as exemplified by the turmoil embroiling financial markets today. 
Bank regulation and private governance: A critical, little understood nexus 
In fact, little is known about how private governance mechanisms interact with national 
regulations to shape bank risk taking. Rather, researchers and policymakers have focused 
on using official regulations to induce sound banking, while largely ignoring how 
owners, managers, and debt holders interact to influence bank risk.  
Bank owners, debt holders, and managers frequently disagree about risk.34 As in any 
corporation, diversified owners of banks (owners who do not have a large fraction of 
their personal wealth invested in the bank) have a greater incentive to increase risk than 
uninsured debt holders. Stock holders disproportionately enjoy the fruits of high-risk, 
potentially high-return investments, while debt holders want the bank to take as little risk 
as possible, while earning enough to pay them back. On risk, non-shareholder managers 
(managers who do not have a substantial equity stake in the bank) frequently align 
themselves with debt holders against diversified owners. Non-shareholder managers 
generally prefer to take less risk than owners because their jobs are linked to the survival 
                                                 
33 Disclaimer: While one of the authors of this column is a staff member of the 
International Monetary Fund, the views expressed herein are those of the authors and 
should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management. 
34 See influential theories by Galai and Masulis (1976) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
and recent empirical work on nonfinancial firms by John, Litov, and Yeung (2008). 
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of the bank. Of course, to the extent that the manager has a large equity stake in the bank 
or holds stock options, this would enhance his or her risk-taking incentives through 
enticing potentially large rewards for high-return investments. In practice, however, bank 
managers often do not hold much bank stock, placing them at odds with diversified bank 
owners in their views on risk taking. 
Thus, the comparative power of owners, managers, and debt holders within bank’s 
governance structure matters. Banks with an ownership structure that empowers 
diversified owners will tend to take more risk than banks in which owners have less 
influence. 
New evidence 
In a recent paper (Laeven and Levine, 2008), we test how national regulations interact 
with a bank’s private governance structure to determine its risk-taking behaviour. It is 
crucial to examine regulations and governance simultaneously.  
If regulations boost the risk-taking incentives of bank owners but not those of managers 
and debt holders, then the actual change in bank risk depends on the comparative power 
of owners within the bank’s governance structure. Thus, the same regulation will yield 
different effects depending on the governance structure of each bank. Similarly, changes 
in policies toward bank ownership, such as allowing private equity groups to invest in 
banks or changing limits on ownership concentration, could have differential effects 
depending on bank regulations.  
Examining national regulations or bank governance in isolation will almost certainly 
yield misleading results since regulations and governance structures differ across 
countries. To address this, we first collected new information on the ownership and 
management structure of banks and merged this with data on bank regulations around the 
world. The new database covers detailed data on banks across 48 countries and traces the 
ownership of banks to identify the ultimate owners of bank capital and the degree of 
ownership concentration.  
Most big banks have very concentrated ownership 
It turns out that banks around the world are generally not widely held, despite 
government restrictions on the concentration of bank ownership, though there is 
enormous cross-country variation.  
• About 75% of major banks have single owners that hold more than 10% of the 
voting rights.  
• 20 out of 48 countries do not have a single widely held bank (among their largest 
banks).  
• Of those banks in our sample with a controlling owner, more than half are 
families.  
Most governments restrict the concentration of bank ownership and the ability of 
outsiders to purchase substantial stakes in banks without regulatory approval, generally to 
limit concentrations of power in the economy. But regulatory restrictions on the 
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concentration of bank ownership are often ineffective or not well enforced. Families 
employ various schemes, such as pyramidal structures, to build up control in banks.  
Key results 
• We find that banks with more powerful owners (as measured by the size of their 
shareholdings) tend to take greater risks.  
This supports arguments predicting that equity holders have stronger incentives to 
increase risk than non-shareholding managers and debt holders and that large owners 
with substantial cash flows have the power and incentives to induce the bank’s managers 
to increase risk taking.  
Furthermore, the impact of bank regulations on bank risk depends critically on each 
bank’s ownership structure such that the relationship between regulation and bank risk 
can actually change sign depending on ownership structure.  
• For example, our results suggest that deposit insurance is only associated with an 
increase in risk when the bank has a large equity holder with sufficient power to 
act on the additional risk-taking incentives created by deposit insurance.  
• The data also suggest that owners seek to compensate for the loss in value of 
owning a bank from capital regulations by increasing bank risk.  
• Stricter capital regulations are associated with greater risk when the bank has a 
sufficiently powerful owner, but stricter capital regulations have the opposite 
effect in widely held banks.  
Ignoring bank governance leads to incomplete and sometimes erroneous conclusions 
about the impact of bank regulations on bank risk taking. 
Policy implications  
These findings have important policy implications. They question the current approach to 
bank supervision and regulation that relies on internationally established capital 
regulations and supervisory practices. Instead, we find that:  
(1) private governance mechanisms exert a powerful influence over bank risking, and 
(2) the same official regulation has different effects on bank risk taking depending on the 
bank’s governance structure.  
Since governance structures differ systematically across countries, bank regulations must 
be custom-designed and adapted as financial governance systems evolve.  
Regulations should be geared toward creating sound incentives for owners, managers, 
and debt holders, not toward harmonising national regulations across economies with 
very different governance structures. 
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Bertola and Lo Prete: Finance, redistribution, globalisation 
3 December 2008 
Globalisation seemingly erodes governments’ ability to redistribute wealth. This column 
presents new evidence of the tradeoff between integration and redistribution, showing 
that financial development has filled in where government has receded. The current crisis 
may pose political challenges to both financial development and economic integration. 
The current global financial crisis highlights the vexed issues of what role national 
governments should and do play in an internationally integrated economic system. In 
Dani Rodrik’s (1998) classic analysis of data from the 1960s to the early 1990s, openness 
to international trade was found to be associated with a larger share of government in 
GDP. Government policies meant to shelter citizens from risk may indeed be more 
important in countries where international market access fosters opportunities to trade but 
also exposes workers to more frequent and intense shocks. More recent and precise data 
on social expenditure in 18 OECD countries confirm Rodrik’s observation. In Figure 1, 
the fraction of GDP spent on such policies is larger in OECD countries that import and 
export more, perhaps because they are small and near to each other or because they 
choose to deregulate international trade. 
Figure 1. Public social expenditure and trade openness 
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Another mechanism is relevant, however. Redistribution may be more useful in more 
open economies but national governments are less powerful if economic integration 
allows private agents to seek more lenient taxes and more generous subsidies across 
countries’ borders. Competition among systems (Sinn, 2003) may reduce the viability of 
collectively enforced national policies, making income redistribution negatively 
associated with international openness. It is not difficult to find such a relationship in the 
data. In Figure 2, we plot deviations from countries’ means of social expenditure and 
openness, which capture reasons for countries to be permanently more or less open, or 
more or less inclined to social expenditure. The relationship is negative. This suggests 
that as technological progress and multilateral trade liberalisation have made borders less 
of a barrier to economic activity, the scope of redistribution policies has become smaller. 




As an increasingly globalised economic system increases the risk households face and 
makes it harder for governments to enforce redistribution policies, something has to pick 
up the slack. Our CEPR Discussion Paper 7048 finds that, controlling for country and 
time effects, the negative association between openness and redistribution illustrated in 
Figure 2 is more pronounced when and where financial markets are better developed. As 
globalisation progressed, financial development substituted for government policies. In 
theory, this makes a lot of sense. Financial markets must indeed be more important if 
international competition makes it difficult to implement social protection schemes while 
introducing new sources of income risk. In a more risky world, absent heavily 
redistributive national welfare states, credit and insurance volumes have to increase. 
Globalisation increases aggregate incomes but erodes redistribution, and it could decrease 
welfare if it were not accompanied by better insurance against new and larger risks. In 
our empirical work, following Jappelli and Pagano (1994), we proxy the accessibility and 
efficiency of household financial markets by loan-to-value ratios – the percentage of a 
house purchase price that may be financed by mortgages. Available indicators are 
significantly and sensibly related to openness and social policy developments. Over time, 
loan-to-value ratios increased from about 75% on average in the 1980s to about 90% in 
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the 2000s. They differed sharply across countries in the 1980s, when loan-to-value ratios 
already exceeded 80% in the UK and the US but were only slightly above 50% in Italy 
and Greece. By the late 1990s, the loan-to-value ratios in all our OECD countries 
exceeded 70%, and by the early 2000s they ranged up to 115% in countries such as the 
Netherlands. 
From the perspective of this column, a high loan-to-value ratio is a good thing. 
Borrowing allows households within countries to buffer the ups and downs of 
international competition without having to rely on collective redistribution and makes it 
possible to reap the fruits of globalisation in terms of overall competitiveness. For 
individual households, it is beneficial to be able to borrow a lot and go bankrupt upon 
negative income shocks. But there can be too much of a good thing. 
If individual repayment risk is not properly packaged and diversified, financial market 
development can be a source of aggregate instability. Financial markets are indeed in 
trouble and, if our perspective on past developments is correct, their fragility does not 
bode well for globalisation. The breakdown of private financial markets excites calls for 
stronger redistribution. If redistribution is national (as it has to be as long as politics are 
national), it will only be sustainable if national borders become less permeable to 
economic activity.  
Researchers will be looking carefully at signs of such reversals. Not only financial market 
development, but also trade and social policies will change as a consequence of the 
current economic turmoil. The character of these developments may foster confidence in 
the structural character of the empirical relationships we detect in our paper, which could 
so far be spuriously driven by trending factors other than those we focus on. 
And policymakers should also be keenly aware of these mechanisms. The path that led to 
the Great Depression was paved by protectionism and an increasing role of government. 
Rescuing financial institutions fosters confidence, but using the rising power of 
governments in the current financial storm to bail out manufacturers distorts competition 
and reduces confidence in further economic growth. To steer clear of the Great 
Depression path in a world where redistribution is no longer very effective and financial 
markets are key to the sustainability of international integration, we must develop an 
internationally coordinated financial regulation framework and avoid retracing backwards 
decades of international integration and financial development. 
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Forbes: What Next for the Dollar? The Role of Foreigners 
12 June 2008 
To pay for its current account deficit and capital exports, the US needs $2 trillion of 
additional foreign investment in 2008. Recent research shows that the quality and depth 
of US capital markets are key to attracting such investment, but the subprime crisis has 
raised doubts. A judicious regulatory reaction to the subprime crisis will thus be critical 
to the value of the dollar. If the US imposes a massive increase in poorly thought-out 
regulation, the dollar could quickly return to its downward spiral. 
The US government is so concerned about the US dollar that on June 3 it broke from 
standard operating procedure and had the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board speak 
about the dollar (a role previously reserved for the US Treasury Secretary and 
occasionally the President). The dollar immediately strengthened and some analysts 
predicted that the dollar’s relentless depreciation since its peak in February of 2002 was 
finally over. Some even predicted a dollar appreciation over the next year (at least versus 
the Euro and other flexible currencies). On June 6, however, the dollar took another dive 
and fears resurfaced that the dollar’s depreciation had further to go. Secretary Paulson 
responded on June 9 by stating in a CNBC interview that he “would never take 
intervention off the table” to support the dollar. 
What will it take? 
In order for the dollar to stabilize, the US will need to attract enough capital at existing 
prices to not only finance its current account deficit, but also to balance capital outflows 
by US citizens (which increased by over 100% from 2005 to $1.21 trillion in 2007). 
Figure 1 shows the countries with the largest holdings of US portfolio liabilities (equities 
and debt) as of June 30, 2007. 




Notes: Based on US govt. data 'Report on Foreign Portfolio Holdings of US Securities'. 
Includes official and non-official sector holdings. 
*Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. 
Will foreigners continue to add to their holdings of US assets? This is the greatest 
vulnerability to not only the dollar, but also the existing system of large global 
imbalances. Rough estimates suggest that despite the reduction in the US current account 
deficit, the US will require an additional $1.8 to $2.7 trillion of foreign investment in just 
2008.35 This is in addition to the (roughly) $16 trillion that foreigners already hold.36 Will 
foreigners invest these massive sums of money at current exchange rates? What will be 
the effect of increased regulation in US markets and perceived hostility in some sectors to 
foreign investment? 
How have foreigner done on their US investments? 
                                                 
35 Assuming that the U.S. current account deficit in 2008 is $627 billion (IMF forecast) 
and gross U.S. capital outflows are between $1.2 trillion (equal to gross outflows in 
2007) and $2.0 trillion (assuming growth in capital outflows from 2007 to 2008 equals 
the average annual growth rate from 2005 through 2007). Capital flow statistics from 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
36 According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, foreigners held $16 trillion in U.S. 
liabilities at year-end 2006 and data for 2007 is not yet available. 
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These questions are particularly pressing given the disappointing returns that foreigners 
have recently earned in the US. Evidence shows that investors tend to “chase returns”—
i.e., increase investment in assets and countries that have recently had higher returns and 
vice versa.37 But from 2002 through 2006—before the recent turmoil in US financial 
markets—foreigners earned an average annual return of only 4.3% on their US 
investments, while US investors earned a much more impressive 11.2% abroad.38 
This lower rate of return for foreigners investing in the US persists even after removing 
official sector investment (as much as possible given data limitations) and focusing only 
on the private sector.39 As shown in Figure 2, this pattern even persists for investment 
within specific assets classes—equities, foreign direct investment, and, to a lesser extent, 
bonds. For example, foreigners earned an average annual return of only 7.6% on their US 
equity holdings from 2002 through 2006, while US investors earned 17.4% on their 
foreign equities. These patterns also persist (although to a lesser extent) after removing 
the effect of the dollar’s depreciation and making rough adjustments for risk. 
Figure 2 Returns on private sector investment positions, 2002-6 
                                                 
37 For evidence on return chasing, see Henning Bohn and Linda Tesar (1996), “U.S. 
Equity Investment in Foreign Markets: Portfolio Rebalancing or Return Chasing?” 
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 86: 77-81. Also see Erik Sirri and 
Peter Tufano (1998), “Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows,” Journal of Finance 
53:1589-1622. 
38 For more details on return calculations, see Kristin J. Forbes (2008), “Why do 
Foreigners Invest in the United States?” NBER Working Paper #13908. 
39 For evidence that these return differentials between foreign investment in the United 
States and U.S. investment abroad did not exist in bonds, and probably in equities, over 
longer periods of time, see Stephanie Curcuru, Tomas Dvorak, and Francis Warnock 
(2008), “The Stability of Large External Imbalances: The Role of Returns Differentials,” 




Other Potential Reasons to Invest in the US 
Are there reasons why foreigners would invest in the US even if they expect these lower 
returns to continue? Without a doubt. Foreigners may be attracted to: 
the highly liquid US financial markets—especially investors in countries with small and 
less developed financial markets.40 
the strong corporate governance and accounting standards in the US. (Granted, recent 
problems with SIV’s and other structured products shows that these standards have room 
for improvement, but they are still perceived to be better than in many other countries.) 
the US as part of a standard portfolio diversification strategy, especially if returns in the 
investor’s country are less correlated with US returns. 
US investments due to close linkages to the US through trade, “familiarity” (such as 
sharing a common language or colonial history) and low information costs. 
the US due to the benefits of holding assets in the global reserve currency. 
While all of these reasons could hypothetically motivate foreigners to hold US assets, 
which are actually important in practice? 
The evidence 
                                                 
40 For excellent theoretical models of this relationship, see the following three papers. (a) 
Ricardo Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas (2008), “An 
Equilibrium Model of ‘Global Imbalances’ and Low Interest Rates,” American Economic 
Review 98(1): 358-93. (b) Jiandong Ju and Shang-Jin Wei (2006), “A Solution to Two 
Paradoxes of International Capital Flows,” NBER Working Paper #12668. (c) Enrique 
Mendoza, Vincenzo Quadrini and José-Víctor Ríos-Rull (2006), “Financial Integration, 
Financial Deepness and Global Imbalances,” NBER Working Paper #12909. 
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A recent analysis, “Why do Foreigners Invest in the United States?”, tests which factors 
drove foreign investment in US stocks and bonds between 2000 and 2006.41 It finds that 
the most important factor was the perceived advantages from the developed, liquid and 
efficient US financial markets. Even after controlling for a series of factors (including 
income levels), countries with less developed financial markets invested significantly 
more in the US relative to other countries and what optimal portfolio theory would 
suggest. 
Although the benefit from the more developed and liquid financial markets in the US is 
not the only factor supporting US capital inflows, the empirical estimates suggest it can 
be important. For example, the estimates from the previous analysis suggest that if Italy 
improved its equity markets to a level comparable to France, then Italy would reduce its 
holdings of US equities by $3.7 billion. Taking a more extreme example, if China 
developed its bond markets to a level comparable to South Korea, it would reduce its 
holdings of US bonds by about $200 billion (compared to total holdings of $695 billion 
of US bonds at the end of 2006). Although this is only a fraction of total US Treasury, 
agency and corporate bonds outstanding, it is “real money”. 
Implications for the Future of the Dollar 
The role of differences in financial market development in supporting US capital inflows 
has several important implications. First, countries around the world will hopefully 
continue the progress they have made in developing and strengthening their own financial 
markets. This will gradually reduce this important incentive for countries to invest in the 
US. Any such adjustments and the corresponding effect on the dollar, however, would 
likely occur very slowly, since developing financial markets (especially in low-income 
countries) is a prolonged process. 
Second, and potentially more worrisome, is the implication for recent events in the US. 
Recent market volatility, problems with US rating agencies and a lack of transparency in 
off-balance sheet structured products have raised concerns that US financial markets may 
not be the “gold standard” that they were previously believed. Recent discussion by the 
US Congress about rewriting mortgage agreements sets a worrisome precedent of 
government intervention in private contracts. Hostility to foreign investment has emerged 
in a few high-profile cases. This series of events has undoubtedly already reduced foreign 
willingness to hold US assets and accelerated the depreciation of the dollar over the past 
few months. 
Conclusions 
The US needs to improve its regulatory mechanisms in order to avoid a repeat of past 
excesses. But at the same time, the US government will hopefully not overreact and rush 
to pass a massive increase in poorly thought-out regulation. Any such response could 
seriously undermine the existing advantages of US markets and reduce foreigners’ 
willingness to invest the massive sums of money required by the US to support its current 
account deficit and capital outflows by US investors. The dollar could quickly return to 
                                                 
41 Kristin J. Forbes (2008), “Why do Foreigners Invest in the United States?” NBER 
Working Paper #13908. 
82 
 
its downward spiral. This need not occur if critical decisions on openness to foreign 
investment and financial market regulation are driven by cooler minds instead of 
election-year politicking. It is critically important that policymakers augment—instead of 
undermine—the long-term efficiency, resiliency and openness of US financial markets. If 
foreigners lose interest in investing in the US, additional reassuring words by Chairman 
Bernanke and Secretary Paulson, and even coordinated intervention in currency markets, 




Reinhart and Reinhart: Is the US too big to fail? 
17 November 2008 
Why are investors rushing to purchase US government securities when the US is the 
epicentre of the financial crisis? This column attributes the paradox to key emerging 
market economies’ exchange practices, which require reserves most often invested in US 
government securities. America’s exorbitant privilege comes with a cost and a 
responsibility that US policy makers should bear in mind as they handle the crisis. 
A familiar script has played as the global financial crisis has spread, picking up speed and 
intensity. The drama has three acts that have been written out in the historical record for 
as long as there have been open financial markets. 
• Act One: Unbounded Enthusiasm. Some markets find favour with global 
investors.42 Credit becomes readily available, asset prices percolate, and many 
categories of spending are buoyed. 
• Act Two: Day of Reckoning. Recognition that some of that enthusiasm was 
overdone spreads among investors. New credit flows cease, collateral is sought, 
asset prices crash, and prominent private-sector icons crumble. 
• Act Three: Restoration. Here governments pick up the pieces, typically passing on 
the cost to future generations by issuing a vast volume of debt. The cost can be 
punishing because investors pull away from the governments of emerging market 
economies as forcefully as they do from private creditors.43 
American exceptionalism 
But there has been one prominent exception to this classic tale. With fitting irony, the US, 
which is the epicentre of the crisis, has avoided Act Three. The US enjoyed a capital 
                                                 
42 In Reinhart and Reinhart (2008a and b), we refer to this act as a “capital flow 
bonanza.” 
43 Such funding strains have frequently been sufficient to compel governments to default. 
This is why we find in Reinhart and Reinhart (2008a) that episodes of capital flow 
bonanzas help to predict sovereign defaults. 
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inflow bonanza that funded yawning current account deficits, and asset prices spiralled 
upward only to crash. While the crash has constricted credit and is redrawing the 
financial landscape, the US has not been punished by investors in typical Act-Three 
fashion. 
If this had happened to any other government in the world whose national financial 
institutions were in as deep disarray as those of the US, investors would have run for the 
hills – cutting off the offending nation from global capital markets. But for the US, just 
the opposite has happened. 
Rather than facing prohibitive costs of raising funds, US Treasury Bills have seen yields 
fall in absolute terms and markedly in relative terms to the yields on private instruments. 
This has been called a “flight to safety.”44 But why do global investors rush into a 
burning building at the first sign of smoke? 
The answer lies in part with the exchange market practices of key emerging market 
economies. 
Since the last global market panic, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998, many governments 
have stockpiled dollars in their attempts to prevent their exchange rates from 
appreciating. At the same time, the long upsurge in commodity prices has swollen the 
coffers of many resource-rich nations. As a result, and as shown in the latest forecast in 
the World Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund, international reserves 
of emerging market economies are expected to have increased $3.25 trillion in the last 
three years. According to the Fund’s survey of the currency composition of those 
holdings, the bulk is in dollars (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 





The dollar portion of these reserves is most often invested in US government securities, 
which offers excellent market liquidity, and US government debt is also considered as 
safe as anything (following a precedent laid down by the first Secretary of the Treasury, 
Alexander Hamilton).45 All this explains the dollar’s popularity with foreign investors 
who might otherwise be expected to shun the US. As the Figure 2 indicates, foreign 
official entities now own almost one-quarter of outstanding government securities (the 
upper panel). These holdings of securities constitute about 10% of non-US nominal GDP 
(the lower panel). 
Our currency, your problem 
Herein lies the special status of US government securities. For a few of the world’s key 
decision makers, it is not in their economic interest to stop, or even slow, the purchase of 
Treasury Bills. As Keynes once said: “If you owe your bank a hundred pounds, you have 
a problem. But if you owe a million, the bank has a problem.” Potential capital losses on 
existing stocks keep foreign investors locked into US government securities. 
Figure 2 
                                                 
45 The history of US debt is not unblemished. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) report that the 
US never defaulted on its sovereign external debt but that the abrogation of the gold 




Figure 2 also shows a precedent for recent financial market strains. The last time foreign 
official purchases bulked so large in the US government’s financing was from 1968 to 
1973, when the Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates broke down.46 At that 
                                                 
46 Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004) have dubbed this latest period Bretton 
Woods II, in part exactly because of the role of foreign official purchases in facilitating 
US current account deficits. They pose plausible reasons why it might be in the self-
interest of foreign officials to do so. Another possibility, as discussed earlier, is that 
existing portfolio holdings are so large that officials are in a self-fulfilling trap. 
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time, keeping the system going required increasing support from abroad, primarily from 
Europe. This time around, the source of that support has shifted to Asian-Pacific 
economies and Middle East exporters. In both cases, the message from the US seems best 
summarised in the words of then-Treasury-Secretary John Connolly, who famously 
advised, “the dollar is our currency, but your problem.” 
As the tone of those words suggests, another lesson from the earlier experience is that 
foreign resentment with a US-dominated arrangement grows over time. That America 
could be a source of financial instability and a haven of sovereign financial security 
seems to some, to quote Valerie Giscard d'Estaing, to be an “exorbitant privilege.”  
In this episode, Treasury yields have fallen and the foreign exchange value of the dollar 
has appreciated recently. Moreover, many European financial firms have had funding 
difficulties associated with a lack of access to dollar liquidity. This has made it necessary 
for European officials, caps in hands, to seek swap arrangements with the Federal 
Reserve to acquire dollars to re-lend to their national champions. 
Recent enthusiasm in Europe for fundamental reform of the international monetary 
system finds its roots, in part, in this resentment. They do not want our dollar to be their 
problem, and they want to erode some of that privilege. Put it those terms, however, it 
seems clear that this will mostly be a one-way conversation. US officials must recognise 
that their nation’s funding advantage rests on the unrivalled, for now, position of US 
government securities in global financial markets. Thus, they will listen and agree to 
work-streams for groups to report back in the future. But whether it is this Administration 
or the next, advantages to the US, unfair as that may seem as viewed from abroad, will 
seem worth preserving. 
An exorbitant privilege that comes with a cost and a responsibility 
These advantages come with a cost and a responsibility. Open access to markets probably 
allowed US officials to drift in their response to the financial crisis. They initially 
mistook a solvency problem for a liquidity one. When action was ultimately forthcoming, 
Treasury officials failed to articulate a clear sense of principles and priorities for 
intervention. This ad hoc improvisation has probably stretched out and intensified the 
crisis. In a crisis in an emerging market economy, the sudden stop of credit to the 
government forces painful adjustment to be done quickly.47 These adjustments may have 
been painful, but a quick response tends to reduce the overall bail-out cost. 
As for responsibility, officials must recognise that investors have granted the US its 
reserve-currency status for reasons. Size matters, but other reasons include a respect for 
the rule of law and for contract enforcement and the predictability and transparency of the 
policy process. 
                                                 
47 In this regard, the current US situation is more akin to that in Japan in the 1990s, when 
policymakers delayed addressing the fundamental problem of non-performing loans and 
favoured half-measures for some time. The Japanese government could tap a large pool 
of domestic saving to fund its equivocations so that the opinion of global creditors was 
not relevant. The lesson is market discipline does not apply either if a nation is too big to 
fail or saves too much to care. 
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When US officials move to the next stage of the crisis – the search for legislative 
protections to prevent a recurrence – it will be important to preserve these attractive 
aspects of US markets. 
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Eichengreen: Can the IMF save the world? 
7 October 2008  
Global crises used to remind us why we have the IMF. If the Fund doesn’t come up with 
some new ideas for how to handle this one, it may remind us why it has become 
increasingly unimportant. The IMF could reassert its relevance by aiding middle-income 
countries caught up in the crisis with new ideas on how to link emergency lending with 
policy adjustment. 
As the financial crisis has unfolded, the International Monetary Fund has been noticeable 
mainly for its absence. This will now change – at least temporarily – as its Governors 
assemble for their annual meeting and the kleg lights are turned on. The question is 
whether those Governors and the management to whom they entrust the Fund’s operation 
can restore its relevance for more than a weekend. 
If not now … 
If this is not a set of circumstances that call for the Fund, it is hard to know what is. 
While recent problems affecting institutions like Fortis and Dexia have been adequately 
handled by a handful of governments, containing a run on a much larger British, German, 
or Swiss bank will require wider international cooperation. The managing director, 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, should urge governments to get their ducks in a row. He 
should urge them to move together when raising deposit insurance limits and extending 
other guarantees in order to avoid draining funds from one another’s financial systems. 
He should call for coordinating interest rate cuts and fiscal stimulus to prevent the world 
from sliding into depression. For consciousness-raising purposes if nothing else, the Fund 
should be issuing an urgent call to action, not maintaining radio silence. 
Multilateral Consultation on the crisis: Too little, too late 
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No doubt Mr. Strauss-Kahn will also call for an IMF-directed Multilateral Consultation 
bringing together the US, European Union, and others to discuss the credit crisis. But 
cross-Channel and Transatlantic crisis management will not be arranged through a 
Multilateral Consultation or more generally through the IMF. Central bankers are already 
in continuous communication. The relevant regulators meet under the aegis of the Basel 
Committee of Banking Supervisors. European finance ministers meet as the Ecofin 
Council, and if they need to reach Mr. Paulson they know his number. They do not need a 
Multilateral Consultation to bring them together. 
And having Mr. Strauss-Kahn and his deputies orchestrating their meeting is unlikely to 
produce a different outcome. Reflecting diplomatic niceties, the IMF’s first Multilateral 
Consultation on global imbalances stretched over the better part of a year. This does not 
exactly match the timing of a financial panic. Any Multilateral Consultation focusing on 
immediate management of the crisis will quickly become irrelevant. 
Focus on regulatory reform: Better ideas needed 
Better would be to focus the next Multilateral Consultation on regulatory reform and 
preventing the next crisis. Here, however, the IMF must first demonstrate that it is a 
better orchestrator of these discussions than the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
or the Financial Stability Forum. Establishing this means offering better ideas. And so far 
the novel ideas for regulatory reform – capital insurance, countercyclical capital 
requirements, forcing over-the-counter trading into an organised exchange – have come 
from other quarters. 
To advertise the 2007 decision strengthening its surveillance of currencies, the Fund will 
also want to say something about exchange rates. Under current circumstances, however, 
the less said the better. Notwithstanding the lemming-like rush of investors into US 
treasury bills, the dollar will have to fall over the medium term as capital flows into the 
United States diminish, reflecting the reluctance of foreigners to accumulate more toxic 
assets. Dollar depreciation may make life difficult for other exporting countries, but it is 
unavoidable and should not be resisted. It is not clear that there is anything constructive 
for the Fund to say about this. 
Aiding middle-income countries 
Where the Fund should have a role is in aiding middle-income countries caught up in the 
crisis. Countries with large current account deficits and relying on foreign capital to 
finance them will find their position unsustainable as growth slows, undermining their 
ability to export, and as foreign investors, cash-strapped and in a state of high anxiety, 
hesitate to commit. 
In present circumstances, anyone with a large current account deficit depending on 
foreign capital inflows is at risk. This includes, of course, the United States, although 
America is not a client of the Fund, since it can effectively print international reserves 
(the dollar remaining the dominant reserve currency). But in many smaller countries with 
even larger current account deficits relative to the size of their economies, corporate 
borrowing, home mortgages, and even auto loans are denominated in foreign currency. 
For them, flooding the markets with liquidity and letting the currency depreciate, as the 
US does, is no solution. Indeed, it will only make matters worse. 
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Helping countries in this pickle has long been the IMF’s bread and butter. But even here 
it is not clear that the crisis will allow the Fund to reassert its relevance. Eastern Europe 
crisis countries may be bailed out by the EU and the ECB, while their East Asian 
counterparts may receive swaps and credits through the Chiang Mai Initiative. Once 
again the Fund may end up being sidelined unless it demonstrates that it has a better idea, 
in this case about how to link emergency lending with policy adjustment. 
It is sometimes said that the crisis is a reminder of why we have the IMF. If the Fund 
doesn’t come up with some new ideas for how to handle it, the crisis may only remind us 
why we can forget it. 







What is wrong with the traditional economic/financial viewpoint and 
models? 
Dale: The financial meltdown is an academic crisis too 
27 November 2008 
Recent events have not been kind to the modern financial market structure. This column 
blames the prevailing consensus amongst finance academics for underestimating the 
irrationality and instability involved. Has the discipline failed to understand global 
financial markets?  
Recent events have demonstrated that the financial market structure that has evolved over 
the past twenty years is a powder keg – the detonating device was the bursting of the 
2004 to 2007 credit bubble. In considering where we go from here, two separate issues 
need to be addressed: how to deal with financial bubbles and the design of a new 
financial market regulatory structure. 
Counter-cyclical bank capital requirements may help to deal with the first problem but 
regulatory reform presents more formidable difficulties. The problem here has been 
exacerbated by the forced financial restructuring that has taken place during the crisis 
management of the past few months. We now have a much more concentrated financial 
services industry and one in which large investment firms have been merged with 
deposit-taking banks. The financial landscape is now dominated by huge financial 
conglomerates which markets will correctly perceive as being far too systemically 
sensitive to be allowed to fail. Hence the whole moral hazard issue is thrown into even 
sharper relief. 
There are two possible regulatory responses to this situation. The first is to try to put 
banking back in its box; to reverse the trends of the past twenty years by dismantling the 
financial conglomerates and re-imposing strict activity constraints on deposit-taking 
institutions. This was the US response after the 1929/33 crash not only from the 
legislature in the form of the Glass Steagall Act but also from the leading banks 
themselves (National City Bank and Chase National Bank), who of their own volition 
announced that they were disposing of their securities affiliates because events had 
shown that commercial and investment banking should not be mixed.48  It is ironic that 
today’s response is in the opposite direction: non-bank investment firms have either been 
eliminated (Lehman), pushed into the arms of banks (Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch) or 
induced to re-charter themselves as deposit-taking banks (Morgan Stanley, Goldman 
Sachs). Unscrambling these new universal banking conglomerates would, however, 
present enormous practical difficulties and is probably unrealistic. 
The second approach is to neutralise moral hazard by subjecting financial institutions to a 
comprehensive regulatory framework which would also see regulators acting in a much 
                                                 
48 Edwin Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking, Banking Law 
Journal, June (1971) p.523. 
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more intrusive, investigative and, if necessary, adversarial manner. Crucially, this new 
regulatory approach would have to be truly global since national authorities are at present 
inhibited from taking action that might induce regulated activities to move to more 
accommodating financial centres. 
Mixing banking and securities 
Fifteen years ago, I argued that banks’ increasing involvement in securities activities 
worldwide could eventually lead to a repetition of the 1929/33 banking meltdown.49 My 
analysis rested on the observation that if banks were permitted to diversify away from 
non-core banking activities the moral hazard that is known to promote excessive risk-
taking in traditional banking would be extended to these other activities, in particular 
securities markets. The question then was whether ‘the mixing of banking and securities 
business can be regulated in such a way as to avoid the danger of a catastrophic 
destabilisation of financial markets’50. After considering all the regulatory options, I 
concluded that there was no solution: “Allowing banks to engage in risky non-bank 
activities could either destabilise the financial system by triggering a wave of contagious 
bank failures – or alternatively impose potentially enormous costs on tax payers by 
obliging governments or their agencies to undertake open-ended support operations.”51  
The prevailing view amongst finance academics at the time, as reflected in a critical 
review of my book in the Journal of Finance, was that financial structure was largely 
irrelevant to the question of systemic stability.52 According to the conventional wisdom 
we had learned from the 1929/33 crash, a monetary contraction such as occurred then 
could be neutralised by injecting reserves into the banking system and a flight to quality, 
because it merely redistributes bank reserves, “is unlikely to be a source of systemic 
risk”.53 This widely held view of the behaviour of financial markets turns out to have 
been entirely misguided. As we have witnessed in recent months, a major shock arising 
from publicised losses on banks’ securities holdings can have a domino effect on 
financial institutions, leading ultimately to a seizure in credit markets which central 
bankers, on their own, are powerless to unblock. Only drastic government intervention – 
guarantees for money market funds, guarantees for interbank lending, emergency deposit 
insurance cover, lending directly to the commercial paper market, and partly 
nationalising the banking industry – has prevented a full repetition of the 1929/33 
financial meltdown. 
In addition to underrating the importance of financial market structure, finance academics 
have also largely neglected the well-documented boom/bust characteristic of asset and 
credit markets. In my recent book on the South Sea Bubble, I analysed the behaviour of 
                                                 
49 Richard Dale, International Banking Deregulation: The Great Banking Experiment, 
Wiley-Blackwell 1993. 
50 Ibid, p.2 
51 Ibid, p.43 
52 Book review by Richard Herring, Journal of Finance, September 1993, pp. 1553-1556. 
53 Ibid, p. 1554. 
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South Sea stock prices and concluded that, even when judged against the valuation 
techniques available at the time, there is overwhelming evidence that the South Sea boom 
represented an irrational bubble.54 My central thesis was that, taken together with other 
more recent boom/bust episodes, the events of 1720 lend force to the argument that 
national authorities must intervene to head off unsustainable financial market booms. I 
was also critical of revisionist histories of financial upheavals such as the South Sea 
Bubble that have tended to stress the rationality of investors and downplay the idea that 
financial markets are inherently unstable and prone to bouts of euphoria and panic.55  
What we have witnessed in recent months is not only the fracturing of the world’s 
financial system but the discrediting of an academic discipline. There are some 4000 
university finance professors worldwide, thousands of finance research papers are 
published each year, and yet there have been few if any warnings from the academic 
community of the incendiary potential of global financial markets. Is it too harsh to 
conclude that despite the considerable academic resources that go into finance research 
our understanding of the behaviour of financial markets is no greater than it was in 
1929/33 or indeed 1720? 
 
 
Kiff, Mills, and Spackman: European securitisation and the possible 
revival of financial innovation 
28 October 2008 
Securitisation volumes have plummeted in the wake of the subprime crisis. As a result, 
banks are keeping more loans on their balance sheets and tightening lending standards. 
This column reviews the factors that have led to this virtual market shutdown and 
suggests structural changes, in the form of simpler and more transparent products 
trading at wider spreads, will be required to revive securitisation. 
Collapsing global securitisation volumes in the wake of the subprime crisis have raised 
fundamental questions over the viability of the originate-to-distribute business model.56 
Issuance has dropped precipitously in both Europe and the US, with banks keeping more 
loans on their balance sheets and tightening lending standards as a result (Figure 1). The 
decline has been particularly sharp for mortgage-backed securities and mortgage-backed-
securities-backed collateralised debt obligations. The originate-to-distribute model was 
                                                 
54 Richard Dale, The First Crash: Lessons from the South Sea Bubble, Princeton 
University Press, 2004. 
55 See eg. Peter Garber, Famous First Bubbles, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 
1990; Larry Neal, The Rise of Financial Capitalism, International Capital Markets in the 
Age of Reason, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
56 Securitisation involves the transformation of pools of loans and other types of assets 
into marketable securities. 
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thought to have made the financial system more resilient by dispersing credit risk to a 
broad range of investors. Ironically, however, it became the source of financial 
instability. 
Figure 1  
Mortgages constituted the vast majority of loans securitised in Europe in 2006–07. Of 
these, most originated in the UK (about 54%), followed by Spain (14%) and the 
Netherlands (11%). Total European mortgage-backed securities issuance dropped from 
€307 billion in 2007 to €28 billion in the first quarter of 2008. During the same period, 
collateralised debt obligations issuance plummeted from €471 billion to €63 billion, and 
asset-backed securities (ABS) issuance dropped from about €124 billion in 2007 to €9 
billion in the first half of 2008.57 
What went wrong? 
In many cases, the risk transfer from securitisation proved to be less complete than 
believed, and investors to whom risks were transferred were too complacent. The 
adoption of new international financial accounting standards in Europe forced balance-
sheet recognitions of substantial securitisation volumes (IMF, 2008, Box 1.3). Also, the 
efficacy of some risk transfers (e.g., to asset-backed commercial paper conduits and 
structured investment vehicles) relied on market liquidity, which broke down in 2007. As 
a result, banks have had to take back onto their balance sheets assets they had earlier 
securitised. Some banks also retained supposedly lower-risk collateralised debt 
obligations and mortgage-backed securities tranches but have been forced to drastically 
                                                 
57 European ABS issuance is primarily of business loans and vehicle leases. 
94 
 
write down these holdings as their market values have fallen and bond insurers have been 
downgraded. 
Investor complacency resulted in over-reliance on credit ratings. Furthermore, the rating 
agencies’ key assumptions on some risks (e.g., subprime mortgage delinquencies and 
recovery rates) turned out to be overly optimistic. As credit fundamentals deteriorated, 
many of the more complex and multilayered securities became nearly impossible to 
value, and market liquidity disappeared as leveraged investors (primarily hedge funds) 
reduced their exposures. The disappearance of market liquidity and the reliance on 
models for valuations triggered uncertainty about losses and loss exposures. The 
interaction of credit and liquidity risk drove market valuations into downward spirals of 
mark-to-market losses and forced liquidations. 
Road to recovery 
Reviving securitisation requires structural change. Investor confidence in the instruments, 
the originators, and the rating agencies needs to be restored. Originators will have to 
simplify security structures and improve the disclosure of their underlying assets in a 
timely and comprehensive manner. Rating agencies will need to provide more 
information on the models and inputs that underpin their ratings and on the potential for 
rating volatility. 
The American and European Securitisation Forums are engaged in coordinating 
standardised reporting and originator principles. This process will take many years. Also, 
the major rating agencies are consulting over whether to supplement rating letter grades 
with rating volatility and loss sensitivity metrics. However, they have been slow to 
address the conflict of interest that arises because of their parallel activities as 
consultancy services. 
It has been proposed that originators in Europe retain some meaningful economic interest 
in the underlying securities, so that their incentives can be more closely aligned with 
those of investors. A European Commission proposal regarding implementation of the 
Capital Requirements Directive suggests requiring minimum levels of originator risk 
retention. However, this proposal could easily make securitisation uneconomic for 
originators and faces considerable monitoring and enforcement difficulties. It is, 
therefore, unlikely to restart the market. 
Covered bonds 
In Europe, covered bonds have provided banks with cost-efficient secured financing for 
over 200 years, and US authorities recently launched an initiative to encourage their use 
by US banks. Covered bonds are backed by identifiable and legally “ring-fenced” pools 
of loans. They remain on the balance sheet, however, so that the bank retains the ultimate 
credit risk and is encouraged to maintain loan quality. Nevertheless, yield spreads on UK 
and Spanish covered bonds have widened sharply during the crisis, owing to declining 
housing markets. 
Meanwhile, German and French spreads have remained relatively low (Figure 2). 
Although secondary market liquidity has dried up, issuance of “jumbo” bonds is 




Covered bond issuance is expected to remain below trend for some time, but the market 
is likely to continue broadening. The first Greek covered bond issue is expected in 2008, 
and the four largest US banks have committed to issuing covered bonds, while an 
electronic trading platform in Europe is planned. The covered bond market has not been 
immune from recent turbulence, but it does provide a less complex alternative to outright 
securitisation. 
Conclusion 
The risk transfer and capital saving benefits of securitisation, combined with underlying 
investor demand for securities, should eventually revive issuance. But the products are 
likely to be simpler, more transparent, and trade at significantly wider spreads. 
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Pagano: The price of transparency 
8 October 2008  
By simplifying the information they transmitted to investors, banks managed to expand 
the market for the structured bonds that they issued. But this has also led to a 
catastrophic uncertainty that paralyses markets and even affects policy choices. The 
choice of opacity by issuers and rating companies has been socially harmful and should 
have been constrained much more tightly by regulation. Until today, though, few believed 
that transparency could be worth as much as 5% of US GDP. 
The most surprising aspect of the current crisis is that the estimate of bank losses has 
been subject to continuous and macroscopic revisions. When the first problems arose in 
the subprime loans sector in 2006, the problem seemed to concern a quite modest 
segment of the U.S. credit market. But already in December 2007, the Economist 
estimated that losses stemming from mortgage loan insolvencies would sit between $200 
and $300 bn. In April 2008 the IMF predicted losses of $565 bn on mortgage loans and 
on related securities, and $945 bn including loans and securities related to commercial 
real estate, consumer credit and corporate loans. Now the IMF has revised its estimate 
further to $1400 bn. How could it happen that bankers, central banks, international 
institutions and economic experts made such macroscopic mistakes in insolvency 
estimates? And how can it be that they are still so uncertain as to their real extent? 
The Origins of Uncertainty 
The uncertainty originates from the same roots of this crisis, that is from the opacity of 
the securitization with which banks “packaged” and then sold their credits in structured 
bonds, often after slicing them in different risk tranches. In this process, only roughly 
synthesized information was transmitted to the market concerning the underlying loan 
portfolio or its tranches. So there was a great loss of information that would have helped 
to evaluate the credit risk of those portfolios. 
Since structured bonds and the derivatives written on them were massively bought by 
banks, insurance companies and trust funds, the uncertainty concerning their value turned 
into uncertainty regarding the amount of losses and toxic assets hidden in bank balances, 
and made it difficult or impossible for them to obtain liquidity or raise fresh capital. 
Indeed, extreme uncertainty generates fear, and fear generates paralysis. This is best 
illustrated by the case of Lehman Brothers, the large investment bank that played a 
central role in the securitization process. When Lehman entered distress, the primary 
U.K. bank Barclays was the only institution that showed interest in buying up Lehman, 
but for fear that its balance sheet hid more losses and toxic assets than those declared, 
they asked for a guarantee from the U.S. Treasury against this risk. As the Treasury 
refused to offer a guarantee, Barclays held back and Lehman failed. One might say that 
this bankruptcy, the largest in U.S. history, is the outcome of uncertainty. It cannot be 
ruled out that Lehman would have been solvent if only their assets and liabilities could 
have been properly evaluated. 
The uncertainty generated by lack of transparency is also at the root of market illiquidity. 
Since June 2007, the market of structured bonds basically froze and even the liquidity on 
the money markets rarefied. The reason behind this event too is the fear generated by 
uncertainty: investors were afraid of buying securities that could hide more insolvent 
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loans than expected, so if they had liquidity they preferred to hoard it. This market 
paralysis in turn worsened the situation of banks, making their assets illiquid and forcing 
them to curtail credit. 
Uncertainty can even explain the swinging and ill-timed behaviour of U.S. policy makers: 
on September 8, the Treasury nationalized agencies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, who guarantee most of the U.S. mortage loans. The Treasury had already obtained 
Congress authorization in July and at that time had insisted there would be no need for 
intervention. On September 15, the Treasury let Lehman fail. On September 18, the Fed 
saved AIG, the world’s largest insurance company, by giving them an enormous loan 
with the option to buy 80 per cent of its shares, replace its executives and nearly 
eliminate its preexisting shareholders. Finally, on September 20 Henry Paulson, Secretary 
of the U.S. Treasury, asked Congress to allocate $700 bn (5 per cent of U.S. GDP) to the 
purchase of the banks’ bad assets, hopefully with adequate haircuts. Yet this policy move 
had already been proposed as early as April 2008 on the Financial Times by Luigi 
Spaventa, who had observed that there would be no way out from the crisis unless the 
authorities intervened to reestablish prices of structured bonds, which markets can no 
longer establish because of uncertainty.58  
Maybe the dimensions of the crisis could have been contained if this suggestion had been 
put into action earlier. But even this delay was probably caused by the uncertainty as to 
the real proportion of the problem. 
A socially harmful choice 
But what can explain the behaviour that is at the root of this catastropic uncertainty, that 
is, the destruction of a large amount of price relevant information in the process of 
securitization and rating of structured bonds? The answer is that by simplifying the 
information transmitted to the market, banks managed to expand the market for the 
structured bonds that they issued: providing detailed and complex information would 
have kept away from the market many unsophisticated investors, who would have been at 
a disadvantage compared to those capable of processing this information. 
Therefore, greater transparency would have forced issuers to reduce their security 
issuance or to accept a less liquid primary market, and this would have reduced their 
revenues, as well as those of rating agencies. Instead, they preferred to expand the 
primary market as much as possible, even at the cost of endangering the stability and 
liquidity of the secondary market.59  
Now we know that this choice by issuers and rating companies was socially harmful: 
market liquidity and credit market stability have a social value that exceeds the private 
one, to the point that that today the U.S. is willing to sacrifice 5 per cent of its GDP to 
restore them. But this also indicates that the choice of opacity by issuers and rating 
companies should have met with far more solid and stringent regulatory constraints. We 
                                                 
58 Luigi Spaventa, “How a new Brady bond could ease the strain”, Financial Times, 11 
April 2008. For a more detailed description and motivation of Spaventa’s proposal, see 
“Avoiding Disorderly Deleveraging”, CEPR Policy Insight No. 22, May. 
59 Volpin in "Securitization, Transparency and Liquidity"  
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all knew that transparency is important for the operation of financial markets, but to this 
time few thought that it could be worth 5 per cent of the U.S. GDP and possibly more. 




Cohen: The Panglossian World of Finance 
3 June 2008 
What easy money brought forth in the new century, tight credit will take away in the 
years to come. Here one of France’s leading economists explains the origins of the 
subprime crisis and why it is likely to continue to unfold.  
What is the origin of financial crises? A simple fact, a fact that may be summarised as 
follows: one tends to bet more freely with other people’s money than with one’s own. 
The typical investment manager/financial innovator thinks: “If I win, my profit will be 
proportional to the gross sales I have initiated. If I lose, I will be dismissed, and perhaps I 
will lose my reputation in the process.” Thinking even further, the manager realises that 
the downside is limited to being fired, but the upside is limitless. This asymmetry 
between profits and losses encourages audacity. Once a certain risk threshold is breached, 
the investment manager who places bets with other people’s money ignores danger. From 
a social point of view, the problem stems from the divergence of incentives. Even though 
the intermediary knows that he may suffer a severe personal loss, it will never be 
proportional to the losses inflicted on investors. 
This simple rule - that profits are for me (at least in part) while losses are for others – 
makes it possible to understand the enchanted world of finance. The investment manager 
lives in a world with “Panglossian” values, to borrow an expression used by the 
economist Paul Krugman. Just as Voltaire’s hero, this investor only sees the bright side of 
affairs. He ignores the risk – not by inadvertence, but by rationality. 
In a recent CEPR Discussion Paper “Self fulfilling and self enforcing debt crises” (CEPR, 
Discussion Paper 6718), Sebastien Villemot and I show how this mechanism explains the 
sovereign debt crises of the last four decades. Let me show here how it helps 
understanding the subprime crisis of the last year. (Many Vox columnists have already 
written on the causes of the subprime crisis, Carmen Reinhart most recently in her 15 
March 2008 column). 
Panglossian principles first explain why finance requires regulation. Prudential rules set a 
minimum ratio of banks’ equity capital to the amount of their investments. The idea is to 
oblige them to hold at their disposal the liquidity necessary to pay, and therefore to 
anticipate, their potential losses. The subprime crisis illustrates a contrario how the 
applicable logic works when, by diverse artifices, the financial intermediaries were able 
to free themselves from regulatory constraints. 
At the origin of the so-called subprime crisis, there is a brilliant innovation. To make real 
estate credit available more to investors at attractive rates, the engineers of Wall Street 
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came up with the following idea. Slice up portfolios of pooled mortgage assets into 
several tranches. The highest quality tranches are paid first, the mezzanine tranches 
afterward, and the lowest (equity) tranches sustain the risk of eventual default. A palette 
of varied assets is constructed in this way, attracting vast classes of investors: pension 
funds for the senior tranches, and hedge funds for the risky assets. This invention, 
finalized in 1983 by a subsidiary of General Electric, was originally intended for ordinary 
borrowers. In spite of a first crisis in 1994, the technique took off in 2000, making it 
possible to broaden the range of households benefiting from mortgage loans. Thanks to 
the now famous subprimes, the most disadvantaged social classes were able at last to buy 
their housing on credit. Wall Street came to the aid of Harlem with “ninja” loans (No 
Income, No Job, no Assets). 
Stage one: warped creditworthiness evaluation 
The collapse of the subprime system unfolded in several stages, each of which revealed 
the Panglossian vision of financial intermediaries. Upstream from the crisis, one fact 
became apparent rapidly. The quality of mortgage extended had profoundly deteriorated, 
even making allowances for the new clientele for whom they were intended. The clients’ 
creditworthiness had been systematically overestimated by the intermediaries in charge of 
distributing the mortgages. The cause of this deterioration is evident. Beforehand, in the 
old school of bank lending, lenders originating a loan were the ones who collected it 
afterwards, so they had an incentive to evaluate creditworthiness correctly. With the 
advent of loan securitisation, the agent originating the credit sells it immediately in the 
financial markets. The incentives are totally changed. What counts is to increase the 
numbers, not to examine the quality of the client. 
Step two: flippancy of the banks 
However, this phenomenon is only the first level in the house of cards. The second story 
is the “flippancy” of the banks themselves. To profit to the maximum from the new 
opportunities in mortgage lending, the banks created new, off-balance-sheet structures – 
“Special Investment Vehicles” (the infamous SIVs). By placing their new activities in 
these ad hoc structures, the banks liberated themselves from prudential rules. They were 
able to exploit to the financial leverage to finance high yielding operations on credit, 
without having to make use of their equity capital. The machine for betting imprudently 
with other people’s money was then set in motion. 
The crisis that began in the summer of 2007 revealed the magnitude of the phenomenon. 
Losses are between 422 billion dollars, according to the OECD, and 945 billion 
according to the IMF. Whatever the final figure turns out to be, depending on how the 
current crisis evolves, a “reverse leveraging effect” is at work, what is called 
“deleveraging” on Wall Street. The banks will indeed be forced to reduce the volume of 
their lending, (re-)proportioning it to their equity capital, at the very moment when this 
equity is amputated by losses. A contraction of credit is inevitable, and this usually leads 
to a recession. 
Phase three: the real estate bubble 
This leads to the third and last story in the house of cards: the real estate bubble. Easy 
money in the year 2000 nourished an explosion in asset prices, especially housing prices. 
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This enabled American households to live on credit. A very lax system allowed them 
indeed to increase their debt progressively as the value of their real estate holdings rose. 
All goes well as long as prices rise. When price fall, the households whose mortgage debt 
exceeds the value of their house (negative equity) may want to or may be forced to 
default. 
Phase four: the borrows become Panglossian 
Panglossian reasoning applies again here, but this time on the part of borrowers. The 
most heavily indebted households have an incentive to bet on the continuation of the rise, 
ignoring the risk of market reversal. This is the where the greatest risk lies going forward. 
In the United States, the fall in real estate prices has now reached a 10% average annual 
rate. A vicious circle is in motion. The reduction in prices obliges households to declare 
bankruptcy, which leads the banks to put the unpaid houses up for sale, which brings 
down the prices still more. Many of the same households also borrowed to buy cars, run 
up credit card bills, etc, so ‘deleveraging’ by the little guys could spread the crises far 
beyond mortgage lending. 
What easy money brought forth during the years 2000, tight credit will take away in the 
years to come. “Deleveraging” has begun on all levels: for the banks, for the financial 
institutions having used leveraging to the maximum, such as the hedge funds or the 
private equity firms, and for the households themselves. Is this the disenchantment of the 
financial world? No doubt - until the next round. 
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Sinn: What can be learned from the banking crisis 
17 December 2008 
This column says the core of the crisis lies in the legal provisions of limited liability. 
Europe and the world need stricter rules for financial traffic which are vital for the 
functioning of the financial capital markets. 
Now that the countries of the west have agreed to a three-trillion dollar bailout 
programme to rescue their banking systems, it is time to look forward and to draw lessons 
from the crisis. To do this we must understand the causes of the crisis. 
The claims that the model of American capitalism has self-destructed are just as 
misguided as putting the blame on the greed of investment bankers and other groups in 
society. They only touch the surface of the problem. 
The core of the crisis lies in the legal provisions of limited liability. Creditors of 
corporations have no claims against the personal assets of the owners (shareholders) of 
these corporations. These liability constraints lead to a systematic disregard of disaster 
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risks – occurrences with only a slight probability bring about gigantic losses. Investors 
that opt for high-risk projects with high potential gains and losses instead of safe projects 
with similar average profits can expect to gain, since they only have to bear a portion of 
the possible losses. If things go well, investors reap the full profit. If things go badly, at 
worst their losses would be limited to the stock of equity invested, because claims against 
private assets have been ruled out. This asymmetric situation encourages bold behaviour 
and risk-taking. 
The conclusion that the limited-liability constraint should be eliminated would be too 
rash, however, because risk-taking also has its merits. Limited liability was introduced in 
the nineteenth century in the US and Europe in order to avoid uncontrollable burdens 
being placed on equity holders and to enable entrepreneurs to make enterprising 
economic decisions that they otherwise would not have had the courage to make. It 
brought about the productive forces that have created the wealth of today’s generations. 
In times of great economic insecurity, however, limiting liability can become a problem 
because it induces entrepreneurs to become gamblers. As always it is a matter of 
weighing up the advantages and disadvantages and finding the proper middle ground. 
The problem of gambling is particularly serious when corporations are allowed to 
determine the extent of their liability themselves by choosing the ratio of equity to 
business volume as they see fit. Then they tend to operate with too little equity and 
distribute to their shareholders too large as fraction of their profits as dividends. The five 
large US investment banks, of which three have already fallen victim to the crisis, 
unscrupulously pursued this strategy, their motto being that you can’t lose what you don’t 
have. The risks created incentives to minimise the stock of equity kept inside the firms, 
and the small amount of equity capital in turn created incentives to pursue overly risky 
operations. The interplay of these incentives is the actual cause of the crisis – and this is 
where reform must begin. 
The privilege of limited liability is not a creation of the market; it was granted by the 
legislator, and because this is the case, the legislator himself must define his real 
intention. He cannot allow the beneficiaries themselves to make this definition. If they 
can, they will define the limitation in such a way that they assume almost no liability, as 
we have seen. US investment banks, which were not subject to American bank 
supervision, practised their business with equity-asset ratios in the region of 4%, which is 
much lower than the rate at which private commercial banks operate. In addition, they 
carried out very complex credit operations outside of their balance sheets, placing them 
thus away from investor control. 
Some may point out in defence that gambling is prevented by the rating agencies. They 
argue that rating agencies give poor ratings when risks are excessive, forcing the banks to 
pay higher interest for the money they themselves have borrowed. In this way, so the 
argument, the market corrects itself and creates the proper amount of caution. The 
miserable failure of the rating agencies during the present crisis shows, however, how 
illusory this reasoning is. The agencies did not give sufficient warning, and their AAA 
ratings were only withdrawn when there was no other alternative. Since they live on the 
fees they collect from the financial institutions they rated and were dependent on their 
good-will, they could not afford to tell the truth. The nearly bankrupt major customers of 
the rating agencies in America were glamorised while comparably robust but smaller 
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customers in Europe were downgraded. This is also how the credit packages with claims 
against American homeowners, which were already in risky territory, were offered to the 
world far above value. 
The best proof that the rating agencies and other information channels do not function 
and are not able to reliably inform purchasers of bank bonds and credit packages about 
the true circumstances lies in the fact that on the capital market equity capital is always 
more expensive than debt capital. If the purchasers of bank bonds had been correctly 
informed about the true repayment probability, they would have demanded adequate risk 
premiums on interest or sufficient reductions in the prices of these bonds, which would 
have made these liabilities just as expensive for the banks as equity. Finance theory 
designates this finding as the Modigliani-Miller theorem, after its authors. But this 
theorem fails to match reality. Everyone uses the leverage effects of debt capital up to the 
limit that the rating agencies establish in order to achieve higher yields from equity 
capital. Whoever does not do this and instead raises his equity-asset ratio to increase 
repayment probability is not rewarded for his virtue by the capital market. 
Bank bonds and securitised risks are entwined in a cascade of interlinked legal claims at 
whose end there is somewhere a real investment project. These are products that even 
specialists cannot properly appraise. The purchasers are almost never able to assess the 
true repayment probabilities correctly. Only the sellers that assemble the securitised 
packages have some idea of what they are selling. In the language of economists, these 
bank products are lemon goods, that is goods whose quality can only be partially assessed 
by the customers at the time of purchase and for this reason are usually offered at inferior 
quality. The sellers exploit the customers’ lack of information by reducing their costs at 
the expense of quality, knowing that the customers are not able to punish them by 
refusing to purchase or by demanding price discounts. Quality declines below the quality 
that would prevail in a market of informed customers. In order to prevent lemon markets, 
most countries have, for example, food regulators who set the lower limits for quality in 
food in the form of upper limits for unhealthy ingredients. In the case of pharmaceuticals, 
quality is safeguarded by the licensing procedures. The loans given to homeowners in the 
US – and that ended up as mortgaged-backed securities and collateralised debt 
obligations – are lemon products. In America higher rates of indebtedness are more 
common than in Germany. But the banks do not have the same claims to the private 
assets or income of homeowners than in Germany. If a low-income US homeowner 
chooses, he can hand over his house keys to the bank and has no repayment obligation. 
Conscious of this limited liability, US homeowners were much too cavalier in taking on 
real-estate which they could only afford if housing prices continued to rise. The real-
estate bubble that began to burst one and a half years ago and that gave rise to the 
banking crisis arose this way. 
Since the Reagan presidency a quarter century ago, Americans have increasingly become 
indebted to foreign creditors and have made a good life for themselves. They financed 
their investments from the capital streaming in from foreign countries and instead of 
saving relied on the increasing value of their real-estate. The deficit on the current 
account balance, that is the surplus of imported products and services over exports, 
reached a peak of 5.5% of GDP. This was financed with increasingly more sophisticated 
investment products that were certified with the stamp of the rating agencies – in the end 
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even the last investment manager of the German state banks noticed what junk was being 
sold here. The wheeling and dealing has now come to an end. No European bank escaped 
the painful experience that the expensive value-at-risk models of the investment bankers 
were just as worthless as the agency ratings. 
Politicians must finally face the task of defining legal liability limitations for corporations 
by establishing strict minimum standards for equity capital requirement for the various 
business models of the banks, both in America and in Europe. Stricter rules are not a 
disadvantage for the economy, since the apparently so much more expensive equity 
capital, whose use is thus made compulsive, is not economically more expensive than 
debt capital, as shown by the burdens that the taxpayers must now bear. Furthermore, no 
scarcity of funds would arise as a result, since the savings of the world just suffices – 
independently of such rules – to finance the investments. 
The necessary steps are as follows: 
1. The US must finally participate in international agreements on the harmonisation 
of banking supervision. These agreements can be based on the Basel-II system, 
which must be under government control. 
2. Europe needs a common system of financial supervision. Every state must pay for 
the losses of its own banks. 
3. Investment banks, hedge funds and private equity firms must be subjected to the 
same rules as commercial banks. 
4. Personal liability limitations for mortgages and other real-estate loans must be 
lifted in the US and wherever else they exist. 
5. Conduits and other constructs for the shifting of investment banking business 
from the bank balance sheets should be limited in such a way that the risks that 
the banks take on are transparent in the bank balance sheets. 
Free market advocates that argue against these remedies, without which a market 
economy cannot survive, confuse the market economy with anarchy. The market 
economy can only function when it is subjected to traffic regulations. Civil codes in 
many countries are full of rules that limit private contracts. Only a portion of the 
contracts that an uncontrolled market economy would develop is allowed, and because of 
this the system functions. Europe and the world need stricter rules for financial traffic. 
Such rules do not constitute a systemic break. They are vital for the functioning of the 
financial capital markets. 
Editors’ note: Published originally in German as „Ende des Verwirrspiels“, 
WirtschaftsWoche, no. 42, 13 October 2008, p. 64-65. 
 
Mariano: Do reputational concerns lead to reliable ratings? 
12 July 2008 
Rating agencies are currently plagued by conflicts of interest in building and rating 
financial products. But even with the right incentives, reliable ratings would be hard to 
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come by, this column argues. If market participants punish wrongly optimistic 
predictions more than wrongly pessimistic ratings, then an agency’s good reputation and 
a good rating do not coincide. 
In the recent debate about the role of rating agencies in the subprime debacle, conflicts of 
interest have received much attention. If rating agencies were not rating the financial 
products they helped construct, they would provide accurate information to market 
participants in order to safeguard their reputation, thus ensuring reliable ratings, or so the 
argument goes. But is it really the case that reputational concerns lead to reliable ratings? 
In a recent paper, I argue that this is not the case: worrying about reputation is not the 
same as worrying about providing reliable ratings. 
A rating agency assigns a rating based on information that is publicly available to all 
market participants and information that is privately assembled by its analysts or 
provided by the firm. This information goes through the rating agency’s credit model to 
produce a rating. If privately available information is inaccurate or difficult to interpret, 
or if the credit model is flawed, this may prompt a rating agency to make mistakes and 
issue an incorrect rating.60 When a rating agency that is aware of the imperfections in its 
ratings process finds itself in a situation in which a strongly held public opinion and its 
interpretation of its private information diverge, a rating agency might just conform to 
public opinion, issuing the rating that everyone expects, because of fears of being wrong. 
Even when public opinion does not come down strongly on the side of either a good or 
bad rating, reputational concerns do not necessarily lead to reliable ratings. It is likely 
that market participants are more likely to find out about a mistake when a rating agency 
gives a good rating than when it gives a bad one - good ratings entail more investor 
interest and analyst coverage, and a wider range of investors will end up holding the 
securities of the rated firm. In a situation in which a rating agency faces no competition, it 
might want to be conservative, issuing bad ratings too often, ignoring both publicly and 
privately available information that indicate otherwise, as this behaviour minimises the 
chances of being identifiably wrong. In a situation in which a rating agency faces tough 
competition, it might prefer to be bold and issue good ratings too often, ignoring both 
publicly and privately available information that indicate otherwise, in order to gamble 
on increasing its reputation relative to its competitors. 
Rating agencies can be too conformist, too conservative, or too bold precisely because 
they worry about reputation. Even if conflicts of interest were not an issue, governments 
and regulators should be cautious in giving rating agencies quasi-regulatory powers. 
 
 
                                                 
60 Financial Times, “Moody’s error gave top ratings to debt products”, May 20 2008. 
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Goodhart: The Financial Economists Roundtable’s statement on 
reforming the role of SROs in the securitisation process 
5 December 2008 
Credit rating agencies were at the heart of the rise of securitisation, and securitised 
assets were at the heart of the Subprime problems. Plainly these agencies are slated for 
major reforms. This column presents the statement of an eminent group of financial 
economists on such reform.  
During the last few decades, securitisation has become a primary channel for enlarging 
financial markets and transferring credit risk from lenders to investors. Outstanding 
issues of privately securitized assets peaked worldwide at just under $12 trillion in 2008. 
Table 1. Estimated Size of the Global Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) Securitisation 
Market, Classified by Collateral Employed (in billions of dollars) 
Prime Mortgage-Backed Securities  $3,800 
Subprime Mortgage-Backed Securities  $780 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities  $940 
Consumer ABS  $650 
High-Grade Corporate Debt  $3,000 
High-Yield Corporate Debt  $600 
Collateralized Debt Obligations  $400 
Collateralized Loan Obligations  $350 
Other ABS  $1,100 
Total  $11,920 
Source: Compiled from a variety of sources including Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase 
& Co, Lehman Brothers, Markit.com, Merrill Lynch and IMF Staff estimates. 
Benefits of well-regulated securitisation 
When properly structured and monitored, securitisation promises numerous benefits. It 
can generate opportunities for specialisation that reduce funding costs, increase the range 
of financial products available, encourage financial institutions to deploy capital more 
efficiently, and allow borrowers, lenders, and investors to manage their risks more 
flexibly. However, transferring risk undermines incentives to perform due diligence at 
virtually every stage in the securitisation process. In the last year, evident shortfalls of 
care and diligence in the origination, rating, and securitisation of mortgages have led to a 
collapse in the prices of securitisations related to subprime mortgages, alt-A mortgages 
and other leveraged loans. The suddenness and extent of this price decline has 
undermined confidence in the reliability and integrity of the ratings process for asset-
backed securities, and has reduced prices and credit flows in every market in which 
investors count on ratings firms to ascertain the quality of debt. 
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Meeting in Glen Cove, New York in July 2008, the Financial Economists Roundtable 
(Roundtable) discussed the need to strengthen the securitisation process by changing the 
incentives under which Statistical Ratings Organisations (SROs) operate. SROs (profit-
making firms that prefer to call themselves credit rating “agencies”) play a central role in 
testing the quality of the pool of obligations being securitized and in creating and 
marketing “tranches” of graded claims to cash flows from the underlying mortgages or 
other debt. The scope and scale of ongoing ratings downgrades and defaults on 
securitized debt make it clear that the ways in which credit ratings are used and 
constructed must be reformed. 
Three types of improvements 
The Roundtable sees a strong need for three types of credit-rating reform. 
6. The Roundtable supports strategies designed to improve SRO incentives by 
increasing the transparency of their modelling practices and holding their 
managements accountable for negligent ratings errors. 
7. The Roundtable challenges the wisdom of incorporating SRO ratings in securities 
and banking regulations issued by governmental entities. By outsourcing public 
authority to private firms, this practice intensifies the conflicts of interest that 
SRO personnel must resolve. 
8. To acknowledge differences in the degree of leverage that is imbedded in 
different issues of securitized debt, Roundtable recommends that SROs be 
required to state an express margin for error in their ratings for every tranche of 
securitized instruments. 
Some Historical Perspective 
Bond markets functioned internationally for 300 years before the first rating 
organisations appeared in the US. An active corporate bond market, largely in debt issued 
by railroad companies, emerged in the middle of the 19th century in the US more than 
half a century before the first SRO opened for business. SROs remained largely US-
focused until the 1970s, when global capital markets began to re-emerge after fading in 
the interwar period. 
In the pre-SRO era, underwriters performed some certification and monitoring for 
investors. Thereafter, third-party ratings mitigated asymmetric-information problems 
between issuers, underwriters, and investors by credibly centralizing efforts to collect and 
analyze the information needed to estimate, monitor, and update the probability of default 
of individual bonds. 
Ratings data also expanded the range of investors willing to hold corporate bonds to 
include parties that lacked the resources to undertake a complete and independent credit 
analysis. SROs originally earned their revenue by selling ratings manuals directly to 
investors. 
Building a reputation for accuracy is critical to the success of any SRO. Ratings firms 
prospered to the extent that their predictions of the probability of default proved reliable 
after the fact. Over time, the accumulation of reputational capital by successful SROs 
made entry difficult for new SROs. The result is that two or three SROs have dominated 
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the market for credit ratings, and did so long before the SEC began to designate particular 
SROs as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organisations (NRSROs) in the 1970s. 
In the early 1930s, incentives for SROs to produce reliable information for investors were 
complicated by introducing ratings into the regulatory process. Regulators of banks, 
insurance companies and pension funds began to use ratings to limit the riskiness of the 
assets held by regulated entities. Regulators now set two kinds of rules: rules that restrict 
the extent to which a firm can hold assets that fall below investment-grade or, as in the 
case of money market mutual funds, require a higher threshold than investment grade, 
and rules that link capital requirements to the ratings on individual securities, with lower 
capital charges for high-rated securities.61 The existence of such regulatory consequences 
was bound to intensify pressure on SROs to inflate the grades of lower-rated securities, 
because regulated clients routinely explore and develop ways of reducing their regulatory 
burdens. Frank Partnoy (1999, p.684)62 describes client pressure in this way: “[O]nce 
regulation … incorporates ratings, rating agencies begin to sell not only information but 
also valuable property rights associated with compliance with the regulation.” As ratings 
became more widely used in trigger clauses in bond contracts, strong ratings conveyed 
additional benefits to the issuer. 
Of course, a concern for protecting their reputations can act as a healthy counterincentive. 
Studies of ratings accuracy during the 20th century find that SROs have done a 
reasonably good job of predicting the probability of default of corporate bonds relative to 
regulatory indicators63 of default risk and market measures of default risk. Still, grade 
inflation has occurred. Caouette et al. (2008) observe that though the ratings do represent 
relative risks (on average) reasonably well, they are less reliable as indicators of absolute 
                                                 
61 For example, (Sylla 2002, p. 37) notes that in 1936, the US Comptroller of the 
Currency issued a regulation prohibiting banks from purchasing investment securities 
with characteristics that were “distinctly or predominantly speculative,” and then added 
that “the terms employed…may be found in recognized rating manuals, and where there 
is doubt as to the eligibility of a security for purchase, such eligibility must be supported 
by not less than two ratings manuals.” The latter phrasing, referring to recognized raters, 
was attacked as placing too much authority in the private rating agencies, and on that 
ground it was deleted from the regulation in 1938, although in a less formal way it 
remained in effect with regulators. For additional details see Richard Sylla, 2002, “An 
Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Rating,” in Ratings, Rating Agencies, and the 
Global Financial System, edited by Richard M. Levich, Giovanni Majnoni, and Carmen 
Reinhart, The New York University Salomon Center Series on Financial Markets and 
Institutions, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 19-40. 
62 Frank Partnoy, 1999, “The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets? Two Thumbs Down 
for the Credit Rating Agencies,” Washington University Law Quarterly, 77, October. 
63 For example, Hickman (1960) used legal investment lists for savings banks adopted by 
regulatory authorities in the states of Maine, Massachusetts, and New York as an 
indicator of regulatory ratings. For additional details see W. Braddock Hickman, 1960, 




credit risks; default probabilities associated with specific rating levels drift over time and 
therefore need to be frequently updated.64  
The spread of photocopying technology facilitated unauthorized reproduction of SRO 
rating manuals, which undermined the traditional user-pays revenue model. SROs 
responded by shifting to a business plan in which the issuer pays for their services. This 
plan intensified SRO conflicts of interest with issuers. Issuers and underwriters actively 
shopped for ratings and were unwilling to pay for ratings they deemed too low.65 In the 
case of the newer securitized debt, pressure for favourable ratings has been particularly 
intense because the large underwriters of structured debt could direct substantial future 
revenue to a cooperative NRSRO, thus increasing the potential for undue influence. 
SROs argued that concern for maintaining their reputational capital would nevertheless 
insulate ratings decisions on securitized debt from undue influence by issuers. This 
argument became increasingly less persuasive as income from rating structured debt 
began to increase sharply and account for almost half of the revenues of the three 
dominant firms. 
A further weakness inherent in issuer-pays arrangements is that they undercut SRO 
incentives to monitor and downgrade securities in the post-issuance market. The re-rating 
of securities is usually paid for by a maintenance fee that is collected in advance from 
each issuer. Few issuers are eager to be monitored closely, especially when monitoring is 
apt to result in downgrades, and so it is not surprising that ratings are seldom downgraded 
until long after public information has signalled an obvious deterioration in an issuer’s 
probability of default.66  
Not until 1975 did the SEC confront the problem of how to determine whether a 
particular SRO could be relied upon to provide ratings of sufficiently high quality that 
they could be used in the regulatory process. The SEC’s solution to this problem was to 
certify particular SROs as meeting sufficiently high standards to be designated by the 
SEC as an NRSRO. Other regulatory agencies, Congress, and many private agreements 
made use of the SEC’s designation of qualified NRSROs. For potential new entrants to 
                                                 
64 See J. Caouette, E. Altman, P. Narayanan, Managing Credit Risk, 2nd edition, John 
Wiley & Sons, NY, 2008. The expected dollar-denominated default rate on non-
investment grade corporate bonds in 1984 was 1.6% per year, but is now 3.9% per year. 
As late as 2007, Fitch reported that the default rate on structured products through 2006 
was similar or lower than that on corporate bonds. Subsequently, results for structured 
products deteriorated sharply. 
65 The June 2008 settlement between the New York Attorney General and the ratings 
agencies mandated charging separate fees for indicative ratings. While the intent was to 
reduce shopping for ratings, some FER members raised concerns that it may have the 
opposite effect by lending tacit official approval to the practice of shopping for ratings. 
66 E. Altman, H Rijken, “How Rating Agencies Achieve Rating Stability,” Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 28 (2004), 2629-2714, and E. Altman & H. Rijken, “A Point in 




the ratings industry, the costs and uncertainty of obtaining NRSRO status imposed an 
additional, legal barrier on top of their already substantial reputational disadvantage. 
From 1975 to 2002, although the SEC received numerous applications from entities in the 
US and abroad, only one new general-purpose NRSRO was approved. 
The NRSRO designation strengthened the market power of the dominant three incumbent 
firms: Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard & Poors. In turn, the oligopolistic position these 
firms enjoy reduces their incentives to compete in ratings methods and procedures. For 
example, even though SROs inevitably lack long histories and through-the-cycle data on 
innovative instruments, they have all been slow to draw on the information generated by 
derivatives trading (especially in credit default swaps) and from secondary markets for 
debt and equity, both of which would help them analyze potential defaults in a forward-
looking context. Nor have SROs developed procedures for supplying information on 
correlations that investors need to protect against concentrations in risk exposure that 
might exist in a portfolio of securities. 
Despite the potential benefits of strengthening competitive forces in the SRO industry, 
the three major NRSROs have been permitted to acquire competitors virtually without 
challenge.67 The Roundtable believes that the regulators could enhance competition 
among SROs by more vigorous application of antitrust policy. Although the SEC recently 
recognized a handful of additional firms as NRSROs in the last two years in response to 
pressure from Congress to ease barriers to entry, it will take considerable time for new 
entrants to wean much market share away from the three dominant firms. 
Roundtable’s Evaluation of the SEC’s Proposals for Reform 
Because some market participants are bound to base investment decisions primarily on 
credit ratings, efforts to improve ratings quality are important. In June, the SEC proposed 
several ways to improve the work of SROs and to increase competition in the ratings 
industry in three ways. The avowed and laudable purpose of these proposals is to foster 
increased transparency, accountability, and competition in the credit rating industry for 
the benefit of investors. The precise models used by SROs are proprietary and to 
encourage an individual SRO to invest in improving its models, the models themselves 
must remain proprietary. At the same time, to hold SROs accountable for their 
performance requires that each SRO release enough information on data input into its 
models to allow outside experts to verify its conclusions or provide alternative results. 
The SEC’s first proposal seeks to mitigate conflicts of interest, enhance disclosures, and 
improve internal policies and business practices at SROs. The second proposal would 
require NRSROs to differentiate the ratings on structured products from those that they 
issue on traditional bonds and loans, and perhaps to provide a timely and relevant 
accompanying narrative. The third proposal would nearly eliminate the role of ratings in 
                                                 
67 For example, Moody’s purchased the market-based credit risk and portfolio 
management firm, KMV, in 2001 and Duff & Phelps was purchased by Fitch in the early 




SEC regulations. Roundtable supports the thrust of each proposal. To explain why, we 
discuss each in turn. 
Conflicts of interest, disclosure, and improve business practices 
In the important areas of disclosure and incentive conflicts, the SEC’s first proposal 
would require SROs to: 
• Publish all ratings and subsequent re-ratings in ways that facilitate comparisons of 
SRO performance in a timely manner. Disclosures would include performance 
statistics for spans of 1, 3, and 10 years within each rating category.68  
• Disclose all information used to determine ratings for structured products. In 
addition, this would require each SRO to explain whether and how it might rely 
on the due diligence of others to verify the character of the assets underlying a 
structured product and to include sufficient information on the changing value of 
underlying assets to permit outside analysts (i.e., persons who are not paid by the 
issuer) to evaluate the riskiness of the structured claims issued against them. 
• Explain how frequently credit ratings are reviewed, whether different models are 
used for ratings surveillance than for setting an initial rating, and whether, when 
changes are made in an SRO’s models and procedures, they are applied 
retroactively to existing ratings. 
The Roundtable is less enthusiastic about the SEC’s proposed prohibition against letting 
an SRO act as both a rater of and a paid advisor for a tranched securitisation. Although 
we appreciate that acting in these dual capacities intensifies SROs’ conflicts of interest, 
we believe that the customary industry practice of presenting alternative structures for an 
SRO to rate makes it impossible for the courts to distinguish ratings services from 
advisory services in a definitive way. Moreover, we believe the enhanced disclosures will 
ease this conflict of interest. 
The SEC or Congress might also impose disclosure requirements on issuers. Every US 
issuer of securitised claims could be required to provide a monthly balance sheet and 
income statement for each and every securitisation structure it creates, even if the 
securities are to be marketed offshore. The revenue-generating pool of underlying assets 
constitutes the structure’s assets and the tranches set by the securitisation structure 
constitute claims against these assets. When underlying assets lose value, whether 
through rating downgrades or outright defaults, prospective revenues diminish and the 
values of affected tranches deteriorate. These easy-to-interpret disclosures would make 
pending deteriorations in cash flows more visible to investors and permit the joint 
distribution of risk statistics for the various tranches to be studied more effectively. 
Differentiating structured products from traditional bonds and loans 
                                                 
68 Although SROs provide data on default rates for bonds and loans by rating categories, 
data on structured products have been provided less frequently and ought to be published 
faster and more extensively in times of market turmoil. 
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The SEC’s second proposal seeks to differentiate ratings on securitisations in the future 
from those on ordinary bonds. Because of their imbedded leverage, securitised 
instruments may have a much deeper downside loss exposure than ordinary bonds. Using 
the same grading scale for both kinds of instruments reduces the effectiveness of 
restraints on institutional risk taking built into longstanding regulatory protocols. This 
renders many inherited regulatory strategies obsolete and was bound to confuse at least 
some investors. As an estimate, every credit rating carries a calculable margin for error. 
Introducing a differentiated scale is one way to alert investors that downside margins for 
error are much larger for securitised claims than for ordinary debt. Because imbedded 
leverage and downside margins for error grow larger when claims on an underlying asset 
pool are tranched and retranched, SROs should be required to express ratings on 
securitised debt in a two-dimensional fashion (i.e., with an accompanying estimate of 
their particular margin for error). This would be much more useful than merely 
developing a separate scale for securitised instruments. SROs might either use estimates 
of potential downside variability to rate claims in an interval framework (e.g., a particular 
rating might be expressed as lying in the range from A to AAA) or prepare and publish 
the volatility estimates themselves. 
Eliminate ratings’ role in SEC regulations 
The SEC’s third proposal addresses its practice of basing rules and reporting procedures 
on NRSRO ratings. The concern is that the use of NRSRO ratings in supervision 
simultaneously outsources some of the regulatory authority’s political accountability to 
profit-making firms and appears to confer an official seal of approval on their methods 
that might reduce the willingness of other parties to undertake due diligence and invest in 
securities analysis. The SEC proposes to remove references to NRSRO ratings from 
virtually all of its rules and protocols.69  
The Roundtable discussion divided references to NRSRO ratings in SEC regulations into 
two categories: 
• Prescriptive mandates that tell asset managers what they must do; and 
• Quasi-safe-harbour provisions that provide firms, managers and directors some 
protection from liability for adverse outcomes. 
The Roundtable strongly endorses eliminating from SEC regulations every prescriptive 
mandate that is or would be based solely on credit ratings set by NRSROs. We believe 
this will have three advantages. First, the prudence of investment decisions must 
ultimately be evaluated in a portfolio context and cannot be assured by constraining the 
                                                 
69 An exception is drawn for rules and forms that “relate to non-public reporting or 
recordkeeping requirements used to evaluate the financial stability of large brokers or 
dealers or their counterparties and are unlikely to contribute to any undue reliance on 
NRSRO ratings by market participants.” (Quoted from SEC 17 CFR Parts 229, 230, and 
240, Release No. 33-8940; 34-458071; File No. S7-18-08, p. 5.) These include rules 
which impose certain recordkeeping and reporting requirements for holding companies 
that own broker-dealers and of supervised investment-bank holding companies and 
reports regarding the risk exposures of large broker-dealers and OTC derivatives dealers. 
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credit quality of individual assets an institution holds, regardless of how accurate the 
SRO ratings might be. Second, depriving SRO ratings of regulatory consequences will 
remove a major source of pressure for ratings inflation. Third, in the absence of SEC 
mandates, managers and directors can and will subject the prudence of their decision 
making to review by a much wider array of outside monitors. In particular, they will 
expand their use of directors and officers insurance and introduce letters of assurance 
from well-respected experts. Whether or not these other monitors aspire to attain SRO 
status, they would supplement, extend, and challenge the assessments of individual 
securities made by SROs, thereby injecting valuable competition into the market for 
rating services. 
The Roundtable found it harder to assess the net benefits of quasi-safe-harbours (offered 
mainly to directors and officers of money market mutual funds) based on credit ratings.70 
Some members felt that removal of quasi-safe-harbours would yield benefits from 
increased managerial diligence and reduced pressures for grade inflation that would more 
than offset the increased compliance costs and costs of defending nuisance lawsuits. 
Other members believed that there are efficiencies to be achieved by use of 
intermediaries specialized in credit review. They argued that the rating requirements for 
money market mutual funds had worked reasonably well (apart from the current credit 
crisis) and that increased compliance costs, especially for smaller funds, would swamp 
any benefits that might emerge from increased managerial effort. Moreover, it was agreed 
that retaining this role for NRSROs would provide SROs with an incentive to register for 
NRSRO status and comply with the enhanced disclosure requirements. Even if the SEC 
should decide to continue to offer quasi-safe-harbours based on credit ratings, requiring a 
new ratings scale for securitised debt means that the content of such provisions has to be 
analyzed afresh to acknowledge the implications of the distinctions created. A new scale 
will similarly force banking agencies and state regulatory bodies to rethink and rephrase 
all rules and regulations that rely on credit ratings. In view of the importance of 
regulation-induced innovation in creating financial turmoil, such rethinking is long 
overdue. 
Implications for Other Regulators 
Although the SEC stressed that it had consulted with the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets, the Financial Stability Forum and the Technical Committee of the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the SEC’s proposed 
removal of references to ratings in its regulations diverges sharply from reform strategies 
currently being implemented by other regulators in the US and abroad. For example, the 
Treasury’s temporary insurance of money market mutual funds relies on compliance with 
rule 2a-7 that relies on rating as a useful indicative guidance, and the Treasury’s recent 
plan to recapitalize banks will be contingent on ratings to some extent. Roundtable sees 
the SEC’s third proposal as providing a timely challenge to other regulators to re-
                                                 
70 This protection is at best a quasi- safe- harbor because rule 2a-7(c) (3) states that the 
board must take into consideration “factors pertaining to credit quality in addition to any 
rating.” It might better be viewed as indicative guidance. 
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examine the extent to which they plan to employ SRO ratings in their own regulatory 
schemes. 
Although new rules and enhanced supervision might induce slightly better SRO 
performance, it is unlikely that increased government oversight of the production of 
credit ratings can improve SRO performance over time and improve the performance of 
investment managers as effectively as market forces can. It is particularly important for 
banking regulators to reconsider their reliance on ratings decisions. By adopting Basel II, 
they are linking minimum capital requirements for some banks to ratings issued by 
whatever SROs they recognize in each individual nation. Some banks will be free to use 
Basel II’s Standardized Approach, which the EU and Japan have already begun to 
implement and is proposed for implementation in the US. In this scheme, capital charges 
are assigned to each bank’s assets according to their credit ratings, with unrated assets 
receiving a 100% risk weight. Since loss reserves are already based on anticipated losses, 
capital requirements are intended to provide a buffer against unexpected risks. Thus, it is 
illogical to use credit ratings to establish capital requirements, since they convey no 
information about the volatility of an asset’s return around expected loss experience. In 
addition, ratings may be useful for establishing loss reserves for particular assets, but they 
say nothing about how a bank’s net worth or its portfolio of assets may vary in value. The 
amount of capital that must be set aside to achieve a particular target level of safety has to 
be linked explicitly to measures of the volatility of its earnings, not asset ratings. 
Since the subprime crisis has had a world-wide reach, regulatory authorities in other 
countries are also thinking about how to regulate SROs. Despite the SEC’s attempt to 
coordinate its actions with IOSCO, it is clear that different countries may respond to the 
crisis in different ways. The use of ratings is hard-wired into many EU regulations. The 
EU’s internal market commissioner is thinking of introducing some exacting regulatory 
requirements to make sure ratings are not “tainted” by the conflicts of interest inherent to 
the ratings business. The European Commission has proposed a registration and oversight 
regime that would have two features. The first charges the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) with the responsibility for choosing an individual country 
to register, coordinate and consolidate oversight of individual SROs. The second creates a 
central supervisor, financed from the EU budget, to license rating organisations. As 
capital markets become more closely integrated, ratings organisations are bound to find it 
difficult to operate under different rules in different locations. Also differences in rules 
would complicate cross-country comparisons of ratings for investors and regulators. If a 
single supervisory approach is to be adopted, Roundtable strongly supports the SEC’s 
strategy which relies on greater transparency, increased competition and the 
abandonment of the practice of incorporating NRSRO ratings in regulatory mandates. 
The Roundtable hopes that other regulators will follow the SEC’s lead. 
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Pedersen: Liquidity risk and the current crisis 
15 November 2008 
What is liquidity? Why is it at the heart of the crisis? How can we fix it? This column 
explains it all in terms any trained economist can understand. 
What is liquidity risk and how can it help us understand the current crisis? How do we 
solve the crisis - and which measures will only hurt? 
Here I provide some answers. The column is based on my 20 October 2008 talk at the 
International Monetary Fund and the Federal Reserve Board. To see the slides with lots 
of figures and graphs, click here. 
What is liquidity risk? 
There are two kinds of liquidity: market liquidity, and funding liquidity. 
• A security has good market liquidity if it is “easy” to trade, that is, has a low bid-
ask spread, small price impact, high resilience, easy search (in OTC markets). 
• A bank or investor has good funding liquidity if it has enough available funding 
from its own capital or from (collateralised) loans. 
With these notions in mind, the meaning of liquidity risk is clear. 
• Market liquidity risk is the risk that the market liquidity worsens when you need 
to trade. 
• Funding liquidity risk is the risk that a trader cannot fund his position and is 
forced to unwind. 
For instance, a levered hedge fund may lose its access to borrowing from its bank and 
must sell its securities as a result. Or, from the bank's perspective, depositors may 
withdraw their funds, the bank may lose its ability to borrow from other banks, or raise 
funds via debt issues. 
We are experiencing extreme market and funding liquidity risk 
Liquidity generally varies over time and across markets, and currently we are 
experiencing extreme market liquidity risk. The most extreme form of market liquidity 
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risk is that dealers are shutting down (no bids!), which is currently happening in a number 
of markets such as those for certain asset-backed securities and convertible bonds. We are 
also experiencing extreme funding liquidity risk since banks are short on capital, so they 
need to scale back their trading that requires capital, and also scale back the amount of 
capital they lend to other traders such as hedge funds, that is, hedge funds now face 
higher margins. In short, if banks cannot fund themselves, they cannot fund their clients. 
The two forms of liquidity are linked and can reinforce each other in liquidity spirals 
where poor funding leads to less trading, this reduces market liquidity, increasing 
margins and tightening risk management, thus further worsening funding, and so on. 
Liquidity risk and asset prices 
An illiquid security has a higher required return to compensate investors for the 
transaction costs. Since market liquidity may deteriorate when you need to sell in the 
future, investors face market liquidity risk as discussed above. Investors naturally want to 
be compensated for this, so market liquidity risk increases the required return. Indeed, the 
liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model shows how liquidity betas complement the 
standard market beta. The higher required return in times of higher market liquidity risk 
leads to a contemporaneous drop in prices, according to this theory, consistent with what 
we are seeing in the current marketplace. An overview of the liquidity literature is 
available here. 
Liquidity risk and the current crisis: downward liquidity spirals 
The trigger of the crisis was the bursting of the housing bubble, combined with a large 
exposure by the levered financial institutions. This led to significant bank losses with 
associated funding liquidity problems. This started the systemic liquidity spirals. As 
banks’ balance sheets deteriorated, they had to de-lever. To do this, they: 
• started selling assets; 
• hoarding cash; 
• tightening risk management. 
This put stress on the interbank funding market (as measured e.g. by the TED spread, see 
slides) as everyone was trying to minimise counterparty exposures. 
Banks’ funding liquidity problems quickly spread. Other investors, especially those that 
rely on leverage such as hedge funds, face funding risk when banks become less willing 
to lend, they raise margins, and, in the extreme, when the banks fail as Lehman did. 
When banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman started to look vulnerable, their clients 
risked losing capital or having it frozen during a bankruptcy, and they started to withdraw 
capital and unwind positions, leading to a bank run. 
This funding liquidity crisis naturally lead to market illiquidity with bid-ask spreads 
widening in several markets, and quoted amounts being reduced by dealers with less 
available capital. This market illiquidity, and the prospect of further liquidity risk, scared 
investors and prices dropped, especially for illiquid assets with high margins. 
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This is the downward liquidity spiral as illustrated in the chart. 
 
The crisis spreads to other asset classes 
The crisis has been spreading across asset classes and markets globally. There are 
currency crashes as traders unwind carry trades and lose faith in weak currencies. 
Further, as an example of the gravity of the liquidity crisis, the “Covered Interest Rate 
Parity” – the most basic arbitrage condition in the world’s thickest market (foreign 
exchange) – currently fails to hold even for the major currencies. This must mean that no 
one can arbitrage because no one can borrow uncollateralised, no one has spare collateral, 
and no one is willing to lend – arbitrage involves both borrowing and lending. 
The increased risk and illiquidity has also lead to a spike in volatility, contributing to the 
higher margins. Further, correlations across assets have increased as everything started 
trading on liquidity. 
The crisis spreads to Main Street 
Clearly, the crisis is having a significant effect on the real economy as homeowners see 
their property value deteriorate, consumers access to borrowing is reduced, main street 
companies face higher cost of equity and especially debt capital and a lower demand for 
their products, unemployment goes up, etc. 
What can - and what cannot - solve a liquidity crisis? 
If the problem is a liquidity spiral, we must improve the funding liquidity of the main 
players in the market, namely the banks. Hence, banks must be recapitalised by raising 
new capital, diluting old equity, possibly reducing face value of old debt. This can be 
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done with quick resolution bankruptcy for institutions with systemic risk, i.e. those 
causing liquidity spirals. 
Further, we must improve funding markets and trust by broadening bank guarantees, 
opening the Fed's discount window broadly (giving collateralised funding with 
reasonable margins), and ensuring the Commercial Paper market function. Further, risk 
management must acknowledge systemic risk due to liquidity spirals and the regulations 
must consider the system as a whole, as opposed to each institution in isolation. 
If we have learned one thing from the current crisis, it is that trading through organised 
exchanges with centralised clearing is better than trading over-the-counter derivatives 
because trading derivatives increases co-dependence, complexity, counterparty risk, and 
reduces transparency. Said simply, when you buy a stock, your ownership does not 
depend on who you bought it from. If you buy a “synthetic stock” through a derivative, 
on the other hand, your ownership does depends on who you bought it from - and that 
dependence may prevail even after you sell the stock (if you sell through another bank). 
Hence, when people start losing confidence in the bank with which they trade, they may 
start to unwind their derivatives positions and this hurts the bank’s funding, and a 
liquidity spiral unfolds. 
Banning short selling is a bad idea 
In the debate about how to solve the crisis and prevent the next one, it has been suggested 
that policymakers should ban short selling and impose a transaction tax on stocks. I 
believe that neither is a good idea. First, short sellers bring new information to the 
market, increase liquidity, and reduce bubbles (remember the housing bubble started this 
crisis) so preventing this can be very costly and prohibiting short sales does not solve the 
general funding problem. While temporarily banning new short sales of financial 
institutions can be justified if there is risk of predatory trading, this is rarely a good idea 
since short sellers are often simply scapegoats when bad firms go down fighting. (See 
here for how shortselling works.) 
Tobin taxes are a bad idea 
Second, a transaction tax on stocks is problematic for several reasons, most importantly 
because it moves trading away from the official exchanges and into the derivatives world, 
thus increasing the systemic risk. One of the main arguments in favour of such a 
transaction tax is that it helps to prevent bubbles, but there is little or no empirical 
evidence to support this. For instance, in the UK there is a 0.5% tax on trading stocks and 
a higher tax on trading real estate (up to 4%), but the UK arguably had one of the larger 
housing bubbles. Further, with a depressed and vulnerable stock market, this does not 
appear to be the best time to introduce transactions taxes related to potential stock price 
bubbles in the far future. 
To see the problem, consider what happened in the UK due to their transaction tax. The 
professional investors such as hedge funds found a way around the regulation by 
executing their trades using derivatives rather than trading stocks directly (while 
individual investors are unable to avoid the tax). Specifically, in the UK hedge funds 
typically trade via swaps with counterparties such as investment banks to avoid the 
transaction tax. There is little doubt that this would also happen in the US if such a tax 
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was introduced here. This would increase counterparty dependencies, systemic risk, and 
worsen risk management spirals as discussed above. 
Another serious problem with the tax is that it lowers liquidity in the marketplace as 
trading activity may move abroad, move into other markets, or disappear. On top of these 
distortions to the stability of the financial system, this tax may raise capital costs for Main 
Street firms because of higher liquidity risk in US financial markets. Indeed, buying US 
stocks will be less attractive to investors – domestically and internationally – if they must 
pay a tax to buy and if they anticipate reduced liquidity in the future when they need to 
sell. 
This could make it harder for US corporations to raise capital. And, the importance of 
being able to raise capital is what this crisis is all about. 
Conclusion 
Market liquidity risk is an important driver of security prices, risk management, and the 
speed of arbitrage. And the funding liquidity of banks and other intermediaries is an 
important driver of market liquidity risk. Liquidity crisis are evolve through liquidity 
spirals in which losses, increasing margins, tightened risk management, and increased 
volatility feed on each other. As this happens, traditional liquidity providers become 
demanders of liquidity, new capital arrives only slowly, and prices drop and rebound. 
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Persaud: How risk sensitivity led to the greatest financial crisis of 
modern times 
7 October 2008  
Subprime mortgages account for less than 1% of the world’s debt stock. How could they 
cause the greatest financial crisis in modern times? “Risk sensitivity” is this column’s 
answer. Regulators gave bankers incentives to combine bad loans with good ones and 
securitise the package in complex structures. The inseparability of the suspect parts 
meant problems with one package questioned the value of all packages. The least liquid 
banks failed, triggering a vicious cycle of fear and failure. 
As banks fail and world stock markets plummet, the questions on many investors lips is 
how could rising delinquency rates in sub-prime mortgages, which account for less than 
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1% of the world stock of debt, trigger one of the biggest financial crises of all times? And 
how do we reverse it? 
The answer to the first question lies in the two-word mantra of bankers and bank 
regulators over the past decade: “risk sensitivity”. Like all mantras, this sounded good but 
was dangerous in its oversimplification. The pursuit of “risk sensitivity” led to a re-
organisation of bank assets away from lending on the basis of the banker’s private views 
about the borrower - regulators considered this hard to quantify and a little suspect – 
towards lending on the basis of an external credit rating. The higher the rating, the lower 
the capital banks had to set aside against the loan. Regulators saw this as not only risk-
sensitive but transparent and quantifiable. Banking by numbers was oh so modern. 
One of the implications of this risk sensitivity is that bankers were given incentives to 
enhance the credit rating of lending to reduce their capital charges and improve their 
profitability. They did so in multiple ways with Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG 
often acting as the brokers. The result was that the unit of lending was no longer a known 
borrower, but an indivisible hodge-podge of bits of originated and purchased loans and 
hedges that when combined, justified good ratings. 
The focus on the rating led to the complexity that inevitably follows from using 
quantitative models to try and combine enough risky things to make the whole safer. But 
when something happened to question the rating of one package of loans, the complexity 
of these packages led the ratings of all packages to be questioned. Assets with the highest 
ratings, against which banks carried very little capital to protect them from the less than 
1% probability of default, are now trading at 90 cents on the dollar. This is more of an 
uncertainty premium – reflected in liquidity – than it is a credit risk premium. It is the 
revenge of relationship banking. 
One of the other consequences of lending by rating is that banks cannot easily quarantine 
the suspect parts of these loan packages because they are integral parts of the rated 
instrument. Because banks cannot easily do so, they do not trust other banks to have done 
so, so they stopped lending to each other. This forced the less liquid banks to fail, which 
encouraged the remaining banks to hoard liquidity, snatching it from the mouths of their 
clients whenever possible. This is how some problems in one small part of a subset of the 
financial system can bring the entire edifice down. 
The good news is that the problem is partly artificial and therefore solvable. The trouble 
is that banks and others don’t know how to value their assets because of the way they 
have been “organised”, not that their assets don’t have any value. The vast majority of 
governments, corporations, and individuals are servicing their debts. The bad news is that 
to re-organise loans and allow a greater dispassion in their valuation requires time. The 
definition of a crisis of confidence is that there is no time. This points to a few ways of 
reversing the current free fall of credit, markets, and economic activity. 
First, as my friend Willem Buiter has suggested, the central bank could guarantee all 
short-term interbank loans – there is more than enough room for inter-bank rates to fall 
even if the central bank charged for this guarantee. It may buy the authorities some time 
and it would serve to revive the interbank market rather than disintermediate it. Second, if 
the cycle of asset write-downs has depleted a bank’s capital, it makes sense for 
governments to inject capital in return for debtors accepting some partial debt for equity 
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swap. There is value locked up in these balance sheets. Third, we need to bring back 
buyers of credit, fast. The government could use ten-year loans to capitalise long-term 
buyers of credit instruments – like an insurance company or an investment fund with lock 
ups – prepared to hold assets either to maturity or long enough to pay back the 
government’s capital. This gets around the mark-to-market problem, the problem of the 
public sector pricing and owning complex credit instruments, and may even encourage 
other investors to follow suit. It is not a million miles away from J.P. Morgan’s rescue of 
the US financial system a hundred years ago. It is sad how little we have learned about 
the market’s frequent insensitivity to risk. 
 
 
Frank, González-Hermosillo, & Hesse: Transmission of liquidity 
shocks: Evidence from the 2007 subprime crisis 
13 September 2008 
The recent credit crisis started as a credit shock and then rapidly promulgated in the 
form of market and funding illiquidity before inducing solvency problems at some 
financial institutions. This column presents empirical evidence mapping the transmission 
channels of the crisis.  
The rapid transmission of the US subprime mortgage crisis to other financial markets in 
the US and abroad during the second half of 2007 raises some important questions: 
9. Through which mechanisms were the liquidity shocks transmitted across US 
financial markets during this period? 
10. What was the relative strength of these potential linkages? 
11. Did the episode of funding illiquidity in structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and 
conduits turn into an issue of bank insolvency? 
Conceptually, a number of transmission mechanisms are likely to have been established 
during the recent period of turbulence, either through increased market liquidity, funding 
liquidity, or even default risks. In addition, re-enforcing liquidity spirals may be 
observed. 
Market liquidity is an asset-specific characteristic measuring the ease with which 
positions may be traded without significantly affecting their corresponding asset price. In 
contrast, funding liquidity refers to the availability of funds such that a solvent agent is 
able to borrow in the market in order to service his obligations. 
In general, the mechanisms through which liquidity shocks influence the market-clearing 
process may operate through different channels during normal times than in the midst of 
an episode of financial stress. During tranquil periods, market illiquidity shocks are 
typically short-lived, as they create opportunities for traders to profit and, in doing so, 
provide liquidity and contribute to the price-discovery process. However, during periods 
of crisis, several mechanisms may amplify and propagate liquidity shocks across 
financial markets, creating systemic risks. These mechanisms can operate through direct 
121 
 
linkages between the balance sheets of financial institutions but also indirectly through 
asset prices. Specifically, these price movements are set in motion when financial 
institutions face marked-to-market losses. As a consequence, positions are deleveraged, 
and if the value of the corresponding assets is significantly affected, the creditworthiness 
of the respective institutions will deteriorate due to rising risk of default. Here, leverage is 
procyclical and can amplify the financial cycle. 
Transmission channels in the subprime crisis 
The recent crisis’ initial shock, the deteriorating quality of US subprime mortgages, was a 
credit event rather than a liquidity issue. Increased delinquencies on subprime mortgages 
resulted in uncertainty surrounding the value of a number of structured credit products 
that had these assets in their underlying portfolios. As a result, rating agencies 
downgraded many of the related securities and announced changes in their methodologies 
for rating such products, first in mid-July but then again in August and October. 
Meanwhile, asset-backed securities indices saw rapid declines, and the liquidity for 
initially tradable securities in their respective secondary markets evaporated. The losses, 
downgrades, and changes in methodologies shattered investors’ confidence in the rating 
agencies’ abilities to evaluate risks of complex securities, a result of which, investors 
pulled back from structured products in general. 
The main channels of transmission were: 
• Asset-backed commercial paper funding liquidity: Investors became unwilling to 
roll over the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) by which SIVs and conduits 
funded themselves. This idiosyncratic funding liquidity shock reflected increasing 
uncertainty with regard to the value of underlying securities. 
• Bank funding liquidity: The SIVs began calling on the contingent credit lines from 
the sponsoring banks, and the balance sheets of those financial institutions were 
strained by the reabsorption of the SIVs, which was amplified due to declining 
asset values. As a result, the level of interbanking lending declined both for 
reasons of liquidity and credit risk, leading to higher LIBOR spreads. 
• Market liquidity and volatility: As turbulence related to the US subprime 
mortgages heightened, financial markets more generally showed signs of stress, as 
investor preference moved away from complex structured products in a flight to 
transparency. Subsequently, positions were shifted in order to invest in only the 
safest and most liquid of all assets, such as US Treasury bonds. Furthermore, 
hedge funds that held asset-backed securities and other structured products were 
burdened by increased margin requirements, driven in turn by greater market 
volatility. 
• Bank solvency: The crisis also brought to the forefront concerns about the 
soundness of some of the largest banks, as witnessed by the collapse of Bear 
Stearns. Financial institutions saw a decline in the values of the securitised 
mortgages and structured securities on their balance sheets, resulting in extensive 
write-downs. Also, funding liquidity pressures forced rapid deleveraging during 
this period at depressed asset prices. Finally, refinancing costs increased due to 
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rising money market spreads, amplified by banks’ increasing reliance on 
wholesale funding. 
Mapping the transmission channels 
In a recent paper (Frank, González-Hermosillo, and Hesse 2008), we use a model of five 
variables which act as proxies for overall market liquidity, funding liquidity, default risk 
and volatility to examine the linkages across the different channels. For example, as 
Figure 1 shows, the ABCP spread, proxying for ABCP funding liquidity, the Libor 
spread, capturing bank funding liquidity and the CDS spread as a measure of bank default 
risk, all sharply increased at the onset of the subprime crisis.  
Figure 1. Aggregate bank credit default swap rate and selected spreads 
 
Sources: Bloomberg LP and IMF staff estimates 
Notes: Spreads are expressed in basis points. Asset-backed commercial paper spread is 
the spread between yields on 90-day US ABCP and three-month US Treasury bills. 
Credit default swap is the unweighted daily average of the five-year credit default swaps 
for the following institutions: Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Lehman 
Brothers, JPMorgan, Deutsche Bank, Bank of America, Citigroup, Barclays, Credit 
Suisse, UBS, and Bear Sterns. LIBOR spread is the spread between yields on three-
month US LIBOR and three-month US overnight index swap. 
We adopt a multivariate generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) framework that accounts for structural breaks to analyse the co-movement of 
markets by inferring the correlations of the changes in the spreads discussed above, 
which in turn is essential in understanding whether the recent episode of financial distress 
has become systemic. 
Figure 2 presents some results of the GARCH specification. There is strong evidence of 
increased interaction between the proxies for market and funding liquidity. The implied 
correlations between the ABCP and Libor spreads rise from a pre-crisis average of 
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approximately 0.3 to above 0.5, a level at which they remain. Furthermore, the linkages 
between these two funding liquidity measures and the 2-year on-the-run/off-the-run 
spread, proxying for market liquidity, jump from around zero to 0.2.  
Furthermore, stronger interactions across the bond and the stock markets are evident, 
with S&P 500 returns and the ABCP spread becoming more highly correlated amongst 
each other, as well as with all other variables. Finally, the co-movement between liquidity 
and solvency is sharply increased. Before the hypothesised break date at the end of July 
2007, changes in the credit default swap spreads remain approximately uncorrelated with 
all other measures, whereby the magnitude of these correlations increase to between 0.25 
and 0.5 in absolute value. Whilst implied correlations had been fairly small in the pre-
crisis period, the results presented here suggest that new channels of transmission of 
liquidity shocks were established during the second half of 2007.  









The results of a very pronounced interaction between market and funding liquidity are 
consistent with the emergence of re-enforcing liquidity spirals during the crisis period. 
On the one side of this liquidity spiral, financial institutions were exposed to refinancing 
needs in the form of issuing ABCP, a situation where market illiquidity in complex 
structured products led to funding illiquidity. In this regard, the results also show that 
increased correlations between the ABCP and Libor spreads reduced the possibilities of 
funding from the interbank money market, thus highlighting systemic risks. On the other 
side of this spiral, many European banks that had large exposures to US asset-backed 
securities had difficulties accessing wholesale funding, inducing subsequent market 
illiquidity in different market segments. Due to the major importance of the interbank 
money market, central banks in turn intervened by reducing interest rates and providing 
additional liquidity to the markets in order to reduce pressures.  
In addition to the described period of illiquidity, the US subprime crisis increasingly 
became one of insolvency, as banks such as Northern Rock, IKB, and Bear Stearns had to 
be rescued. This is captured by the implied correlations between the CDS and other 
variables in the GARCH model, which show clear signs of a structural break during the 
crisis period. Furthermore, these correlations have remained at elevated levels since then, 
suggesting that solvency concerns remain an issue.  
Finally, it is also shown that seemingly unrelated stock and bond markets were affected 
during these times of severe stress. These transmission mechanisms were not restricted to 
the US financial markets but were also observed across other advanced and key emerging 
market economies. In particular, many of these markets abroad were also subject to 
heightened implied correlations between funding and market liquidity, and their 




The financial turbulence that originated in US financial markets has so far been very 
protracted. What started out as a liquidity crisis turned into a solvency issue. Indeed, a 
number of major central banks have intervened heavily in order to maintain the stability 
of the global financial system. Many of the largest complex financial institutions had to 
replenish their balance sheet positions through capital injections from Sovereign Wealth 
Funds and by other investors. The analysis presented here suggests that innovation, such 
as structured credit products and banks’ increased ability to move risk off their balance 
sheets as well as augmented interconnectedness of large complex banks, made market 
and funding liquidity pressures readily turn into issues of insolvency. 
The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent 
those of the IMF or IMF policy. 
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Freixas and Parigi: The lender of last resort of the 21st century 
22 December 2008 
This column argues that the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 redefines the functions of 
the lender of last resort, placing it at the intersection of monetary policy, supervision and 
regulation of the banking industry, and the organisation of the interbank market. 
Since the creation of the first central banks in the 19th century, the existence of a lender 
of last resort (LOLR) has been a key issue for the structure of the banking industry. 
Banks finance opaque assets with a long maturity with short-lived liabilities – a 
combination that is vulnerable to sudden loss of confidence. To avoid avoidable disasters 
when confidence evaporates, the classical view (Thornton 1802 and Bagehot 1873) is that 
the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks, at a penalty rate, and against 
collateral deemed to be good under normal times. 
With the development of well-functioning financial markets, this view has been 
considered obsolete. Goodfriend and King (1988) in particular argue that the central bank 
should just provide liquidity to the market and leave to banks the task of allocating credit 
and monitoring debtors. This view, however, assumes that interbank markets work 
perfectly and in particular are not plagued by asymmetric information – but that is one of 
the main reasons why banks exist. The problem with asymmetric information is that 
liquidity shocks affecting banks might be undistinguishable from solvency shocks, thus 
making it impossible to distinguish between illiquid and insolvent banks (Goodhart 1987 
and Freixas, Parigi and Rochet 2004). 
LOLR and bank closure policy 
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LOLR is thus connected with the efficient bank closure policy and, more generally, with 
the costs of bank failures and of the safety net. In cases of illiquidity, the LOLR is 
channelling liquidity and improving the efficiency of the monetary policy framework. In 
insolvency cases, the LOLR acts as part of a safety net and thus is directly related to the 
overall regulatory framework. 
Clearly, the design of an optimal LOLR mechanism has to take into account both the 
banking regulation context and the monetary framework that is intended to cope not only 
with inflation but also with the management of aggregate liquidity. 
These issues are compounded by the fact that financially fragile intermediaries are 
exposed to the threat of systemic risk. Systemic risk may arise from the existence of a 
network of financial contracts from several types of operations: the payment system, the 
interbank market, and the market for derivatives. The tremendous growth of these 
operations recent decades has increased the interconnections among financial 
intermediaries and among countries. This has greatly augmented the potential for 
contagion (Allen and Gale 2000 and Freixas, Parigi and Rochet 2000). 
The panic of 2008 and subprime crisis of 2007 
The panic of 2008, originating with the subprime crisis of 2007, offers key insights into 
systemic risk and illustrates vividly the new role of a lender of last resort. 
Years of accommodating monetary policy, regulatory arbitrage to save capital, and waves 
of financial innovations – which by definition tend to escape traditional prudential 
regulation – have created the conditions for slack credit standards and rating agencies that 
fail to call for adequate risk premia. 
The opacity of the assets of the banks and of the financial vehicles they created to hold 
mortgages resulted in a dramatic and sudden reappraisal of risk premia. As with a thin 
market typical of the Akerlof lemons problem (Freixas and Jorge 2007), financial 
intermediaries have become reluctant to lend to each other if not for very short maturities. 
The fear that the interbank market might not work well and might fail to recycle the 
emergency liquidity provided by the central banks around the world in various and 
coordinated ways has induced banks to choose the rational equilibrium strategy of 
hoarding some of the extra liquidity instead of recycling it to the banks in deficit. 
The resulting equilibrium closely resembles the gridlock described by Freixas, Parigi and 
Rochet (2000), where the fear that a debtor bank will not honour its obligations induces 
the depositors of the creditor bank to withdraw deposits, thus triggering the liquidation of 
assets in a chain reaction. This is the modern form of a “bank run” – financial 
intermediaries refuse to renew credit lines to other intermediaries, thus threatening the 
very survival of the system. 
Liquidity in a non-functioning interbank market 
Clearly channelling emergency liquidity assistance through the interbank market will not 
work if the interbank market is not functioning properly. Thus, to limit the systemic 
feedbacks of the sudden deleveraging of financial institutions, the Fed has taken the 
unprecedented steps of both increasing the list of collateral eligible for central bank 
lending and extending emergency liquidity assistance to investment banks, government 
sponsored entities, money market mutual funds, and a large insurance company (AIG). 
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Preventing a complete meltdown of the financial system has required the central bank to 
guarantee (and accept potential losses) that most if not all claims on financial institutions 
will be fulfilled. 
The panic of 2008 has showed that it would be erroneous to adopt a narrow definition of 
the LOLR, stating that its role should be limited to the funding of illiquid but solvent 
depository institutions, while capital injections should be the Treasury’s responsibility. 
This would lead to a very simplistic analysis of the LOLR’s functions, as the complex 
decisions would be either ignored or handed over to the Treasury. Such a narrow view of 
the lender of last resort would create an artificial separation between lending by the 
lender of last resort at no risk and the closure or bail-out decision by the Treasury. In fact, 
the recent crisis has proved that the lender of last resort cannot deny support to a 
systemic, too-big-to-fail financial institution in need.  
To understand the interventions of the lender of last resort in the current crisis, the view 
of its role has to be a broad one encompassing the closure or bail-out decision defining 
the lender of last resort as an agency that has the faculty to extend credit to a financial 
institution unable to secure funds through the regular circuit. 
LOLR policy as part of the banking safety net 
Once we establish that the lender of last resort policy has to be part of the overall banking 
safety net, the interdependence of the different components of this safety net becomes 
clear. 
• First, the existence of a deposit insurance system limits the social cost of a bank’s 
bankruptcy, and therefore, reduces the instances where a LOLR intervention will 
be required. 
• Second, capital regulation reduces the probability of a bank in default being 
effectively insolvent, and so has a similar role in limiting the costly intervention 
of the LOLR. 
• Third, the procedures to bail-out or liquidate a bank, determined by the legal and 
enforcement framework will determine the cost-benefit analysis of a LOLR 
intervention. 
Adopting a perspective of an all-embracing safety net does not mean that the safety net 
has to be the responsibility of a unique agent. Often several regulatory agencies interact, 
because different functions related to the well functioning of the safety net are allocated 
to different agents. 
It is quite reasonable to separate monetary policy from banking regulation, and the 
separation of the deposit insurance company from the central bank makes the cost of 
deposit insurance more transparent. Also, the national jurisdiction of regulation makes 
cross-border banking a joint responsibility for the home and host regulatory agencies, an 
issue of particular concern for the banking regulatory authorities in the EU. 
Lessons for the LOLR’s role 
• First, we have witnessed how an additional aggregate liquidity injection is not a 
sufficiently powerful instrument to solve the crisis. 
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The illiquidity of financial institutions around the world is, in fact, directly linked not 
only to their solvency but also to asset prices. 
• Second, central banks around the world have been much more flexible in 
providing support to the banking industry than initially expected. 
In other words, that central bank cannot credibly commit to a bail-out policy. Indeed, the 
arguments regarding the bail-out of banks only if their closure could have a systemic 
impact (too-big-to-fail), that were intended for an individual bank facing financial 
distress were soon discarded in favour of a more realistic approach. 
The case of Northern Rock, certainly not a systemic bank, illustrates this point. Its 
liquidation in such a fragile banking environment would have triggered a domino effect 
with contagion from one institution to another. From that perspective the lesson is that 
when facing a systemic crisis, the LOLR has to take into account also the “too-many-to-
fail” issue, and consider how it will treat all banks that are in a similar position. 
• A third point is that, in a systemic crisis, the safety net is extended to non-bank 
institutions. 
This may be the result of financial innovation. Yet, because AIG had been issuing credit 
default swaps, its bankruptcy would have affected the fragility of the banking industry by 
leading to losses and a lower capital. 
• Fourth, regulators around the world have a mandate to protect the interests of their 
national investors. 
The international coordination of regulators, and in particular, the European coordination 
has been helpless when faced with the real cost of the Icelandic crisis. So, the theoretical 
models of non-cooperative behaviour are the ones to cope ex-ante with the burden-
sharing issue. 
Editor’s note: This article draws in part on the work Freixas and Parigi (2008). 
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Persaud: Reason with the messenger; don’t shoot him: value 
accounting, risk management and financial system resilience 
12 October 2008  
The US Economic Emergency Act of 2008 allows the SEC to suspend mark-to-market 
accounting rules. But a blanket suspension would be counter-productive. Crises are times 
when uncertainty quickly turns to panic. Now is not the time to increase uncertainty by 
changing accounting standards. This column proposes an alternative: mark-to-funding.  
The Economic Emergency Act of 2008 reaffirms the authority of the SEC to suspend fair 
value accounting. Observers elsewhere support a suspension of this accounting rule. It is 
a widespread view, especially amongst bankers, that International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) on fair value accounting compounded the recent financial crisis.  
Application of the IAS 39 rule that governs loan-loss provisions and extends mark-to-
market valuation of assets meant that when credit prices fell sharply and asset values 
were written down, banks were forced to sell assets and pull back credit lines to raise 
capital, which lowered asset prices further, causing more write downs and more capital 
losses. The jump in mark-to-market volatility compounded the problem by keeping 
buyers away. When lower prices do not drag out bargain hunters, but instead, more 
sellers, liquidity vanishes into what I have called a Liquidity Black Hole.  
In the Liquidity Black Hole of 2007/8 credit risk instruments were being priced, not in 
terms of the probabilities of default, but in terms of they would fetch if they had to be 
sold tomorrow in a massive clearance sale, to the diminishing number of buyers who do 
not require credit to purchase the assets and do not care about mark-to-market volatility. 
Consequently, prices have plummeted far below any measure determined by the risk of 
default. These prices represent liquidity-risk, not credit-risk. But a blanket suspension of 
mark-to-market rules would be counter-productive.  
Crises are a time when rumours are rife and uncertainty quickly turns to panic. It is not 
the time to increase uncertainty by changing accounting standards. Moreover, this would 
work against future crisis avoidance. Financial crashes are not random: they follow 
booms. Offering forbearance from mark-to-market accounting rules during a crisis, yet 
using these rules during the preceding boom, would promote excessive lending and 
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leverage in the good times. This asymmetry in the application of rules could contribute to 
more frequent and severe crashes. There is room for a principled revision to the 
application of mark-to-market rules, not a revision based on relying on the messenger’s 
every last word in good times and shooting him when things turn bad.  
There is another important issue that points the way to resolution of this issue. Under 
Basle I, the mechanism by which falling prices of assets lead to further declines in the 
price of assets was driven in large part by value accounting of assets. Under Basle II, 
market prices enter into both valuation and risk assessment. The very philosophy of Basle 
II – risk sensitivity – is about incorporating market prices into the assessment and 
response to risk. It should be no surprise that putting market prices at the heart of the 
system whose purpose is to avoid market failure will lead to systemic collapse. But the 
point is that simply changing the value accounting, but continuing to use market prices 
and their proxies such as credit ratings in assessment of the riskiness of assets will not 
pull us out of the liquidity black hole.  
From a risk management perspective, the problem with the current value accounting rules 
is that the focus is on the asset: its perceived liquidity and the intention of the asset holder 
to hold it to maturity or to trade it. We have seen how asset liquidity and holder intentions 
can change rapidly in a crisis leading to an increasingly artificial view of value and 
solvency. We should instead focus on the funding liquidity of the asset. Where assets are 
funded with short-term liabilities, then whatever the perceived liquidity or intentions of 
the asset owners, it is appropriate to mark the value of that asset to market in case funding 
dries up and the assets need to be sold tomorrow. But where assets are funded with long-
term liabilities or set against long-term liabilities, as is typically the case with a young 
pension fund, then marking asset values to market is not appropriate and can lead to an 
artificial view of risk and investment decisions based on a risk that is not important to the 
holder.  
The valuation "window" and the duration of risk management should be linked directly to 
the maturity of funding. The scope for banks to switch away from mark-to-market 
accounting under my proposal will be less than they are currently employing by re-
classifying assets from trading to hold to maturity. But the scope this presents would be 
more credible for being less artificial. Moreover, this proposal which I may call “mark-
to-funding” would provide scope for banks and other institutions to create (risk 
absorbing) pools of capital – funded with long-term liabilities – that could buy assets that 
are at a distressed price today, without being held back by short-term price volatility.  
To date crisis management efforts have been focused on trying to reduce the selling of 
assets: getting buyers back to the market place would also help. 
Editors' Note: This column is a precis of a presentation given by the author and hosted by 






Heinemann: Escaping from a Combined Liquidity Trap and Credit 
Crunch 
26 October 2008 
The dizzying falls in equity prices seem to have stopped. If they restart, it may be time for 
radical measures. This column suggests one motivated by bubble theory. The Fed could 
temporarily guarantee a lower bound for the S&P 500 through targeted purchases of 
market portfolios via open-market operations and financed by injecting cash.  
Between the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15 September and the announcements of 
European and US bank recapitalizations on 13 and 14 October, stock prices fell daily, 
producing double-digit percentage-point losses in most major markets. The muscular 
interventions agreed on 13 and 14 October seem to have quelled the worst of the panic, 
but stock prices have not rebounded.  
The current situation is worrisome. Private investors are liquidating all kinds of real-
valued assets and are instead hoarding liquidity at banks considered safe due to 
government guarantees. Banks are selling their shares and are calling in debts to 
minimize loses and save their remaining equity and to simply remain solvent. They are 
parking their liquidity at central banks and are not issuing new loans. 
Monetary policy is currently ineffectual. Interest rate cuts are not being passed on and the 
expansion of the money supply has also failed to influence credit terms. 
We are in a credit crunch – albeit not for lack of liquidity in the banking sector, but rather 
due to banks’ naked fear of having to write off more debts and, thereby, of endangering 
their own solvency.  
As monetary policy can presently neither reduce market interest rates nor stimulate the 
issuance of private loans, we are, furthermore, in a liquidity trap. The novelty here is that 
this liquidity trap is occurring at significantly positive interest rates, whereas it appeared 
in Japan through the zero bound on nominal interest rates.  
A Pessimistic Forecast 
If the large scale selling of stocks continues, the assets of banks and insurance companies 
will continue to fall in value until these institutes are insolvent. 
Banks and insurance companies may be nationalized as governments infuse these 
institutions with fresh capital in exchange for shares. 
This will be financed through the issuance of new government debt that will be accepted 
by markets as investors are fleeing to safe nominal assets. 
Should governments not be able to finance themselves on capital markets, due to a loss of 
confidence by the markets, they would still have access to a final recourse: the purchase 
of these government debts by central banks. 
Alternatively, central banks could prop up banks by recapitalizing them. Here, a lasting 
expansion of the money supply would be necessary. 




There are two ways out of a liquidity crisis: 
1. An increase in government expenditures (fiscal policy). This is already being 
accomplished indirectly through the partial nationalization of the banking sector. 
Additional government expenditures to stimulate the demand for goods could reduce the 
consequences of the crisis for the real economy, but would likely lead to large distortions 
and inefficiencies. Increased aggregate demand will not, however, stimulate investment if 
banks do not provide loans. Therefore, multiplier effects fail to unfold. 
2. Increasing inflation expectations. This would lead to a reduction in real interest rates 
even with constant nominal rates and normally would stimulate investment demand. In 
the current situation, however, the latter is unlikely, as investment demand is irrelevant 
for markets so long as banks are not issuing new loans.  
Textbook wisdom on escaping a liquidity trap is unlikely to work in the current situation, 
because we are in the unique situation of a combination of a liquidity trap and a credit 
crunch. 
Downward spiral 
We are currently experiencing a downward spiral. Banks are selling their assets to 
maintain their solvency. As all banks are acting in the same way, this reduces the value of 
assets, destroying banks’ equity. As a result, banks are forced to sell even more assts. 
Private investors are also acting in the same way to limit their losses. Since October 13, 
there are signs, however, that the downward spiral is coming to a halt. 
What to do if the downward spiral resumes 
Real value underlies stocks and mortgages. The downward spiral leads to a negative price 
bubble as was last seen in 2002. The dividend returns then exceed the returns on fixed 
income instruments and the risk for long-run oriented investors becomes very small. 
Eventually, investors will shift their portfolios and take advantage of the depressed prices 
to enter the stock and real estate markets. 
When will the flow of capital turn around? 
It is inevitable that expectations of a future rise in prices eventually prevail over 
expectations of a continuation in price decreases. For this to happen, however, a 
significant disequilibrium would have to occur first. 
Theory 
We are seeing an increasing (positive) bubble in fix-income investments, government 
bonds and other investments considered “safe”. (As their nominal value provides the 
basis of measurement, this is equivalent to a negative bubble in real values.) Here, Abreu 
and Brunnermeier (2003) and Brunnermeier and Morgan (2005) are applicable: every 
market participant is aware of the mistaken valuation, the lack of common knowledge, 
however, hinders the bubble’s bursting. The turnaround in capital flows can be expedited 
by a common signal, a piece of information that provides the markets with common 
knowledge that investment in real-valued assets is worthwhile. 
What could such a signal look like? 
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The coordinated lowering of target interest rates on October 8 was apparently not a 
sufficient signal. From theoretical research and experimental results regarding 
coordination games and bubbles, we know that a common signal has an impact on 
behaviour and beliefs about others’ behaviour only when the signal by itself has an 
impact on expected payoffs. 
That means: 
1. A signal must change the relative return expectations even in the absence of immediate 
changes in behaviour. 
2. Due to the changes in return expectations, there is an increase in market participants’ 
propensity to change their investment positions. 
3. As the signal is common knowledge, market participants expect that others will also 
change their positions. 
4. Due to strategic complementarities, participants react more strongly to the signal than 
they would have solely due to 1. 
The coordinated lowering of interest rates did create common knowledge, but failed to 
fulfil condition 1, since changes in central bank rates are currently ineffectual or are 
considered ineffectual by the markets.  
A coordinated recapitalization of banks, as was decided during the week from October 13 
to October 17, might not suffice, as banks have no interest in buying stocks or expanding 
lending under current conditions. Although banks are required to expand lending to the 
real sector as a condition for recapitalization by the government, it is not yet clear 
whether this stipulation will have any impact on the credit crunch and lead to the desired 
turnaround in market expectations.  
Concrete suggestions: 
A turnaround in the dynamics could be achieved by several signals: 
1. Several large private investors, whose actions comment sufficient attention, invest their 
liquid funds in stocks. Warren Buffet already did something along these lines with his 
investment in Goldman Sachs. This was, though, only a recapitalization of one bank and, 
so had only a small impact. What would have been necessary was the purchase of a 
broader set of assets on a much larger scale. I do not think that private investors hold 
enough funds to invest on the necessary scale. 
2. Sovereign wealth and pension funds engage in large-scale purchases of stocks. These 
funds, like private investors, have no interest in coordinating their purchases for the 
common good, as they would thereby eliminate the bargains they would otherwise be 
able to get. If only in the interest of their investors, pension funds are not in a position to 
make coordinated purchases. 
3. China uses its foreign exchange reserves to buy stocks on US markets and makes its 
intentions publicly known. One could also question China’s interest in announcing its 
intentions, but China would be the hero of the US financial system if it were to succeed. 
It could, furthermore, increase its strategic holdings and finally get rid of its exposure to 
Dollar-denominated government bonds. It would be a realistic chance for China to 
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participate in stock markets without provoking knee-jerk political reactions. Thus far, 
however, China does not appear to be seriously involved in discussions.  
4. The Fed could buy up the excess supply of stocks and guarantee a clearly defined 
lower bound for the major stock indices for a limited time. This could be easily achieved 
through the targeted purchase of market portfolios in exchange for cash (Concrete 
example: the backing of the S&P 500 through the sharing of costs and acquired shares by 
the participating reserve banks).  
5. A credible announcement by the Fed of inflationary policy for a limited time. 
Options 4 and 5 seem the most realistic, so I focus on them and, in the end, recommend 
option 4. 
Temporary guarantee of a lower bound on stock prices: 
I assume that the guarantee will be at a level that is clearly below the present value of 
expected future revenues (fundamental value). Thus, it should only be effective if there 
really is a negative bubble; and, in the long run, potential purchases are expected to be 
profitable. 
Pros: The announcement alone should prevent further sales from occurring. The Fed 
would actually only need to engage in limited purchases in an initial period to ensure the 
credibility of their announcement. By eliminating the downward risk, the flow of capital 
would reverse immediately and prices would advance significantly past the announced 
lower bound.  
Cons: A guaranteed lower bound creates moral hazard problems. Thus, any such 
guarantee must be temporary in nature.  
Inflation expectations: As the expiration of the guarantee nears, there are three possible 
scenarios to consider: 
1. The crisis has come to a halt. Stock prices are sufficiently above the announced lower 
bound, and the expiration date has no significant effect on the level (apart from some 
temporarily higher volatility). 
2. The crisis has come to halt, but markets expect that the guarantee is still a binding 
restriction. Stock owners will sell to the Fed well before the expiration date and the Fed is 
forced to acquire a large amount of stocks. 
3. The crisis continues up to the expiration date of the guarantee: In this case, the Fed 
may decide to extend the guarantee or let it expire and stand ready to acquire a large 
amount of stocks. 
If the Fed really is forced to buy a large amount of stocks, this will be conducted through 
open-market operations, increasing the money supply, and, thereafter, increasing 
inflation. As there is an ex ante positive probability that one these negative scenarios 
realizes, inflation expectations should increase immediately after the credible 
announcement of such a guarantee.  
To the extent that there is immediate action and a well-defined expiration date, the 




Note, however, that in the period leading up to the expiration date, inflationary 
expectations will exceed actual inflation. According to textbook wisdom, this should 
have contractionary effects on the demand side and tend to raise savings. In the current 
situation, however, with a liquidity trap occurring simultaneously with a credit crunch, 
such reductions in demand will hardly affect GDP, because current GDP is restricted by 
credit, not by demand. This is the same reason why fiscal policy is unlikely to have 
multiplier effects (see above). 
Long-term impact: this action would continue to create a moral hazard problem in the 
future, as market participants would expect that the systemic risk in future crises would 
be borne by the Fed. On the other hand, current actions aimed at refinancing and 
recapitalizing banks have the same effect – but even more, because they are directly 
aimed at helping those institutions that created systemic risk. The latter creates a bailout 
arbitrage in which institutions have an additional incentive to magnify systemic risk. 
A guarantee of a lower bound on stock prices is appealing in comparison with the 
original Paulson plan of buying troubled assets from banks, as the former exploits market 
mechanisms for injecting equity into the banking sector. There is no asymmetry 
distorting relative prices and the moral hazard problem is limited to systemic risk. Buying 
troubled assets, instead, preferentially rewards those institutions that caused the crisis by 
accumulating these assets. 
Announced temporary increase in inflation targets: 
Pros: -A temporary increase in inflation targets is credible under current circumstances. 
If the downward spiral continues, an increase in inflation is already inevitable. 
Higher inflation expectations lead to a shift in real return expectations from fixed-income 
assets to stocks and real estate and make real assets more attractive in one fell swoop. 
A joint signal along these lines could serve to coordinate market participants’ portfolio 
realignments and, thereby, lead to a turnaround in the flow of capital. The turnaround 
would become self-propagating and continue until the negative exaggerations in stock 
markets have been corrected. 
As a large fraction of Dollar-denominated debt is held abroad, the associated burden 
(inflation tax) will be borne by foreigners.  
Cons-1: Consequences for monetary policy 
A temporarily higher inflation target must be accompanied by a monetary policy that 
actually delivers the increases in price levels associated with the changed target. This 
would create the credibility that will be necessary for the subsequent period of 
disinflation after the cessation of the temporary target. Additionally, undercutting 
inflation expectations would lead to contractionary effects in the real economy that would 
necessarily have to be avoided as they would otherwise lead to a strengthening of the 
recession that is already expected. 
In the long run, markets would have to accept and price the possibility of inflation 
temporarily exceeding its target. This possibility would have to be weighed against the 
probability of a systemic banking crisis (that will no longer be neglected in the future). 
This would lead to an inflation-risk premium on long-term debt obligations and would, 
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above all, make financing government debt more costly. A higher inflation bias in the 
sense of Barro and Gordon (1983) is not likely though, as wage contracts generally have 
shorter maturities. 
Cons-2: Political consequences 
A temporarily higher inflation leads to a de facto one-time real devaluation of savings 
deposits. This places the burden of financing the financial crisis on those parties who 
were least responsible for its inception, including older people whose savings are to a 
larger extent invested in nominal bonds. 
I cannot foretell what consequences this might have for politicians and decision makers. 
To me, it would not seem to be a popular way to solve the crisis.  
Conclusion 
I recommend policy 4: 
In the event that the downward spiral in asset prices resumes, the Fed should agree to 
temporarily guarantee a clear lower bound for the S&P 500. It should arrange the 
implementation of this guarantee through targeted purchases of market portfolios. This 
action should be carried out by open-market operations and financed by injecting cash. 
The portfolios thusly acquired can be sold for profit at a later date, reducing inflationary 
pressure in the long run, or to repay the government debt that has already been 
accumulated in various bailouts. 
For a more elaborate descriptions of a downward spiral, see e.g. Adrian, T., and H.S. 
Shin (2008), Liquidity and Financial Cycles, BIS working paper No. 256. 
Abreu, D. and M. Brunnermeier (2003), Bubbles and Crashes, Econometrica 71, 173-
204. 
Brunnermeier, M., and J. Morgan (2005), Clock Games: Theory and Experiments, 
working paper. 
Svensson, L.E.O. (2003), Escaping from a Liquidity Trap and Deflation: The Foolproof 
Way and Others, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, 145-166. 
Barro, R.J., and D.B. Gordon (1983), A Positive Theory of Monetary policy in a Natural 
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Danielsson: Complexity kills 
29 September 2008  
Complex financial models and intricate assets structures meant extraordinary profits 
before the crisis. Markets for structured products became overly inflated as even the 
banks did not have a clear view of the state of their investments. Given complexity's role 
in today’s mess, future regulation should focus on variables that are easy to measure and 
hard to manipulate (e.g. leverage ratios).  
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Uncertainty about asset values is a key factor in the wave of financial institutions failures 
we have been experiencing. It used to be that banks became insolvent because their loans 
went sour. Now it is the complexity of assets that lets them down. It may well be that the 
Lehmans of this world would have been able to cover their liabilities in the long run, but 
their downfall was triggered by a lack of liquidity because they were unable to 
demonstrate to the market that their assets were sound.  
At first, complexity was a virtue 
Before the crisis, sophisticated financial models and intricate assets structures enabled 
many banks to reap extraordinary profits, by enabling them to identify profit 
opportunities and risks in enormous detail. Complexity became a virtue. However, this 
complexity often meant that banks did not have a clear view of the state of their 
investments. Indeed, the greatest profit opportunities often lie at the edge of chaos. 
Unfortunately, at that point it takes little to send you over the edge. 
In such complex financial models, mathematics often assumes far greater importance 
than the accurate depiction of reality. The models generally ignored liquidity as well as 
the fact that in a downturn assets that were previously well diversified move together, 
sharply increasing their correlation. The subprime industry only started after the previous 
recession, and the models therefore did not consider the possibility of economic 
downturns.  
Consequently, valuations and risk assessments of structured products became 
increasingly out of sync with economic fundamentals and the underlying assets. 
Unfortunately, few mechanisms existed for identifying the looming problems. If the 
models indicate everything is fine, backed up by mark to market accounting practices, it 
is not surprising that the markets for structured products became overly inflated. 
A sense of invulnerability: Mark to market, model or magic 
A sense of invulnerability, or hubris developed within the financial system. “It is hard for 
us, without being flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of reason that 
would see us losing one dollar in any of those transactions" said Joseph J. Cassano, the 
former AIG executive, who was in charge of the AIG CDS operation that ultimately led 
to its failure in August 2007. See Lo (2007) and Danielsson (2008) for more on these 
issues.  
Eventually, in August 2007 the bubble burst. At the beginning of the crisis banks 
comforted themselves with the belief that that the crisis in the credit markets was a 
temporary phenomenon. After all, from a mark-to-market point of view the assets 
retained their values. What they did not realise was that it was the models themselves 
were wrong. Mark to market in the absence of a liquid market implies mark to model, or 
simply mark to magic. 
Without liquidity, complexity became a vice 
When credit markets collapsed and liquidity disappeared, complexity became a vice. In a 
crisis, banks gain access to liquidity by being able to demonstrate that they are solvent. If 
assets are so complicated that nobody, not the regulators, not the clients and not even the 
banks are unable to get any realistic assessment of valuations and risk, of course investors 
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will refuse to supply liquidity. Banks simply became too sophisticated for their own 
good. 
Given the role model complexity played in fuelling the crisis, the reaction of banking 
regulators has been on occasion incomprehensible. The regulators have allowed and on 
occasion encouraged the use of sophisticated models by banks, and they have gauged the 
health of the financial system with the output of these models. This approach is an 
important component of both the Basel 2 Accord for banks and Solvency 2 for insurance 
companies.  
Before the current crisis there was some logic to this process. But given the role of 
model-driven complexity in the crisis, regulators should now be focusing on alternatives. 
An implementation of the leverage ratio as a means to determine minimum capital would 
be a good step forward. Unfortunately, while the leverage ratio is in use in the US and 
being advocated by Switzerland, the rest of the world’s regulators have so far rejected it. 
It is the nature of financial regulations that they tend to be reactions to previous crisis 
episodes and slow to adapt to the dynamic nature of the financial system. Existing 
regulations and the Basel 2 Accord address the problems of the financial system circa 
1995. Hopefully, this crisis will lead to both banks and regulators to develop a healthy 
scepticism for the complex models that helped to get us into this crisis. Regulations 
should focus on variables that are easy to measure and hard to manipulate, such as the 
leverage ratio, and encourage transparency and simplicity in a bank’s operations. 
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Bloom: Will the credit crunch lead to recession? 
4 June 2008 
The credit crunch has produced significant volatility in the stock market. This column 
argues that the wave of uncertainty troubling the markets will likely induce a recession – 
and render policy instruments powerless to prevent it. 
One of the most striking effects of the recent credit crunch is a huge surge in stock 
market volatility. The uncertainty over the extent of financial damage, the identity of the 
next banking casualty, and the unpredictability of the policy response of central banks 
and governments have all led to tremendous instability. 
A standard measure of uncertainty – the “implied volatility” of the S&P100 of the US 
stock market, commonly known as the index of “financial fear” – has more than doubled 
since the subprime crisis first emerged in August 2007. This jump in uncertainty is of 
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similar magnitude to those that followed the Cuban missile crisis, the assassination of 
President Kennedy, the Gulf War, and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Monthly US stock market volatility 1962 - 2008 
 
Note: Prior to 1986, “annualised standard deviation” is calculated as the percentage 
actual volatility of monthly returns on the S&P500 index of the US stock market. After 
1986, it is calculated using the percentage “implied volatility” from an option on the 
S&P100 index. 
But after these earlier “shocks”, volatility spiked and then quickly fell back. For example, 
after 9/11, implied volatility dropped back to baseline levels within two months. In 
contrast, the current levels of implied volatility have remained stubbornly high for the last 
seven months, rising rather than abating as the crisis continues. 
In recent research, I show that even the temporary surges in uncertainty that followed 
previous shocks had very destructive effects. The average of the 16 shocks plotted in 
Figure 1 (before the credit crunch) cut US GDP by two percent over the next six months 
(Bloom 2007).So the omens for the impact of the current credit crunch are worrying. If 
these earlier temporary spikes in uncertainty had such a significant effect on economic 
activity, the impact of the current persistent spike in uncertainty is likely to be far worse. 
On these numbers, a recession is almost inevitable. 
For a broader historical comparison to the credit crunch, we can also go back 70 years to 
the Great Depression. This was the last time that volatility was persistently high (see 
Figure 2). 




Note: The vertical axis shows a measure of volatility derived from Schwert (1990), which 
contains daily stock returns to the Dow Jones composite portfolio from 1885 to 1927, and 
to the Standard and Poor’s composite portfolio from 1928 to 1962. 
Much like the credit crunch today, the Great Depression began with a stock market crash 
and a meltdown of the financial system. Banks withdrew credit lines and the interbank 
lending market froze up. The US central bank – the Federal Reserve – desperately 
scrambled to restore calm but without success. 
What followed were massive levels of stock market volatility and a recession of 
unprecedented proportions. From 1929 to 1933, US GDP fell by 50%, a bigger drop than 
in every recession since World War II combined. On these numbers, a recession not only 
looks almost inevitable, but its longer-run effects start to become alarming. 
The cost of uncertainty 
So why is this rise in uncertainty likely to be so damaging for the economy? The reason 
is that firms typically postpone making investment and hiring decisions when business 
conditions are uncertain. It is expensive to make a hiring or investment mistake – so if 
conditions are unpredictable, the best course of action is often to wait. 
If every firm in the economy waits, then economic activity slows down. This directly cuts 
back on investment and employment, two of the main drivers of economic growth. But it 
also has knock-on effects in depressing productivity growth. 
Most productivity growth comes from “creative destruction” – productive firms 
expanding and unproductive firms shrinking. But if every firm in the economy pauses, 
then creative destruction temporarily freezes – productive firms do not grow and 
unproductive firms do not contract. This leads to a stalling of productivity growth. 
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Similarly damaging effects also happen on the consumers’ side: when uncertainty is high, 
people avoid buying consumer durables like cars, fridges and TVs. The housing market is 
also hit hard: uncertainty makes people cautious about upscaling their house. 
One reassuring fact is that global policy-making is in safe hands. The damaging effects of 
uncertainty shocks are well known to Fed chairman Ben Bernanke. His doctoral thesis of 
more than 25 years ago explored the negative effects of uncertainty shocks. 
The main paper from that thesis was pioneering in the way it formalised the negative 
effects of uncertainty in causing recessions, noting that: “events whose long-run 
implications are uncertain can create an investment cycle by temporarily increasing the 
returns to waiting for information” (Bernanke 1983). 
Policy problems 
So what is stopping Chairman Bernanke from acting to counteract this rise in uncertainty 
and forestall the recession? Well, as Bernanke also knows, the same forces of uncertainty 
that lead to a recession also render policy-makers relatively powerless to prevent it. 
When uncertainty is high, firms become cautious, so they react much less readily to 
monetary and fiscal policy shocks. According to research on UK firms, which I 
conducted with two colleagues, uncertainty shocks typically reduce the responsiveness of 
firms by more than half, leaving monetary and fiscal policy-makers relatively powerless 
(Bloom et al. 2007). 
So the current situation is a perfect storm – a huge surge in uncertainty that is not only 
generating a rapid slowdown in activity but also limiting the effectiveness of standard 
monetary and fiscal policy to prevent this. 
Policy-makers are doing the best they can – making huge cuts in interest rates, dishing 
out tax rebates and aggressively pouring liquidity into the financial markets. But will this 
be enough? History suggests not. A recession looks likely. 
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Bloom: The credit crunch may cause another great depression 
8 October 2008 
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The crisis is shaping up to be a perfect storm – a huge surge in uncertainty that is 
generating a rapid slow-down in activity, a collapse of banking preventing many of the 
few remaining firms and consumers that want to invest from doing so, and a shift in the 
political landscape locking in the damage through protectionism and anti-competitive 
policies. 
Back in June 2008 I wrote a piece for VOXEU predicting a mild recession in 2009. Over 
the last few weeks the situation has become far worse, and I believe even these 
pessimistic predictions were too optimistic. I now believe Europe and the US will sink 
into a severe recession next year, with GDP contracting by 3% in 2009 and 
unemployment rising by about 3 million in both Europe and the US. This would be the 
worst recession since 1974/75. In fact the current situations has so many parallels with 
the Great Depression of 1929-1932, when GDP fell by about 50% in the US and by about 
25% in Europe, that even my updated predictions could again be over optimistic. 
Uncertainty is higher then it’s been in 20 years 
One of the most striking effects of the recent credit crunch is the huge surge in stock 
market volatility this has generated. The uncertainty over the extent of financial damage, 
the identities of the next banking casualty and the unpredictability of the policy response 
have all led to tremendous instability. As a result the implied volatility of the S&P100 – 
commonly known as the index of “financial fear” - has more increased almost six-fold 
since August 2007. In fact since the outbreak of the Credit Crunch it has jumped to levels 
even greater than those witnesses after the events of the 9/11 Terrorist attacks, the Gulf 
Wars, the Asian Crisis of 1997 and the Russian default of 1998 (see Figure 1).  




But after these earlier shocks volatility spiked and then quickly fell back. For example, 
after 9/11 implied volatility dropped back to baseline levels within 2 months. In 
comparison the current levels of implied volatility have been building since August 2007 
and are likely to remain stubbornly high. 
But even these more moderate surges in uncertainty after these earlier shocks had very 
destructive effects. The average impact of the sixteen shocks I examined in prior research 
was to cut GDP by up to 2% in the following six-months. The current shock is both larger 
than these on average and also appears to be more persistent. If these earlier temporary 
spikes in uncertainty led to a 2% drop in GDP the impact of the current persistent spike in 
uncertainty is likely to be far worse. 
The rise in uncertainty and banking collapse look like the Great Depression 
For a broader historical comparison to the credit crunch we can also go back 70 years to 
the Great Depression. This was the last time that volatility was persistently high (Figure 
2). Much like today, the Great Depression began with a stock-market crash and a melt-
down of the financial system. Banks withdrew credit lines and the inter bank lending 
market froze-up. The Federal Reserve Board desperately scrambled to restore calm but 
without success. What followed were massive levels of stock-market volatility and a 
recession of unprecedented proportions. 




From 1929 to 1933 GDP fell by 50% in the US and about 25% in Europe, a bigger drop 
then in every recession since World War II combined. On these numbers a recession not 
only looks almost inevitable, but its longer run effects start to become alarming. 
So why is this banking collapse and rise in uncertainty likely to be so damaging for the 
economy? First, the lack of credit is strangling firm’s abilities to make investments, hire 
workers and start R&D projects. Since these typically take several months to initiate the 
full force of this will only be fully felt by the beginning of 2009. Second, for the lucky 
few firms with access to credit the heightened uncertainty will lead them to postpone 
making investment and hiring decisions. It is expensive to make a hiring or investment 
mistake, so if conditions are unpredictable the best course of action is often to wait. Of 
course if every firm in the economy waits then economic activity slows down. This 
directly cuts back on investment and employment, two of the main drivers of economic 
growth. But this also has knock-on effects in depressing productivity growth. Most 
productivity growth comes from creative destruction – productive firms expanding and 
unproductive firms shrinking. Of course if every firm in the economy pauses this creative 
destruction temporarily freezes – productive firms do not grow and unproductive firms do 
not contract. This leads to a stalling productivity growth.  
And much like the Great Depression politicians may make this worse 
Finally, on top of the survey in uncertainty and collapse in credit we also have the spectre 
of a damaging political response. One of the major factors compounding the Great 
Depression was that politicians moved to hinder free trade and encourage anti-
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competitive practices. The infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 was introduced 
by desperate US policy-makers as a way of blocking imports to protect domestic jobs, but 
helped worsen the recession by freezing world trade. At the same time policy-makers 
were encouraging firms to collude to keep prices up and encouraging workers to unionize 
to protect wages, exacerbating the situation by strangling free markets. The current 
backlash against capitalism could lead to a repeat, with politicians swinging towards the 
left away from free-markets. This happened after the Great Depression, it happened after 
the major recession of 1974/75 and I think it will happen again now. This will lock in the 
short-run economic damage from the current credit crunch into longer run systematic 
damage from anti-growth policies. 
So the current situation is a perfect storm – a huge surge in uncertainty that is generating 
a rapid slow-down in activity, a collapse of banking preventing many of the few 
remaining firms and consumers that want to invest from doing so, and a shift in the 
political landscape locking in the damage through protectionism and anti-competitive 
policies. 
An inconvenient recession 
In fact the only upside of all this is that the massive slow-down in economic growth will 
rapidly cut the growth rates of CO2 emissions. Pollution is tightly linked to the level of 
economic activity, so that a few years of negative growth would lead to reductions in 
pollution levels not seen since the 1970s. It seems ironic that the greed of Wall Street 
may have inadvertently achieved what millions of well intentioned scientists, activists 
and politicians have failed to achieve – a slowdown in global warming.  
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Repullo and Suarez: The procyclical effects of Basel II 
14 July 2008 
Basel II’s goal was to reduce incentives for excessive risk taking. Making banks’ capital 
requirements risk-sensitive, however, also set the system up for credit crunches during 
economic down turns. This column argues that small cyclical adjustments to the 
confidence levels set by regulator could preserve Basel II’s value-at-risk foundation 
while avoiding painful credit crunches during periods of economic distress. 
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The global charter that regulates banks’ capital requirements – known as Basel II – aims 
to make each bank’s capital holdings proportional to its potential credit losses.71 The idea 
was to reduce the incentives for excessive risk-taking and the opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage supposedly offered by the old regime – Basel I. 
Even before the Subprime crisis, there was widespread concern about the possibility that 
the risk-sensitivity of the new requirements may amplify business cycle fluctuations, 
forcing banks to restrict their lending when the economy goes into recession (Kashyap, 
and Stein 2004). 
In recent research, we assess the impact of Basel II on banks’ cyclical lending capacity 
taking into account that banks will possibly respond to the new regulatory environment 
by modifying their buffers of capital held in excess of the regulatory minima. Our 
analysis suggests that, despite their attempt to reduce the procyclical effects by increasing 
their buffers, Basel II implies a much larger contraction in credit supply than Basel I 
when the economy enters a recession. 
We also show that there are some easy fixes that would drastically ameliorate the 
problem. These would involve some wise adjustments in the cyclical profile of the levels 
of solvency (or “confidence”) targeted by the regulators. 
Can bank regulation be procyclical? 
Even under the essentially flat capital requirements of Basel I, bank capital regulation has 
the potential to be procyclical because bank profits may turn negative during recessions, 
impairing banks' lending capacity. Additionally, the Internal Ratings Based Approach 
(IRB) of Basel II makes capital requirements an increasing function of banks' estimates 
of their loans’ probability of default and loss given default, which are both likely to 
increase during downturns. This might substantially exacerbate the negative impact of 
recessions on banks’ supply of credit and, thereby, on the economy as whole, hence the 
concern on the procyclicality of Basel II. 
However, there are some necessary conditions for capital requirements to have 
contractionary effects: 
Some banks must find it difficult to respond to the accumulation of losses or higher 
capital requirements by issuing new equity. 
The borrowers of the constrained banks must be unable to switch to other sources of 
finance. 
If these conditions hold, capital requirements may be responsible for an aggregate 
contraction in the supply of credit – a credit crunch – during recessions. 
Relationship banking and capital buffers 
                                                 
71 In 2004, after years of discussion, the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision reached 
an agreement, known as Basel II, which introduces a major revision of the original 
agreement on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards 




Are these conditions likely to hold? The informational features of banking relationships 
suggest so. 
If lending makes banks privately informed about their borrowers, then informational 
asymmetries are likely to plague the market for seasoned equity offerings, making urgent 
recapitalisations prohibitively costly. As the Basel II Accord notes, “it may be costly for 
banks to raise additional capital, especially if this needs to be done quickly or at a time 
when market conditions are unfavourable” (paragraph 757c). Intuitively, the market for 
seasoned equity offerings might be what economists describe as a “market for lemons”—
after a negative shock, the banks with lower quality borrowers would be more interested 
in issuing equity than the banks with higher quality lending relationships, resulting in 
prices for new equity that are unattractive to the latter, collapsing the market or 
engendering large price discounts. 
The informational contents of bank relationships also implies that borrowers may become 
dependent upon the banks with which they maintain a relationship, as they might be 
locked in by the switching costs and stigma faced when switching to another bank 
(especially if they come from a bank in trouble). 
However, banks involved in information-intensive lending relationships tend to 
appropriate rents from their continued lending and may hold buffers of capital, in excess 
of the minimal regulatory requirements, in order to reduce the effect of negative shocks 
on their lending capacity. So the key question is whether the losses and additional capital 
requirements associated with recessions will overwhelm banks’ precautionary capital 
buffers? Answering that question requires a model of how banks will behave under Basel 
II. 
In our recent paper, we build a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship banking in 
which business cycle fluctuations affect borrowers’ default rates. Assuming that equity 
financing is more costly than deposit financing, we show that capital requirements 
increase equilibrium loan rates but have an analytically ambiguous effect on capital 
holdings. On the one hand, the higher prospects of ending up with insufficient capital 
necessitates holding larger buffers; on the other hand, higher capital requirements reduce 
the profitability of future lending and thus a bank’s interest in preserving its future 
lending capacity. 
We use numerical simulations in order to assess which effect will dominates under the 
Basel II requirements. For our simulations, we assume that credit losses conform to the 
single risk factor model that rationalizes the formula of the IRB capital requirements of 
Basel II. Importantly, under such a model, capital requirements have an exact value-at-
risk interpretation: required capital is such that it can absorb the potential losses of a loan 
portfolio over a one-year horizon with a probability of 99.9%.72 
Results 
Under realistic parameterisations, Basel II leads banks to hold buffers that range from 
about 2% of assets in recessions to about 5% in expansions. The procyclicality of these 
                                                 
72 See Gordy (2003) on the use of the single factor model as a foundation for the capital 
requirements of Basel II. 
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buffers reflects the fact that banks are concerned about the upsurge in capital 
requirements that takes place when the economy goes into a recession. We find, however, 
that these equilibrium buffers are insufficient to neutralise the effects of the arrival of a 
recession, which may cause a very significant reduction in the supply of credit – ranging 
from 2.5% to 12% in our simulations, depending on the assumed cyclical variation of the 
default rates. 
There are significant differences between Basel I and Basel II. Under the flat (risk-
insensitive) capital requirement of Basel I, the same banks would keep slightly 
countercyclical buffers and the economy would suffer very small credit crunch effects. 
However, the probabilities of bank failure under Basel I are substantially greater than 
under the new risk-sensitive approach. This suggests that designing the optimal policy 
involves evaluating a trade-off between the importance of long-term solvency of the 
banking sector and the short-term effects on the availability of credit. Yet, we show that a 
minor policy adjustment would allow regulators to make progress on both fronts. 
Policy response: adjusting the cyclical profile of confidence levels 
Small cyclical adjustments to the confidence levels set by the regulator could ameliorate 
the procyclical impact of Basel II. If the regulator replaced a constant confidence level 
with a cyclical profile of confidence levels, it would be possible to keep the long-term 
average confidence at its current level—99.9%—while lowering the target during periods 
of economic distress in which current regulations might induce a painful credit crunch. 
Using our model, we evaluate the effects of some specific cyclical adjustments that 
would reduce the confidence level to 99.8% during periods of high default and raise it 
above 99.9% during prosperous periods. Our simulations suggest that these approaches 
would achieve significant gains in terms of alleviating credit rationing without incurring 
major costs in terms of banks’ solvency. Such cyclical adjustment would preserve the 
value-at-risk foundation of the Basel II requirements, while addressing the very real 
concern that risk-sensitive capital requirements – in their present form – may exacerbate 
credit crunches. 
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Goodhart: Central banks’ function to maintain financial stability: An 
uncompleted task 
24 June 2008 
Central banks cannot achieve price and financial stability with one instrument (interest 
rates). A counter-cyclical regulatory system is needed to dampen asset booms and to 
smooth busting bubbles. To use such macro-prudential instruments effectively, regulators 
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need courage, quantitative triggers, and independence; they will be criticised by lenders, 
borrowers and politicians in both booms and busts. 
The events of the last year have reminded us all that a central bank does not just have one 
responsibility, that of achieving price stability. It is indeed its first core purpose (CP1); 
but as the sole institution that can create cash, and hence bank reserve balances, a central 
bank has a responsibility for acting as the lender of last resort and maintaining financial 
stability. This is its second core purpose (CP2). 
Two goals but only one instrument 
One of the major problems of central banking is that the pursuit of these two core 
purposes can often conflict, not least because the central bank currently appears to have 
only one instrument, its command over the short-term interest rate. Indeed, a central 
purpose of the first two great books on central banking, Henry Thornton’s (1802), Inquiry 
into the Paper Credit of Great Britain, and Walter Bagehot’s (1878), Lombard Street, 
was to outline ways to resolve such a conflict, especially when an (external) drain of 
currency threatened maintenance of the gold standard at the same time as an internal 
drain led to a liquidity panic and contagious bank failures. 
Under such circumstances, however, with rising risk aversion, the central bank would 
find that it had two instruments, due to its ability to expand its own balance sheet, e.g. by 
last-resort lending, at the same time as keeping interest rates high, (to deter gold outflows 
and unnecessary (speculative) borrowing). The greater problem, then and now, was how 
to avoid excessive commercial bank expansion during good times. With widespread 
confidence, the commercial banks neither want nor need to borrow from the central bank. 
A potential restraint is via shrinking the central bank’s own balance sheet, open market 
sales, thereby raising interest rates. But increasing interest rates during good times, (gold 
reserves rising and high; inflation targets met), i.e. ‘leaning into the wind’, is then against 
the ‘rules of the game’, and such interest rates adjustments small enough to be consistent 
with such underlying rules are unlikely to have much effect in dampening down the 
upswing of a powerful asset price boom-and-bust cycle. 
CP1: ‘Price stability’ versus CP2: ‘Financial stability’ 
Although the terminology has altered, this basic problem has not really changed since the 
start of central banking in the 19th century. An additional analytical twist was given by 
Hy Minsky, who realised that the better the central bank succeeded with CP1 (price 
stability), the more it was likely to imperil CP2 (financial stability). The reason is that the 
greater stability engendered by a successful CP1 record is likely to reduce risk premia, 
and thereby asset price volatility, and so support additional leverage and asset price 
expansion. The three main examples of financial instability that have occurred in 
industrialised countries in the last century (USA 1929-33, Japan 1999-2005, sub-prime 
2007/8) have all taken place following periods of stellar CP1 performance. 
We still have not resolved this conundrum. It shows up in several guises. For example, 
there is a tension between trying to get banks to behave cautiously and conservatively in 
the upswing of a financial cycle, and being prepared as a central bank to lend against 
whatever the banks have to offer as collateral during a crisis. Again, the more that a 
central bank manages to constrain bank expansion during euphoric upswings, e.g. by 
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various forms of capital and liquidity requirements, the greater the disintermediation to 
less controlled channels. How far does such disintermediation matter, and what parts of 
the financial system should a central bank be trying to protect? In other words, which 
intermediaries are ‘systemic’; do we have any clear, ex ante, definition of ‘systemic’, or 
do we decide, ex post, on a case-by-case basis? 
Bank risk and bank-system risk 
Perhaps these problems are insoluble; certainly they have not been solved. Indeed, recent 
developments, notably the adoption of a more risk-sensitive Basel II CAR and the move 
towards ‘fair value’ or ‘mark-to-market’ accounting, have arguably tilted the regulatory 
system towards even greater pro-cyclicality. A possible reason for this could be that the 
regulators have focussed unduly on trying to enhance the risk management of the 
individual bank and insufficiently on the risk management of the financial system as a 
whole. The two issues, individual and systemic risk performance, are sometimes 
consistent, but often not so. For example, following some financial crisis, the safest line 
for an individual bank will be to cut lending and to hoard liquidity, but if all banks try to 
do so, especially simultaneously, the result could be devastating. 
The bottom line is that central banks have failed to make much, if any, progress with 
CP2, just at the time when their success with CP1 has been lauded. This is witnessed not 
only by the events of 2007/8, but also by the whole string of financial crises (a sequence 
of ‘turmoils’) in recent decades. Now, there are even suggestions that central banks 
should have greater (even statutory) responsibility for achieving financial stability, (e.g. 
the Paulson report). But where are the (regulatory) instruments that would enable central 
banks to constrain excess leverage and ‘irrational euphoria’ in the upswing? Public 
warnings, e.g. in Financial Stability Reviews, are feeble, bendy reeds. All that central 
banks have to offer are mechanisms for picking up the pieces after the crash, and the 
more comprehensively they do so (the Greenspan/Bernanke put), the more the 
commercial banks will enthusiastically join in the next upswing. 
Counter-cyclical instruments 
Besides such public warnings, which the industry typically notices and then ignores, the 
only counter-cyclical instruments recently employed have been the Spanish pre-
provisioning measures, and the use of time-varying loan to value (LTV) ratios in a few 
small countries, e.g. Estonia and Hong Kong. But the Spanish measures have 
subsequently been prevented by the latest accounting requirements, the IFRS of the 
IASB; and the recent fluctuations in actual LTVs have been strongly pro-cyclical, with 
100+ LTVs in the housing bubble being rapidly withdrawn in the housing bust. 
Indeed, any attempt to introduce counter-cyclical variations in LTVs or in 
capital/liquidity requirements will always run into a number of generic criticisms: 
• It will disturb the level playing field, and thereby cause disintermediation to less 
regulated entities (in other segments of the industry, or in other countries). It will 
thus both be unfair and ineffective. 
• It will increase the cost of intermediation during the boom and thereby reduce 
desirable economic expansion (and financial innovation). 
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• It will increase complexity and add to the informational burden. 
These criticisms have force. Indeed, there are empirical studies that suggest that countries 
which allow a less regulated, and more innovative and dynamic, financial system grow 
faster than their more controlled brethren, despite being more prone to financial 
(boom/bust) crises. Nevertheless it should be possible to construct a more counter-
cyclical, time-varying regulatory system in such a way as to mitigate these problems, so 
long as the regulations are relaxed in the downturn after having been built up in the 
boom. 
But those same generic criticisms will also mean that regulators/supervisors will be 
roundly condemned for tightening regulatory conditions in asset prime booms by the 
combined forces of lenders, borrowers and politicians, the latter tending to regard cyclical 
bubbles as beneficent trend improvements due to their own improved policies. 
Regulators/supervisors will need some combination of courage, reliance on quantitative 
triggers, and independence from government if they are to have the strength of mind and 
purpose to use potential macro-prudential instruments to dampen financial booms. 
 
Giovannini: Let banks be banks, let investors be investors 
22 November 2008 
Simplicity and transparency, two major causalities of recent financial market changes, 
are essential to restoring trust in financial markets. This column suggests that 
distinguishing two types of financial intermediaries – client servicers and capital 
managers – would be a big step in the right direction. Today’s lack of distinction means 
one set of regulations is applied to the two very different functions.  
Simplicity and transparency – two vital ingredients of trust in financial dealings – are 
casualties of financial market changes in the recent years. To restart the financial system 
and the world economy we need to re-establish them, a point acknowledged in the recent 
G20 communiqué.  
Restoring simplicity and transparency is a task for world governments. I propose a 
straightforward method for doing so. Here is the sound-bite version: let banks be banks, 
let investors be investors.  
Essential distinctions among financial intermediaries 
Intermediaries in financial markets (and in particular, in securities markets) necessarily 
fall into one of two categories: 
• Client servicers 
• Capital managers. 
The client business is defined by proximity to clients. It consists of selling access to 
markets (primary, i.e. capital raising, and secondary, i.e. brokerage), and all its ancillary 
activities such as research and advice (on capital raising, mergers and acquisitions). The 
client business also includes supplying derivative contracts tailored to client needs, so 
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these are hedged in the books of the client servicer. Finally, client business includes 
borrowing and lending cash, as well as borrowing and lending securities performed only 
to fulfil client requests. 
The capital management business is completely different. The simple and robust criterion 
for distinguishing capital management from client servicing is that the franchise of the 
capital management business is not counterparties, but shareholders. The client business 
gains in value if it provides good service to its counterparties. The capital management 
business has no special regard for counterparties; it gains in value if it provides good 
investment returns to shareholders. Capital managers may invest their shareholders’ 
moneys on a leveraged or un-leveraged basis and provide exposure to the whole spectrum 
of financial risks. While their transactions may be the same as those of the intermediaries 
in the client business and therefore their balance sheets may look very similar, their 
objectives and their risk profile is completely different.  
A dangerous muddling of functions  
What is wrong with the financial system now? That there is no clear distinction between 
these two functions, and as a result regulations and functions have grown too far apart.  
Banks and investment banks mix client business and capital management business – 
despite the fact that the proximity of these two businesses gives rise to very serious 
conflicts of interest. In addition, the capital management business within banks and 
investment banks is not transparent (who knows how much money comes from 
proprietary investments?), and is not subject to efficient capital constraints.  
Consider this simple example: a bank can hold risk-weighted assets up to 12.5 times its 
capital (the capital requirement is 8% of risk weighted assets, equal 1/12.5). Is this a 
constraint appropriate to the low-risk world of client business (which, as explained above, 
by definition systematically hedges away financial risk) or the potentially much higher 
risk of investment management? In the past year or so, the largest dollar losses caused by 
the financial turmoil have come from banks. By definition, these large losses imply that 
the banks that have incurred in them have taken excessive risks. The hypothesis that an 
inappropriate regulatory framework led these institutions to take on excessive risks is by 
now the most credible one. 
Capital management is also performed by asset managers and hedge funds (in addition to 
the banks mentioned above). But hedge funds are institutions that are subject to very 
different rules than asset managers, despite the fact that they do the same business. The 
very fact that most hedge funds are corporations based in offshore centres illustrates the 
lack of a satisfactory institutional setup for an industry that in recent years has become 
the most dynamic part of the financial system. 
How do we let banks be banks and let investors be investors?  
The answer, in a nutshell, is to create a regulatory regime (or better, adapting current 
regulations) that clearly distinguishes between the two types of intermediaries – client 
businesses and investors – and provides a consistent set of rules for each.  
This idea may look similar to recent proposals to re-instate Glass-Steagall legislation 
prohibiting banks from dealing in securities or to return to narrow banking (see Paul De 
Grauwe 2008). It is in fact quite different. 
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Consider Glass-Steagall first. It can be argued conceptually and it has been shown 
empirically that the presumed conflicts of interest between lending and capital markets 
(issuance of bonds) activities are insignificant.73 In a financial system where securities 
have become, appropriately, a dominant medium of transactions, it makes little sense to 
separate out securities activities from the rest of the activities of client businesses. 
Proponents of narrow banking, by contrast, argue for ways to eliminate liquidity 
transformation.74 I do not think this should be an objective of a well-working financial 
system, because liquidity transformation is a socially productive activity and, as the 
recent experience has shown, liquidity risk never goes away from securities markets. 
There are, however, ways to mitigate and control liquidity risk, as I discuss below. In 
conclusion, banks and broker dealers should only be that; they should not be investment 
managers. 
Consider now the capital management business. The second fundamental pillar of a well-
working financial system is a consistent institutional framework for capital managers. All 
capital (or investment) managers, mutual funds and hedge funds, should be subject to the 
same rules (which of course recognize the different degrees of risk of different asset 
classes and investment styles). Thus, all hedge funds should be onshore, and subject to 
the appropriate regulations (like other asset managers, prudential rules and investor 
protection rules). Such rules are not expected to prevent professional hedge fund 
managers to carry out their business as they have done so far. My impression is that those 
who claim that hedge funds were much less hit in their investments by market turmoil 
because they were offshore and unregulated are overstating the potential perverse 
incentives caused by investment management rules.  
Dealing with financial instabilities 
It is apparent that both categories of intermediaries, client businesses and capital 
managers, may be subject to financial instabilities that are caused by liquidity 
mismatches and can be aggravated by leverage. Banks are subject to runs. Even money 
market mutual funds can be subject to runs (the recent $540 billion bailout of US money-
                                                 
73 Proponents of the separation of lending and securities businesses were inspired by the 
hypothesis that lenders may offload unwanted credit risks by issuing bonds by the same 
borrower to the public. The many defaults that occurred in the early 1930s were at the 
origin of that hypothesis and of the legislative initiatives in the US. However, the 
hypothesis does not take into account the fact that capital markets activities are repeated, 
and that selling bonds that subsequently default causes large damage to such activities. In 
addition, for empirical analysis showing that in the early 1930s United States broker-
dealers’-issued corporate bonds were not significantly less risky than banks’-issued 
corporate bonds, See Kroszner and Rajan (1994). 
74 For example, De Grauwe (2008) suggests that matching the duration of assets and 
liabilities of banks would amount to a return to narrow banking. While this rule would 
eliminate interest-rate risk from banks balance sheet, it would not eliminate liquidity risk, 
which is more specific to the nature of the assets and liabilities held. In other words, it is 
not the sensitivity of assets’ and liabilities’ values to interest-rate movements that 
determines their liquidity. 
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market funds is a good example) and, a fortiori, those hedge funds that use leverage and 
invest in relatively illiquid securities. These events may spread in the financial industry, 
causing systemic risks.  
The avoidance of systemic risk has to come from the combination of three things:  
• Appropriate capital structures for every type of intermediary;  
• Full knowledge of intermediaries by public institutions responsible for financial 
stability; and  
• Appropriate ex-post intervention by authorities. 
The fact that an appropriate capital structure is the first defence against runs is almost a 
tautology. The choice of appropriate capital structures does not need to be mandated, 
though regulations could for example allow different investors to access investment 
managers depending on their business and the safeguards provided by their capital 
structure.  
We should support the creation of a new and comprehensive system of disclosure of all 
risk positions, on- and off-balance sheet, to authorities in charge of market stability. This 
information should allow them to aggregate and analyze the macro issues and identify the 
areas of weakness, as well as to communicate to individual institutions their fragilities.  
While this is a big and complex task, it should be greatly facilitated by the clear 
separation of the different classes of intermediaries described above. Does this not look 
like a simpler financial system than what we have today?  
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Coutert and Gex: Stormy Weather in the Credit Default Swap Market 
13 October 2008 
Credit default swaps (CDSs) – bilateral insurance contracts against bond default – are 
now in the eye of the storm. Worries about counterparty risk are mounting among market 
players and is multiplied by the lack of global netting. This column discusses lessons 
from the 2005 crisis in CDSs.  
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Are credit derivatives markets particularly prone to speculation and contagion? The 
answer is certainly yes if we take a look at the credit default swaps (CDSs), which are the 
most widely traded credit derivatives. 
Hedging or speculation? 
As most derivative instruments, such as forward markets or options, CDSs were 
originally designed to hedge out investors’ risks. CDSs are aimed at insuring against the 
risk of borrowers’ default. Suppose that an investor holds a bond on a given borrower 
(called X). He can buy a CDS on X to get his money back in case the borrower defaults. 
In the CDS contract on X, the buyer (A) agrees to pay a certain amount of money, called 
“premium”, to the seller (B) over a given period of time. The seller B receives the 
premium and is committed to give the buyer a pay-off only in case X defaults on his debt. 
This pay-off offsets investor A’s loss as it is equal to the difference between the face 
value of the bond and its depreciated market value. 
In practice, as most other derivative products, the huge development of the market is not 
to be imputed to hedging purposes, but to arbitrage and speculation. Suppose that an 
investor holds neither bonds nor debts on company X, but thinks that this company may 
default. He can buy a CDS on X and pockets the pay-off in case of default. This strategy 
is equivalent, but more straightforward than short-selling bonds. The CDS market is also 
reported to have recently been used to bet on companies’ default after the ban on short-
selling in financial stocks. 
The size of the market has soared well above the value of the underlying debt that they 
are supposed to insure (reaching about USD 62 trillion at the end of 2007). This has 
become clear since 2005, when Delphi, the auto parts maker, went bankrupt: the CDS on 
Delphi’s debt in the market exceeded the value of its bonds tenfold. 
The rise in correlations 
All major financial actors are deeply involved in the market. From the beginning, in the 
mid-nineties, banks have used CDSs to escape from their capital requirements. But 
nowadays, banks, hedge funds, insurance companies and pension funds are hugely 
exposed as buyers or sellers, or both. By transferring the risk, the CDSs have acted as a 
kind of insurance and provided incentives for risk-taking. They are therefore at the heart 
of the present crisis. 
Since the start of the crisis last summer, the CDS market has been especially affected. 
Premia have been driven upward, and reached all-time peaks, especially in the high-yield 
segment. As the whole market has been hit, not only distressed firms, one can assume 
that there have been contagion effects. To check this, contagion can be defined as a 
simultaneous move in asset prices which results in a rise in correlations (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2000), Forbes and Rigobon (2002)). In fact, the CDS market has exhibited a 
stunning rise in its correlations since the start of the crisis in August 2007 (see Graph 
below). 





Note: Europe : 66 European CDS (in the iTraxx Main since 2004), US : 73 North 
American CDS (in the CDX NA IG since 2004). Correlations are calculated by EWMA 
and averaged accross all pairs of CDS 
Fears on counterparty risk 
The CDS market is now in the eye of the storm. The reason is straightforward, because 
this crisis is about credit risk. A credit bubble has ballooned for years, being enhanced by 
the existence of credit derivatives. As credit originators can pass their risk to other agents, 
they have been less careful about the quality of their loans. In that sense, CDS have given 
an incentive for distributing more credit to more risky borrowers. 
As banks and all financial institutions have massively committed themselves in the CDS 
market, they are now highly dependant on market continuity and its smooth functioning. 
The failure of a major participant, or worse a whole set of participants, can put at stake all 
the others. Bankruptcies of Bear Sterns, then that of AIG, two key counterparties, could 
have brought about a complete meltdown of the market. This has certainly been taken 
into account when the US government decided to step in and prevent them from going 
bankrupt. However, faith in the reliability of the market has been deeply shaken by these 
events. Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy has also severely hit the whole market, as it was 
among the ten main participants. 
As long as the financial system was sound, there was no fear that counterparty risk could 
be a problem. Today, after the near-failure of three key participants, the counterparty risk 
is the major worry and raises widespread fears of a market collapse. The main drawback 
stems from the very nature of this market, which is over-the-counter (OTC). Each buyer 
negotiates with a seller directly, without global clearing. The buyer thinks he escapes 
158 
 
from the default risk of company X, but is still exposed to the counterparty risk of the 
CDS seller. If no netting is done, when trying to exit from a contract, the buyer has to sell 
another contract, which theoretically offsets its default risk but does not cancel the 
counterparty risk. In this framework, counterparty risks are multiplied by the lack of 
global netting. On-going projects to switch to an organised market with a global clearing-
house seek to tackle this issue, as it would drastically reduce the counterparty risk. 
However, they are not likely to solve the problem in the short run, as the bulk of contracts 
have been made at a 5-year maturity on an OTC basis. 
Another cause for concern is that the market is unregulated. CDSs act as insurance 
against default, but they are not submitted to any regulations as is the case for insurance 
companies. The latter have to meet required reserves and are closely monitored by public 
authorities. On the CDS market, no reserves are required from the sellers of protection, 
only very thin margins, ranging from 2% to 5% of the amount insured. However, the 
danger is even greater than insuring against natural catastrophes for example, because of 
the high correlation of default risk, which is linked to the business cycle. 
The first warning: the May 2005 crisis of GM and Ford 
Looking back on its short historical evolution, this is not the first time the CDS market 
has been routed. There was already a big meltdown of the CDS market in May 2005. At 
that time, General Motors (GM) and Ford were downgraded by the rating agencies from 
investment grade to “junk” grade, which triggered a violent crisis. 
The 2005 crisis was a premonitory event. The GM and Ford downgrades had a large 
impact on the market due to the huge size of the two leading multinational firms. At that 
time, the CDS premia of both firms posted a sharp rise and the whole of the CDS market 
was affected, as well as the bond market. Acharya et al. (2007) have highlighted the 
liquidity shock that this crisis brought about on the market. 
Coudert and Gex (2008) investigate the contagion effects of the GM and Ford crisis 
within the market. To do so, they calculate the conditional correlations between each of 
226 CDSs on major US and European firms that are included into the main indices. Their 
results show that the correlations significantly increased during the crisis, especially in 
the first week. Both the US and the European markets were affected, pointing to the 
strong international integration of the credit markets. 
They also analyze the links with the other financial markets. Theoretically, as a CDS is 
aimed at protecting investors against a borrower’s default, its premium should be close to 
the borrower’s bond spread, for a given maturity, even if in practice, they differ slightly. 
Usually, the CDS market is considered to lead the bond market, in the sense that price 
innovations go from the CDS market to the bond price (Blanco et al., 2004). This 
relationship between the two markets was somewhat mitigated during the 2005 crisis. At 
that time, CDS spreads tended to increase more than bond spreads, as investors bid up the 
price of protection; this points to the speculative nature of the market. 
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Giavazzi: Why does the spread between LIBOR and expected future 
policy rates persist, and should central banks do something about it? 
2 June 2008 
There has been a persistent spread between the rate at which banks lend each other 
money and government-backed securities yields in recent months. This column describes 
hypotheses explaining the spread – including the possibility that banks aren’t lending in 
order to bankrupt acquisition targets. 
For a few months now the markets have been concerned by the persistence of a spread 
between the 1- and 3-month LIBOR (“London Interbank Offer Rate” – the interest rate at 
which banks lend money to each other without posting collateral) and the comparable 
overnight index swap rates (OIS), i.e. future expected policy rates (the Federal Funds rate 
in the U.S. and similar rates in the U.K and in the euro area) over the same horizon.75 The 
persistence of such a spread is surprising because banks should in principle be able to 
arbitrage it away – up to the cost of the insurance they need to buy if they want to protect 
themselves against future fluctuations in policy rates. To arbitrage, they simply need to 
borrow overnight on the money market – for instance at the Federal Funds rate – roll over 
the funds for three months and use them to lend to another bank at LIBOR. 
Until summer 2007, the spread between LIBOR and future expected policy rates was 
very small, about 10 basis points – which probably reflected the cost of insurance. Since 
then, it has fluctuated between 50 and 100 basis points in various markets, including the 
U.S. dollar, British pound, and euro. Today the spread is about 70-75 basis points. See 
Figure 1, which shows a time series of the spread for the U.S. dollar since January 2007. 
 
Figure 1 LIBOR-OIS spread, U.S. Dollar, 2007-2008 (basis points) 
                                                 
75 This column is the result of conversations with Olivier Blanchard, Ricardo Caballero 




A European view 
There are two views as to why such a spread persists and whether central banks might 
reduce it. Europeans tend to think that the spread reflects credit risk, as LIBOR loans are 
not collateralised. Since there remains widespread uncertainty about the strength of 
banks’ balance sheets, LIBOR loans are risky and the spread simply reflects the market 
assessment of such risk. Assuming that this is the reason, European central bankers think 
that it would be inappropriate for them to try to eliminate a “market price”. Thus we 
should live with it. It has been suggested that this explains why the European Central 
Bank and Bank of England have very reluctantly followed the Federal Reserve in 
announcing the swap lines created among the three central banks (in early May) to make 
it possible for Euro area and U.K. banks to borrow overnight dollars – and symmetrically 
for U.S banks to borrow pounds and euros. The Fed proposed these swaps – which are in 
effect credit lines – to try and bring the spread down; the Europeans thought this was 
inappropriate, or in any case useless. 
We can compute the market’s assessment of the probability that a loan may not be 
reimbursed, i.e. that the bank fails and completely foregoes its obligations – admittedly 
an extreme case, since a fraction of the loans is typically repaid. In the Euro area, with 
(annualised) overnight rates at 4%, a 50 basis point (bp) spread implies (assuming risk 
neutrality, which may not be right) a default probability of about 5% over a three-month 
loan. When the spread was 80 bp (as in December 2007), the default probability was 
7.5%. In the U.S., with the Fed Funds at 2%, a 50 bp spread implies a default probability 
of about 10%. In both cases, these are not small numbers. 
A problem with the “European” view is that if the LIBOR reflected the creditworthiness 
of banks, spreads should vary across banks depending on the perceived state of their 
balance sheets. This does not appear to be the case. Figure 3 shows that the range of 
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LIBOR rates for 16 reporting banks is rather small: 10 basis points, hardly a reflection of 
a market characterised by widespread credit concerns. 
 
Source: William C. Dudley, “May You Live in Interesting Times: The Sequel,” Remarks 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's 44th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and 
Competition, 15 May 2008 
An American view 
The Fed seems to hold a different view, which starts from the presumption that after the 
Bear Stearns episode it is very unlikely that a U.S bank will be allowed to fail – and that 
even if it did the Fed would intervene to protect bondholders (including the banks that 
lent to the failed institution at LIBOR) and shift the loss entirely onto shareholders. The 
Fed suggests instead that what underlies the spread is a “shortage of bank capital”. 
Consider a bank that has enough capital: it can borrow and make a new loan without with 
the capital it has, without going beyond its target level of leverage. In other words, the 
shadow price of its capital is zero. Such a bank will arbitrage between LIBOR and 
the expected cost of rolling over overnight funds and insuring against fluctuations in 
the overnight rate. 
 
Consider instead a bank that, in order to make a new loan, must raise new capital, or 
reduce the capital it has assigned to other activities. For such a bank the spread between 
the lending rate and the cost of borrowing must equal the shadow price of capital.76 
 
For instance, with a capital requirement, under current Basel rules, of 1.6% and a shadow 
price of capital of 20% (what many banks are promising to attract new investors), the 
spread between LIBOR and the overnight rate (net of the insurance premium) is 32 bp. 
                                                 
76 Here too, knowing the marginal capital requirement needed to make a new LIBOR 
loan, we could compute the equilibrium spread. 
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Before the crisis the insurance premium was around 10 bp: it may have risen considering 
the increase in volatility. This gives an overall spread of 42 bp and possibly more, 
depending on the current level of the premium. This explains some of the divergence 
from historical levels, but it is far from the peaks observed during the crisis. 
This view has an additional problem. It requires that all banks are capital constrained. 
This is unlikely to be true, and just a few unconstrained banks could arbitrage away the 
spread. For this to happen, however, the unconstrained banks should be large relative to 
the market. Otherwise, as they lend at Libor, they will also eventually hit a capital 
constraint. 
Predatory banks 
The bottom line is that both the European and the Fed's view have problems. An 
interesting alternative explanation has been suggested by MIT's Ricardo Caballero. Banks 
could be engaging in "predatory behaviour". Banks that have "free" capital might be 
tempted to behave strategically and refrain from lending to banks which need the funds to 
overcome a liquidity crisis. Here is how the argument goes. 
Since we cannot assume that the Fed will bail out all banks in trouble, it is possible that a 
liquidity crisis might result in a bank failing. The experience of Bear Stearns then 
suggests that, faced with a possible failure, the Fed would protect bondholders but wipe 
out shareholders. This means – as in the Bear Stearns-JPMorgan case – that the bank with 
"free" capital can acquire a competitor to which it has denied a loan at a price close to 
zero. Predatory behaviour could explain the persistence of the spread even in the presence 
of a few large banks that are not capital constrained. 
Finally let's come to central banks and what they can do to reduce the spread. The 
simplest option would eliminate the need for banks to borrow at LIBOR from other banks 
by providing the funds they need directly through the Term Auction Facility (TAF). The 
facility (created earlier this year) allows a bank to borrow reserves from the Fed by 
posting assets (of any quality) as collateral. Currently the TAF is a 28-day facility. To 
pursue this route and make it equivalent to borrowing at LIBOR, the Fed might need to 
extend the horizon of the TAF from 28 to 90 days. (The ECB and the Bank of England 
have similar facilities.) One remaining difference is the need to post collateral, which is a 
requirement to access the TAF, while no collateral is needed in the case of interbank 
borrowing. But since the Fed accepts almost any asset as collateral, this would not be a 
serious constraint. 
Saving banks 
There remains an underlying problem. How credible is the Fed's commitment to supply 
funds to banks through the TAF – even in the case of a liquidity crisis that might bring a 
bank down – without affecting the monetary base? This question has often been raised in 
recent months as markets worried what might happen when the Fed "runs out of TBills". 
There are three ways in which the Fed could expand its balance sheet without affecting 
the outstanding stock of base money: (i) if it were allowed to issue its own Bills (as some 
other central banks do, e.g. the People’s Bank of China), (ii) if it could induce banks to 
hold more reserves for any given level of the monetary base, (iii) if the Treasury were to 
issue more Bills than it needs to finance the deficit and the Fed bought them back from 
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the market. Option (iii) is straightforward: however it is not unlimited, unless Congress 
raises the yearly limit of Treasury issues. Options (i) and (ii) are related but only (i) 
would put the Fed in the position of issuing an unlimited amount of Bills to buy banks’ 
paper. To compare options (i) and (ii), it is useful to consider their implications on the 
Fed’s balance sheet. 
 
(i)  Assets  Liabilities  (ii)  Assets  Liabilities 
   TBills  M     TBills  M 
   FedBills ↑  Reserves     Banks' paper ↑  Reserves 
   Banks' papers ↑             
 
It is unclear whether today the Fed has the authority to issue its own Bills, and the Fed 
hopes that the law currently being discussed in Congress that would allow it to pay 
(starting in October 2011) interest on reserves might contain a line that explicitly 
authorises the Fed to issue its own Bills. 
Options (i) and (ii) are obviously very different. If the Fed could issue its own paper, its 
ability to expand its balance sheet would be unlimited – and its commitment to bail out 
any bank without affecting M would be fully credible. Inducing banks to increase their 
reserves is much less powerful. If we compare the balance sheet of the Fed with that of 
the ECB (which pays interest on reserves) we see that this could add some $100 billion to 
the liabilities side: not small but not unlimited either. Moreover, banks can certainly be 
induced to hold a higher volume of reserves if these are remunerated, but in order to do 
so – at an unchanged level of base money – banks must liquidate other assets. This would 
happen but only with time. 
Conclusion 
The two competing views about why a Libor-OIS spread persists – credit risk or a 
shortage of bank capital – both have problems. The possibility that banks with still 
abundant capital might be engaging in predatory behaviour seems a better explanation for 
the persistence of the spread. Central banks, particularly the Federal Reserve, in principle 
have the power to get rid of the spread: they could simply eliminate the need for banks to 
borrow at LIBOR from other banks and provide them the funds they need directly 
through the Term Auction Facility. This leaves us with a final basic question: can central 
banks credibly commit to provide unlimited high quality paper to banks without affecting 
the monetary base? In the U.S. case such a commitment would require Congress to 







The proper governmental response 
 
Eichengreen: Anatomy of the financial crisis 
23 September 2008  
The crisis solution depends upon its causes. Here one of the world’s leading international 
macroeconomists explains how the world got into this mess. This is the ‘Director’s cut’ of 
his 18 September 2008 column on Project Syndicate. 
Getting out of our current financial mess requires understanding how we got into it in the 
first place. The dominant explanation, voiced by figures as diverse as Thomas Friedman 
and John McCain, is that the fundamental cause was greed and corruption on Wall Street. 
Though not one to deny the existence of base motives in the institutional investor 
community, I would insist that the crisis has roots in key policy decisions stretching back 
over more than three decades. 
At the domestic level, the key decisions in the United States were to deregulate 
commissions for stock trading in the 1970s and then to eliminate the Glass-Steagall 
restrictions on mixing commercial and investment banking in the 1990s. In the days of 
fixed commissions, investment banks could make a comfortable living booking stock 
trades for their customers. Deregulation meant greater competition, entry by low-cost 
brokers like Charles Schwab, and thinner margins. The elimination of Glass-Steagall then 
allowed commercial banks to encroach on the investment banks’ other traditional 
preserves. (It was not only commercial banks of course, but also insurance companies 
like AIG that did the encroaching.) 
In response, investment banks to survive were forced to branch into new lines of business 
like originating and distributing complex derivative securities. They were forced to use 
more leverage, funding themselves through the money market, to sustain their 
profitability. Thereby arose the first set of causes of the crisis: the originate-and-distribute 
model of securitisation and the extensive use of leverage. 
It is important to note that these were unintended consequences of basically sensible 
policy decisions. It is hard to defend rules allowing price fixing in stock trading. 
Deregulation allowed small investors to trade stocks more cheaply, which made them 
better, off other things equal. But other things were not equal. In particular, the fact that 
investment banks, which were propelled into riskier activities by these policy changes, 
were entirely outside the regulatory net was a recipe for disaster. 
Similarly, eliminating Glass-Steagall was a fundamentally sensible choice. 
Conglomeratisation allows financial institutions to better diversify their business. 
Combining with commercial banking allows investment banks to fund their operations 
using a relatively stable base of deposits rather than relying on fickle money markets. 
This model has proven its viability in Germany and other European countries over a 
period of centuries. These advantages are evident in the United States even now, with 




Again, however, the problem was that other policies were not adapted to the new 
environment. Conglomeratisation takes time. In the short run, Merrill, like the other 
investment banks, was allowed to lever up its bets. It remained outside the purview of the 
regulators. As a self-standing entity, it was then vulnerable to inevitable swings in 
housing and securities markets. A crisis sufficient to threaten the entire financial system 
was required to precipitate the inevitable conglomeratisation. 
The other key element in the crisis was the set of policies giving rise to global 
imbalances. The Bush Administration cut taxes, causing government dissaving. The 
Federal Reserve cut interest rates in response to the 2001 recession. All the while the 
financial innovations described above worked to make credit even cheaper and more 
widely available to households. This of course is just the story, in another guise, of the 
subprime, negative-amortization and NINJA mortgages pushed by subsidiaries of the like 
of Lehman Brothers. The result was increased U.S. consumer spending and the decline of 
measured household savings into negative territory. 
Of equal importance were the rise of China and the decline of investment in much of Asia 
following the 1997-8 crisis. With China saving nearly 50 per cent of its GNP, all that 
money had to go somewhere. Much of it went into U.S. Treasuries and the obligations of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This propped up the dollar. It reduced the cost of 
borrowing for U.S. households by, on some estimates, 100 basis points, encouraging 
them to live beyond their means. It created a more buoyant market for Freddie and Fannie 
and other financial institutions creating close substitutes for their agency securities, 
feeding the originate-and-distribute machine.  
Again, these were not outright policy mistakes. The emergence of China is a good thing. 
Lifting a billion Chinese out of poverty is arguably the single most important event in our 
lifetimes. The fact that the Fed responded quickly to the collapse of the high-tech bubble 
prevented the 2001 recession from becoming worse. But there were unintended 
consequences. Those adverse consequences were aggravated by the failure of U.S. 
regulators to tighten capital and lending standards when abundant capital inflows 
combined with loose Fed policies to ignite a ferocious credit boom. They were 
aggravated by the failure of China to move more quickly to encourage higher domestic 
spending commensurate with its higher incomes. 
Now we are all paying the price. As financial problems surface, a bloated financial sector 
is being forced to retrench. Some cases, like the marriage of BofA and Merrill, are 
happier than others, like Lehman. But either way there will be downsizing and 
consolidation. Foreign central banks like China’s are suffering immense capital losses for 
their unthinking investment. As the People’s Bank and other foreign central banks absorb 
their losses on U.S. Treasury and agency securities, capital flows toward the United 
States will diminish. The U.S. current account deficit and Asian surplus will shrink. U.S. 
households will have to begin saving again. All this is of a piece. 
The one anomaly is that the dollar has strengthened in recent weeks against pretty much 
every currency out there. (The one exception is the yen, which is being supported by Mrs. 
Watanabe keeping more of her money at home.) With the U.S. no longer viewed as a 
supplier of high-quality financial assets and the appetite of foreign central banks for U.S. 
treasury and agency securities falling off, one would expect the dollar to weaken. The 
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dollar’s strength reflects the reflex action of investors rushing into U.S. treasuries as a 
safe haven. It is worth recalling that the same thing happened in early August 2007, when 
the Subprime Crisis first erupted. Once investors realised the extent of U.S. financial 
problems, the rush into treasuries subsided, and the dollar resumed its decline. Now, as 
investors recall the extent of U.S. financial problems – and even more so as they realise 
the U.S. Treasury debt is going to rise significantly as the authorities are forced to 
recapitalise the banking system – we will again see the dollar resume its ongoing decline. 
Emphasising greed and corruption as causes of the crisis leads to a bleak prognosis. We 
are not going to change human nature. We can’t make investors less greedy or to prevent 
them from cutting corners when they see doing so as in their self interest. But 
emphasising policy decisions as the mechanism amplifying these problems into a threat 
to the entire financial system suggests a more optimistic outlook. Policy mistakes may 
not always be avoidable. Unintended consequences cannot always be prevented. But they 
at least can be corrected. Correcting them, however, requires first looking more deeply 
into the root causes of the problem. 
Editors’ note: A shortened version of this appeared in Project Syndicate on 18 September 
2008. 
 
Calomiris: The subprime turmoil: What’s old, what’s new, and what’s 
next 
22 August 2008 
The subprime crisis is the joint product of perverse incentives and historical flukes. This 
column explains why market actors made unrealistic assumptions about mortgage-
backed securities and how various regulatory policies exacerbated the problem. The 
crisis will necessitate changes in monetary policy, regulation, and the structure of 
financial intermediation. 
The financial system is working through a major shock. It started with problems in the 
subprime mortgage market but has spread to securitisation products and credit markets 
more generally. Banks are being asked to absorb more risk – moving off-balance-sheet 
assets back onto their balance sheets – when their ability to do so is reduced by massive 
losses. The result is a bank credit crunch as the scarcity of bank equity capital is forcing 
banks to limit exposure to new risk. 
Origins of the turmoil 
There are both old and new components in the origins of the subprime shock. The 
primary novelty is the central role of “agency problems” in asset management.  
In previous real estate-related financial shocks, government financial subsidies for 
bearing risk seem to have been key triggering factors, along with accommodative 
monetary policy, and government subsidies played key roles in the most severe real 
estate-related financial crises. While the subsidisation of borrowing also played a role in 
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the current US housing cycle, the subprime boom and bust occurred largely outside the 
realm of government-sponsored programmes.  
Investors in subprime-related financial claims made ex ante unwise investments, which 
seem to be best understood as the result of a conflict of interest between asset managers 
and their clients. In that sense, sponsors of subprime securitisations and the rating 
agencies – whose unrealistic assumptions about subprime risk were known to investors 
prior to the run up in subprime investments – were providing the market with investments 
that asset managers demanded in spite of the obvious understatements of risk in those 
investments.  
The subprime debacle is best understood as the result of a particular confluence of 
circumstances in which longstanding incentive problems combined with unusual 
historical circumstances. The longstanding problems were (1) asset management agency 
problems of institutional investors and (2) government distortions in real estate finance 
that encouraged borrowers to accept high leverage when it was offered. But these 
problems by themselves do not explain the timing or severity of the subprime debacle. 
The specific historical circumstances of (1) loose monetary policy, which generated a 
global savings glut, and (2) the historical accident of a very low loss rate during the early 
history of subprime mortgage foreclosures in 2001-2002 were crucial in triggering 
extreme excessive risk taking by institutional investors. The savings glut provided an 
influx of investable funds, and the historically low loss rate gave incentive-conflicted 
asset managers, rating agencies, and securitisation sponsors a basis of “plausible 
deniability” on which to base unreasonably low projections of default risk. 
What is the evidence for this? How do we know that asset managers willingly over-
invested their clients’ money in risky assets that did not adequately compensate investors 
for risk? 
Detailed analyses by Joseph Mason and Joshua Rosner, by the IMF, and by others 
describe in detail why the assumptions that underlay the securitisation of subprime 
mortgages and related collateralised debt obligation (CDOs) were too optimistic. These 
facts were known to sophisticated market participants long before the subprime collapse.  
Consider, for example, rating agencies assumptions about the underlying expected losses 
on a subprime mortgage pool. They assumed a 6% expected loss on subprime mortgage-
backed securities pools in 2006 – a number that is indefensibly low. Expected losses prior 
to 2006 were even lower. Independent observers criticised low loss assumptions far in 
advance of the summer of 2007.  
The 6% assumption is not a minor technical issue. It was hugely important to the growth 
of subprime mortgage-backed securities in the four years leading up to the crisis. It goes a 
long way toward explaining how subprime mortgages were able to finance themselves 
more than 80% in the form of AAA debts, and more than 95% in the form of A, AA, or 
AAA debts, issued by subprime mortgage-backed securities conduits.  
So long as institutional investors buying these debts accepted the ratings agencies’ 
opinions as reasonable, subprime conduit sponsors and ratings agencies stood to earn, and 
did earn, huge fees from packaging loans with no pretence of screening borrowers. 
Where did expected loss estimates come from? 
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How were the low loss assumptions justified, and why did institutional investors accept 
numbers ranging from 4.5% to 6% as reasonable forward-looking estimates of expected 
pool losses?  
Recall that subprime mortgages were a relatively new product, which grew from humble 
beginnings in the early 1990s, and remained small even as recently as several years ago; 
not until the last three years did subprime origination take off. Given the recent origins of 
the subprime market, which postdates the last housing cycle downturn in the US (1989-
1991), how were ratings agencies able to ascertain what expected losses would be on a 
subprime mortgage pool? A significant proportion of subprime mortgages defaulted in 
the wake of the 2001 recession. Although the volume of outstanding subprime mortgages 
was small, a very high proportion of them defaulted; in fact, only in the last quarter has 
the default rate on subprime mortgages exceeded its 2002 level. The existence of defaults 
from 2001-2003 created a record of default loss experience, which provided a basis for 
the 6% expected loss number.  
Of course, this was a very unrepresentative period on which to base loss forecasts. Low 
realised losses reflected the fact that housing prices grew dramatically from 2000 to 2005. 
In a flat or declining housing market – the more reasonable forward-looking assumption 
for a high-foreclosure state of the world – both the probability of default and the severity 
of loss in the event of default would be much greater (as today’s experience 
demonstrates). The probability of default would be greater in a declining housing market 
because borrowers would be less willing to make payments when they have little equity 
at stake in their homes. Loss severity would be greater in a declining housing market 
because of the effect of home price appreciation on lenders’ recoveries in foreclosure.  
This error was forecastable. For the most part, the housing cycle and the business cycle 
coincide very closely. Most of the time in the past (and presumably, in the future) when 
recession-induced defaults would be occurring on subprime mortgages, house prices 
would be not be appreciating. This implies that the loss experience of 2001-2003 (when 
house prices rose) was not a good indicator either of the probability of foreclosure or of 
the severity of loss for subprime mortgage pools on a forward-looking basis. Anyone 
estimating future losses sensibly should have arrived at a much higher expected loss 
number than the 4.5%-6% numbers used during the period 2003-2006.  
Another reason that the expected losses were unrealistically low relates to the changing 
composition of loans. Even if 6% had been reasonable as a forward-looking assumption 
for the performance of the pre-2005 cohorts of subprime borrowers, the growth in 
subprime originations from 2004 to 2007 was meteoric, and was accompanied by a 
significant deterioration in borrower quality. Was it reasonable to assume that these 
changes would have no effect on the expected loss of the mortgage pool? The average 
characteristics of borrowers changed dramatically, resulting in substantial increases in the 
probability of default, which were clearly visible by 2006 even for the 2005 cohort.  
Of course, investors could have balked at these assumptions as unrealistic, precisely 
because they were based on a brief and unrepresentative period. Why didn’t they? 
Because they were investing someone else’s money and earning huge salaries, bonuses, 
and management fees for being willing to pretend that these were reasonable investments. 
And furthermore, they knew that other competing asset managers were behaving 
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similarly and that they would be able to blame the collapse (when it inevitably came) on a 
surprising shock. The script would be clear, and would give “plausible deniability” to all 
involved. “Who knew? We all thought that 6% was the right loss assumption! That was 
what experience suggested and what the rating agencies used.” Plausible deniability was 
a coordinating device for allowing asset managers to participate in the feeding frenzy at 
little risk of losing customers (precisely because so many participated). Because asset 
managers can point to market-based data and ratings at the time as confirming the 
prudence of their actions on a forward-looking basis, they are likely to bear little cost as 
the result of investor losses. 
Official input and managerial incentive problems 
Various regulatory policies unwittingly encouraged this “plausible deniability” 
equilibrium. Regulation contributed in at least four ways. 
• Insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, and banks all face regulations 
that limit their ability to hold low-rated debts, and the Basel I and II capital 
requirements for banks place a great deal of weight on rating agency ratings. 
By granting enormous regulatory power to rating agencies, the government encouraged 
rating agencies to compete in relaxing the cost of regulation (through lax standards). 
Rating agencies that (in absence of regulatory reliance on ratings) saw their job as 
providing conservative and consistent opinions for investors changed their behaviour as 
the result of the regulatory use of ratings, and realised huge profits from the fees that they 
could earn from underestimating risk (and in the process provided institutional investors 
with plausible deniability). 
• Unbelievably, Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
were sending strong signals to the rating agencies in 2005 and 2006 to encourage 
greater ratings inflation in subprime-related collateralised debt obligations! 
In a little known subplot to the ratings-inflation story, the SEC proposed “anti-notching” 
regulations to implement Congress’s mandate to avoid anti-competitive behaviour in the 
ratings industry. The proposed prohibitions of notching were directed primarily at the 
rating of CDOs and reflected lobbying pressure from ratings agencies that catered most to 
ratings shoppers.  
Notching arose when collateralised debt obligation sponsors brought a pool of securities 
to a rating agency to be rated that included debts not previously rated by that rating 
agency. For example, suppose that ratings shopping in the first generation of subprime 
securitisation had resulted in some mortgage-backed securities that were rated by Fitch 
but not Moody’s (i.e., perhaps Fitch had been willing to bless a higher proportion of 
AAA debt relative to subprime mortgages than Moody’s). When asked to rate the CDO 
that contained those debts issued by that subprime mortgage-backed securities conduit, 
Moody’s would offer either to rate the underlying MBS from scratch, or to notch (adjust 
by a ratings downgrade) the ratings of those securities that had been given by Fitch. 
• Changes in bank capital regulation introduced several years ago relating to 
securitisation discouraged banks from retaining junior tranches in securitisations 
that they originated and gave them an excuse for doing so. 
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This exacerbated agency problems by reducing sponsors’ loss exposures. The reforms 
raised minimum capital requirements for originators retaining junior stakes in 
securitisations. Sponsors switched from retaining junior stakes to supporting conduits 
through external credit enhancement (typically lines of credit of less than one year), 
which implied much lower capital requirements. Sponsors that used to retain large junior 
positions (which helped to align origination incentives) no longer had to worry about 
losses from following the earlier practice of retaining junior stakes. Indeed, one can 
imagine sponsors explaining to potential buyers of those junior claims that the desire to 
sell them was driven not by any change in credit standards or higher prospective losses, 
but rather by a change in regulatory practice – a change that offered sponsors a plausible 
explanation for reducing their pool exposures.77 
• The regulation of compensation practices in asset management likely played an 
important role in the willingness of institutional investors to invest their clients’ 
money so imprudently in subprime mortgage-related securities. 
Casual empiricism suggests that hedge funds (where bonus compensation helps to align 
incentives and mitigate agency) have fared relatively well during the turmoil, compared 
to other institutional investors, and this likely reflects differences in incentives of hedge 
fund managers, whose incentives are much more closely aligned with their clients.  
The standard hedge fund fee arrangement balances two considerations: the importance of 
incentive alignment (which encourages profit sharing by managers), and the risk aversion 
of asset managers (which encourages limiting the downside risk exposure for managers). 
The result is that hedge fund managers share the upside of long-term portfolio gains but 
have limited losses on the downside. Because hedge fund compensation structure is not 
regulated, and because both investors and managers are typically highly sophisticated 
people, it is reasonable to expect that the hedge fund financing structure has evolved as 
an “efficient” financial contract, which may explain the superior performance of hedge 
funds. 
The typical hedge fund compensation structure is not permissible for other, regulated 
asset managers. Other asset managers must share symmetrically in portfolio gains and 
losses; if they were to keep 20% of the upside, they would have to also absorb 20% of the 
downside. Since risk-averse fund managers would not be willing to expose themselves to 
such loss, regulated institutional investors typically charge fees as a proportion of assets 
managed and do not share in profits. This is a direct consequence of the regulation of 
compensation, and arguably has been a source of great harm to investors, since it 
encourages asset managers to maximise the size of the funds that they manage, rather 
than the value of those funds. Managers who gain from the size of their portfolios rather 
than the profitability of their investments will face strong incentives not to inform 
investors of deteriorating opportunities in the marketplace and not to return funds to 
investors when the return relative to risk of their asset class deteriorates. 
                                                 
77 Of course, either through external enhancement or voluntary provision of support to 
their conduits, sponsors may still be taking an effectively junior position, and of course, 
many did so by absorbing losses that otherwise would have been born by other investors. 
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Propagation of the turmoil 
When it comes to the shock’s spread, much is familiar. As usual, the central role of 
asymmetric information is apparent in adverse selection premia that have affected credit 
spreads and in the quantity rationing of money market instruments. But there is an 
important and favourable novelty – the ability and willingness of banks to raise new 
capital. As of mid-June 2008, financial institutions had raised over $300 billion in new 
capital to mitigate the consequences of subprime losses.  
This novelty is especially interesting in light of the fact that the subprime shock (in 
comparison to previous financial shocks) is both large in magnitude and uncertain in both 
magnitude and incidence. In the past, shocks of this kind have not been mitigated by the 
raising of capital by financial institutions in the wake of losses. This unique response of 
the financial system reflects improvements in the US financial system’s diversification 
that resulted from deregulation, consolidation, and globalisation.  
Another unique element of the response to the shock has been the activist role of the Fed 
and the Treasury, via discount window operations and other assistance programmes that 
have targeted assistance to particular financial institutions. Although there is room for 
improving the methods through which some of that assistance was delivered, the use of 
directly targeted assistance is appropriate and allows monetary policy to be “surgical” 
and more flexible (that is, to retain its focus on maintaining price stability, even while 
responding to a large financial shock). Unfortunately, in the event, the Fed threw caution 
to the wind in its Fed funds rate cuts, driving long-term inflation expectations 
significantly higher over the past year. The Fed could have, and should have, maintained 
financial stability through surgical interventions and provided less inflationary monetary 
stimulus than it did in the form of rate cuts. 
Near-term implications: monetary policy, regulation, and restructuring 
Dire forecasts of the near-term outlook for house prices and attendant macroeconomic 
consequences of subprime foreclosures for bank net worth and consumption reflect an 
exaggerated view of downside risk. Inflation and long-term inflation expectations have 
risen substantially and pose an immediate threat. Monetary policy should focus on 
maintaining a credible commitment to price stability, which would ensure the continuing 
stability of the dollar, encourage stock market recovery, and therefore assist the process 
of financial institution recapitalisation.  
Regulatory policy changes that should result from the subprime turmoil are numerous, 
and they include reforms of prudential regulation for banks, an end to the longstanding 
abuse of taxpayer resources by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the reform of the regulatory 
use of rating agencies’ opinions, and the reform of the regulation of asset managers’ fee 
structures to improve managers’ incentives. It would also be desirable to restructure 
government programmes to encourage homeownership in a more systemically stable 
way, in the form of down payment matching assistance for new homeowners, rather than 
the myriad policies that subsidise housing by encouraging high mortgage leverage. 
What long-term structural changes in financial intermediation will result from the 
subprime turmoil? One likely outcome is the conversion of some or all standalone 
investment banks to become commercial (depository) banks under Gramm-Leach-Bliley. 
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The perceived advantages of remaining as a standalone investment bank – the avoidance 
of safety net regulation and access to a ready substitute for deposit funding in the form of 
repos – have diminished as the result of the turmoil. The long-term consequences for 
securitisation will likely be mixed. In some product areas with long histories of 
favourable experiences – like credit cards – securitisation is likely to persist and may 
even thrive from the demise of subprime securitisation, which is a competing consumer 
finance mechanism. In less-time tested areas, particularly those related to real estate, 
simpler structures, including on-balance sheet funding through covered bonds, will 
substitute for discredited securitisation in the near term and perhaps for many years to 
come. 
 
Rancière An international perspective on the US bailout 
20 October 2008 
The current credit crisis has prompted many calls for regulation to prevent such an event 
from ever happening again. This column defends a financial system that engenders 
systemic risk. Economies that risk occasional credit crises enjoy higher long-run growth, 
and the cost of the US bailout is well within historical norms. 
As the US economy is hit by the financial crisis and associated bailout costs, it is useful 
to take an international perspective on current events. In the last three decades, many 
developing countries have also experienced financial crises and large bailouts. Yet, the 
growth gains brought by financial liberalisation and deregulation have, in most cases, far 
more than offset the output and bailout costs of crises. Importantly, financial 
liberalisation by itself did not generate crises – government meddling and implicit bailout 
guarantees were often involved. In many ways, the US story is not so different. 
In the current debate, pundits are railing against the enormity and unfairness of the US 
bailout, not to mention the bad precedent it will set. Many also point to financial 
deregulation as a key cause of the crisis. But the facts suggest otherwise. 
• First, the size of the bailout is within historical and international norms. 
• Second, financial liberalisation and deregulation policies along with financial 
innovation have largely contributed to the impressive growth performance of the 
US economy relatively to EU countries. The development of new financial 
instruments has helped finance the IT revolution and the large-scale increase in 
home ownership. Both factors have been powerful engines of US growth. 
• Third, policy interventions, such as the effort by some in the administration and 
Congress to induce Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to move into the subprime 
mortgage market, have largely paved the road to the financial crisis the US faces 
today. 
How big is the bailout compared to others? 
How big is the current US bailout? The $700 billion bailout bill is equivalent to 5% of 
GDP. Adding to it the cost of other rescues – Bear Stearns, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, 
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AIG – the total bailout costs could go up to $1,400 billion, which is around 10% of GDP. 
In contrast, 
• Mexico incurred bailout costs of 18% of GDP following the 1994 Tequila crisis. 
• In the aftermath of the 1997-98 Asian crisis, the bailout price tag was 18% of 
GDP in Thailand and a whopping 27% in South Korea. 
• Somewhat lower costs, although of the same order of magnitude, were incurred 
by Scandinavian countries in the banking crises of the late 1980s. 11% in Finland 
(1991), 8% in Norway (1987), and 4% in Sweden (1990). 
• Lastly, the 1980s savings and loans debacle in the US had a cumulative fiscal cost 
for the taxpayer of 2.6% of GDP. 
The bailout costs that the taxpayers are facing today can be seen as an ex post payback 
for years of easy access to finance in the US economy. The implicit bailout guarantees 
against systemic crises have supported a high growth path for the economy – albeit a 
risky one. In effect, the guarantees act as an investment subsidy that leads investors to (1) 
lend more and (2) at cheaper interest rates. This results in greater investment and growth 
in financially constrained sectors – such as housing, small businesses, internet 
infrastructure, and so on. Investors are willing to do so because they know that if a 
systemic crisis were to take place, the government will make sure they get repaid (at least 
partially). 
No innocent souls 
Importantly, there must be systemic insolvency risk for the bailout scheme to have these 
effects. This is because a bailout is not granted if an isolated default occurs, but only if a 
systemic crisis hits, since only under the threat of generalised bankruptcies and a 
financial meltdown would Congress agree on a bailout. Thus, an investor will be willing 
to take on insolvency risk only if many others do the same. When a majority of investors 
load on insolvency risk, they feel safe (because of the bailout guarantee). No wonder 
many financial firms end up with huge leverage and loaded with risky assets. In the 
Tequila and Asian crises the risky bet was the so-called currency mismatch, in which 
banks funded themselves in dollars and lent in domestic currency. In the US, it took the 
form of toxic mortgage-related assets. There are no innocent souls here. Borrowers, 
intermediaries, investors and regulators understood the bargain. At the end, the bailout 
guarantee scheme has succeeded in inducing more investment by financially constrained 
agents in real estate and small businesses. 
The positive side of risk-taking in the long run 
Perhaps the financial sector lent excessively, leading to overinvestment in the housing 
sector today and the IT sector in the late 1990s. But the bottom line remains that risk-
taking has positive consequences in the long run even if it implies that crises will happen 
from time to time. Over history, the countries that have experienced (rare) crises are the 
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ones that have grown the fastest.78 In those countries, investors and businesses take on 
more risks and as a result have greater investment and growth. Compare Thailand's high-
but-jumpy growth path with India's slow-but-steady growth path before it implemented 
liberalisation a few years ago. Over the last 25 years, Thailand grew 32% more than India 
in terms of per-capita income despite a major financial crisis. Similarly, easier access to 
finance and risk-taking explains, in part, why the US economy has strongly outperformed 
those of France and Germany in the last decades. 
Some argue for the rolling back of financial liberalisation and for a return of the good old 
days of strict regulation. Not so fast! 
Conclusion 
Today's bailout price seems high. But is it that much relative to the higher growth the US 
has enjoyed in specific sectors and overall? Let's wait for the final price tag. Other 
countries' experiences tell us that financial liberalisation – and some of its consequences 
– is not such a bad idea after all. They also teach us the importance of quickly jump-
starting the lending engine so as to avoid a growth collapse and for the regulatory 
agencies to refrain from killing the natural risk-taking process that accompanies the 
resumption of credit growth. 
 
 
Berglöf and Rosenthal: Not the end of capitalism 
2 October 2008  
European politicians have been quick to proclaim the bankruptcy of the US model of 
capitalism “as we know it”. But, this column explains, all this hyperbole is premature. In 
fact, the US system of today is the outcome of numerous similar interventions and offers 
further pause for Europe. 
"In the Bolshevik Revolution, the slogan was 'Peace, land, and bread'. Today, you are 
being asked to choose between bread and freedom.” These were the words of Rep. 
Thaddeus McCotter (R-Mich.) in the congressional debate of the Paulson bailout plan. 
European politicians have been quick to proclaim the bankruptcy of the US model of 
capitalism “as we know it”. But all this hyperbole is premature. In fact the US system of 
today is the outcome of numerous similar interventions since the foundation of the 
republic.  
If we leave aside the more limited savings and loans crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, the 
most recent economy-wide bailout in the United States was when the Roosevelt 
administration reduced industrial debt in 1933 by cancelling the gold clauses in industrial 
bond contracts. Then, as now, a core of Republicans strongly opposed the policy. In the 
                                                 
78 See Romain Rancière, Aaron Tornell and Frank Westermann, 2008. "Systemic Crises 




House they voted 64-14 for a motion that would have eviscerated the policy by making it 
non-applicable to previously concluded contracts and they voted 48-28 against passage. 
In the Senate, Republican opposition was even stronger. 
Depression-era governments also massively intervened in mortgage markets. The 
economic historian Lee Alston has documented that about half the states legislated 
moratoria on farm mortgages. At the federal level, the Roosevelt administration 
intervened in the residential mortgage market, creating public sector institutions. The 
privatisation of some of these institutions in the 1960s is arguably a basic element of the 
current crisis. 
The interventions in the Depression era were very controversial at the time. Both the 
cancellation of the gold clauses and the farm mortgage moratoria would appear to violate 
the contracts clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld both policies – but by 
narrow 5-4 majorities.  
What was done at the time was not novel for the United States. After the panics of 1797, 
1819 and 1840, each arguably more severe than the Great Depression, Congress enacted 
bankruptcy laws that proved to be temporary and served to allow for massive write-offs 
of debt. In 1819, many states also passed “stay laws” that prevented creditors from 
foreclosing on debtors. In the early 1820s, Congress voted to allow debtors to delay or 
greatly reduce payments on land that had been purchased from the federal government. 
The evidence, at least on the gold clause, suggests that these interventions were necessary 
and in the end strongly beneficial for the economy, even if credit markets anticipated 
intervention ex ante. The key to avoiding the moral hazard problem is to restrict 
intervention to truly exceptional circumstances. Actions in the Depression did not result 
in the permanent collapse of credit markets. Nor will intervention today. 
It is unlikely to change US-style capitalism “as we know it”. The US system is the result 
of a long evolutionary process. For example, it took the entire 19th century to establish 
key institutions like the Federal Reserve. Seven attempts to establish a federal bankruptcy 
law, all undertaken at the bottom of severe downturns, either failed or later repealed. It 
was not until 1898 that the United States had a uniform bankruptcy law valid in all states.  
What made these institutions politically possible in the US was the massive realignment 
after the Civil War, which weakened a reluctant South – and, ironically, a Republican-
controlled Congress and Presidency in 1898. But most of all it was the dramatically 
increasing financial integration of the US. This integration has only increased since and 
accelerated with the deregulation in the wake of the savings and loans crisis and the 
globalisation of banking. Massive integration exacerbates the “too big to fail” problems. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were the epitome of integration. 
The US experience offers further pause for Europe today. The continent is more 
financially integrated than ever but its institutional structures are lagging and responses 
by individual governments may not be sufficient. Perhaps the most extreme expression of 
integration can be found in the financial systems of Central and Eastern Europe, which 
are 60% and 80% controlled by Western European banks, respectively. For these 







Corsetti and Müller: The effectiveness of fiscal policy depends on the 
financing and monetary policy mix 
12 November 2008 
Governments are crafting fiscal stimulus packages to counter the crisis. This column 
highlights factors that are crucial in determining the effectiveness of such measures: the 
financing mix (taxes vs future spending cuts), and accompanying monetary policy. To 
illustrate the importance of these considerations, simulation results are presented for 
several stimulus packages. 
Policymakers around the world realise that they need a broad range of policies to contain 
the ongoing financial crisis. Fiscal policy is clearly in the minds of all, as stressed by the 
essays by Alesina and Tabellini and others in the recent VoxEU.org book. 
The main feature of this recession, namely, the emergence of widespread credit 
constraints, is a strong argument in favour of fiscal policy. The reason is that the 
monetary policy transmission becomes weaker and more uncertain when credit markets 
are dysfunctional. Moreover, as our economies have become more open, international 
coordination of fiscal expansions is increasingly necessary to achieve the maximum 
impact without worsening trade balances. 
Both issues are discussed in a previous Vox column by one of us. Here we want to 
highlight two additional aspects that are crucial for the effectiveness of fiscal policy 
interventions: 
12. The financing mix of a fiscal expansion, and; 
13. The stance of monetary policy. 
Even though they are fundamental, these points are not receiving sufficient attention in 
the debate. 
Fiscal stimulus: How it’s financed matters 
First, the effect of a fiscal expansion depends on how the expansion is financed. This 
applies not only to the short-term debt-tax mix used to finance a current increase in 
government expenditure, but also – and perhaps even more importantly – to the long-term 
financing source, i.e., taxes versus spending cuts in the future. 
The impact of higher current expenditure is strengthened when complemented with a 
credible plan that ensures it is financed at least in part by future spending cuts. How? 
1. Future spending cuts tend to raise current private consumption and investment via 
their effects on the long-term interest rate. 
This channel is emphasized by both Keynesian and neoclassical models. 
177 
 
• Lower future spending commitments mean that future taxes won’t have to rise as 
much. 
In other words, such a financing plan, if credible, will help sustaining the spending plans 
by firms and households who are currently not credit-constrained, and who therefore 
immediately respond to long-term fiscal prospects. 
Admittedly, a commitment to reduce spending in the future may lack credibility, 
especially in a situation like today, when the uncertainty about the length and the overall 
fiscal implications of the crisis is enormous. Even in countries with explicit fiscal rules 
(like the UK), one may doubt if these provide sufficient commitment devices. 
It may nonetheless pay to identify measures which are inherently temporary, i.e., matched 
by future cuts in spending. An obvious example consists of measures that bring forward 
in time investment projects that are already planned, thereby raising current spending 
while simultaneously reducing future spending. This is not a perfect solution to the 
commitment problem, but it may help. 
Monetary and fiscal policy should work together 
Second, fiscal policy is more effective if monetary policy is accommodative. For fiscal 
stimulus to work, central banks should not adhere too narrow-mindedly to their mandate 
of price stability – a criticism often raised against the Bank of Japan in the ‘lost decade.’ 
This risk is hopefully small today. 
Yet, one could envision a situation in which, even if policy interest rates were brought 
close to zero, it would still be possible that the overall monetary stance of the economy 
remain too tight. In this situation, the lower bound of zero for nominal interest rates – 
while providing a rationale for a fiscal expansion – may at the same time limit the 
effectiveness of any given fiscal intervention. 
Evidence from model simulations 
Now we back our arguments using a standard new-Keynesian model to track the 
macroeconomic consequences of an unexpected increase in government spending in an 
economy which is otherwise undisturbed (Corsetti, Meier and Müller 2008a). Although 
the model and simulations fail to capture all elements of today’s reality (as always), the 
exercise shows the extent to which the impact fiscal policy depends on the financing mix 
and monetary policy. 
To illustrate the mechanism, we model an open economy, and, for simplicity, assume it is 
small; this allows us to abstract from macro interdependence. We also assume away all 
kinds of credit-constrained agents, whose presence would increase the consumption 
multiplier above what we report. The results from this exercise are shown in the graphs 
we attach to this text. 
The graphs show the evolution of government consumption, private consumption, output, 
the government budget balance and debt, the real exchange rate, inflation and interest 
rates, over 40 quarters in response to an increase in government spending by one percent 
of (quarterly) GDP. 
(All variables are expressed relative to their trend values (note that a negative value for 
the nominal interest rate means a fall relative to the initial level). Quantity variables are 
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expressed in percent of quarterly GDP, the real exchange rate is measured in percentage 
deviation relative to its pre-intervention value, interest rates and inflation are measured in 
annualized percentage points. Each graph includes three lines.) 
In the diagram: 
• The dashed black line refers to a spending shock which is entirely financed by 
taxes. 
• The solid blue and the dash-dotted red lines refer to a spending shock which is 
partly financed by cuts in spending in the future. (You can see this in the upper 
left panel since government spending falling below trend about 3-4 years after the 
initial measures were taken.) 
• The dash-dotted lines refer to the case of no monetary accommodation as the 
central bank pursues complete price stability. 
• The solid blue line to the case of accommodative monetary policy – in the sense 
that central banks adopt a Taylor rule with a relatively low coefficient on inflation 
(1.2 in this example, with prices remaining fixed for 5 quarters on average). 
 
Results 
The message from our diagram is unequivocal. The response of consumption is positive 
for the ‘right mix’ of accommodative monetary policy and financing by spending cuts in 
the future, but negative either when spending is entirely financed through higher taxes 
(the dashed lines), or when the monetary reaction is non-accommodating (the dash-dotted 
179 
 
lines). Comparing the difference in the response of consumption and output across 
monetary stances (accommodating, not accommodating), one can observe a gap of about 
half a percentage point of GDP through many quarters. 
Monetary accommodation is measured by the difference in the response of real interest 
rates depicted by the solid and the dash-dotted lines in the lower right panel (ex ante real 
rates): under the accommodating stance (solid lines) real rates are lower by about a 
quarter of a percentage point (annualized) relative to the tight monetary stance (dashed-
dotted line). Importantly, under the ‘right’ policy mix the path of real short term interest 
rates implies a fall in the long-term real interest rate, because future short rates fall below 
their long term average value. 
We may note that the response of interest rates is by and large consistent with empirical 
findings on the effects of fiscal expansions identified in historical time series. Moreover, 
with the ‘right’ financing and policy mix, the model also predicts a positive consumption 
multiplier together with exchange rate depreciation, a stylized fact which has been 
established by several recent studies (e.g. Monacelli and Perotti 2006, Ravn et al. 2007). 
While apparently difficult to reconcile with conventional wisdom, this stylized fact has 
motivated quite a bit of recent theoretical work, generating the widespread impression 
that the standard model needs to be adapted in a significant way to fit the fact. The 
message from our study is different: the standard model works. However, sufficient 
attention must be given to the financing of fiscal expansions and the fiscal-monetary 
policy mix – a message that is strongly related to the argument by Dornbusch (1980). 
These exchange rate-related considerations bring us to a final point, which is particularly 
relevant in the current situation, in which governments are contemplating cooperative 
action. Looking at our results, depreciation may be interpreted as an unwelcome beggar-
thy-neighbour effect of domestic policies – domestic economic activity is sustained by 
‘stealing’ foreign demand. 
We would like to stress here that exchange rate depreciation is not crucial for the size of 
fiscal multipliers (our results also go through in a closed economy model). Most 
important, depreciation will be contained, or eliminated altogether, when fiscal expansion 
is coordinated across borders. 
Actually, our analysis provides support to the idea of including a specific item in an 
agenda for international policy cooperation, that is, the opportunity of pursuing fiscal 
plans where current expansions are matched in part by offsetting correction of spending 
down the line. 
Notes of caution 
Some notes of caution are in order as concluding remarks. It is hard to believe that the 
impact of fiscal expansions will be independent of the initial budgetary conditions of a 
country. Indeed, in related empirical work based on a sample of OECD countries, we find 
that consumption multipliers are much lower and even negative in economies with high 
debt and deficits (Corsetti, Meier and Müller 2008b). In a sense, however, we could argue 
that for these economies our point applies with unusual force: when initial budget 
conditions are weak, rigorous financing plans may be a precondition for fiscal policy to 




The case for fiscal stimulus may be strongest when there is a presumption of a 
coordination failure in the economy, as is apparently the case in the running dry of credit 
markets. Yet in many countries the current juncture also shares characteristics of an 
inevitable hangover after some excessive binge. While fiscal policy can soften the blow 
and it is wise to use it, the truth remains that American consumers, for instance, have to 
repair their balance sheet, rather than resume old spendthrift ways. The way stimulus 
programs are designed matters here. We should not lose sight of this plain observation. 
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Gros: Fiscal policy and the credit crunch: What will work? 
21 December 2008 
Most countries need a fiscal stimulus, but how should it be implemented? This column 
assesses fiscal policy's potential to increase demand and argues that any meaningful 
boost must come from transfers to the private sector, not infrastructure investments. Tax 
cuts will be most effective in countries where households are net borrowers. 
As the real economy sinks quickly into a deep recession, governments are groping for 
measures to limit the downturn. And as interest rates are quickly bumping against the 
zero bound, an aggressive use of fiscal policy seems to be the only way to sustain 
demand.  Fiscal policy seems particularly appropriate since our macroeconomic models 
tell us that fiscal policy multipliers increase when more economic agents become 
liquidity constrained because they are then likely to spend any additional income they 
receive. 
Unfortunately the discussions about the appropriate use of fiscal policy have degenerated 
into a shouting much with accusations of ‘crass Keynesianism’ and ‘stupid fiscal 
orthodoxy’. Instead of engaging in such polemics, one should look calmly at what fiscal 
policy can actually achieve under the present extraordinary circumstances. 
The key question: Can fiscal policy increase demand effectively?   
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The most direct way for governments to increase demand is to buy goods and services 
from the market. However, most European governments spend very little this way. Public 
sector investment represents only 2–2.5% of GDP and is difficult to increase quickly 
since the large projects, which make up the bulk of the expenditure, take often a decade 
or more to realize. Even if governments were able to increase public investment by 20% 
in one year, this would result in a fiscal impulse of only less than 0.5% of GDP. Even in 
the US, this instrument will only have limited importance, as public infrastructure 
spending is projected to increase from around 2.6% (in 2007) to 3.6% of GDP (in 2009), 
thus constituting only a small fraction of the overall deficit, which is now projected to 
climb to around 8%–9% of GDP. 
Any large-scale fiscal policy impulse must therefore, to be effective quickly, work 
through transfers to the private sector, either via lower taxes or via higher transfer to 
households. The key problem here is that under the present circumstances of extreme 
uncertainty households might just save any increase in their disposable income. How 
likely is this to happen?  A key factor will be the financial position of households 
themselves. 
Households that depend on credit to finance their consumption will be most affected by 
the credit crunch and are thus most likely to react to a tax cut by maintaining their 
consumption. For this type of household, a tax cut (or an increase in expenditure) will be 
an effective tool to prevent an even sharper drop in consumption. 
However, for households that do not depend on credit, the situation is quite different. 
Households that are saving anyway will probably at present just increase their savings in 
response to an increase in their disposable income that they know to be temporary. 
This implies that the effectiveness of fiscal policy will vary greatly across the EU. Table 
1 shows that households are on average net borrowers in only two of the larger member 
countries – Spain and the UK, unsurprisingly. In these two countries (with the largest 
housing bubbles) fiscal policy should thus be effective. However, in the three other large 
member countries, households are on average net savers. In these countries, and in 
particular in Germany where households are net lenders to the tune of about 10% of their 
disposable incomes, fiscal policy will not be effective – households can just increase their 
lending in response to a tax cut. The experiences of the US and Japan point in a similar 
direction. In Japan, the government has been running very large deficits for over a 
decade, but an increase in private savings has offset this, leaving domestic demand flat. 
Even in the US, where the private savings rate has been close to zero, households still 
chose to save more than half of the tax rebate decided earlier in 2008. 
Table 1. Household lending across the EU 
 Net lending of households Net lending of 
corporations 
   Billion euro Percentage of income Billion euro 
Germany  +144 9.5% +46 
Spain  -27 -4.4% -75 
France  +66 5.4% -0 
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Italy  +63 6.4% -58 
UK  -97 -8.2% +98 
Source: Ameco 
The fact that the marginal propensity to save is likely to be much higher in countries with 
solvent households (Germany and most of rest of continental Europe) also implies that 
the multiplier effect of spending on public infrastructure will also be lower than in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries where households are close to bankruptcy. This is another reason 
why the German government should be more hesitant than others to engage in a big fiscal 
stimulus. 
A similar reasoning applies to the corporate sector – in a credit crunch investment will be 
strongly affected by the liquidity situation of enterprises. This implies that in countries 
where the corporate sector is a heavy borrower (Spain, France and Italy) it would be 
important to improve the liquidity situation of enterprises. One simple way to do this 
would be to allow all corporations to postpone payment of corporate income taxes for 1-2 
years. This would not result in higher deficits as usually measured, but the cash deficit 
would increase as governments would effectively extend a credit to the corporate sector. 
Such a measure would thus be very different from a tax cut because it would not lead to 
larger debt levels and thus should not lead to sustainability problems later on. Postponing 
the payment of corporate income tax would of course help only enterprises that make a 
profit, but this should be considered an advantage because it would mitigate the impact of 
the credit crunch for sound enterprises, i.e. those that deserve to be saved. Companies that 
did not pay corporate income tax because they were not able to turn a profit even during 




Castanheira: Episode V: Expectations strike back 
14 October 2008 
Fears that the present crisis might reach 1930s proportions risk becoming a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. To quell them, we must anchor expectations in the right direction. This column 
advocates a temporary but aggressive expansionary fiscal policy to rebuild confidence. 
We need to exploit the stability pact in a different way: for the next two years, the pact 
should constrain national governments to significantly increase all deficits, beyond 3% if 
needed. 
Do you remember Luke Skywalker’s challenge to become a Jedi in The Empire Strikes 
Back? Luke had to enter a dark,foggy cave and fight evil foes. What Luke did not know 
is that these foes would be materialisations of his own apprehensions. Empowered by the 
Force, Luke killed the materialisation of his arch-enemy. But that was not the purpose of 
the challenge. The real purpose was to teach Luke that the Force lies less in the sword 
than in the mind. Luke should have turned off his lightsabre and focused his mind. By 
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quelling his own fears, monsters and enemies would have receded. That victory, Luke 
had to achieve. 
These fictional events are the epitome of a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is only because 
Luke imagines an enemy that the enemy materialises. Bank runs are their very non-
fictional equivalent – if every other depositor leaves his cash with the bank, my deposits 
are safe. But, let me conceive of another equilibrium in which other depositors run to the 
bank and withdraw their deposits... this would mean that the bank would no longer be 
safe. Then, I should also run to withdraw my deposits. If the whole herd does the same, 
the bank goes bust, thereby confirming my expectations. Like Luke with his lightsabre, 
governments have until now mobilised enormous amounts of energy (and cash) to fight 
each of these madmen-made foes. These fights have been epic but not sufficient – they 
only combat the enemies who have already materialised. 
So far, the current crisis has proved elusive and unstoppable because it is a test of each 
chapter of a good economics textbook. All economists have studied multiple equilibria 
and self-fulfilling prophecies. All of us – and I include here central bankers, as well as 
stock brokers and traders – studied the weaknesses of the banking system. All of us learnt 
about the 1929 crisis, the savings and loan crisis, and the Japanese crisis. All of us have 
the same fears and wonder which will be the victor: the heroic-but-clumsy governments 
or the traders’ and brokers’ panic? Like in Keynes' beauty contest, each player tries to 
outguess the other. But we have the same textbooks, and thus the same fears at the same 
time. Today’s fear is whether this crisis could prove worse and more protracted than in 
the 1930s. This is not a prediction! Just a fear... 
Why could such a fear come true in Europe? After the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, we 
developed institutions meant to anchor expectations towards a conservative and sound 
long-term policy of stability – a safe-and-sound European Central Bank with a heralded 
conservative policy. The stability pact prevents a re-run of the counter-productive deficit 
policies of the 1980s. But these institutions are totally inappropriate to stave off present 
fears. They actually reinforce the expectation that Europe will be unable to adapt its 
macroeconomic policy. Textbooks say that in 1930 Herbert Hoover increased taxes to 
prevent a deficit increase, which actually worsened the crisis (see Barry Eichengreen's 
recent column). Textbooks say that Japan, unable to react quickly, is still suffering from 
its 1990s crisis. Today, the Belgian government is designing its 2009 budget and yearns 
for it to be balanced. If we do not coordinate policies away from such misplaced 
orthodoxy, we may well anchor current expectations towards a worse-than-in-the-thirties 
crisis. 
Today, we thus need to exploit the stability pact in a different way if it is to play its 
stabilising role. For the next two years, the pact should constrain national governments to 
significantly increase all deficits, beyond 3% if needed. Textbooks tell us that such a 
Keynesian policy cannot work for a prolonged period nor when countries face an adverse 
supply shock. But it might be badly needed to combat the likely contraction in demand 
that we now expect to take place in 2009. A temporary but aggressive budgetary policy 
has the potential to rebuild confidence – to anchor expectations towards a moderate and 
short-lived drop in aggregate demand. 
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Europe has delayed many important policies because they are costly: energy saving 
investments to meet CO2 targets, research and development investments to meet the 
Lisbon agenda, and many efficiency-enhancing but deficit-generating tax reforms. These 
are genuine investments, which are costly in the short-run but beneficial in the medium or 
long run. Now is the time to accelerate them and let all deficits increase significantly, to 
cash in the rewards when growth returns. The purpose is certainly not to abandon the 
sound policies that have worked in recent years. Yet, to quell present fears, we must 
anticipate the next textbook chapter and anchor expectations in the right direction – no 
Luke, such a crisis there will not be! 
 
Boltho and Carlin: Germany needs high wage settlements and a serious 
fiscal stimulus 
26 November 2008 
Germany is in better shape than many to weather the financial crisis. But, this column 
argues, it needs to raise private consumption with a substantial fiscal stimulus and higher 
real wages, lest it run the risk of slipping into combined stagnation and deflation. 
The German economy is in better shape than many to weather the financial crisis. 
Germany has no over-indebted households and no house price bubble. Private and 
government consumption have been flat for years. Growth has been led by net exports 
thanks to successful company restructuring, and the non-financial corporate sector is in 
good shape. While earlier euro appreciation and recent financial turmoil may lead to 
recession, Germany could ride out the crisis by establishing more balanced growth via 
real wage increases to encourage long-suppressed private consumption and a significant 
fiscal policy stimulus. 
German strengths and weaknesses 
Germany’s recent performance has been impressive – 2006-07 saw nearly 3% growth 
despite a sharp increase in VAT. This revival was clearly not due to government reforms, 
as was the case in the UK under Mrs Thatcher, whose sweeping deregulation contributed, 
if with a long lag, to the remarkable economic performance of the last decade. The 
limited reforms undertaken by Schroeder in 2004-05 may have had some positive effects, 
but they were far too recent and small to explain a more than doubling of the growth rate. 
Nor did Germany experience the alternative model of successful reforms, pioneered by 
the Netherlands or Ireland, based on a consensus between the social partners, an incomes 
policy and fiscal restraint. 
Yet, far-going reforms lie behind recent German successes. These came neither from 
above (as in the UK), nor from cooperation between industry, labour, and the government 
(as in the Dutch and Irish cases). They were the result of corporate action, usually in 
cooperation with works councils and unions. Over the last decade, German firms have 
profoundly changed work practices and compensation levels and this, in turn, has greatly 
boosted exports and growth. 
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Through the early 1990s, German competitiveness plummeted as labour costs (in dollars) 
skyrocketed. To redress this, German companies aggressively embraced both 
globalisation and outsourcing. The first choice is illustrated in Chart 1. While Germany’s 
foreign trade/GDP share was broadly similar to that of the other major European 
economies in the early 1990s, it rose much more sharply than elsewhere over the last 
decade. And a large element of that increase came from trade with Eastern Europe, which 
provided Germany not only with a buoyant market but also with a source of cheap, well-
trained labour. As German companies outsourced or threatened to outsource a large 
fraction of their manufacturing activities, the domestic labour force made significant 
concessions in terms of both wages and work practices in order to safeguard jobs. Recent 
research (Becker and Muendler, 2008) shows that German companies that increased 
employment in foreign subsidiaries retained more workers at home than similar firms that 
did not expand abroad. 
 
Interestingly, this was achieved in the absence of virtually any strike activity, thanks, in 
large part, to the Mitbestimmung or codetermination practices (Carlin and Soskice, 2008). 
These have been fiercely criticised in much of the Anglo-American literature, as an 
intolerable intrusion in the freedom which managers should have to cut wages, fire 
workers (and pay themselves inordinate amounts). Yet, by involving organised labour in 
strategic decisions, codetermination facilitated an adjustment that would elsewhere 
almost certainly have been accompanied by a good deal more social strife and 
redundancies. 
The resulting moderation in wages and improvements in productivity have been startling, 
especially in a comparative European context (Chart 2). As a result, Germany’s 
competitiveness improved sharply, as shown by Commission estimates of developments 
in real intra-Eurozone exchange rates (Chart 3). Improved competitiveness is, of course, 
not the only explanation for the sudden acceleration in German growth, but it is almost 
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certainly the most important one. The reverse side of this coin is, however, the weakness 
of private consumption. For seven years now, consumer spending has hardly risen, in 
sharp contrast to developments elsewhere in Europe (Chart 4). A strategy that privileges 
wage restraint and productivity growth has strengthened profits and, with a lag, 
investment, but it has so far done very little to boost household income. 
 
 
Stimulating German consumption 
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The financial turmoil now threatens to plunge the country into a lengthy recession. The 
lop-sided nature of recent growth makes Germany vulnerable to a slump in capital goods 
exports, as global investment falters in response to the dramatic rise in uncertainty (see 
Nick Bloom’s Vox column). Rapid and decisive policy intervention is needed to raise 
private consumption. In the US, the UK, and several other OECD countries, such efforts 
face the headwind of falling house prices and high household debt. This is not the case in 
Germany: house prices have fallen since 1990, household debt has remained stable, and 
the saving ratio is high and rising. 
How can consumption be encouraged? There are two mechanisms. The first is via 
stronger growth of real wages. In April, EU finance ministers and ECB president Jean-
Claude Trichet approved of the 8% public sector wage deal (spread over two years), 
arguing that unlike other countries, German real wages required an upward correction 
(Financial Times, 4 April 2008). For the engineering industry (whose negotiations have 
just ended), a settlement above inflation would have been welcome. The very moderate 
agreement reached will make little additional contribution to the growth of consumption. 
Second, consumption must be supported by a substantial fiscal stimulus. The design of 
such a stimulus should reflect longer-term principles via measures that boost demand 
(especially consumption) in the short run but also contribute to improving the supply side 
in the longer run. The stimulus should also be directed toward reversing the significant 
rise in income inequality and poverty in Germany from the mid-1990s. Chart 5 compares 
the growth of household incomes at the bottom and top of the distribution and poverty 
rates in Germany and the other large European economies. 
Chart 5 Income distribution and poverty 
 
Source: OECD (2008) 
The opportunity should be taken to introduce expenditure programmes that will not have 
to be reversed (either because they improve long-run economic efficiency or because they 
are self-liquidating) and to introduce changes to the tax system consistent with longer-
term objectives. Measures such as temporary tax rebates (‘cheques through the post’) or 
reductions in VAT rates do not fall under this umbrella. They may well be necessary but, 
in a climate of great uncertainty, direct tax cuts might be saved, while indirect ones could 
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contribute to price deflation. Hence the need to direct tax cuts or benefit increases to 
poorer households since these are likely to have the greatest short-run impact on 
consumption. Time-limited cheques for use on specific items related to other government 
objectives such as the reduction of CO2 emissions would also fit the criteria. 
A number of other specific policies on the expenditure and tax side would more reliably 
boost demand and contribute to longer-run objectives. Examples include: 
Policies to improve incentives for women to participate more fully in the labour market 
These will create jobs, raise incomes and boost consumption. Such policies include: 
• bringing forward the planned increased provision of pre-school child care (this is 
much lower in Germany than elsewhere in Europe); 
• speeding up the introduction of full-day school (half-day school is still prevalent 
in much of Germany and restricts women’s hours of work); 
• reform the tax treatment of married women to remove the disincentive for second 
earners to work longer hours. 
In the short run, policies to improve the availability of childcare and to provide full-day 
school will directly raise employment. In the longer run, they will boost women’s labour 
force participation and working hours, creating a larger tax base. Higher levels of labour 
market participation by married women will improve the possibilities for self-insurance 
within the household and reduce the need for increased precautionary savings that have 
accompanied the labour market reforms introduced in the past few years (Carlin and 
Soskice, 2008). 
Policies to improve training and education 
These involve front-loaded additional government expenditure in the short run (thus 
generating jobs for example, for young university graduates), but do not represent 
spending programmes that the government would want to reverse. Such policies include: 
• targeting German language training and other remedial education for immigrant 
children, who have been highlighted as a major problem area in the PISA studies. 
• targeting additional teaching resources on children from low-education and 
jobless households. 
• increased provision of training for older workers (Germany’s highly successful 
apprenticeship model should be supplemented with effective retraining for 
adults). 
Policies to bring forward expenditure on self-liquidating investment projects 
These, in particular, are projects contributing to longer term environmental goals, from 
those on a household scale to major infrastructure investments. 
There was a structural improvement in Germany’s fiscal position over recent years 
(producing a cyclically adjusted budget balance in 2007). Consolidation was 
predominantly expenditure rather than tax-based. Years of spending restraint provide the 
basis for the implementation of a structurally oriented fiscal stimulus package now. If this 
is delayed or is too timid, Germany runs the risk of slipping into combined stagnation and 
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deflation. Japan’s lost decade stands as a stark reminder of the dangers of an inadequate 
response to a potentially severe recession. 
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Zingales: Plan B 
11 October 2008  
Paulson’s plan won’t work. Leaders agreed to inject equity into the banking system, but 
too little, too late. Nothing short of a 5% increase in banks’ equity capital (about $600 
billion) will restore confidence. This column explains that even then, there are three 
additional problems. We need a plan that minimizes the bailout money so we’ll have 
some for a stimulus package to restart the economy. 
After pointing a gun to the head of Congress, threatening a financial meltdown in case his 
plan was not approved, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson has finally arrived at the only 
logical conclusion: his plan will not work. 
Desperate for a Plan B, Paulson is slowly warming to the suggestion of many economists: 
inject some equity into the banking system. Unfortunately, it is too little and too late. The 
confidence crisis currently affecting the financial system is so severe that only a massive 
infusion of equity capital can reassure the market that the major banks will not fail, 
recreating the confidence for banks to lend to each other. The piecemeal approach of 100 
billion today, 100 billion tomorrow used with AIG will not work. It will only eat up the 
money, without achieving the desired effect—without reassuring the market that the 
worst is over. Simply stated, nothing short of a 5% increase in the equity capital of the 
banking system will do the trick. We are talking about 600 billion. Unfortunately, even if 
the government is willing to spend this kind of money, there are three problems. 
First, to restore the necessary confidence, a capital infusion needs to reduce a financial 
institutions’ risk of default to trivial levels. This implies transforming the existing, 
outstanding debt (roughly two trillion if we just count the long-term bonds) into safe 
debt. A large fraction of the equity injected will not go to generate new loans, but to 
provide this insurance to the existing debtholders. How much? We can estimate it by 
looking at the credit default swaps, which provide us with the cost of insuring the debt 
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against default. At yesterday’s prices, the cost of insuring the two trillion of outstanding 
long-term bonds outstanding would be more than 300 billion. Consequently, half of the 
capital the Government will invest in banks will not go to increase new loans, but to bail 
out Wall Street investors. 
Second, a capital infusion does not address the root of the problem, which stems from the 
housing market. If homeowners continue to default and walk away from their houses, the 
banking sector will continue to bleed and additional equity infusions will be needed. 
More importantly, the very bailout plan, and the animosity it generates, will induce more 
homeowners who are sitting on a house with a negative equity value to walk away. Many 
of them will think: “Why do I have to play by the rules when Wall Street does not?” 
This leads us to the third and most important problem. If we bail out Wall Street, why not 
bail out Detroit (probably another 150 billion) and Main Street? In fact, Senator McCain 
has already talked about buying out the defaulted mortgages to keep people in their 
homes. Even if we limit ourselves only to the subprime mortgages, we are talking about 
$1.3 trillion. Where do we stop? 
We need a different solution: a Plan B. A plan that minimizes the money the Government 
uses in bailing out Wall Street and Main Street to save our precious dollars for a stimulus 
package, which will be essential to restarting the economy. 
Rescuing Main Street 
Suppose that you bought a house in California in 2006. You paid $400,000 with only 5% 
down. Unfortunately, during the last two years the value of your house dropped by 30%; 
thus, you now find yourself with a mortgage worth $380,000 and a house worth 
$280,000. Even if you can afford your monthly payment (and you probably cannot), why 
should you struggle to pay the mortgage when walking away will save you $100,000, 
more than most people can save in a lifetime? However, when the homeowner walks 
away, the mortgage holder does not recover $280,000. The foreclosure process takes 
some time during which the house is not properly maintained and further deteriorates in 
value. The recovery rate in standard mortgage foreclosures (which will not take place in 
the middle of the worst crisis since the Great Depression) is 50 cents per dollar of the 
mortgage. I am generous in estimating that under the current conditions it might recover 
50 cents per dollar of the appraised value of the house; right now, it is only 37 cents per 
dollar of the mortgage, which given a house appraised at $280,000 equals only $140,000 
for the mortgage holder. In other words, foreclosing is costly for both the borrower and 
the lender. The mortgage holder gains only half of what is lost by the homeowners, due to 
what we economists call underinvestment: the failure to maintain the house. 
In the old days, when the mortgage was granted by your local bank, there was a simple 
solution to this tremendous inefficiency. The bank forgave part of your mortgage;let’s 
say 30%. This creates a small positive equity value—an incentive—for you to stay. Since 
you stay and maintain the house, the bank gets its $266,000 dollars of the new debt back, 
which trumps the $140,000 that it was getting through foreclosure. 
Unfortunately, this win-win solution is not possible today. Your mortgage has been sold 
and repackaged in an asset-backed security pool and sold in tranches with different 
priorities. There is disagreement on who has the right to renegotiate and renegotiation 
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might require the agreement of at least 60% of the debt holders, who are spread 
throughout the globe. This is not going to happen. Furthermore, unlike your local bank, 
distant debt holders cannot tell whether you are a good borrower who has been unlucky 
or somebody just trying to take advantage of the lender. In doubt, they do not want to cut 
the debt for fear that even the homeowners who can easily afford their mortgage will ask 
for debt forgiveness. 
Here is where government intervention can help. Instead of pouring money to either side, 
the government should provide a standardized way to re-negotiate; one that is both fast 
and fair. Here is my proposal. 
Congress should pass a law that makes a re-contracting option available to all 
homeowners living in a zip code where house prices dropped by more than 20% since the 
time they bought their property. Why? Because there is no reason to give a break to 
inhabitants of Charlotte, North Carolina, where house prices have risen 4% in the last two 
years. 
How do we implement this? Thanks to two brilliant economists, Chip Case and Robert 
Shiller, we have reliable measures of house price changes at the zip code level. Thus, by 
using this real estate index, the re-contracting option will reduce the face value of the 
mortgage (and the corresponding interest payments) by the same percentage by which 
house prices have declined since the homeowner bought (or refinanced) his property. 
Exactly like in my hypothetical example above. 
In exchange, however, the mortgage holder will receive some of the equity value of the 
house at the time it is sold. Until then, the homeowners will behave as if they own 100% 
of it. It is only at the time of sale that 50% of the difference between the selling price and 
the new value of the mortgage will be paid back to the mortgage holder. It seems a 
strange contract, but Stanford University successfully implemented a similar arrangement 
for its faculty: the university financed part of the house purchase in exchange for a 
fraction of the appreciation value at the time of exit. 
The reason for this sharing of the benefits is twofold. On the one hand, it makes the 
renegotiation less appealing to the homeowners, making it unattractive to those not in 
need of it. For example, homeowners with a very large equity in their house (who do not 
need any restructuring because they are not at risk of default) will find it very costly to 
use this option because they will have to give up 50% of the value of their equity. 
Second, it reduces the cost of renegotiation for the lending institutions, which minimizes 
the problems in the financial system. 
Since the option to renegotiate (offered by the American Housing Rescue & Foreclosure 
Prevention Act) does not seem to have been stimulus enough, this recontracting will be 
forced on lenders, but it will be given as an option to homeowners, who will have to 
announce their intention in a relatively brief period of time. 
The great benefit of this program is that provides relief to distressed homeowners at no 
cost to the Federal government and at the minimum possible cost for the mortgage 
holders. The other great benefit is that it will stop defaults on mortgages, eliminating the 
flood of houses on the market and thus reducing the downside pressure on real estate 
prices. By stabilizing the real estate market, this plan can help prevent further 
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deterioration of financial institutions’ balance sheets. But it will not resolve the problem 
of severe undercapitalization that these institutions are currently facing. For this we need 
the second part of the plan. 
Rescuing Wall Street 
The plan for Wall Street follows the same main idea: facilitating an efficient 
renegotiation. The key difference between the Main Street and Wall Street plans is in the 
ease of assessing the current value of the troubled assets. It is relatively easy to estimate 
the current value of a house by looking at the purchase price and at the intervening drop 
in value (per the Case and Shiller index). In banks, however, the lack of transparency 
makes this estimation very difficult. To avoid having to come up with this estimate, 
which would be a difficult process and one fraught with potential conflict of interests, we 
are going to use a clever mechanism invented twenty years ago by a lawyer economist, 
Lucian Bebchuk. 
The core idea is to have Congress pass a law that sets up a new form of 
prepackaged bankruptcy that would allow banks to restructure their debt 
and restart lending. Prepackaged means that all the terms are pre-specified 
and banks could come out of it overnight. All that would be required is a 
signature from a federal judge. In the private sector the terms are generally 
agreed among the parties involved, the innovation here would be to have 
all the terms pre-set by the government, thereby speeding up the  process. 
Firms who enter into this special bankruptcy would have their old 
equityhodlers wiped out and their existing debt (commercial paper and 
bonds) transformed into equity. This would immediately make banks 
solid, by providing a large equity buffer. As it stands now, banks have lost 
so much in junk mortgages that the value of their equity has tumbled 
nearly to zero. In other words, they are close to being insolvent. By 
transforming all banks’ debt into equity this special Chapter 11 would 
make banks solvent and ready to lend again to their customers. 
Certainly, some current shareholders might disagree that their bank is insolvent and 
would feel expropriated by a proceeding that wipes them out. This is where the Bebchuk 
mechanism comes in handy. After the filing of the special bankruptcy, we give these 
shareholders one week to buy out the old debtholders by paying them the face value of 
the debt. Each shareholder can decide individually. If he thinks that the company is 
solvent, he pays his share of debt and regains his share of equity. Otherwise, he lets it go. 
My plan would exempt individual depositors, which are federally ensured. I would also 
exempt credit default swaps and repo contracts to avoid potential ripple effect through the 
system (what happened by not directing Lehman Brothers through a similar procedure). It 
would suffice to write in this special bankruptcy code that banks who enter it would not 
be considered in default as far as their contracts are concerned. 
How would the government induce insolvent banks (and only those) to voluntarily 
initiate these special bankruptcy proceedings? One way is to harness the power of short-
term debt. By involving the short-term debt in the restructuring, this special bankruptcy 
will engender fear in short-term creditors. If they think the institution might be insolvent, 
they will pull their money out as soon as they can for fear of being involved in this 
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restructuring. In so doing, they will generate a liquidity crisis that will force these 
institutions into this special bankruptcy. 
An alternative mechanism is to have the Fed limit access to liquidity. Both banks and 
investment banks currently can go to the Federal Reserve’s discount window, meaning 
that they can, by posting collateral, receive cash at a reasonable rate of interest. Under my 
plan, for the next two years only banks that underwent this special form of bankruptcy 
would get access to the discount window. In this way, solid financial institutions that do 
not need liquidity are not forced to undergo through this restructuring, while insolvent 
ones would rush into it to avoid a government takeover. 
Another problem could be that the institutions owning the debt, which will end up 
owning the equity after the restructuring, might be restricted by regulation or contract to 
holding equity. To prevent a dumping of shares that would have a negative effect on 
market prices, it is enough to include a norm that allows these institutions two years to 
comply with the norm. This was the standard practice in the old days when banks, who 
could not own equity, were forced to take some in a restructuring. 
The beauty of this approach is threefold. First, it recapitalizes the banking sector at no 
cost to taxpayers. Second, it keeps the government out of the difficult business of 
establishing the price of distressed assets. If debt is converted into equity, its total value 
would not change, only the legal nature of the claim would. Third, this plan removes the 
possibility of the government playing God, deciding which banks are allowed to live and 
which should die; the market will make those decisions. 
Tomorrow is too late 
The United States (and possibly the world) is facing the biggest financial crisis since the 
Great Depression. There is a strong quest for the government to intervene to rescue us, 
but how? Thus far, the Treasury seems to have been following the advice of Wall Street, 
which consists in throwing public money at the problems. However, the cost is quickly 
escalating. If we do not stop, we will leave an unbearable burden of debt to our children. 
Time has come for the Treasury secretary to listen to some economists. By understanding 
the causes of the current crisis, we can help solve it without relying on public money. 
Thus, I feel it is my duty as an economist to provide an alternative: a market-based 
solution, which does not waste public money and uses the force of the government only 
to speed up the restructuring. It may not be perfect, but it is a viable avenue that should 
be explored before acquiescing to the perceived inevitability of Paulson’s proposals. 
 
Wyplosz: Why Paulson is (maybe) right 
22 September 2008  
The world’s bankers created a reckless mix of lending and securitisation that exploded in 
their faces last year; they’ve stonewalled since. It would be criminal to bail them out, but 
spilling blood for its own sake is foolish. Here one of the world’s leading 
macroeconomists explains how the ‘Paulson Package’, history’s largest bet, might work 
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and might not cost taxpayers too much. It’s too early to know which label to apply: 
“bailout” or “shrewd cleansing operation”. 
First of all, let me state clearly my position. Banks have made huge mistakes. 
Even though many serious economists (the likes of Robert Shiller and Nouriel Roubini) 
had warned for years – not months – that the credit boom and the housing price bubble 
would end up in tears, bankers superbly closed their ears and soldiered on, driven by 
greed and short-term analyses. When the mix of reckless lending and securitisation 
exploded in their faces, more than one year ago, they stonewalled and drove the economy 
down in the hope of being bailed out. It would be criminal to bail them out. It would 
guarantee even worse crises in the future. Conclusion, there must be blood. 
This being said, spilling blood for the sake of it is a bit silly. Banks are not oil companies. 
When an oil company goes bust, by definition, it is because its liabilities exceed its 
assets. After bankruptcy, its assets remain as valuable as before. Oil is safely tucked away 
under ground, refineries and gas stations stay put above ground. 
A bank goes bust when its assets have collapsed. Bankruptcy means that its liabilities 
collapse too and these are assets of other banks and of millions of hapless citizens. This is 
why contagion and bank runs occur more frequently than oil runs. Sure, with patience, 
both assets and liabilities can regain value, but in the meantime the financial system is 
impaired and the resulting credit crunch provokes an economic crisis that spares no one. 
This is why large, systemic financial institutions cannot be summarily dispatched to 
receivership. Avoiding a credit crunch ought to be every one’s priority. 
Bleeding the culprits cannot be done with a truncheon, it requires a surgical intervention. 
Secretary Paulson has obviously been testing many scalpels: 
• He half bailed out Bears Stearns. 
• As he butchered Lehman Brothers, he so frightened Merrill Lynch that this last 
problem was not solved at taxpayer’s cost. 
• On the next day, though, the Fed and many other central banks were lending huge 
amounts of money – presumably to Lehman’s creditors and to horrified financial 
institutions that realised that bailouts are not part of the plan anymore. 
• The following day, he effectively nationalised AIG. 
This is not a bailout. AIG shares have been so diluted that shareholders lost most 
of their money. The Treasury will keep this too-big-to-fail company functioning 
but over time it will dispose of its assets. For all practical purposes the old AIG is 
gone. 
• Then, on the final day of the creation of the new financial order, Paulson did a 
mega-AIG – he offered to buy all the toxic assets that financial institutions will 
care to sell. 
The details of the plan are not known yet, so it is too early to determine whether it is a 
bailout or more blood. All will depend on two things. The price at which the assets will 




Indications are that these assets will be bought at auctions. These will have to be reverse 
auctions, probably of the Dutch variety. If the sellers are confident in their financial 
health, or just smart enough to collectively bluff Paulson, the price will be close to the 
purchase price and it will be a bailout. If the sellers are scared and unable to organise 
themselves, the price will be a deep discount. Willem Buiter argues that the auctions are 
likely to force the sellers to reveal their true reservation price and I tend to agree. 
Let us assume that, indeed, the toxic assets will be acquired at a deep discount. What 
happens next? 
• First, the selling financial institutions will have to acknowledge their losses, a step 
that they did their utmost to resist for more than a year. 
They argued all along that there was no market for these assets – indeed they 
refused to sell them – so no price to mark them and therefore no objective way of 
entering the losses in their books. The auctions will provide a market price, at 
long last. Whether they sell or not, being forced to mark their assets to market, all 
financial institutions will have no choice but to formally acknowledge their losses. 
Either they recapitalise quickly, which dilute existing shares, or they will file for 
bankruptcy, which is even worse for the shareholders. 
That does not look like a bailout, but it still could be one. Before we reach any 
conclusion, we must consider the second stage of the story. 
• Second, the RTC will hold a huge portfolio of toxic assets, but it will be in no 
rush to sell them. 
Like the previous RTC, thanks to taxpayers’ money, it can take years to do so. If the toxic 
assets gain some value, the RTC and the taxpayers will make a profit and the financial 
institutions that sold them will definitely not have been bailed out. We will be able to call 
the operation a bailout only if toxic-asset prices go on falling, since it will then be 
established that the financial institutions managed to sell these assets above market price 
and at taxpayer’s expense. 
It is therefore much too early to call the operation a bailout or a shrewd cleansing 
operation. Judgment will have to wait until the yet-to-be-created RTC is folded, several 
years from now. Meanwhile, for the first time since mid-2007, we can foresee the 
beginning of the end of the crisis since the financial institutions will have either to 




Spaventa: A (mild) defence of TARP 
26 September 2008  
Bernanke and Paulson's Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) is not perfect, but it is a 
good start. Both aspects of the problem – assets’ illiquidity and shortage of capital – 
should be addressed in sequence. By removing troubled assets from the banks’ books, 
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TARP would remove uncertainty. This will encourage private injections of capital and 
provide better information for public intervention if they prove necessary. 
The Paulson-Bernanke Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), whereby the US 
Treasury would be endowed with $ 700 billion for the purchase of “troubled” financial 
instruments (and in particular mortgage-backed securities) to be sold at a later dater or 
held to maturity, has elicited widespread (and at time indignant) negative reactions from 
the best and brightest of the economists’ profession (though with notable exceptions, like 
Willem Buiter79 and Charles Wyplosz80). In the critics’ view the scheme, though inspired 
or shared by a trio of eminent former officials81, is ill-conceived and will likely end up by 
transferring taxpayers’ money to undeserving financial institutions: if urgent public 
intervention is required, there are fairer and more effective remedies. 
Two preliminary remarks on the timing of the TARP initiative (or, for that matter, of any 
other proposal as bold and sizeable as TARP). First, its effectiveness is impaired by 
coming too late, as a hastily defined measure of last resort after the crisis has become 
acute. An earlier pre-emptive move (a solution similar to TARP was proposed in the 
Financial Times in April and in Vox and in CEPR Policy Insights in May) may have 
prevented the acceleration of the vicious feedback between the falling value of the assets 
of financial institutions and their capital and funding requirements. Second, however, 
once the Treasury and the Fed have jointly announced their emergency program, with the 
stark motivation that it is the only way to avoid an imminent meltdown, doing nothing or 
unduly delaying its implementation would increase uncertainty and plunge the markets 
into chaos. 
There are two related aspects to the crisis besetting financial institutions which are now 
shrinking their balance sheets by cutting credit to the economy: (1) the illiquidity and 
falling value of some of their assets, and (2) a shortage of capital, as only 70% of the 
recognised losses have so far been matched by new capital. TARP attempts to address the 
first aspect, while its critics argue that public intervention should solely aim at the 
second. 
The most relevant objection to TARP concerns the price at which the Treasury would buy 
the troubled assets, most of which have no market and are otherwise difficult to price 
because of their opaqueness and complexity. The unavoidable discretion in price setting 
can, according to critics, only lead to two outcomes: a mark-to-market price, which 
however would provide no relief as it would merely crystallise existing losses or even 
unveil new ones; or a higher price (the most likely outcome) which, while providing 
relief, would transfer the losses from the sellers to the taxpayer, helping moreover those 
financial institutions that made the worst investment decisions. The proposed alternatives 
are all variations on the theme of shoring up the banks’ capital: either by the government 
                                                 
79 “A TAD (toxic Asset Dump) for USSA”, FT.com/Mavercom, September 20, 2008 and 
the comments to Calomiris and Rajan ,  FT.com. 
80 “Why Paulson is (maybe) right", Vox, 22 Septemer, 2008 
81 Nicholas F. Brady, Eugene A. Ludwig, Paul Volcker “Resurrect the Resolution Trust 
Corp.”, The Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2008. 
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acquiring banks’ preferred stock (Krugman82), possibly through a well-designed but 
rather complex scheme of matching the preferred stock assistance with  a common stock 
issue (Calomiris83); or by forcing the financial companies to raise capital making rights 
offerings (Rajan84), or by mandating debt-equity swaps (Zingales, Wolf85). 
In general, the view that, for at least some of the troubled securities, there does not exist a 
price which would relieve the position of financial firms without imposing a cost to the 
taxpayers is not robust. Available data and even pessimistic projections on default rates 
show that “market” prices reflect a negative bubble rather than “fair” values: a thorough 
analysis led the Bank of England to conclude “that using a mark-to-market approach to 
value illiquid securities could significantly exaggerate the scale of losses that financial 
institutions might ultimately incur”.86 For a large class of securities, therefore, the 
alternative is not as stark as the critics maintain. As Chairman Bernanke believes, there 
does exist an intermediate price, high enough to provide relief, but low enough as not to 
inflict budgetary losses. The real problem lies in how that price can be discovered. The 
method of a reverse auction does not by itself prevent sellers’ opportunistic behaviour 
based on asymmetric information. As detailed in an important statement of the Director 
of the Congressional Budget Office87, the conditions to avoid this outcome are that the 
auction should be for shares in the same asset rather that in different assets (hence not 
different complex products but homogeneous tranches) and that those shares be widely 
distributed among many potential sellers. If the auction is well-designed, on the other 
hand, the prices it establishes may provide the floor necessary to revive the markets, 
thereby re-creating liquidity. (What puzzles me about TARP is why cash is offered to 
purchase the troubled assets instead of guaranteed liquid bonds.) 
The many alternatives based on public cum private capital injections are themselves not 
without problems. First and foremost, they leave the assets’ liquidity problem unsolved: 
if the fall of prices continues, injections of capital may prove inadequate after a short time 
(as has already happened). Second there are elements of discretion, and hence 
                                                 
82 “Cash for Trash”, The New York Times, September 21, 2008 
83 “A matched preferred stock plan for government assistance”, in Vox, 22 September 
2008. 
84 “Desperate times need the right measures”, FT.com, 19 September, 2008. 
85 “Why Paulson is wrong”, Vox 21 September, 2008; “Paulson’s plan was not a true 
solution to the crisis”, Financial Times, 23 September, 2008. 
86 Financial Stability Report April 2008, p. 20. This is especially true for the triple-A 
securities, for which losses estimated at market prices are almost 80% higher than those 
based on model-implied prices. See also the letter to the Financial Times, 25 September, 
2008, by Dan McLaughlin of Bank of Ireland Global Markets. 
87 “Federal Responses to Market Turmoil”, Statement of Peter. R. Orszag, Septemer 24, 
2008, which provides a balanced and insightful assessment of the alternatives. For 
another review of benefits and costs, see Douglas M. Elmendorf, “Concerns about the 
Treasury Rescue Plan”, Brookings, September 25, 2008. 
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arbitrariness, in the alternative schemes as well. While a mandatory solution for all would 
be too invasive, targeting and deciding eligibility would imply a discretionary choice. 
Ideally, both aspects of the problem – assets’ illiquidity and shortage of capital – should 
be addressed in sequence.88 Taking the troubled assets off the banks’ books first would 
stabilise the losses incurred by the banks because prices would find a floor (or in the case 
of undeserving asset have openly sunk to the bottom). By removing uncertainty, this 
would at the same time encourage private injections of capital in some cases and provide 
more accurate information on the need for public intervention otherwise. Religious wars 




Persaud: The right alternative to Paulson's plan 
27 September 2008  
This column suggests that TARP is the wrong solution, but it might buy time to develop a 
better plan. Such a plan could involve a private debt-for-equity swap with the government 
co-investing in the equity. This would put tax payers in hock for something like $70bn 
rather than $700bn. Managers and shareholders would take the biggest hit, but bond 
holders would share the pain. 
It is hard to come up with the right solution if you are addressing the wrong problem. 
Which is why Hank Paulson’s US$700bn, Troubled Asset Recovery Plan (TARP) is the 
wrong solution for US credit woes. The best thing that could be said about it is that in 
these febrile markets agreeing to any plan may help to restore confidence and buy policy-
makers enough time to find a better solution that would cost tax payers less and be more 
likely to succeed. 
What is the problem we are trying to solve it and what is the better solution? 
After an eighteen month cycle of write downs of assets, forced sales and further write 
downs, banks have travelled from illiquidity to the borders of insolvency. Banks asset 
values can no longer support bank liabilities. Capital is insufficient. Swapping troubled 
assets for cash - the essence of the TARP - may strengthen asset quality, but by 
crystallising the current distressed price of assets, it does nothing to address the problem 
of asset levels being too low relative to the level of liabilities. This was the right course 
18 months ago, but not now. It is fighting the battle of illiquidity not insolvency. 
                                                 
88 As suggested by Lucien A. Bebchuk, “A plan for addressing the financial crisis”, 
Harvard, Johnson M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business, Discussion Paper 
No. 628, September 2008, the Financial Times editorial of September 19, 2008, Simon 
Johnson and James Kak, “The price of salvation”, FR.com, Economists’ forum, 
September 25, 2008. 
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The TARP prayer is that by strengthening asset quality, banks would be able to raise 
fresh capital, but there is no guarantee of this. Investors will be mindful that even if the 
quality of the existing assets improves, banks are on the edge of insolvency, their current 
business models of securitisation, mortgage lending, equity short-selling and prime 
brokerage need to be rethought and other investors with as deep pockets as the sovereign 
wealth funds are nursing large losses for stepping in early. Tax payers may easily find 
themselves on the hook for another round of cash. Recall that Lehman Brothers, one of 
the smaller investment banks, went bankrupt with US$639bn of assets. 
TARP also manages to save the blushes of bank creditors by putting tax payers at risk. 
This is not the time for moral outrage to cloud clear thinking, and it should not be 
forgotten that policy-makers share much blame in this crisis, but it does seem a little 
perverse to protect those that were paid to take the risk of banks failing, and instead to tax 
those that were not. 
The appropriate analogy is a Chapter 11-type debt restructuring of a bankrupt country or 
company. By swapping a bank’s debt for equity, and hence reducing bank liabilities to 
match the lower level of assets, a bank can stay in business without State control or 
money. It is done all the time for insolvent companies, though I am not underestimating 
the difference of today’s crisis in terms of the systemic nature of the loss of confidence in 
the financial sector and the sheer pace of developments. Moreover, corralling creditors to 
abandon their contractual rights is not easy at the best of times. 
Debt for equity swaps: A better plan 
When all creditors are desperate for cash, none may be willing to give up a bit to ensure 
all end up with something. However, as Anne Gelpern of Rutgers University points out, 
loan agreements are sacred but they are not suicide pacts. In my plan, once a bank 
declares that its minimum regulatory capital level is in danger of being hit, it can appeal 
to the government to facilitate a debt re-organisation where debt is swapped for equity so 
that bank liabilities fall back below back assets with some buffer. 
The government can apply a carrot and a stick to support agreement and confidence that 
the problem will be solved. Where debtors refuse to swap sufficient debt into equity, the 
central bank’s extended liquidity arrangements could be withdrawn for that institution. I 
am not convinced that it is required, but if it would support confidence in the debt 
markets, the government could also offer to co-invest in the equity with the creditors, 
through a parallel purchase of preference shares up to a maximum level that would put 
tax payers in hock for $70bn, say, rather than $700bn. Under this plan, managers and 
shareholders take the largest proportional hit. Bond holders share in the pain. The 
government’s principal role is as facilitator of debt re-organisation, not as the guarantor. 
Losses by creditors will help to re-introduce investment discipline, not reward 
indiscipline. Those with a capacity to diversify risks through time are not forced to 
crystallise losses today. In a world that has become capital-short, fresh capital is not 
required. By closing the asset-liability gap, the Damocles sword of potentially large asset 
sales now is removed, supporting the market recovery. And creditors and tax payers may 





Buiter: The Paulson Plan: A useful first step but nowhere near enough 
25 September 2008  
The Paulson Plan addresses market illiquidity for toxic assets but the real problem is a 
lack of bank capital and the risk of widespread insolvency. Fixing this requires a 
government injection of new bank capital or a forced conversion of bank debt into equity. 
This column argues against the former as it would further socialise the US financial 
system. The Package needs some work, but Congress must stop its infantile posturing and 
act soon. 
The Paulson plan addresses market illiquidity.... 
The Paulson plan for using up to $700 bn of federal government money to buy up illiquid 
securities – mainly complex financial instruments such as asset-backed-securities, and in 
particular private label retail mortgage backed securities – represents an incomplete step 
towards dealing with the simplest part of the financial disaster that is threatening to 
engulf the US financial sector and, with a short lag, the real economy. 
Paulson’s TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program), which I prefer to call TAD (Toxic 
Asset Dump) is a program designed to deal with market illiquidity. It is the most extreme 
manifestation of the authorities acting as what Anne Sibert and I have called market 
maker of last resort (MMLR) for systemically significant assets whose markets have 
become illiquid.  
The MMLR supports market prices when either there is no market price or when there is 
a large gap between the actual market price of the asset, which is a fire-sale price 
resulting from a systemic lack of cash in the market, and the fair or fundamental value of 
the asset – the present discounted value of its future expected cash flows, discounted at 
the discount rate that would be used by a risk-neutral, non-liquidity-constrained economic 
agent (e.g. the government). 
The MMLR can do this either by accepting the illiquid security as collateral for a loan or 
by purchasing it outright. The central bank can, in principle, act as MMLR when the 
support actions involve just collateralised lending, at the discount window, in repos or at 
purpose-designed liquidity facilities like the TAF (the Term Auction Facility), the PDCF 
(the Primary Dealer Credit Facility and the TSLF (Term Securities Lending Facility), but 
two conditions must be satisfied. First, ex-ante, the terms of the collateralised loan must 
be such as to give the central bank an adequate risk-adjusted rate of return (in excess of 
the rate on Treasury bills or bonds of the same maturity). It is not the job of the central 
bank to subsidise the borrowing bank ex-ante. Second, should the collateralised loan 
default (that is, both the borrowing bank and the issuer of the collateral default at the 
same time), the Treasury guarantees to indemnify the central bank automatically and 
immediately. 
Outright purchases of illiquid private securities would expose the central bank to the full 
default risk on the security it purchases. That means, in my view, that this is no job for 
the central bank, except as agent for the government. The central bank can manage the 
transactions on behalf of the Treasury, but it is the Treasury, and behind it the tax payer, 
that carries the credit risk. 
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It is possible for the Treasury, through the outright purchase of illiquid toxic private 
assets both to help the banks selling the toxic securities and the tax payer. This would be 
the case if it prices the securities it purchases above their fire-sale market prices but 
below their fundamental values. It is of course difficult to determine, when markets are 
illiquid, what the present discounted value of the future cash flows of a security is, even if 
the purchaser can always choose to hold the security till maturity, as the Treasury can. 
Even if the fundamental value could be determined somehow, I doubt whether the bulk of 
the US banking system could survive even with their illiquid assets priced at their 
fundamental value.  
But the real problem now is lack of capital and the threat of widespread insolvency 
in the banking sector 
As the full horror story of the bad investments and bad loans made by so many American 
banks has gradually been revealed, it is clear that the US banking sector faces an 
insolvency crisis and not just an illiquidity crisis. The number of impaired mortgages is 
exploding, and not just in the subprime and Alt-A categories, but across the whole 
residential mortgage spectrum. Impaired commercial and industrial mortgages are rising 
fast. Bad loans to the construction industry and to developers are mushrooming. ABS 
backed by automobile loans, by credit card receivables are tottering in growing numbers 
as are many other unsecured household loans. With the economy slowing down and 
probably entering recession soon, even exposures to the non-financial corporate sector 
will become more vulnerable. 
In a nutshell, the US banking sector needs recapitalisation. “Banking sector” here 
includes the entire ‘shadow banking sector’, including such entities as the financial 
instruments division of AIG, that leveraged itself to the eyeballs and engaged in massive 
maturity and liquidity transformation. It needs to shrink overall (as regards employment, 
value added and especially as regards the number of banks and their leverage), but the 
much reduced number of banks that ought to survive this crisis badly need additional 
capital. 
Where can American banks get additional capital today? A very few – really only the 
best-of-breed like Goldman Sachs, which raised $5 billion each from Warren Buffett 
(through his company Berkshire Hathaway) and from the issuance of new shares to 
American institutional investors – can get the capital they need at home, in the US; and 
even then it is expensive (I must declare an interest here – I am a part-time Adviser to 
Goldman Sachs International). Another possible source of new capital are the nouveaux 
riches of the Middle East and the Far East – the Sovereign Wealth Funds and large state-
owned banks of China, Singapore, Korea and the Gulf States. The supply of capital from 
these sources is restricted by the rather disastrous (on a marked-to-market basis) first 
attempts late in 2007 and early in 2008 at diversifying out of Treasuries by these new 
deep pockets of the future. No doubt they will be back – these institutions take a long-
term perspective and are unlikely to become the hapless captives of mark-to-market 
valuation, but the speed with which they gird their loins is unlikely to match the speed 
with which the current crisis moves. 
That leaves just two sources of capital. The first is the US federal government. It could 
inject capital into US banks, say by purchasing preference shares. I would uncouple such 
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a capital injection from Paulson’s toxic asset purchase plan. The market illiquidity 
problem is related to but not the same as the banks’ capital deficiency problem. The 
government could implement a system-wide capital injection by specifying maximum 
leverage ratios (or minimum capital ratios) for various categories of financial institutions. 
It could then inject capital in return for preference shares to bring all these leverage ratios 
down to the maximum levels (all the capital ratios up to the minimum levels).  
My main concern about this way of injecting additional capital is that it would take the 
socialisation of the US financial system yet a step further. Governments may be able to 
run the deposit-raising side of an ordinary commercial bank. For the government to 
decide on other funding strategies, let alone on desirable lending and investment 
strategies is a bridge I hope not to cross. 
 Preferred solution: mandatory debt for equity conversions 
Finally, there is my preferred solution to the capital deficiency problem: the compulsory 
conversion of some of the banks’ debt into equity. Again, this could be done by the 
government specifying maximum leverage ratios (or minimum capital ratios) for various 
categories of financial institutions. Different kinds of debt then would be mandatorily 
converted into equity (preference shares or ordinary shares) with the proportion of each 
category of debt to be converted into stock inversely related to the seniority of the debt. 
These proportions would have to satisfy the requirement that all leverage ratios be 
brought down to the maximum levels (all capital ratios up to the minimum levels). There 
are infinitely many ways of skinning this cat, but it will not be difficult to produce a 
simple and fair solution.  
In the mean time, the Congress fiddles while the financial sector burns... 
Given the extreme urgency of the situation, the response of the US Congress has been 
truly astonishing.  
The House and the Senate are acting as if this is politics as usual. Some grandstanding 
here. The threat of delays or even a filibuster. Amendments and modifications that range 
from the revoltingly populist to the terminally stupid with the disgustingly opportunistic 
and self-serving in between. 
Admittedly, Secretary Paulson laid an egg by including the following phrase in his 
proposal: “Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act are non-
reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court of 
law of any administrative agency”. This reads as though it was personally written by 
Dick Cheney, the prince of absolute executive authority, no checks and balances, no 
accountability, no recourse. No administration that brought us WMD in Iraq and the 
torture camps of Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib should expect anything but hysterical 
giggles in response to such a request. Not smart. 
So, let’s put in accountability and oversight and make sure than Paulson cannot donate 
$700bn to Nature Conservancy. But then let’s pass the plan. 
Ornaments to hang on the Paulson “Christmas tree” 
Instead consider some of the ornaments Congress wants to hang on the Christmas tree: 
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• Caps on the executive remuneration for executives of companies making use of 
the facility created under the plan. A figure of $400,000 has been bandied about. 
From the perspective of fairness, 25 cents would probably too much for some 
CEOs. Indeed, tarring, feathering and running out of town may well be justified in 
certain cases. But it would stop the banks from making use of the facility for the 
very reasons that make the Congress want to punish the CEOs of the banks. If it is 
true, as many in Congress argue, that greedy and irresponsible CEOs have risked 
their banks, and imperilled the wellbeing of their communities and the stability of 
the US economy as a whole, in the pursuit of private gain, then these same CEOs 
would surely once again risk their banks, imperil the wellbeing of their 
communities and the stability of the US economy as a whole to avoid the 
$400,000 cap. “Duh”, as my two teenage kids would say. I know there are too 
many lawyers in Congress, but surely there must be someone with half a brain? 
• Amendments to (personal) bankruptcy laws making it easier for homeowners who 
cannot service their existing mortgages to remain in their homes rather than face 
repossession. This would be both inequitable (why should tax payers who stuck to 
mortgages they can afford be asked to subsidise the mortgages of those whose 
eyes were larger than their stomachs?) and inefficient (it would discourage future 
mortgage lending). Individual homeowners are also not important for systemic 
stability.  
• Other cookies and goodies for those with mortgages they cannot afford to service 
(see the previous bullet point). 
• Equity stakes for the government in the banks it purchases toxic assets from. This 
also would discourage banks from accessing the facility, if the acquisition of 
equity by the government represents a transfer from the bank rather than the quid-
pro-quo for a capital injection by the government.  
• Warrants for the government (options to acquire equity in the banks during some 
period at a set price). See the previous bullet point. 
Conclusion 
Since the invention of the telegraph, panics and crises spread at the speed of light. 
Congress doesn’t have weeks. It doesn’t have too many days, as I see it. Unless it acts 
now, the freeze of the financial wholesale markets will intensify and the attacks on 
financial institutions will resume, first in the US, then in the UK, then in the rest of 
Europe and soon after everywhere in the financially connected world. Short selling 
restrictions/bans won’t help.  
If Congress continues its infantile posturing, the crisis of the financial system will mutate 
into a financial crisis paralysing lending by banks to households and non-financial 
corporations. Instead of a mere recession, there will be a long and deep depression.  
At this stage of the game, liquidity concerns, while still omnipresent, have become the 
epiphenomena of underlying solvency problems in the financial sector. The US banking 
sector is seriously undercapitalised. The UK banking sector too is undercapitalised and 
so, albeit to a lesser-known degree (because of much impaired transparency) are the 
banking systems of the other European nations. Central banks therefore no longer play 
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the lead part. The national treasuries (ministries of finance) backed by the tax payers and 
the beneficiaries of other public spending programs are taking centre stage. Unless plans 
to recapitalise systemically important institutions and to support systemically important 
financial markets are backed with the full faith and credit of the US Federal Government 




Acharya: From recapitalisation to restructuring and reforms 
12 October 2008  
Recapitalise the banks, yes. But how? One option is to sell troubled institutions to 
healthier ones with government help; the other is to restructure them piecemeal. 
Government-assisted bank sales overall present a better form of public-private 
partnership, but both may be necessary. A series of additional restructuring efforts and 
reforms are needed.  
The G7 meeting has raised hopes that coordinated action at the global level will not only 
recapitalize several banking sectors expediently, but also provide further liquidity to 
markets, deposit guarantees and a backstop to money markets to restore funding for 
banks. 
In light of this much-needed response to the global financial crisis, it is important to keep 
in mind that we must also deal with the lemons (in some cases institutions, and in other 
cases assets). This is necessary in order to provide the financial system with the resilience 
and the ability to raise private capital in near future. This should , in turn, help kick-start 
the currently moribund markets for inter-bank lending and commercial paper. 
How we got here 
The aftermath of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy is best characterized as a complete 
collapse of trust between financial institutions and of investor confidence in these 
institutions (and to some extent in the very governments and Central Banks that regulate 
and oversee them). Over the past two weeks, a number of proposals have advocated 
public injection of capital into the troubled banking sector.89 Such recapitalization is 
rightly aimed at shoring up equity base of some highly leveraged institutions that have 
steadily made losses, and of others, less leveraged, whose equity base has suffered as a 
result of information spillover from adverse news about the highly leveraged ones. Partial 
or full nationalization is a temporary measure to put the patient on oxygen, but ultimately 
the arteries must be unclogged. Troubled institutions must be resolved, though not as 
abruptly as was the case with Lehman. 
                                                 
89 Public recapitalisation of the financial sector was the single most common feature in 
opinions of leading academics in VoxEU’s recent publication “Rescuing our jobs and 
savings: What G7/8 leaders can do to solve the global credit crisis”. 
205 
 
Options for restructuring troubled banks 
There are at least two, not mutually exclusive, ways to achieve recapitalization. 
• The first, which I prefer, is to identify and sell troubled institutions to healthier 
ones, possibly with government support in the form of loans or first-default-loss 
protections.90 The sale of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan in March is a good example 
of this method. 
• The second is to restructure troubled institutions piece-meal, selling their healthier 
assets to other institutions and collecting the ones for which there is no current 
private interest into "bad banks", restructuring those assets, and resolving them 
over time. This is trickier given the complexity of institutions involved. 
Two birds with one stone 
Government-assisted sales to healthy institutions are an attractive way of deploying 
public funds since they kill two birds at the same time. They provide capital to the 
system, and entrust the complex task of orderly management and liquidation of troubled 
assets to the healthier parts of the private sector. Such sales also have the right properties 
in terms of not rewarding those institutions and managements that did poorly or refused 
to raise adequate capital in time.  
Whether this mechanism suffices by itself to resolve troubled assets and institutions 
depends to an extent on the condition and willingness of healthy institutions and to some 
extent also on moral suasion powers of regulators. On the one hand, healthy banks stand 
to gain substantially from such sales. On the other hand, they may also try to extract their 
pound of flesh from governments and Central Banks, delaying acquisitions in order to 
deploy as little capital as possible. The latter may however still be the preferred outcome 
given the huge legal and administrative costs of the alternative. 
The alternative arrangement of resolving some institutions piece-meal was employed 
during the US Savings and Loans crisis as well as in the 1997 East Asian crisis. In the 
current context though, this requires substantial clarity on how creditor recoveries will be 
distributed, especially given the complex, contingent and international nature of debt. As 
such, this will call for seamless cross-border coordination.91  
Even if we ignore this rather important issue, holding on to difficult assets requires 
having a long-term horizon as they may not be easy to liquidate as and when needed. 
Currently, there are few private investors with such horizons. The non-banking financial 
sector might be able to muster some capital swiftly to buy such assets at attractive prices, 
but in a severe systemic crisis such as the one we are in, this sector is liquidity- and 
capital-strapped too. Hence, the restructuring vehicles would have to be prepared for a 
somewhat protracted resolution of these assets. 
                                                 
90 Under reasonably general assumptions, government-assisted bank sales can be shown 
to be as effective – ex-post and ex-ante – as bailouts structured through a recapitalisation. 
See Viral V Acharya and Tanju Yorulmazer, “Cash-in-the-market pricing and optimal 
resolution of bank failures”, The Review of Financial Studies, 2008, forthcoming. 




As a result, having the restructuring option in place might provide enough potential 
competition to give incentives to healthier players to make acquisitions sooner and at 
non-extortive terms. Nevertheless, government-assisted bank sales overall present a 
better form of public-private partnership. I am afraid though that both may ultimately be 
required and avoiding some messy restructuring may be unavoidable. 
Trading of Credit Default Swaps on exchanges 
In addition, the efforts underway to move trading of credit default swaps to exchanges 
where collateral arrangements can mitigate counterparty risk must be bolstered by similar 
longer-term arrangements for mortgage-backed securities and standardized securitization 
products. Such infrastructure would be essential if the recapitalized financial system is 
not to experience paralysis in response to further adverse news, which might deplete the 
capital pool and necessitate additional asset sales and restructuring. Indeed, creating more 
transparent platforms for unsecured inter-bank lending in which public funds are initially 
deployed to provide first-default-loss guarantees, with these guarantees eliminated over 
time, also present an attractive option.92 All these measures would eventually reduce the 
burden on the Central Banks to take on credit risk in their lender-of-last-resort operations 
and emergency liquidity assistance schemes. 
While recapitalization employs public funds to get at the issue of insolvency, these other 
efforts employ public funds more directly to reestablish liquidity in several markets that 
are shut down, and build infrastructure to ensure their smooth operation in future. In the 
first case, preferred stakes may potentially provide the taxpayers a good return. In the 
second case, this return is provided by eliminating the negative externality of troubled, 
illiquid assets on healthier parts of the system and creation of public goods. 
Conclusion 
A joint resolution of the issues of inadequate capital and of troubled assets and 
dysfunctional markets is required to restore efficient transfers of liquidity between 
financial institutions and the rest of the system. Until such efficiency is attained, financial 
institutions will continue to hoard liquidity and ration credit, preventing economies to 
emerge from the trap of diminishing levels of financing and growth.  
Recapitalization of banking systems is just the beginning. A series of restructuring efforts 
and reforms, some short- and some long-term, aimed at restoring the orderly functioning 
of markets, must follow with urgency and conviction. 
 
 
Zingales: Why Paulson is wrong 
21 September 2008  
This weekend’s decisions will shape the type of capitalism we live with for the next fifty 
years. Here one of the world’s leading financial scholars, Chicago Business School 
                                                 
92 Some proposals, e.g. in the VoxEU publication cited above, have suggested even 
complete government guarantees of inter-bank lending in the short run. 
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Professor Luigi Zingales, argues that bailing out the financial system with taxpayers’ 
money is wrong. He discusses an alternative – forced debt-for-equity swap or debt-
forgiveness. 
When a profitable company is hit by a very large liability, as was the case in 1985 when 
Texaco lost a $12 billion court case against Pennzoil, the solution is not to have the 
government buy its assets at inflated prices – the solution is Chapter 11. In Chapter 11, 
companies with a solid underlying business generally swap debt for equity. The old 
equity holders are wiped out and the old debt claims are transformed into equity claims in 
the new entity which continues operating with a new capital structure. Alternatively, the 
debt holders can agree to trim the face value of debt in exchange for some warrants. 
Even before Chapter 11, these procedures were the solutions adopted to deal with the 
large railroad bankruptcies at the turn of the twentieth century. So why is this well-
established approach not used to solve the financial sectors current problems?   
No time for bankruptcy procedures 
The obvious answer is that we do not have time. 
Chapter 11 procedures are generally long and complex, and the crisis has reached a point 
where time is of the essence. The negotiations would take months, and we do not have 
this luxury. However, we are in extraordinary times, and the government has taken and is 
prepared to take unprecedented measures. As if rescuing AIG and prohibiting all short-
selling of financial stocks was not enough, now Treasury Secretary Paulson proposes a 
sort of Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) that will buy out (with taxpayers’ money) the 
distressed assets of the financial sector. 
But at what price? 
If banks and financial institutions find it difficult to recapitalise (i.e., issue new equity), it 
is because the private sector is uncertain about the value of the assets they have in their 
portfolio and does not want to overpay. 
Would the government be better in valuing those assets?  No. In a negotiation between a 
government official and banker with a bonus at risk, who will have more clout in 
determining the price? 
The Paulson RTC will buy toxic assets at inflated prices thereby creating a charitable 
institution that provides welfare to the rich – at the taxpayers’ expense. If this subsidy is 
large enough, it will succeed in stopping the crisis. 
But, again, at what price? 
The answer: billions of dollars in taxpayer money and, even worse, the violation of the 
fundamental capitalist principle that she who reaps the gains also bears the losses. 
Remember that in the Savings and Loan crisis, the government had to bail out those 
institutions because the deposits were federally insured. But in this case the government 
does not have do bail out the debtholders of Bear Sterns, AIG, or any of the other 
financial institutions that will benefit from the Paulson RTC. 
An Alternative to Paulson’s RTC 
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Since we do not have time for a Chapter 11 and we do not want to bail out all the 
creditors, the lesser evil is to do what judges do in contentious and overextended 
bankruptcy processes. They force a restructuring plan on creditors, where part of the debt 
is forgiven in exchange for some equity or some warrants. And there is a precedent for 
such a bold move. 
During the Great Depression, many debt contracts were indexed to gold. So when the 
dollar convertibility into gold was suspended, the value of that debt soared, threatening 
the survival of many institutions. The Roosevelt Administration declared the clause 
invalid, de facto forcing debt forgiveness. Furthermore, the Supreme Court maintained 
this decision. 
My colleague and current Fed Governor Randall Koszner studied this episode and 
showed that not only stock prices but bond prices as well soared after the Supreme Court 
upheld the decision. How is that possible? As corporate finance experts have been saying 
for the last thirty years, there are real costs from having too much debt and too little 
equity in the capital structure, and a reduction in the face value of debt can benefit not 
only the equity holders, but also the debt holders. 
If debt forgiveness benefits both equity and debt holders, why do debt holders not 
voluntarily agree to it? 
• First of all, there is a coordination problem. 
Even if each individual debtholder benefits from a reduction in the face value of debt, she 
will benefit even more if everybody else cuts the face value of their debt and she does 
not. Hence, everybody waits for the other to move first, creating obvious delay. 
• Second, from a debt holder point of view, a government bail-out is better. 
Thus, any talk of a government bail-out reduces the debt-holders’ incentives to act, 
making the government bail-out more necessary. 
As during the Great Depression and in many debt restructurings, it makes sense in the 
current contingency to mandate a partial debt forgiveness or a debt-for-equity swap in the 
financial sector. It has the benefit of being a well-tested strategy in the private sector and 
it leaves the taxpayers out of the picture. 
But if it is so simple, why has no expert mentioned it? 
Taxing the many to benefits the few 
The major players in the financial sector do not like it. It is much more appealing for the 
financial industry to be bailed out at taxpayers’ expense than to bear their share of pain. 
Forcing a debt-for-equity swap or a debt-forgiveness would be no greater a violation of 
private property rights than a massive bailout, but it faces much stronger political 
opposition. The appeal of the Paulson solution is that it taxes the many and benefits the 
few. Since the many (we, the taxpayers) are dispersed, we cannot put up a good fight in 
Capitol Hill. The financial industry is well represented at all the levels. It is enough to say 
that for 6 of the last 13 years, the Secretary of Treasury was a Goldman Sachs alumnus. 
But, as financial experts, this silence is also our responsibility. Just as it is difficult to find 
a doctor willing to testify against another doctor in a malpractice suit, no matter how 
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egregious the case, finance experts in both political parties are too friendly to the industry 
they study and work in.   
Profits are private but losses are socialised? 
The decisions that will be made this weekend matter not just to the prospects of the US 
economy in the year to come. They will shape the type of capitalism we will live in for 
the next fifty years. Do we want to live in a system where profits are private, but losses 
are socialised? Where taxpayer money is used to prop up failed firms? Or do we want to 
live in a system where people are held responsible for their decisions, where imprudent 
behavior is penalised and prudent behavior rewarded? 
For somebody like me who believes strongly in the free market system, the most serious 
risk of the current situation is that the interest of few financiers will undermine the 
fundamental workings of the capitalist system. The time has come to save capitalism 
from the capitalists. 
 
Calomiris: A matched preferred stock plan for government assistance 
22 September 2008  
This column, posted 19 September on an FT forum, suggests a better way of ending the 
financial crisis. Instead of buying toxic assets, the US government should buy preferred 
stock capital in ailing banks that could raise matching private sector equity. This would 
avoid the intractable problems of how the government should value the toxic assets and 
directly address the banks' immediate problem – a lack of bank capital.  
The US government is considering broad-based assistance to stem the financial crisis. 
Hank Paulson, Treasury secretary, and Ben Bernanke, Fed chairman, have proposed the 
establishment of an entity that would purchase subprime-related assets from troubled 
financial institutions. 
A broad-based approach is needed, but this is not the best way of achieving 
policymakers’ objectives. Government injections of preferred stock into banks, advocated 
by Senator Charles Schumer, inspired by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation’s 
policies in the 1930s, would be a better choice. Pricing subprime instruments for 
purchase would be very challenging, and fraught with potentially unfair and hard-to-
defend judgments. If the price were too low, that could hurt selling institutions; if it were 
too high, that could harm taxpayers. Who would determine how much should be 
purchased from whom in order to achieve the desired systemic risk reduction 
consequences at least cost to taxpayers? How would the purchasing entity dispose of its 
assets? 
Preferred stock assistance would leave asset valuation and liquidation decisions to the 
private sector, but would provide needed recapitalisation assistance to banks in an 
incentive-compatible manner to facilitate banks’ abilities to maintain and grow assets. If 
executed properly, it would limit taxpayers’ loss exposure, and leave the tough decisions 
of managing assets, and deciding on how to allocate capital assistance from the 
taxpayers, to the market. 
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Preferred stock assistance would work best if it were required to be matched by common 
stock issues underwritten by the private sector, which would ensure the proper targeting 
of assistance, and force private parties rather than taxpayers to bear first-tier losses. 
Banks in need of capital would apply for Matched Preferred Stock (MPS) assistance. 
Initially, say for three years, there would be no dividend paid to the government on MPS. 
That subsidy would increase the net worth of the recipient and facilitate raising additional 
capital via common stock. 
Any US-based financial institution could apply for US government-held MPS (foreign-
based banks could also apply if foreign governments were willing to provide MPS 
financing). To ensure that MPS is only supplied as truly needed from a systemic 
standpoint, and to limit any abuse of the taxpayer-provided subsidy, the private sector 
would also be required to act collectively to help recapitalise undercapitalised banks, and 
share the risks associated with recapitalising banks. 
Specifically, to qualify for MPS assistance from the government, a bank would have to 
first obtain approval from “the Syndicate” of private banks (including the major 
institutions who would benefit from the plan as well as others who would benefit from 
the reduction in systemic risk) to commit to underwrite common stock of the institution 
receiving MPS in an amount equal to, say, at least 50 per cent of the amount of MPS it is 
applying for (at a price agreed between the Syndicate and the bank at the time of its 
application for MPS). The Syndicate would share the underwriting burden on some pro 
rata basis. To support that underwriting, the Syndicate would have access to a line of 
credit from the US government (and from other countries’ governments, if non-US banks 
participate in the MPS system). By making the government’s underwriting support senior 
to the Syndicate, the taxpayer would be protected by the aggregate resources of the 
private financial system. For banks participating in the MPS plan that are based outside 
the US, foreign governments would have to provide the MPS investments. Presumably, 
those foreign governments would also provide the credit line commitment to the 
syndicate for its underwriting of common stock. 
Crucially, matching ensures first-tier loss sharing by the private sector (in a properly 
diversified way), which in turn ensures that unless the bank is worth assisting for 
systemic purposes, and viable upon receiving assistance, it will not receive assistance. 
This arrangement also protects taxpayers (since they only bear second-tier losses – that is, 
the risk of loss on preferred stock, which is senior to the old and new common stock). 
First-tier private sector loss sharing alongside government assistance is a time-honored 
tradition, which incentivises the private sector to limit its requests for government 
assistance. In 1980, for example, the Bank of England was willing to assist in the bailout 
of Barings only on condition that the London banks bore the first tier of losses resulting 
from such assistance. In the US today, the FDICIA legislation of 1991 required that any 
bailouts of uninsured depositors or bank creditors must be paid for by a special 
assessment on surviving banks, as a pro rata share of their deposits. 
Additional safeguards would also be needed. Any bank receiving MPS must suspend all 
common stock dividends for the period that the MPS is on its balance sheet (shockingly, 
the Japanese banks receiving preferred stock injections in 1999 continued to pay common 
stock dividends). Any bank receiving MPS would also devise a “capital plan” within six 
months of receiving MPS. The capital plan would be a plan for reducing leverage and 
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credibly limiting risk taking during the period in which the MPS is outstanding. This 
capital plan would have to be approved by the Syndicate and the Treasury Department (as 
the government’s representative in this transaction). If a capital plan cannot be agreed 
within six months of receiving assistance, then the MPS would be payable immediately. 
Making the MPS callable would also be desirable; by doing so, and by limiting dividends 
and requiring a capital plan, banks would have an incentive to retire their MPS as soon as 




Frankel: An emerging consensus against the Paulson Plan: Government 
should force bank capital up, not just socialise the bad loans  
23 September 2008  
Here one of the world’s leading international economists, a former member of Clinton’s 
Council of Economic Advisors, comments on the growing consensus that the Paulson 
Plan has got the wrong end of the stick.  
In times of war, there is a tendency for both political parties to rally around the president 
– as we saw (all too well) in Iraq after September 11. In times of financial panic, there is 
often a similar inclination. The two presidential candidates, for example, are being very 
careful in their statements.  
I don’t blame them. The issues are too complex to be taken on inside the context of a 
political campaign. Both candidates realise that the danger of a verbal misstep that the 
other side can try to blame for worsening the crisis is far greater than the likelihood that 
either one will come up with a brilliant solution that will gain widespread support or 
solve the problem, let alone both.  
Having said that, opposition to the $700 billion plan proposed by Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson on September 19 has coalesced quickly. And from both ends of the 
political spectrum. Sebastian Mallaby pursues the Iraq analogy in “A Bad Bank Rescue” 
in the Washington Post: 
“…in buying bad loans before banks fail, the Bush administration would be signing up 
for a financial war of choice. It would spend billions of dollars on the theory that pre-
emption will avert the mass destruction of banks.”  
The explicit lack of oversight or checks and balances in the Treasury proposal is very 
worrisome – and it worries Congressional Democrats.  
But the nature of the bailout, how the money is to be used, is what bothers me most of all. 
As Mallaby says: 
“Within hours of the Treasury announcement on Friday, economists had proposed 
preferable alternatives. Their core insight is that it is better to boost the banking system 
by increasing its capital than by reducing its loans.”  
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Examples are not tied to economists from a particular political viewpoint or party. He 
mentions the proposals of Ragu Rajan (FT.com) and Luigi Zingales that the government 
could tell banks to cancel all dividend payments. And proposals by Charlie Calomiris and 
Doug Elmendorf (Brookings) that the government could buy equity stakes in banks 
themselves, rather than just buying their bad loans.  
Similarly, in today’s New York Times opinion page we had Paul Krugman on the left 
side of the page and Bill Kristol on the right side of the page. What Mallaby calls the core 
insight is also the crux of Krugman’s logic (“Cash for Trash”): 
“…the financial system needs more capital. And if the government is going to provide 
capital to financial firms, it should get what people who provide capital are entitled to – a 
share in ownership, so that all the gains if the rescue plan works don’t go to the people 
who made the mess in the first place.”  
Sounds right to me. Don’t socialise the losses without socialising the gains. 
 
Onado: Banks’ losses and capital: The new version of the paradox of 
Achilles and the tortoise 
19 August 2008 
Many banks are raising fresh capital but not as fast as they are reporting fresh write-
downs. Unless regulators push banks to rebuild their equity bases more quickly, the crisis 
will be more painful and protracted than necessary. Merrill Lynch is a salutary example. 
One of the most important lessons from the subprime crisis is that the growth of banks’ 
capital fell behind the dramatic growth of total credit and overall risks over the last 
twenty years. Until August 2007, we were not alarmed by this, having been lulled by the 
comforting hypothesis that the risks were sold outside the banking system and widely 
spread over many investors. The almost $ 500 billion (and counting) of bank losses 
incurred prove that this was pure wishful thinking: first, most risks were still on banks’ 
books; second, other risks had to be taken back to avoid further reputational damages, 
and worst of all, some risks were simply hidden under the carpet in the form of a 
“shadow banking system”, according to the Bank for International Settlements.93 
Warnings and optimism 
In the past few years the main international agencies have repeatedly warned about the 
risk of a major crisis, but at the same time they kept stressing that the international 
banking system was robust as never before, thanks to the overall prudential supervision, 
the capital adequacy rules put in place since the mid-80s, and, most importantly, the 
imminent significant overhaul of the Basel agreements. 
                                                 
93 BIS, Annual Report 2007-2008, Basel, June 2008. The expression has been used also 
by Mario Draghi (who chairs the Global Financial Stability Committee) in the Bank of 
Italy’s Annual Report. 
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The simple and sad truth is that in the last two decades (and in particular in the last one) 
we have seen an unprecedented credit boom with the usual component of euphoria and 
over-optimistic valuations. Bank capital was adequate under in that favourable scenario 
but not in the face of a consistent shock. As soon as the overall mood changed, the 
markets priced into interbank rates and credit default swap premia a significant 
probability of illiquidity and even insolvency for all major banks, notwithstanding the 
extraordinary interventions of the main central banks as lenders of last resort and the not-
less-extraordinary rescue operations put in place for Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, and the 
like.  
The problem for the European banking system is well described by the two following 
figures taken from research analysis published by Citigroup.94 They show two significant 
weaknesses: 
• Total assets grew much faster than the risk-weighted assets against which banks 
must hold capital. 
• The tangible component of equity decreased, which means that a part of the 
capital cushion was largely made of intangible assets deriving from the merger 
process within the banking system. 
Figure 1. Total assets to risk-weighted assets ratio 
Figure 2. Tangible equity to reported assets ratio 
                                                 
94 Citigroup, Jeremy Sigee et al, Time To Delever. Rethinking Capital Needs For 
European Investment Banks, 22 April 2008. 
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An excess of credit is at the same time a shortage of bank capital. The economic research 
prompted by the crisis has shown that banks’ leverage grew at a consistent pace in the 
past twenty years.95 It is also inherently pro-cyclical as it is amplified by the decisions of 
the household sector (determined by house prices) and the decisions of the banking 
system, based on the desired level of capital. Both these engines of the boom have been 
abruptly put into reverse.96 The result is a painful process of deleveraging in the 
international banking system – a process that risks amplifying the inevitable reduction of 
credit supply, thus worsening the macroeconomic impact of the crisis. 
Crisis abatement: Correcting the credit/capital imbalance 
As Greenlaw et al97 put it, the crisis will abate once one or more of three conditions are 
met: 
• Banks (both commercial and investment banks) contract their balance sheets until 
their capital cushion is once again large enough to support their balance sheets; 
                                                 
95 Tobias Adrian - Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity, Monetary Policy, and Financial Cycles, in 
“Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Current Issues in Economics and Finance”, 
January-February 2008. 
96 Marco Pagano, The Subprime Lending Crisis: Lessons for Policy and Regulation, in 
“Unicredit Group, Finance Monitor”, June 2008. 
97 David Greenlaw - Jan Hatzius - Anil K Kashyap - Hyun Song Shin, Leveraged Losses: 
Lessons from the Mortgage Market Meltdown, U.S. Monetary Policy Forum Report No. 
2, Rosenberg Institute, Brandeis International Business School and Initiative on Global 
Markets, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, 2008, p. 34. 
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• Banks raise sufficient new equity capital to restore the capital cushion to a size 
large enough to support their balance sheets; 
• The perceptions of risk change to a more benign outlook so that the current level 
of leverage can once again be supported with existing capital. 
The third appears highly unlikely. This means that the choice is between great injections 
of bank capital or greater credit contraction with its attendant macroeconomic pain. 
Clearly, the priority now should be to rebuild the capital base of the main banks.  
Regulators are using all their powers of moral suasion to push banks towards capital 
rebuilding, but new equity issues have not even kept up with new capital losses (write 
downs, etc.). In a few cases, the gap is quite significant.  
Figure 3, taken from the last data published by the IMF98, shows that new capital trails 
write-downs (i.e. the emergence of unexpected losses) by some $ 100 billion.  
Figure 3. Bank write-downs and capital raising (billions of dollar) 
 
In other words, all the regulators’ efforts could not bring the banking system back to its 
position before the start of the crisis. If the market has discovered that banks’ capital was 
not adequate, it cannot tolerate a situation where banks’ capital is lower than one year 
ago, also taking into account that a large part of the intangible component of equity has 
evaporated. 
                                                 




This Achilles-and-the-tortoise-like adjustment process has two negative effects. It 
maintains a sentiment of distrust even within the banking system, creating a gridlock in 
the market for liquidity instruments. And, it can worsen the effect of deleveraging and the 
ensuing credit crunch. Both can make the crisis last longer and have stronger adverse 
macroeconomic effects. 
Recapitalisation is painful but necessary 
One of the main obstacles to the recapitalisation effort has been the reluctance of banks to 
venture into operations that could be very costly and could significantly dilute existing 
shareholders. This kind of resistance is well proven by recent data from the Bank of 
England, shown in Figure 4.99 
Figure 4. Major banks’ tier one capital raising by type since September 2007 
                                                 





The figure clearly shows that banks preferred to issue hybrid instruments (essentially debt 
instruments that contain some features of equity, such as coupon suspension and principal 
write-down) and in a second stage they turned to off-market private placements of 
mandatory convertible securities to sovereign wealth funds. Only in the second quarter of 
2008 did the focus of capital raising shift to market-based public rights issue. In other 
words, not only do capital injections lag behind the emergence of losses, but the financial 
instruments that have been used are not the less “powerful” available, from the point of 
view of their true equity content. 
In this contest, the whole process of bank recapitalisation seems to be a new version of 
the Zeno’s paradox. Achilles will never reach the tortoise and therefore the effects of the 
crisis can be very serious and long lasting. 
Merrill Lynch’s salutary example 
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The recent case of Merrill Lynch proves that realistic medicines, although bitter to 
swallow, can generate positive effects in the market. Only a few days after John Thain, 
Merrill’s chief executive, had said that the bank did not need more capital, the board 
approved a complex plan whose main components were the sale of collateralised debt 
obligations ($30.6 billion of notional value at $0.22 to the dollar, implying further write-
offs of $ 4.4 billion in the third quarter); a final settlement in the controversial monoline 
business; an $ 8.5 billion issuance of common stock, implying an increase in the number 
of shares of some 38%. Most analysts reacted very well100 and the Lex Column of the 
Financial Times judged the move “cathartic” and “ahead of the crowd”.101 
More policy action needed 
Notwithstanding these favourable judgments, most banks seem still reluctant to follow 
Merrill Lynch’s example. It is therefore important to encourage new issues of capital, 
however painful for the existing shareholders (but more in the short term than in the long 
term). The moral suasion that regulators are reported to exert must be strengthened, under 
a strict cooperative effort, as they successfully in the field of lending at last resort in the 
past twelve months.  
From this point of view, one can argue that the global financial system has to cope with a 
double shortage: liquidity and bank capital. While the first has been solved with 
extraordinary measures and an extraordinary cooperative effort that has profoundly 
changed the lender-of-last-resort mechanisms, the shortage of capital also requires an 
extraordinary and coordinated effort. This is even more important, as European 
legislation could prove to be more rigid than America’s, as it requires giving shareholders 
first rights to new equity capital. 
Europe’s special problem 
From this point of view, it is interesting to remember the recent initiative from a group of 
British institutional investors, who asked for a series of initiatives to make the process of 
raising new capital easier while maintaining the principle of pre-emption to existing 
shareholders.102  
In other words, both from the supply- and the demand-side of bank capital, there are 
signs of willingness to restore the equity base of the financial industry. Regulators must 
do all in their power to encourage this trend. It is true that they could have mixed 
                                                 
100 Goldman Sachs, William Tanona et al, “Capitulation trade. Painful but necessary to 
move forward”, 29 July 2008. The analyst judged that the “decision to finally sell the 
majority of its ABS CDO portfolio and write-off its monoline exposure was the right 
thing to do in order to move the firm forward. [..] Although painful, we believe putting 
these issues largely behind it will better enable the firm to focus on existing business 
opportunities in the marketplace”. 
101 “CDOh no” (Lex Column), Financial Times, 29 July 2008. 
102 Keith Skeoch et al, Respect principle of pre-emption, Financial Times, 30 July 2008 




feelings, because this would mean admitting that banks’ capital was not adequate as they 
had pretended or that they had been aiming at the wrong indicators (risk-weighted assets 
instead of total assets).  
But regulators must face the hard truth, as Merrill Lynch did: “the credit crisis has 
destroyed the idea that unregulated financial markets always efficiently channel savings 
to the most promising investment projects”.103 This means that regulation must be 
thoroughly revised and capital adequacy rules must be strengthened. 
Conclusion 
Supporting market forces that are already pushing banks to rebuild their capital base, at 
least to pre-crisis levels, appears to be of the utmost importance. The sooner we 
acknowledge it, the milder the hangover of the present crisis. Let Achilles reach the 
tortoise. 
 
Cesari: TARP2: A totally alternative relief programme 
18 October 2008 
This column argues that current bailout plans do not address the roots of the crisis. It 
advocates a significant re-regulation of financial markets and assistance to households 
unable to manage their real estate debt.  
After years of deregulation and decades of loose control and mistrust in the systems of 
surveillance and supervision of financial intermediaries, a disrupting crisis of confidence 
has erupted in the US and has quickly reached all developed economies. 
The “perfection” of this “storm” is, I believe, in the clarity of its origins and its 
apparently unavoidable and tragic results. 
The first version of the Paulson Plan involving $700 billion was rejected by the US 
Congress because (apart from obvious electoral reasons) you cannot ask people to finance 
the consequences when the true causes of an economic disaster have not even been 
considered. 
The fundamental causes of this crisis are simply mortgage defaults, the poisoned 
windfalls of both credit deregulation, allowing lending of no-quality (no-doc mortgages) 
and financial deregulation, allowing for wild securitisation with abnormal leverages (up 
to 4000%), and retail selling with no transparency to worldwide individual savers who 
are, ultimately, the lenders of last resort of the system. 
An alternative household-oriented plan 
In the US, subprime and Alt-A mortgages, i.e. the riskier mortgages, amount to about 
$850 and $1000 billion, respectively. 
                                                 




Assuming that $1 trillion has been securitised, i.e. included in structured assets, and that 
the default rate is 50% (at the moment, foreclosure and delinquencies are at about 8% of 
total mortgages) you obtain a total of about $500 billion. 
At a rate of 7%, a 10-year amortising plan requires an annual repayment of $70 billion. 
Considering the total $1850 billion of mortgages, total annual repayment amounts to 
$260 billion. 
Therefore, a truly effective Troubled Assets Relief Programme must defuse the two real 
causes of the crisis by 1) re-regulating the markets (what Paulson did not do in the 
Blueprint for Regulatory Reform, last March) and 2) helping households unable to 
manage their real estate debt (what Paulson did not do in September). 
In particular, in order to infuse new trust and help the orderly functioning of the markets 
we need to introduce a compelling re-regulation of assets (assessment of risks with 
capital adequacy rules), of liabilities (using transparency and fair valuation principles), of 
all financial intermediaries (supervision of banks, but also of leasing, factoring, and 
consumer credit firms), and of the markets (providing incentives for the transfer of 
trading from the abnormal OTC markets to the official ones). 
On these points, the Bank of Italy-Centrale Rischi (active since 1962) and Consob-Issuer 
Rules could represent illuminating experiences. 
Secondly, a “mortgage relief plan” for households would produce many positive effects: 
• It would provide the required guarantee for the underpinnings of credit 
derivatives, eliminating the basic cause of this crisis. 
• It would be less costly and diluted in time. 
• It would counteract the domino effect that is ruining financial firms. 
• It would have relevant anti-cyclical effects in the current pre-recession phase. 
Of course, such a plan (as any other) would require some time and present difficulties in 
selecting households truly in trouble with their mortgages. However, the announcement 
effect would be positive and, in any case, it seems much less difficult to evaluate the 
income position of a borrower than to price a toxic asset made by credit derivatives with 
unknown underpinnings. 
The approved plan 
As an alternative to “real” intervention in favour of households with housing debts, 
different “financial” plans have been proposed, based on the balance sheets of 
intermediaries: 
• the re-negotiation of debts and maturities; 
• the swap between debts and equity; 




In the final version of the plan, the original “socialistic” recipe has been somewhat 
amended with elements of alternative approaches in order to obtain congressional 
approval and to raise the bill from $700 to $850 billion. 
Instead of tackling the fundamental causes, the plan tries to solve their effects by 
“socialising the losses” of the financial intermediaries while letting the households’ asset 
and liability problems remain a private issue. 
The news is that, with the Paulson Plan, a “banker-broker-market maker” State comes to 
life. Having seen that two wrongs don’t make a right, we might try with three. 
 
 
Boeri: Involving European citizens in the benefits of the rescue plan: 
The political paradoxes of bank socialism 
15 October 2008 
Are EU citizens ready to accept the crisis rescue plan that makes massive transfers of 
resources from taxpayers to the banking sector? This column proposes three ways to 
share the rescue’s benefits with citizens: increased competition in the banking sector, tax 
reductions for low-wage earners, and temporary relief schemes for families with 
mortgage problems.  
Leaders of the Eurozone finally agreed on a plan. It is a very ambitious rescue plan – as it 
should be – to stop the self-fulfilling prophecies that brought us to the brink of another 
Great Depression. But it should now be made acceptable to European citizens. 
Making the rescue acceptable to European citizens 
In the next couple of weeks we shall see how effective these extreme measures are in 
reducing the spread between Euribor and the ECB refinancing rate. If they are successful, 
there will be no need to implement these measures. If they are not, public debts in the 
Eurozone are bound to skyrocket. If they only partly succeed in reassuring markets, there 
will be sizeable outlays to the banking sector. The insurance on the interbank market is 
potentially very costly – before the crisis the overnight volumes in many Eurocountries 
were of the order of 1-2% of GDP – while the bank recapitalisation plans commit so far 
up to 20% of the Eurozone GDP and this share is bound to increase further as national 
plans are unveiled and countries are forced to raise capital to match the core tier one 
levels of UK banks (too bad that there was no cross-country co-ordination in this 
respect!). 
Is the public in EU countries ready to accept such potentially massive transfers of 
resources from taxpayers to the banking sector? 
True, it is mainly gross debt that will increase. If the banking equity is later sold for a 
profit, net public debts may actually go down when the crisis is over. It is also true that 
by saving the banking system, we ultimately save our economies and million of jobs. 
Nonetheless, there is a non-negligible risk that plans committing this size of resources 
will encounter strong opposition in national parliaments. Paradoxically, the opposition to 
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“bank socialism” is likely to come mainly from the ranks of the former supporters of the 
socialisation of the means of production. 
Wealth distribution effects of stock market price drops 
So far, the crisis has served to reduce wealth inequalities in Europe. This is due to the 
relatively low participation of households in financial markets and the relatively low 
take-up of pension schemes. Micro data on wealth assembled in the Luxembourg Wealth 
Study project suggest that a reduction of 40% in stock prices significantly reduces wealth 
of about 6% of Italian families compared to almost 30% of families in the US. The 
average wealth loss for those hit by the fall in stock prices is also lower in Italy (roughly 
5% compared to almost 10% in the US). No doubt, measures dealing with the stock 
market crash will be perceived as measures benefiting the top deciles – Wall Street 
against Main Street – and even more so in Europe than in the US. 
Another reason why these measures will be hard for the public to swallow is that the 
Eurozone package postponed much-advertised measures “punishing the bankers”. There 
is a clear sequencing in the international package: 
• First, rescue financial systems in order to restore confidence in the markets; 
• Next, work on avoiding that all this happens again. 
This was the right thing to do. 
Mixing up the two phases could backfire, as the current priority is to anchor expectations 
to rule out domino effects such as those following the failure of Lehman Bros. However, 
are European citizens ready to accept measures rescuing banks, giving public money to 
bankers while deferring the punishment of those who were before the crisis earning up to 
$50 million (Richard Fuld’s compensation in 2007) and for banks that were making 
profits (before the crisis) amounting in some cases to almost 0.5% of GDP (e.g. Unicredit 
and Banca Intesa)? Are the people ready to accept all this after the last decade’s huge 
increase in income inequalities, driven by the gains of the richest 1% of the population 
(whose share in total income more than doubled in countries like the US)? 
In the last few weeks, economists have been rather successful in inducing governments to 
come to terms with the financial crisis. At times of extraordinary politics, they were taken 
extraordinarily seriously by policy-makers, forcing many of them (including George 
Bush and Angela Merkel) to do embarrassing U-turns. Economists should now be equally 
effective in addressing the rescue plans’ political constraints and in devising ways to 
involve European citizens in the benefits of this plan. Here are three options to be 
considered. 
Three options for sharing the rescue’s benefits with European citizens 
1) There is an alternative way to punish banks and bankers that can be implemented 
immediately – increasing competition in the banking sector. 
After experiencing a major liquidity crisis, banks will compete more to attract savings 
from the households. Removing barriers to competition in the retail sector would drive 
down profit margins and improve services for citizens. More contestability should also be 
allowed. Angela Merkel’s initial reluctance to accept a European initiative was due to the 
fear that other countries could put their hands on German banks. The way out of the crisis 
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will involve a fair amount of bank restructuring. National protections against mergers and 
acquisitions could severely hamper this process and hence should be removed as soon as 
possible. 
2) Governments have not been at all active in Europe in providing support to low-income 
families with housing mortgages. 
True, the problems are not as acute as in the US, but the increase in Euribor rates (to 
which monthly mortgage rates are often indexed) is significantly increasing the number 
of poor families with problems in paying their mortgages. Temporary relief schemes for 
these families should be devised as long as the rates decline. They should be narrowly 
targeted to minimise costs and moral hazard problems applied to a large population, but 
they should be implemented. 
3) There is also scope for implementing tax reductions for low-wage earners. 
These measures would kill two birds with one stone. 
• They would increase the progressiveness of taxation, reducing opposition to the 
iniquities of bank socialism. 
• They would help anchor expectations to a moderate output fall, as the current lack 
of confidence is also driven by the belief that the crisis will now spread to firms 
and households leading to a deflationary trap. 
Tax deductions for low-income earners have the advantage of acting on both sides – 
demand and supply. They increase demand as they target the households with the highest 
propensity to consume and increase supply because induce more people to work without 
increasing firms’ labour costs. As these measures could reduce the informal sector, they 
would also have a limited impact on the budget. 
Editor's note: An earlier version first appeared in the Financial Times. 
 
 
Pagano: What is a reverse auction? 
21 October 2008 
The Paulson plan envisages that the US Treasury will purchase financial assets held by 
distressed financial institutions for which there is currently no market. In order to set a 
price for these toxic assets, reverse auctions have been proposed. As this column 
explains, one has to be very careful in designing these auctions in the presence of 
asymmetric information. 
 
One of the most controversial aspects of the recent plan focused on supporting American 
financial institutions is the possibility that a Treasury agency may buy financial 
instruments,  in particular so-called Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), for which there 
is currently no market. The Treasury states that this purchase can be a good deal for 
taxpayers, since now these MBS can be bought at a very low price, but they can be 
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expected to appreciate in value as time goes on. Obviously this is only likely to happen if 
MBS are bought by the Treasury at a sufficiently low price. We do not know yet in detail 
how the purchase mechanism will be designed. It is obvious though, that if there were to 
be total discretion in the determination of prices and in the choice of financial institutions 
to buy from, this would open enormous possibilities of abuse and conflicts of interest. It 
is therefore advisable to adopt a clear and transparent mechanism for purchases. 
On the 23rd of September, in a testimony before the US Senate, Ben Bernanke suggested 
adopting a method called reverse auctions. What are they? What problems can be 
generated if they are used to buy Mortgage Backed Securities? 
What is a reverse auction? 
In a reverse auction the buyer announces an amount he intends to buy and a maximum 
price. At this point sellers offer the quantities that they are willing to sell at that price. If 
the quantity for purchase exceeds the quantity the buyer intends to purchase (if supply 
exceeds demand), the price will be lowered and a new offer will be generated. This 
practice continues until supply equals demand. 
In our case, the buyer is the US Treasury and the quantity to be bought is a certain 
amount of bonds, say MBS with ten-year maturity and face value of 100 million dollars. 
At this point potential sellers, i.e. banks that have these securities in their portfolio and 
want to sell them, announce how many they want to sell at that price. If supply exceeds 
demand, i.e. in our example the bonds on offer exceed the face value of 100 million, their 
price will be lowered. Presumably at the lower price, banks will reduce the amount of 
bonds they wish to sell. If the reduction is sufficient to match supply and demand, the 
auction will be over and the bonds are sold at the last price announced. Otherwise the 
price will be lowered yet again, until supply and demand are matched. 
This is the simplest design. Another one has the buyer announcing the quantity he wishes 
to purchase and all potential sellers announcing the prices at which they are willing to 
tender their bonds. Once the process ends, the buyer purchases from those who 
announced the lowest prices. 
These two designs are not equivalent in terms of final prices that can be obtained, but the 
choice of design is not particularly relevant in relation to the specific issues discussed in 
this article. 
Possible problems in a reverse auction 
Generally when the items on sale are homogenous and have clearly verifiable 
characteristics, these auctions generate an efficient outcome for the buyer. Unfortunately 
this is not the case with MBS, which are financial assets whose cash flow is tied to the 
repayment of the mortgages on which they are based. Two apparently identical MBS, say 
with the same maturity and interest rate, can have very different values depending on the 
solvency of the underlying mortgages. The main problem is the asymmetric information 
on the solvency and therefore on the cash flow likely to be generated by these mortgage 
loans: a financial institution that has certain securities in its portfolio, invariably knows 
better than others how reliable those securities are. 
Let us imagine for example, that as a result of the auction, a bank sells securities for 10 
million dollars at 50% of the face value. Out of all the securities that can be used to 
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satisfy the buyer's requests, which ones will the bank choose? Obviously those that they 
know have a lesser chance of being repaid, typically those that are worth less than 50%. 
The result is a loss for the buyer. 
This is exactly the reason why these securities are so illiquid. Indeed, if there was no 
asymmetric information, private parties would start trading these securities, liquidity 
issues would disappear and it would be easy to establish their market value. Because of 
the market’s failure due to asymmetrical information, the Treasury decided to intervene. 
But quite obviously “you can’t have your cake and eat it”. 
Buying securities under these conditions inevitably creates the risk of overpaying 
An easy way to eliminate the adverse selection problem is to buy all the securities of a 
specific category, or almost all of them. Unfortunately, in this case a reverse auction is 
not a good selling mechanism. As a matter of fact, the higher the demand, the higher the 
buying price will be. If there is demand for all the securities of a specific category, the 
selling price will be the opening one and will have to be high enough to induce sellers to 
get rid of all securities, even the most reliable ones. Therefore, the problem reappears 
again in a different form. 
How to alleviate these problems 
In the presence of asymmetric information, it is very difficult to avoid inefficiencies. 
However, there are ways to alleviate the problems. To begin with, several different 
auctions are needed for different securities, instead of fewer auctions with rough 
specifications of the securities for sale. 
For example, instead of having a single auction for securities with a 5 year maturity, one 
could have different ones depending on the date at which mortgages were signed, 
depending on whether the interest on them is variable or fixed, etc. The more detailed the 
specification of securities, the lesser the adverse selection problems. Even so, a certain 
degree of heterogeneity is bound to remain. In a very recent paper on reverse auctions, 
the economic consultancy firm NERA estimates that there are more than 100,000 
different types of MBS. It is obviously impossible to have an auction for every different 
type, especially if time is limited. 
In an article on the Economists’ Voice, Larry Ausubel and Peter Cramton, two influential 
auction theorists, suggested specifying before the auction that securities bought from the 
Treasury will be resold in a certain amount of time and that selling banks will be fined if 
prices are lowered. 
For example, let us imagine that the Treasury buys an MBS from a bank with a face value 
of 100 at a price of 30. If the mortgages behind the MBS do not go in default and 
payments continue, in a year’s time the MBS will be worth more. If payments, instead, 
are interrupted, the MBS will be worth less and the Treasury will suspect that the bank 
knew about the solvency risk of that MBS and played a dirty trick. In this case Ausubel’s 
and Cramton’s suggestion is for the Treasury to resell the security through another 
auction and ask the bank to pay at least in part for the price reduction. 
Obviously such a mechanism would discourage banks from “being too clever”, since they 
would be paying more at a later date. The main risk is that this mechanism may be very 
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ineffective with more troubled banks. If there is a high chance of bankruptcy over a short 
horizon, then the fear of being fined in the future will have a small deterrent effect.  
 
 
Gros: ‘No recourse’ and ‘put options’: Estimating the ‘fair value’ of US 
mortgage assets 
27 September 2008  
How much are the toxic assets worth? A bit of logic and a straightforward application of 
the Black-Scholes formula suggests that if current expectations of house price declines 
are right, securities built on subprime mortgages might be close to worthless. The key is 
that US mortgages are ‘no recourse’ loans, i.e. debtors can walk away from the 
mortgage without being held personally liable, a feature that gives homeowners a virtual 
put option. 
A key issue for the $700 billion bail out plan now being finalised is the pricing of the 
‘toxic assets’ the US Treasury should buy. The main target of the Paulson plan is the 
market for securities based on low quality mortgages (sub prime and ‘Alt A’ 
mortgages). This subclass of the general universe of RMBS (residential mortgage-based 
securities) has become illiquid.   How should these securities be priced? In the few 
market transactions still taking place their value has often been less than 50 cents to the 
dollar of face value. But it is difficult to establish a reliable market price. Are there any 
other ways to assess their value?  
This column discusses a simple way to thinking the valuation of mortgages and the 
establishment on fair prices for these securities. Preliminary calculations suggest that the 
value of securities based on lower quality mortgages might indeed be very low. 
How to estimate the value of residential mortgage-based securities 
The starting point is a key feature of the US mortgage market, namely that most loans are 
de facto or de jure ‘no recourse’. This means that the debtor cannot be held personally 
liable for the mortgage even if, after a foreclosure, the bank receives only a fraction of the 
total mortgage outstanding from the sale of the house. 
With a ‘no recourse’ mortgage, the debtor effectively receives a virtual put option to 
‘sell’ to the mortgage-issuer the house at the amount of the loan still outstanding. 
Mortgage lenders are ‘short’ this option, but this is not recognised in the balance sheets. 
In most cases, the balance sheets of the banks report mortgages at face value – at least for 
all those mortgages on which payments are still ongoing.  
All RMBS, especially all securities based on low quality mortgages, should also take this 
put option into account in their pricing. It appears that this had not been done when these 
securities were issued. In particular it appears that the ratings agencies neglected this 
point completely when evaluating the complex products build on bundles of 
mortgages. A key input in banks balance sheets and the pricing of RMBS should thus 
have been a valuation of the put option given to US households. 
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Given certain basic data, it is actually fairly straightforward to calculate the value of the 
put option in a standard ‘no recourse’ mortgage.  
The following calculations are for a mortgage of $100, which has an implicit put with a 
strike price equal to the loan to value ratio (LTV) because this is the amount for which 
the owner of the house can ‘sell’ his house to the bank. Most of the key inputs needed for 
the pricing of this option are in fact relatively straightforward. In the following it is 
assumed that mortgages run for 10 years, and that the riskless interest rate is 2% and the 
interest rate on mortgages is 6%. 
It is more difficult, however, to put a number on a key input in the value of any option, 
namely the (expected) volatility in the price of the underlying asset. Recent data might be 
misleading, since prices had been steadily increasing until 2006, but then started to 
decline precipitously. Over a longer horizon the standard deviation of the Case Shiller 
index has been around 5% per year, but over the last few years the volatility has greatly 
increased. The figure is about 10%, if one looks only at the years since the start of the 
bubble (2002/3). The following will concentrate on the low volatility case (5% standard 
deviation). It turns out, however, that this parameter is not as significant as one might 
first think. Under the high volatility case (10 % standard deviation) the losses would be 
under most circumstances only moderately higher. 
Applying the usual Black-Scholes formula to a typical subprime loan with an LTV ratio 
of 100% yields the result that the value of the put option embedded in the ‘no recourse’ 
feature is 26.8% of the loan, even in the low volatility case. For a conforming loan (a loan 
that could be insured by Fannie or Freddie) with a loan to value ratio of 80%, the value of 
the put option would still be close to 14% (still in the low volatility case). This implies 
that all sub prime loans (and other mortgages with a high LTV) were worth much less 
than their face value from the beginning. It is evident that the risk of a mortgage going 
into negative equity territory diminishes sharply with the loan to value ratio. For 
example, with an LTV of 60% the put option is worth only 2.8%. 
In reality it is not the case that all mortgages with negative equity (where the present 
value of mortgage payments is higher than the value of home) go immediately into 
default since a default on a mortgage (and a subsequent foreclosure) still has a cost to the 
household in terms of a poor credit record, some legal costs, etc. This fact could be taken 
into account by just adjusting the strike price by the implicit cost of a worse credit 
history, etc, maybe by around 10%. However, a foreclosure usually leads to rather 
substantial costs for the bank, which can be a multiple of the amount of negative equity 
that is calculated by using standard house prices indices. A sheriff sale often fetches a 
much lower price than a normal sale in which the time pressure is not that great. The loss 
to the mortgage lender is often far in excess of 10% of the value of the home. These two 
effects thus tend to offset each other and the second might even be larger.  It is thus likely 
that the value of the option as calculated here does appropriately reflect the risk for 
banks, and might even constitute a slight under estimation. 
Given the high value of the put option on mortgages with high LTV ratios (i.e. especially 
subprime) it is not surprising that the value of the securities build on these mortgages 
should be rather low. The first loss tranches (e.g. first 10 % loss) are obviously worthless 
when the put option is worth already close to 28 %. Taking this put option feature 
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properly into account shows why all except the ‘super senior’ tranches of an RMBS 
based on sub prime mortgages can easily fall in value below 50 cents to the dollar. 
How much are the assets still on the banks’ balance sheets worth?  
Another implication of the approach proposed here concerns the ‘fair value’ accounting 
of the $3.6 thousand billion of mortgages still on the balance sheets of US banks. The 
value of the put option granted to US mortgage debtors should reflect approximately the 
amount of capital the US banking system would need in order to cover itself against 
further fluctuations in house prices. 
Little is known about the quality of the mortgages that are still on the balance sheets of 
US banks. It must be assumed that most of them are not conforming to the standards 
(limits on LTV, documentation, size, etc.) set by the (now) state-owned mortgage 
financing institutions Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, since banks could make substantial 
savings on regulatory capital by re-financing conforming loans. It is thus likely that the 
mortgages still on the balance sheets of US banks are either jumbo loans (Fannie and 
Freddie refinance-only mortgages of up to around $400 thousand) or lower quality ones. 
Assuming a realistic distribution of loan to value ratios, the average value of the put 
option embedded in all mortgages would be around 9.5% in the low volatility case and 
12.7% in the high volatility case (10% standard deviation for house prices). Given that 
the overall stock of mortgages still outstanding on the balance sheets of commercial 
banks is around $3.6 thousand billion, this implies that the US banking system would 
need between $340 and $460 billion just to cover itself against the variability in house 
prices. Under ‘fair value’ accounting, this is the amount of losses the US would have to 
book today if they recognised the put option as being implicit in the ‘no recourse’ 
mortgages on their books. 
The total stock of mortgages outstanding in the US is about $10 thousand billion. 
However, the market value of these mortgages (whether still on banks’ balance sheets or 
securitised and embedded in RMBS) is in reality lower by $1-1.2 thousand billion, if one 
takes into account the value of the put option granted to US households. 
Why was the value of this option not recognised earlier? One simple reason might be that 
as long as the housing bubble lasted it was generally assumed that house prices could 
only go up, as they had over the 1990s. The average annual increase in house prices had 
been about 5% in the 15 years to 2006. If that number is projected into the future the 
value of a put option even on a sub prime mortgage with an LTV of 100% would have 
been below 5%, as compared to the 26.8% mentioned above, if one uses the standard 
assumption that the price of the underlying (house prices) follows a random walk without 
drift. Viewed from the perspective of ever-increasing house prices, the risk of negative 
equity seemed minor. Expectations about house prices have now changed completely, 
however. If one were to assume that house prices will decline by 3% annually over the 
next decade, the value of the put option would be even higher than calculated so far. For 
a sub prime mortgage with an LTV of 100% the value of the put option would be over 
40% of the mortgage, and even for a conforming loan (80% LTV) the put option would 
still be worth 30 cents to the dollar. The value of the put options on which the US 
banking system is short would then be above $900 billion, and the total losses on all US 
mortgages could amount to over $2 thousand billion. 
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If expectations of future house price declines are now appropriate, the value of all the 
securities built on sub prime mortgages might be close to zero. It remains to be seen what 
pricing, and thus what underlying hypothesis is going to be used for the $700 billion 
rescue plan. 
Editors’ note: this first appeared as CEPS Commentary, 23 September 2008 and CEPS 
retains the copyright.  
Annex 
Details for the calculation of value of a put option embedded in ‘no recourse’ feature 
of US mortgages. 
Underlying Price Loan to value ratio 
Exercise Price 100 
Time until expiration 10 years (mortgages tend to be long term) 
Risk free interest rate 2% 
Yield 6% 
Volatility 5 % (low volatility case) and 10 % (high case). 
 
  
Distribution of mortgages by loan to value ratio 
Value of put option under low volatility case. 
LTV Weight 
Value of option (in cents on the 
dollar) under different expected 
future house price changes 
  +5% p.a. Zero -3% p.a. 
100 0.1 4.7 26.8 43.4 
90 0.1 1.8 20.8 38.9 
80 0.2 0.4 13.8 33.4 
70 0.2 0.1 6.7 26.8 
60 0.2 0 1.8 17.7 
50 0.2 0 0.2 7.6 
Average 0.8 9.3 25.3 






Suarez: Bringing money markets back to life 
13 October 2008 
Government guarantees are no substitute for supervision – they are a complement. Free 
from short-term liquidity pressures, supervisors should focus on banks’ long-term 
prospects and limit their behaviour or encourage restructuring as needed. 
During the last couple of weeks, governments and economists have become increasingly 
inclined towards the temporary insurance of a broad set of bank liabilities (including, at 
least, retail and interbank deposits), a policy option that I already defended in March 
2008.104 In this column, I revisit some of the arguments that support the desirability of 
this emergency measure and its potential to bring money markets back to life.105  
The current banking crisis is characterised by two strongly related ingredients: (i) the 
general concern about the possibility of experiencing a long sequence of bank failures 
around the globe, and (ii) the collapse of money markets. These ingredients share a 
common cause, the prior excesses in subprime lending and securitisation. The rise in 
counterparty risk due to the presence of some unidentified potentially insolvent banks 
created a severe “lemons problem” that, together with the self-fulfilling power of 
confidence crises in banking, led to the collapse of money markets. In the absence of 
active interventions, the normal functioning of money markets will only be restored once 
the current concern on counterparty risk disappears. 
A temporary and aggressive extension of government guarantees on a broad set of bank 
liabilities could temporarily reverse the connection between the concern about bank 
failures and the money market collapse. If money markets lose their panic mood and 
recover their vitality, banks and supervisors may concentrate their efforts on sorting out 
the mess in banks’ balance sheets without having to worry about the refinancing of the 
maturing fraction of each bank's debt. Restoring the exchange of funds from agents with 
financial surpluses to agents with financial deficits would prevent further damage to the 
capital positions of banks and firms with net refinancing needs, reduce the inefficiencies 
associated with a severe credit crunch to firms and households, and facilitate a quicker 
macroeconomic recovery. 
Rather than a sign of desperation, a concession to greedy bankers, or a further step in the 
moral hazard logic, adopting this measure can be an effective way to minimise the losses 
of the crisis to the society as whole. 
Urgency of the situation 
                                                 
104 For details, see "The Need for an Emergency Bank Debt Insurance Mechanism", 
CEPR Policy Insight No. 19, March 2008. 
105 Conversations on an earlier version of this proposal with Benjamin Alonso, Max 
Bruche, Stephen Cecchetti, Darrell Duffie, Abel Elizalde, Anil Kashyap, Luc Laeven, 
Rafael Repullo, Fernando Restoy, Jean-Charles Rochet, and participants in the 2008 
European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets in Gerzensee were especially useful 
to shape the opinions expressed in this column, of which I am solely responsible. 
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As it has been extensively pointed out elsewhere, the roots of the current crisis are at the 
global and massive spreading of risks associated with a severely inflated US housing 
market (and its dangerous subprime mortgages) through a complex range of credit default 
derivatives, securitisation vehicles, and the explicit or implicit credit enhancements 
provided by the originators. 
In the summer of 2007, the news on a first bunch of defaults on these products and their 
subsequent and radical downgrading created a huge increase in counterparty risk. An 
immediate implication was the widening of spreads and shrinkage in the volume of 
transactions on global money markets. After months of speculation on which bank would 
be the next to fail – either due to the disclosure of subprime-related losses or refinancing 
problems caused by the lack of confidence of its potential financiers (including the 
shareholders) – the casualty count is appalling and – worse – there is no evidence that the 
process is nearing a natural end.106  
These months have shown that no government is willing to assume the consequences of 
ex post denying support to its “systemically important” institutions. There has been ad 
hoc commitment of public funds or the extension of public guarantees to some bank 
liabilities. We have seen them offered on a bank-by-bank basis, as in the case of Fortis, 
and on a more system-wide basis, as in Ireland. Interpreting these measures as acts of 
desperation and alluding to moral hazard concerns, many authorities were initially 
reluctant to imitate their presumably more desperate peers. Meanwhile, money markets 
remained inoperative, the credit crunch became tangible for an increasing number of 
households and firms, and the worst expectations about the prospects of the economy as a 
whole gradually unfolded. 
Money markets’ failure 
Banks are crucial intermediaries in capital markets, facilitating the transfer of funds from 
many agents with financing capacity to many agents with financial needs. In normal 
times, access to interbank markets or other money markets allows many banks to lend 
many more funds than those taken from their depositors, and vice versa. Entire national 
banking sectors can be net lenders or net borrowers of other banking sectors (or the rest 
of the world) through capital markets. This creates a complex network of 
interdependencies, risk-diversification, and systemic risk, but it also contributes to funds 
flowing from the most abundant sources to the most profitable uses. 
In general, the flow of funds between banks and across national banking systems is a 
natural implication of reasonably integrated national and international financial systems, 
increases aggregate investment and output, contributes to economic growth, and is 
welfare-improving. Of course, market failures may also occur (and call for public 
intervention), as in other markets. The list of candidate market failures in capital markets 
is long, if only because of the information, incentive, contract-enforceability, and 
                                                 
106 Even in the US, the recently approved Treasury Plan will take time to apply and there 
are numerous uncertainties on the particular way (price, time, etc.) in which each 
institution will manage to get rid of its toxic assets. Up to the full execution of the plan, 
markets may fear that a bank may go under and its creditors may suffer losses. 
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confidence problems to which the trade in “promises to pay” is most vulnerable. Public 
intervention will typically take the form of regulation, sometimes accompanied by 
arrangements such as deposit insurance schemes that may involve taxes, subsidies, and 
transfers. 
In the case of subprime-related products, the mispricing associated with the housing 
market bubble and a clear underestimation of the underlying risks by almost all the 
involved players (including the regulators), created a terrible misallocation of resources. 
The US housing market (and, to a lesser extent, other housing markets with booming 
prices) received excessive credit in the sense that part of the savings directed to that use 
through markets and banks were, arguably, misallocated. In parallel, however, the same 
markets and many banks were performing the useful function of applying other funds 
available across the planet to their most profitable uses. 
The prolonged disturbance of money markets is producing a severe form of financial 
market segmentation. Roughly speaking, banks seem bound to lend at most the funds that 
they can take as deposits. However, both loans and deposits are, to a large extent, local 
products, since they are commonly attached to a variety of information-intensive 
relationships and services that are local in their nature (personal attention, advice, 
monitoring, and some of the payment services). Hence, forcing banks to restructure their 
existing costumer bases and to lend and borrow under the new constraint that no net 
financing can be obtained out of their own local (insured) deposit market can be terribly 
restrictive. 
Neighbouring banks would likely enter wars for deposits in the short run and many of 
them may be forced to reduce their lending relative to their pre-crisis levels, with no 
guarantee of other banks replacing them, especially in the short run and in economies 
with banks that have been structurally receiving net financing from abroad.107 The most 
immediate manifestation of this misallocation of resources would be the deepening of the 
credit crunch and an increased fear of macroeconomic depression. Additionally, the 
process of adjustment would also have a cost in terms of lowered bank profitability, 
worsened solvency, more bank failures, and more costly rescue packages. The parallel 
deterioration of government accounts will not help. The vicious circle, unless effectively 
short-circuited, might lead the global economy into the worst recession in recent history. 
Proposed response 
It is time to manage the exit from the current crisis in the least socially costly way. 
Extending a temporary and aggressive guarantee on a broad set of bank liabilities 
(including, at the very least, retail and wholesale deposits) will bring the corresponding 
segments of the money market back in operation, not only reviving their usual trade but 
also absorbing some of the normal trade of the uninsured segments. The key role of 
money markets in the allocation of funds will be restored, pressures on central banks to 
act as substitutes for the missing market will vanish, and the possibility of a credit crunch 
                                                 
107 Some reduction in credit relative to pre-crisis levels would be perfectly justified by the 
new demand conditions of the recession as well as the correction of prior mispricing 
affecting, essentially, mortgage related credit. 
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artificially exacerbated by some banks’ refinancing problems will become more remote. 
The restored money market transactions may become useful sources of information for 
supervisors to keep track of the institutions they oversee and for central banks to manage 
liquidity provision and monetary policy actions in a more effective way. 
The insurance of bank liabilities should be provided by the governments in charge of 
supervising each bank (in the European Union, essentially the governments of the “home 
country” where the bank is domiciled). An exception should be made in the case of banks 
whose size is excessive relative to the country of reference, where special arrangements 
based on multilateral cooperation or the involvement of an international organisation to 
which the role is delegated should be promptly devised. 
Government guarantees are not a substitute for supervision but a complement. Free from 
short-term liquidity pressures, supervisors should focus on banks’ long-term prospects 
and limit their behaviour or encourage restructuring as needed. Supervisors should 
continue exerting discipline through the usual means (capital regulation and prompt 
corrective action) and explore new ones, based on, for example, establishing an upper 
limit to the total borrowing under coverage and conditions that can increase or decrease it 
over time. In the spirit of the Basel agreements on capital requirements, the upper limit 
might be related to the bank’s capital and perhaps also to some objective measure of the 
risk of each bank’s assets. Supervisors should be granted powers to use the threat of 
announcing the withdrawal of the guarantees for future borrowings as a means of 
encouraging banks to undertake controlled asset sales or fresh equity injections, or to 
move into a gradual use of uninsured borrowing once the crisis is resolved. 
The harmonised introduction of the arrangement by a number of important countries (for 
example, at the level of the whole European Union or a large subset of its members) will 
definitely facilitate its success in restoring the functioning of international money markets 
and minimise criticism of its potential to “unlevel the playing field” in international 
banking. However, if harmonisation is not feasible in a timely manner, countries should 
proceed with their unilateral adoption. The urgency of the situation and the genuine 
value-added of the scheme, relative to its potential to cause negative externalities to non-
joining neighbours, should outweigh the standard “fair play” arguments. Hopefully, 
proving the arrangement’s advantages in a few countries will soon cause others to follow 
suit. 
 
Acharya and Sundaram: The other part of the bailout: Pricing and 
evaluating the US and UK loan guarantees 
26 October 2008 
The recapitalisation aspects of the October rescue packages have been widely analysed 
by the world’s most effective think-tank in this crisis – the blogosphere. Here finance 
professors from LBS and NYU evaluate the rescue packages’ loan guarantees. The UK 
scheme has the flavour of a small tax, and is partly market-reliant; the US plan the 
flavour of a $50 billion subsidy, and is almost fully government-reliant. The UK scheme 
is likely to lead to a separating equilibrium, in which banks whose credit risk is lower 
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than the market’s perceptions opt out. The US scheme will force a pooling outcome 
wherein all eligible banks – regardless of their health – participate because it is not 
possible to re-enter later. Which scheme works better depends upon the depth of the 
coming recession. The UK scheme assumes that following the recent capital infusions, 
even the unhealthy players are now solvent and are unlikely to fail. If the financial crisis 
worsens, this may prove incorrect. 
 
To thaw frozen credit markets, governments on both sides of the Atlantic have taken a 
two-pronged approach – bank recapitalisation and loan guarantees. Specifically, the US, 
the UK and some European governments are re-capitalising their troubled financial 
institutions. They are also trying to kick-start interbank lending by announcing plans to 
guarantee all new senior unsecured debt out to three years.  
The recapitalisation has received plenty of attention, but the load guarantees have largely 
flown under the radar – despite the huge sums involved. This raises questions: 
• Are there taxpayer costs to loan guarantees? 
• How big are the costs to taxpayers likely to be? 
• What are the relative merits of the US and the UK schemes?  
First, some details concerning the schemes. 
The US and UK Guarantee Schemes  
In the UK, nine financial institutions have been identified as initially eligible for the 
program (though more may be added later at the discretion of the UK Treasury). Senior 
unsecured borrowings of these institutions made on or prior to 13 April 2009 will be 
guaranteed by the UK government for a period of 3 years or maturity of the issue, 
whichever comes first. Participation in the program is optional, not just at the institutional 
level, but also at the issue level; that is, a prospective borrower wishing to issue a 
“Guaranteed Liability” applies to the UK government for a guarantee on that particular 
issue. Limits on the total volume of guarantees that may be sought by any one institution 
have not been laid out explicitly, though the UK Treasury has announced a cap of GBP 
250 billion as the maximum amount of liabilities that will be guaranteed under the 
scheme.  
The US program, administered by the FDIC, works very differently. All banks, 
depository institutions, and savings and loan companies are eligible to participate in the 
program. Institutions not wishing to participate in the program must inform the FDIC by 
12 November 2008. If an institution does not opt out of the program, then all senior 
unsecured loans issued by it between 14 October 2008 and 30 June 2009 will be 
guaranteed by the FDIC for a maximum period of three years or until maturity of the 
debt, whichever comes first. The only exception is if a participating institution informs 
the FDIC (again prior to 12 November 2008) of its desire to also issue, during this period, 
non-guaranteed long-term debt maturing after 30 June 2012, in which case the guarantee 
applies to all new senior unsecured issues except these long-term issues. The maximum 
amount of liabilities issued by a single institution that will be guaranteed by the FDIC is 
125% of the outstanding senior unsecured liabilities of the institution as of 30 September 
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2008; but unlike the UK, no cap has so far been proposed on the overall liabilities that 
will be guaranteed under the plan.  
The Fees 
Unsurprisingly, given the differences in the schemes, the pricing of the guarantees in the 
two countries is also along very different lines.  
In the UK, an institution seeking a guarantee on an issue will be charged an annual fee of 
50 basis points plus that institution’s median 5-year credit-default swap (CDS) spread 
observed in the 12 months before 7 October 2008.  
As an example, on 21 October 2008, Barclays decided to issue GBP 1 billion in 3-year 
senior unsecured bonds backed by the UK government’s guarantee. Since Barclays’ 
median 5-year CDS spread over the 12 months to 7 October 2008 was around 82 basis 
points, Barclays will be paying the UK Treasury a figure of 1.32% — about GBP 13.2 
million — per annum for the guarantee. A few days earlier, on 17 October, taking 
advantage of the issue-level optionality available in the UK scheme, Lloyd’s TSB elected 
to issue a GBP 400 million debt issue without seeking a guarantee. Lloyd’s median CDS 
spread during the relevant period was only 62 basis points, among the lowest of any UK 
or US financial institution.  
In the US, each participating institution will pay a flat 75 basis points per annum on the 
entire amount of its new senior unsecured liabilities (subject to the 125% cap mentioned 
above). If the institution has informed the FDIC of its intent to also issue non-guaranteed 
long-term debt, then the 75 basis points fee applies to the guaranteed portion of its new 
debt issues. But in the latter case, the institution must also pay a one-time fee of 37.5 
basis points of that portion of its senior unsecured liabilities as of 30 September 2008, 
that will mature on or before 30 June 2009.  
So, for example, under the US scheme, both Morgan Stanley – whose relevant median 
five-year CDS spread was over 159 basis points – and Bank of America – whose relevant 
median spread was 85 basis points (among the lowest of any major US bank) – would 
both pay the same 0.75% fee (about $7.50 million per year on a $1 billion guaranteed 
issue) despite the large difference in their market-perceived credit risks.  
Question 1: Tax or Subsidy? 
Table 1 presents information on the median 5-year CDS spreads on the eligible British 
banks over the one-year period expiring 7 October 2008.  
Even a casual glance at these numbers suggests that the British Treasury’s fees are a great 
deal higher than the proposed American flat fee structure (0.75% versus anything 
between 109 basis points for HSBC to over 178 basis points for Nationwide).  
Are the British fees too steep — effectively levying a tax on participating banks — are 
the American fees are too low, with the taxpayer subsidising the banks?  
Providing a meaningful answer to this question requires identifying a benchmark “fair 
price” of a three-year sovereign guarantee. Three benchmarks seem relevant. (Note we 
are in uncharted territory here; there is no history of sovereigns writing default protection 
on market issues of debt and pricing these off market quotes. The numbers we describe in 
this analysis should therefore be taken as indicative amounts rather than literally.) 
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• The market price of a similar three-year guarantee is a useful place to begin, 
namely the spread on a 3-year CDS.  
However, this market price represents a private, not sovereign, guarantee, and so 
is of lower quality. Using this approach will result in estimates that are possibly 
too generous to the banks. 
• An alternative is to compensate for this undervaluation by adding the three-year 
swap spread to the three-year CDS spread. 
Roughly speaking, the three-year swap spread measures the difference between 
the three-year borrowing rates of an AA-rated institution and the Treasury in each 
country, and so is a measure of the difference in credit quality of the sovereign 
and the “best” private borrowers. However, the greater liquidity of Treasuries 
may also widen the spread, so some portion of the spread may be due to liquidity 
factors. 
• As a third option, to account for potential liquidity effects that may widen the 
swap spread but have nothing to do with credit risk, we can take the mid-point of 
the first two estimates.  
We compare the fees below under all three alternatives.  
Alternative 1: The first alternative we consider is where the fair value of the government 
guarantee is estimated as the market value of the three-year CDS spread plus the three-
year swap spread.  
The three-year swap spread over the last year has been on average around 90 basis points 
in both the US and the UK. For the 3-year CDS spread, we take the median value of the 
3-year CDS spreads over the 12 months ending 7 October 2008. We note that these 
median spreads are well below the spreads prevailing in recent days (see, for example, 
the last two columns of Table 1 that describe CDS spreads as of 10 October 2008). The 
fourth column of Table 1 describes the resulting fair values by financial institution in the 
UK and the US.  
The UK numbers  
Table 1a: CDS fees and loan guarantee fee for the UK banks 
Bank Median 3-
year CDS 
fee in year 




fee in year 






























56.5 72.6 112.6 146.5 76.5 83.3 
Barclays 66.0 81.4 131.4 156.0 122.9 137.5 
HBOS 93.3 112.7 162.7 183.3 180.0 185.0 
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HSBC 48.5 58.8 108.8 138.5 67.7 77.5 
Lloyds 
TSB 
55.6 62.5 112.5 145.6 102.4 105.0 




73.5 85.9 135.9 163.5 185.1 190.0 
Standard 
Chartered 
50.3 67.5 117.5 140.3 80.7 91.7 
Average 70.8 83.7 133.7 160.8 133.0 136.5 
Source: Datastream. 
 
The average guarantee fee over all eligible institutions works out to 133.7 basis points, 
whereas the average fair price works out to 160.8 basis points. This means an average 
subsidy of 27 basis points per year. If the entire available guarantee amount of GBP 250 
billion is taken up, the resulting subsidy to be borne by UK taxpayers is of the order of 
about GBP 0.675 billion per year, or about GBP 2 billion over the three years of the 
scheme. The figure will be higher if the stronger banks opt out of the scheme, but even if 
only the four weakest banks participate in the scheme, the subsidy estimate rises to only 
about GBP 3.4 billion.  
US numbers are of a different order altogether 
The guarantee fee for all institutions is 75 basis points, while the average fair price works 
out to almost 120 basis points higher at 194.9 basis points. Assuming a total guarantee 
figure of $1.5 trillion (an estimate that is likely on the lower side), this means an annual 
government subsidy to the participating banks of $18 billion, or well over $50 billion 
over the three years of the scheme.  
Table 1b: CDS fees and loan guarantee fee for the US banks 
Bank Median 3-
year CDS 
fee in year 





fee in year 












+ 90 bps) 
3-year 
CDS fee 










71.0 85.0 75 161.0 149.1 186.2 
Citigroup 100.0 115.2 75 190.0 367.2 341.7 
Goldman 
Sachs 





70.6 85.0 75 160.6 152.1 162.5 
Morgan 
Stanley 
174.1 159.4 75 264.1 1621.6 1300.9 
Average 104.9 110.3 75 194.9 579.0 506.3 
Source: Datastream. 
Alternative 2: What if we take a very generous (to the banks) approach and use the 
unadjusted 3-year CDS spread to represent the fair value of the guarantee? In this case, 
the average CDS spread for UK banks is around 70.8 basis points, about 63 basis points 
less than the average fee of 133.7 basis points. In this case, the UK fee represents a tax on 
participating banks that amounts, over the three years of the scheme, to over GBP 4.5 
billion. If only the four weakest banks participate, then the tax figure falls to about GBP 
3.3 billion.  
But even if we use the unadjusted three-year CDS spreads for the US banks, a substantial 
subsidy remains. The average three-year CDS spread works out to 104.9 basis points 
against the fee of 75 basis points. This means a subsidy of 30 basis points per guaranteed 
dollar per annum, or about $13 billion over three years on a guaranteed principal amount 
of $1.5 trillion.  
Alternative 3: As a final computation, we take the mid-point of the two earlier estimates. 
The cost of the guarantee scheme to UK taxpayers ranges between a low estimate of –
GBP 4.5 billion and a high estimate of +GBP 2 billion. Averaging these estimates results 
in a figure of –GBP 1.25 billion, i.e., in a tax on the banks of about GBP 1.25 billion. If 
only the four weakest banks participate, then these low and high estimates become -GBP 
3.4 billion and +GBP 3.3 billion, for an average cost near zero, meaning the scheme 
breaks even.  
The high and low estimates for the US are, however, $13 billion and $54 billion, so even 
the average of these numbers leaves US taxpayers with a bill of over $30 billion over the 
three-year period.  
Question 2: Optional Participation and Pooling/Separating Outcomes  
As we have noted earlier, the US and UK schemes have very different optionality 
features for the participating banks. What are the implications of these differences for 
take-up of loan guarantees and easing of inter-bank lending and other credit markets? 
UK scheme to produce a separating equilibrium 
The UK scheme is likely to lead to what economists term a separating equilibrium. 
Banks (with some hindsight, HSBC and Lloyds TSB) whose credit risk is lower than the 
market’s perceptions can opt out since the loan guarantee scheme provides them little 
subsidy relative to the fair price for guaranteeing their debt (and potentially imposes a 
cost). And there is no cost to opting out. In contrast, banks whose credit risk is worse than 
market’s perceptions would find it costly to opt out and thus avail of the scheme. This 
separation will reveal to the markets which banks are healthy and which are not. It should 
be noted that the UK capital injection scheme has similar features too: it allows healthy 
239 
 
institutions to opt out of accepting government infusion, and indeed HSBC, has opted out 
there as well. 
US scheme to produce a pooling equilibrium 
In contrast, the US loan guarantee scheme will force a pooling outcome wherein all 
banks within the eligible set – regardless of their health – will participate because it is not 
possible to re-enter later should conditions worsen and capital become even harder to 
access. To this stick is attached the carrot of guarantee rates that seem to be heavily 
subsidised relative to fair price. As an aside, we note that the US capital infusion plan too 
involved such pooling, with none of the nine eligible institutions allowed to opt out.  
One would expect that in either case, government guarantees of bank debt should boost 
inter-bank lending in the near future. The question really is whether they will thaw 
markets sufficiently that the guarantees are not relied upon any further. On this front, the 
separating and pooling outcomes have sharply differing implications. 
By revealing healthy banks from the pool, the separating outcome enables banks and 
markets to provide credit at prices that more accurately reflect the credit risk of 
counterparties. Such pricing of credit risk is also an important step in ensuring lending 
markets continue to function in an orderly manner once guarantees are removed. 
Separation also enables healthy banks to signal their quality to other banks and markets, 
making it costly for the unhealthy ones to raise debt and equity capital in future. Thus, the 
UK scheme, by design or coincidence, aims to achieve a market-style outcome at little 
cost to taxpayers (and possibly even at negative cost). All this is to the good.  
The pooling outcome, in contrast, may keep the system reliant on government guarantees 
for a longer period since it does not facilitate a better pricing by banks and markets of 
individual banks’ credit risk. It effectively gets healthy banks to subsidise the borrowing 
of unhealthy ones and does not impair capital-raising ability of the latter. The US scheme 
is best characterised as a bailout that transfers taxpayer funds to the banking sector.  
But might the UK scheme end up being too harsh under some scenario? The answer is: it 
depends on the evolution of the financial crisis over next several months. 
US vs UK schemes if the financial crisis deepens 
The UK scheme implicitly relies on the assumption that following the recent capital 
infusions, even the unhealthy players are now solvent to a point that they are simply 
unlikely to fail in foreseeable future. If the financial crisis deepens further, due to global 
macroeconomic woes or revelation of more losses linked to imprudent lending, this 
assumption may prove incorrect. Under this pessimistic scenario, the unhealthy banks, 
having been separated out, will find it more difficult to issue capital and/or borrow and 
potentially fail. The inter-connectedness of banks may transform a significant bank 
failure, through contagion risk, into a systemic crisis that once again causes credit 
markets to freeze. And, the unhealthy banks, that took the government recapitalization 
and loan guarantees, will be forced to rely even more on taxpayer money. That is, the 
strength of the UK scheme – its attempt to achieve a market-style outcome – could end 
up being its Achilles’ heel in case of further market stress. In contrast, the US scheme, by 
being a government bailout, has the one virtue in that it will ensure smoother tiding over 




How should governments assist banks during a severe systemic crisis: in the UK style 
that uses market information in its operation and looks to separate healthy and unhealthy 
institutions, or in the US one-solution-fits-all style? The answer is ambiguous.  
The only clear picture that emerges at this stage is that the US and the UK schemes – 
both part of a globally coordinated rescue plan – in fact sit at opposite extremes – one 
with the flavour of a subsidy, the other laden with a tax; one partly market-reliant, the 
other almost fully government-reliant. Which one will emerge better? We will be able to 
tell only once we gauge the depth of looming recessions. 
 
 
Gros and Micossi: The beginning of the end game… 
20 September 2008  
The radical moves in the US have direct implications for European banks and indirect 
implications for European governments. This column discusses the likely channels and 
notes that several European banks are both too big to fail and may be too big to be saved 
by their national governments alone. 
The US financial system is being nationalised. The piecemeal approach which culminated 
with the AIG operation was clearly not working. The US government had taken control 
of its biggest insurance company just two weeks after it had to save Fannie and Freddie, 
by far the world’s largest mortgage underwriters. All this was not enough to restore 
orderly market conditions, hence the US political system is working over time to find a 
general solution whose outline is already apparent. The US government is going to buy 
the so-called "toxic" assets still on the banks' balances and will then recapitalise the banks 
to the extent that they make losses. As a result, it will soon own a large share of its own 
banking system. If the details are generous enough, this will finally be enough to restore 
orderly market conditions. It is not going to be the end of the story, as it is likely that a 
number of medium-sized regional banks heavily exposed to the real estate market 
(through mortgages, not "toxic assets") will soon have to be saved as well. 
It is fitting that the first institutions to be formally nationalised in this crisis were not 
banks in the traditional sense, but institutions (Fannie and Freddie, AIG) that were 
supposed to play only a supporting role in the financial system. 
The AIG operation: "Haircut" without the hair 
Formally, the AIG operation is composed of two separate elements: 
• The Federal Reserve of New York has been “authorised to lend” AIG up to US$ 
85 billion, and 
• The US Treasury is taking control of AIG, of which it will own 80%, thereby 
immediately changing its management.  
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The Federal Reserve is thus providing financing to the US government. The punitive 
terms (850 bps above LIBOR) agreed for the loan to AIG are irrelevant as any interest 
payments would merely go from the left to the right hand pocket of the government.  
Fed independence and the recapitalisation by the Treasury 
But at the same time the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve has now been loaded with 
so many assets of dubious value that the Fed itself may soon no longer be solvent; hence 
the Fed’s request for a recapitalisation by the Treasury. This means that the US Central 
Bank has lost its independence, since it now survives on a life-line from the US 
government. 
An independent central bank committed only to the goal of price stability used to be 
considered an essential cornerstone of a modern macroeconomic stability-oriented policy 
framework. In the US, this is giving way to a situation in which the central bank has 
ended up in the pockets of the finance ministry as a consequence of its frantic efforts to 
re-establish normal operating conditions in financial markets. In all likelihood, the large 
increase in US government debt under way will be matched by increased monetary 
financing of the deficit.  
Will Europe be far behind? 
Links between global financial markets  
Global contagion works on the way down and up. The near miss of AIG, followed 
closely by the mother of all bailouts now planned in the US, provides a vivid illustration 
of the nature of the links between global financial markets. One key link has been risk-
sharing. European (and other) financial institutions held a large share of the assets based 
on US residential mortgages and thus shared in the losses that arose when the US housing 
market turned sour. This type of risk-sharing is exactly what financial globalisation 
should be able to provide. The US banking system would be in an even worse shape had 
all the losses from US sub prime-based securities been concentrated in the US. 
AIG's impact on European bank’s regulatory capital 
But the AIG case shows the importance of another link across financial markets, namely 
massive circumvention of regulatory requirements.  The K-10 annex of AIG’s last annual 
report reveals that AIG had written coverage for over US$ 300 billion of credit insurance 
for European banks. The comment by AIG itself on these positions is:  
“…. for the purpose of providing them {European Banks} with regulatory 
capital relief rather than risk mitigation in exchange for a minimum 
guaranteed fee”.  
Thus, a formal default of AIG would have exposed European banks’ large gap of 
regulatory capital, with possibly devastating effects on their ratings and market 
confidence. Which explains why AIG’s problems had sent shock waves through the share 
prices of European banks. Thus, the US Treasury has saved, inter alia, the European 
banking system. However, as AIG is to be liquidated, European banks will have to 
quickly shore up their regulatory capital. 
The extent of regulatory arbitrage can also be seen in the very large gap between overall 
leverage ratios and the official, regulatory ratios. The dozen largest European banks have 
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now on average an overall leverage ratio (shareholder equity to total assets) of 35, 
compared to less than 20 for the largest US banks. But at the same time most large 
European banks also report regulatory leverage ratios of close to 10. Part of the 
difference is explained by the fact that the massive in-house investment banking 
operations of European banks are not subject to any regulatory capital 
requirement. Another part of the explanation must the regulatory arbitrage, for example 
though the credit insurance offered for example by AIG. 
Positive spillovers for Europe’s banks 
Europe’s banks will benefit greatly from the wholesale effective nationalisation of the US 
financial system now being planed because the prices of the so-called "toxic" assets will 
be stabilised. But it remains unclear how many of them they hold in their balance sheets 
and how volatile their liability base will prove if confidence does not return quickly. And 
the ECB is already overloaded with assets of dubious quality in gigantic amounts.  
Too big to fail and too big to save? 
The key problem on this side of the Atlantic is that the largest European banks have 
become not only too big to fail but also too big to be saved. For example, the total 
liabilities of Deutsche Bank (leverage ratio over 50!) amount to around 2,000 billion 
euro, (more than Fannie Mai) or over 80 % of the GDP of Germany. This is simply too 
much for the Bundesbank or even the German state to contemplate, given that the 
German budget is bound by the rules of the Stability pact and the German government 
cannot order (unlike the US Treasury) its central bank to issue more currency. The total 
liabilities of Barclays of around 1,300 billion pounds (leverage ratio over 60!) surpasses 
Britain’s GDP. Fortis bank, which has been in the news recently, has a leverage ratio of 
"only" 33, but its liabilities are several times larger than the GDP of its home country 
(Belgium). 
Are European regulators living on borrowed time? 
With banks that have outgrown national regulators and the financing capacities of 
national treasuries, European central banks and regulators are living on borrowed time. 
They cannot simply develop “road maps” but must contemplate a worst case scenario.  
The ECB must be in charge; Britain and Switzerland should pray 
Given that solutions for the largest institutions can no lounger be found at the national 
level, it is apparent that the ECB will need to be put in charge. It is the only institution in 
the euro area that can issue unlimited amounts of global reserve currencies. The 
authorities in the UK and Switzerland –- who cannot rely on the ECB – can only pray 
that no accident happens to the giants they have in their own garden. 
  Leverage Ratio (total assets/equity) 
 30-Jun-08 2007 
UBS 46.9 63.9 
ING Group 48.8 35.3 
HSBC Holding 20.1 18.4 
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Barclays Bank 61.3 52.7 
BBV Argentaria 20.1 18.6 
Deutsche Bank  52.5 
Fortis 33.3 26.4 
KBC 24.4 20.5 
Lloyd's TSB 34.1 31.0 
RBS 18.8 21.8 
Credit Agricole 40.5 34.8 
BNP Paribas 36.1 31.5 
Credit Suisse 33.4 31.5 




Wyplosz: Financial crisis resolution: It’s all about burden-sharing 
20 July 2008 
Should taxpayers bail out the banking system? One of the world’s leading international 
macroeconomists contrasts the Larry Summers “don’t-scare-off-the-investors” pro-
bailout view with the Willem Buiter “they-ran-into-a wall-with-eyes-wide-open” anti-
bailout view. He concludes that either way, taxpayers are always the losers. The best 
policy makers can do is to be merciless with shareholders and gentle with bank 
customers.  
An old and familiar debate is back. Should taxpayers bail out the US banking system, 
quite possibly the British and European ones as well?  
There are two standard views on the multi-trillion dollar question of who pays for getting 
us out of the financial crisis 
• One view is that the situation has become so desperate that ordinary citizens will 
in any case be paying a high price for the crisis; throwing money at banks right 
now might lower the overall burden by preventing a deep, protracted recession. 
• The other view is that banks ought to be left hanging to pay for their sins. 
Governments ought to be worried about their taxpayers, not bank shareholders.  
In fact, we don’t have that much choice. 
Too big to fail: the Bagehot rule 
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It has long been a poorly hidden secret that large banks cannot be left to go bankrupt. 
Walter Bagehot, a 19th century economist and editor of The Economist, designed the 
solution that remains as relevant today as it was then. The Bagehot rule is that the central 
bank ought to lend freely to a failing bank, against high-quality collateral and at a 
punitive rate (see Xavier Vives’ Vox column).  
The modern version of the rule adds that shareholders ought to bear serious costs and the 
managers ought to be promptly replaced. This is exactly what happened with Bear 
Stearns last March, where another bank, JP Morgan, was used as the conduit for the 
operation. The cost to the taxpayers was a $1 billion guarantee and a $29 billion loan to 
JP Morgan guaranteed by Bear Stearns assets. We don’t yet know if this was a taxpayer-
financed bailout. If JP Morgan redresses the situation within ten years, the taxpayers will 
make a profit. If not, US taxpayers will have borne the burden. Bear Stearns shareholders 
were almost completely expropriated.  
As the US economy keeps limping and the housing market deteriorates, most observers 
believe that there will be many more bank failures. Indeed, in early July, a large 
Californian mortgage lender, IndyMac, went belly up and was also subjected to 
Bagehot’s recipe. The possibility that some very large financial institutions, and many 
smaller ones, will follow provides urgency for the current debate.  
The Larry Summers school of thought: Don’t scare off the investors 
One school of thought – let’s call it, fairly I think, the Larry Summers School – is that the 
Fed has been far too tough with Bear Stearns. It has scared investors and managers alike. 
The result is that investors are now unwilling to provide much needed cash to banks that 
must rebuild their badly depleted balance sheets while bank managers strenuously resist 
acknowledging their losses and continue selling their toxic assets. As a result, the whole 
banking system is in a state of virtual paralysis, which means that borrowing is both 
difficult and costly.  
Lowering the interest rate, as the Fed vigorously did, does not even begin to redress the 
situation. This all leads to a vicious circle where insufficient credit drags the economy 
down, which leads to more loan delinquencies, which further impair banks ability to lend. 
Memories of 1929 immediately come to mind, when the Fed made matters considerably 
worse by clinging to financial orthodoxy.  
This school of thought fears that the same fascination with high-minded principles turns a 
bad crisis into another nightmare of historical proportions. The Larry Summers School 
wants the Fed to lend freely and more generously with the goal being to reassure 
potential investors. If that is done, so goes the argument, banks will be able to rebuild 
their balance sheets and resume their normal activities. This would signal the end of the 
now one-year old financial crisis as a virtuous circle unfolds – more loans, a resumption 
of growth and the end of the housing market decline, healthier banks, and more loans.  
The Willem Buiter school of thought: They ran into a wall with eyes wide- open 
The other school of thought – let’s call it, a bit unfairly, the Willem Buiter School – sees 
things in the exact opposite way.  
The crisis is the result of financial follies by financial institutions that bought huge 
amounts of products that they did not understand – the infamous mortgage-backed 
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securities and their derivatives – parked them off-balance-sheet to avoid regulation, and 
made huge profits in doing so. In short, they ran into a wall with wide-open eyes.  
Once the all-too-well foreseen crisis erupted, these institutions kept hiding the extent of 
their losses as long as they could – they are still playing that game – and started to lobby 
for a bailout from their governments.  
The classic credit cycle: Look who’s crying now 
This school notes that the crisis is part of a classic credit cycle that involves excessive 
risk-taking in good times and ends up in tears. The question is: whose tears?  
The challenge is ensure that these are not the taxpayers’ tears. Indeed banks are in a 
unique position. They used to call for a bailout to protect their depositors, but deposits are 
now insured in all developed countries. Still, because bank credit is the blood supply of 
the economy, we cannot let our banking system sink. But once banks know that they can 
play the high-risk, high-return game, pocket the profits, and let taxpayers face the risks, 
bailouts provide a temporary relief but set the ground for the next crisis.  
Wilder and wilder parties 
Bank of England Governor Mervyn King nicely sums up the situation: “'If banks feel 
they must keep on dancing while the music is playing and that at the end of the party the 
central bank will make sure everyone gets home safely, then over time, the parties will 
become wilder and wilder.” Bagehot principles can be applied when one or two banks 
fail, but when the whole system is under threat, this is no longer an option.  
Which school is winning with policy makers? 
Both schools have developed consistent views. The dismaying part of the story is that 
they lead to radically different policy implications.  
So far, the monetary authorities have been closer to the Willem Buiter School view, but 
things may be changing. The most recent bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is 
clearly a soft rescue operation, with no set limits and, so far at least, no penalty on 
shareholders and managers. Even though Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are very special 
institutions with a federal mandate, the Larry Summers School is right to see some 
glimmers of hope and therefore must be taken seriously.  
In most respects, we have gone through a very classic credit boom- and bust cycle. Two 
cases from the 1990s are worth pondering:  
• Following years of fast bank credit growth accompanied, as should be, by housing 
price bubbles, bank crises started in 1990 in both Japan and Sweden. The Swedish 
authorities reacted swiftly, bailing out most banks at a cost to taxpayers estimated 
at some 4% of GDP, but shareholders were essentially expropriated 
• The Japanese authorities protected their banks with generous loans, even as some 
banks were serving dividend payments to their shareholders.  
Sweden recovered in three years and, nowadays, Swedish banks are not found among 
those that indulged in mortgage-backed securities. Japan has still not recovered from a 
nearly twenty-year long “lost decade” and, nowadays, several Japanese banks have 
already failed under the weight of the toxic assets that they acquired, once again.  
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Figure 1: GDP Growth in Japan and Sweden 
 
Source: Economic Outlook, OECD 
  
Conclusions 
Of course, there is more to it than this simple comparison, including the accompanying 
macroeconomic policies. But three unmistakable messages emerge: 
• Be merciless with shareholders and gentle to bank customers 
• Either way, taxpayers are always the losers. 
• Bagehot had it all right. 
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de la Dehesa: Is the euro area facing a credit crunch or a credit 
squeeze? 
16 July 2008 
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The current credit crisis should be both a squeeze and a crunch, but it seems to have been 
neither in the euro area. This column explains why credit may become costlier or scarcer 
under current conditions and explores how European financial entities seem to be 
defying the negative news. 
There are two channels through which the present credit crisis can affect economic 
activity. The first is prices, making credit more costly, and the second is quantities, 
making it scarcer. Dearer credit is called a “credit squeeze” and while scarcer credit is 
called “credit crunch”. The euro area seems to be suffering neither of the two, at least for 
the time being. 
Credit may be getting dearer for at least for four reasons. 
• Today’s banks tend to face higher spreads when issuing debt compared to non-
banks, even of the same rating, thus their lending to non-banks is less profitable or 
unprofitable unless they get other fees from these corporations or charge higher 
rates to other borrowers with lower ratings. 
• Average inter-bank one- and three-month euribor rates have gone up from 10bp a 
year ago to 80bp today over the OIS (overnight index swap) or EONIA, which is 
a proxy for future central bank rates. 
• Banks are re-pricing their credit because they finally have found out – after 
experiencing an increase in non-performing loans – that they were lending at too 
cheap rates for the risk that they were taking. 
• Banks’ credit default swap or the market price for insuring their risk of default has 
gone up more than that of non-banks. 
Credit may be becoming more restricted for two reasons. 
• Banks have been forced to do large write-downs of many of their assets that have 
depreciated using IFRS mark-to-market valuation.  
As of today, total write-downs by large banks in developed countries have 
reached around $400 billion, but they have been able to raise capital by around 
$300 billion to be able to continue lending. According to the ECB, banks in the 
euro area only made €21 billion in write downs from August 2007 to the end of 
February 2008 (9.5 % of their total asset level of €22 trillion), and they have been 
able to raise capital enough to deleverage 8 percentage points and compensate 
most of them. 
• Some euro area banks have created, with the approval or consent of their 
supervisors, off-balance sheet vehicles that proved to be riskier than their rating, 
so both asset-backed securities commercial paper markets have been drying up 
since August 2007, falling by more than $450 billion. 
These off-balance sheet vehicles (SIV and other conduits), which were created 
with minimum capital, were borrowing short in the asset-backed securities 
commercial paper market both in the United States and Europe and investing long 
in asset-backed securities and other instruments; the purchased assets were used 
as collateral.  
For example, although the ABX HE index is not a very reliable source of 
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valuations given that transactions are small and few, the fall in their values is 
remarkable. After an improvement in the indexes during April and May, today, 
triple A asset-backed securities has fallen from 100 in January 2007 to less than 
50, double A has fallen to less than 10, single A to less than 7 and triple B to 5. 
That trend means that banks write-downs may continue for some time, because 
subprime credits are increasingly defaulting as every year there is a new reset of 
their interest rates upwards (teaser rates), and in 2008 it will affect $280 billion of 
them. 
As banks are unable to refinance these investing vehicles in the capital markets, 
they may be forced to put them back into their balance sheets.  
It is estimated that if all these vehicles were to be reincorporated into the euro 
area banks balance sheets, their regulatory capital would fall by more than 1 
percentage point, from 8% to 7% of total eligible assets and therefore, if no 
capital were raised –highly improbable – credit would have to be reduced by 12%. 
Neither a crunch nor a squeeze 
Nevertheless, for the time being, seasonally adjusted annual credit growth in the euro 
area keeps slowing down rather slowly. 
According to the June ECB report on bank lending, the annual growth rate of total credit 
to the private sector fell from 12.2 % in March to 12.0% in April and to 11.9% in May. 
Lending annual growth rate to private sector companies fell from 10.8% in March to 
10.6% in April and to 10.4% in May. Annual growth rate of loans to non-financial 
corporations decreased to 14.2% in May from 14.9% in April. Annual growth rate of 
loans to households fell from 5.4% in March to 5.2% in April and to 4.9% in May. Loans 
growth rate for house purchase declined 5.5% in May from 5.9% in April and loans 
growth rate for consumer credit fell to 4.8% in May from 5.2% in April. 
Moreover, credit is not getting dearer. 
According to the ECB, interest rates on loans to the private sector have not changed on 
average. On loans to non-financial corporations, they have fallen slightly: Banks’ 
overdraft interest rates have gone down, from 6.62% in December 2007 to 6.54% in April 
2008. On loans up to €1 million, floating rate and over-five-years initial rate fixation have 
gone down from 5.30% in December to 5.22% in April and on loans over €1 million, up 
to five years rates have gone down from 5.48% to 5.39%. In the case of interest rates on 
loans to households, banks’ overdrafts have gone slightly up from 10.46% in December 
2007 to 10.55% in April 2008, as well as in the case of loans for consumption floating 
rate and over-five-years initial rate fixation, which have increased slightly from 8.17% to 
8.45%. Interest rates for house purchase have come down slightly. For loans floating rate 
and over 10 years initial fixation rate, they have gone down from 5.18% to 5.11% in the 
same period. 
Defiant behaviour 
It is really difficult to understand why the increase in banks’ borrowing costs, their 
continuous increase in write-downs, the incorporation of vehicles into their balance 
sheets, their re-pricing of risk, and the increase in their non-performing loans ratios are 
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not having a more negative impact on the flow and the price of their loans to the private 
sector in the euro area. 
Some reasons include: 
• In the case of corporations, banks have maximum loan and price commitments to 
their main clients that contractually are still in force and have not been disposed 
yet by borrowers. 
• In the case of private equity funds and hedge funds, (which actually have 
increased their annual growth rate from 22.2% in April to 25.7% in May) it might 
be that banks seem to be comfortable with their average collateral ratio of 90% of 
loans and because most of them have met their banks’ margin calls on time by de-
leveraging. 
• Unlike in the US, many large banks in the euro area did not create special vehicles 
off-balance sheet or they were very small. 
• The average small and medium size company in the euro area is not highly 
indebted; most households have taken loans to invest in houses and not for 
consumption and have seldom used equity withdrawals. 
• Many large European corporations still have sound financials and good ratings. 
Will this soft loan and interest rate trend persist longer or is it going to change if the 
credit crisis continues biting the euro area banks balance sheets? Time will tell. 
 
Claessens et al: Global financial crisis: How long? How deep? 
7 October 2008 
The house and equity price busts on top of a credit crunch make this an unprecedented 
crisis for the modern US economy; its real economy effects are thus difficult to assess. 
This column provides insights based on evidence from 122 recessions in 21 advanced 
nations since 1960. Findings suggest recessions in such circumstances are much costlier 
and slightly longer. But the outcome can be affected by policy, and it’s high time that 
policymakers act swiftly and decisively.  
Although the unprecedented events of the past few weeks in financial markets have 
dominated the headlines, the debate will inevitably shift to how the most severe financial 
crisis in modern times impacts the broader economy, and, if recessions in major advanced 
countries were to occur, how long and how deep these will be. There are already 
indications that the spillovers from the financial crisis to the broader economy will not be 
mild—in fact, activity in the US and several other advanced economies has slowed down 
in recent months. 
The unique nature of the current financial crisis - combining a house price bust, a credit 
crunch, and an equity price bust - unlike any other one the US has experienced before, 
makes it difficult to assess its implications for the real economy. Barry Eichengreen 
recently assessed the lessons from the Great Depression (Vox 2008), but what of the 
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evidence from modern times? We have witnessed many such episodes of credit crunches 
and busts in house and equity prices around the world since 1960. In fact, in recent work, 
we identified 28 credit crunches, 28 house price busts, 58 equity price busts, and 122 
recessions in 21 advanced countries over 1960-2007 (Claessens, Kose and Terrones, 
2008). These episodes provide some insights on how financial crises evolve and their 
implications for the broader economy.  
How to identify economic and financial cycles? 
Before analysing recessions and their interactions with credit crunches and asset price 
busts, it is necessary to determine the dates of these events. The methodology we employ 
for this purpose focuses on changes in the levels of variables to identify cycles (see 
Harding and Pagan, 2002). Consistent with the guiding principles of the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER), which is the unofficial arbiter of US business cycles, this 
methodology assumes that a recession begins just after the economy climbs a peak of 
activity and ends as the economy reaches its trough. With the help of this methodology, 
we identify cycles in output (GDP), and various financial variables, including credit, 
house prices and equity prices. 
How costly are recessions? 
As shown in Figure 1, a recession on average lasts about 4 quarters (one year) with 
substantial variation across episodes — the shortest recession is 2 quarters and the 
longest 13 quarters. The typical decline in output from peak to trough, the recession’s 
amplitude, tends to be about 2 percent. For recessions, we also compute a measure of 
cumulative loss which combines information about both the duration and amplitude to 
proxy the overall cost of a recession. The cumulative loss of a recession is typically about 
3 percent of GDP, but this number varies quite a bit across episodes. We classify a 
recession as a severe one when the peak-to-trough decline in output is in the top-quartile 
of all output declines during recessions. These recessions tend to be more than a quarter 
longer and much more costly than do typical recessions. 
Crunches and busts: Often long and painful 
The episodes of credit crunches and housing busts are often long and deep (Figure 2). For 
example, a credit crunch episode typically lasts two and a half years and is associated 
with nearly a 20 percent decline in real credit. A housing bust tends to last even longer: 
four and a half years with a 30 percent fall in real house prices. And an equity price bust 
lasts some 10 quarters and when it is over, the real value of equities has dropped to half. 
Are recessions associated with crunches and busts worse than other recessions? 
Contrary to the view of some commentators, the triple whammy of a house price bust, a 
credit crunch and an equity price bust has not always led to an eventual recession. What 
is true is that many recessions are indeed associated with credit crunches or asset price 
busts. In about one out of six recessions, there is also a credit crunch underway, and in 
about one out of four recessions a house price bust. Equity price busts overlap for about 
one-third of recession episodes. There can also be considerable lags between financial 
market disturbances and real activity. A recession, if one occurs, can start as late as four 
to five quarters after the onset of a credit crunch or a housing bust. 
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One of the key questions surrounding the current financial crisis is whether recessions 
associated with crunches and busts are worse than other recessions. Here, the 
international evidence is clear: these types of recessions are not just slightly longer on 
average, but also have much larger output losses than others. In particular, although 
recessions accompanied with severe credit crunches or house price busts last only a 
quarter longer, they have typically result in output losses two to three times greater than 
recessions without such financial stresses. During recessions coinciding with financial 
stress, consumption and investment usually register much sharper declines, leading to the 
more pronounced drops in overall output and unemployment. 
Global nature of economic and financial cycles 
For some, the global nature of the current crisis has been unprecedented as several 
advanced economies have simultaneously witnessed declines in house and equity prices 
as well as difficulties in their credit markets. This is not unusual, however, as recessions, 
crunches and busts often occur at the same time across countries. Recessions in many 
advanced countries have been bunched in four periods over the past forty years — the 
mid-70s, the early 80s, the early 90s and the early-2000s — and have often coincided 
with global shocks. Moreover, when many countries experience a recession, many also 
go through episodes of credit contractions, declines in house and equity prices. 
What are the lessons for the current episode? 
The lessons from the earlier episodes of recessions, crunches and busts are sobering, 
suggesting that recessions, if they were to occur, would be more costly since they would 
take place alongside simultaneous credit crunches and asset price busts. Furthermore, 
although the effects of the current crisis have already been felt gradually around the 
world, its global dimensions are likely to intensify in the coming months. 
The main take-away of the past episodes is that some tough times are ahead for the global 
economy before matters get better. Nevertheless, the nature of a recession in a particular 
country, if it happens, would ultimately depend on a number of factors, importantly how 
healthy the financial positions of its firms, banks, and households are prior to the 
recession, and what policies are being employed. This is high time for policy-makers to 
act swiftly and decisively to undertake the necessary measures at both the national and 
global levels to meet the challenges of the crisis. 
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Figure 1. Recessions: Duration, Amplitude and Cumulative Loss 
(duration, amplitude and cumulative loss) 
1 Duration refers to the number of quarters between the peak and trough of a recession. 
2 Amplitude is the change in GDP between the peak and trough of a recession. 
3 Cumulative loss is the total output loss between the peak and trough of a recession. 
Figure 2. Crunches and Busts: Duration and Amplitude 
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1 Duration refers to the number of quarters between the peak and trough of a credit 
crunch or a house/equity price bust. 
2 Amplitude is the change in credit volume or house/equity price between the peak and 
trough of a credit crunch or a house/equity price bust, respectively. 
Source: Claessens, Kose and Terrones (2008). 
 
 
Laeven: The cost of resolving financial crises 
31 October 2008 
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A new IMF database, which covers the universe of systemic banking crises from 1970 to 
2007, shows that the average fiscal cost was about 15% of GDP, or three times the US’s 
$700 billion. This column points out that quick action often lowers the ultimate cost. 
Moreover wishful thinking teamed with regulatory forbearance and bank liquidity plans 
often raises the cost by delaying vital, but politically painful, government action. 
The crisis is evolving with breakneck speed. The debate about why it happened and how 
it will unfold is still very much ongoing, as Felton and Reinhart (2008) show. 
While it may be too early to write about the lessons learned, authorities do not have the 
luxury to wait for these, and have already embarked on large-scale interventions in the 
financial sector and beyond. 
US moves: $700 billion only a third of the average cost 
Earlier this month, after a first round of hesitation, the US House of Representatives 
voted in favour of the Stabilization Act to bail out the US financial sector in the amount 
of $700 billion. Though the Act was initially sold as a government program to purchase 
distressed financial assets, it has since been recast as a program to recapitalise financial 
institutions by directly injecting capital. 
$700 billion is of course a large number by any measure if taken at face value. But let’s 
put this number in perspective. It amounts to 4.9% of US GDP. This is not an outlier 
when compared to fiscal costs associated with government action to resolve financial 
crises of the past. 
An IMF study of 40 financial crisis episodes puts the fiscal costs associated with 
resolving financial crises in the average country at 16% of GDP (Laeven and Valencia 
2008). Although this average includes some small and emerging economies, the fiscal 
cost is equally high among industrialised economies - at 15% of GDP on average. 
• About half (or 8% of GDP) of these fiscal outlays relate to costs associated with 
government-assisted recapitalisation of banks. 
• The remainder relate mainly to costs associated with government asset purchase 
and debtor relief programs. 
Variation in the fiscal cost of resolving financial crises 
There is much variation in this number, though, as the severity and management of crises 
have varied a great deal. The crisis management packages in countries as diverse as 
Finland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey all cost the taxpayer a multiple of the current 
US bailout plan, ranging from 13% of GDP in Finland to as high as 32% in Turkey. 
Countries like Norway and Sweden fared much better with costs to the taxpayer of 3% 
and 4% of GDP, respectively. 
Of course, the current US financial crisis is still ongoing and the ultimate fiscal costs 
could be much higher. Recent bailouts of individual financial institutions and extensions 
of government guarantees for deposits and money market funds have already added 
significant contingent fiscal liabilities. Other countries, particularly in Europe, have 
followed suit, varying from the announcement of a blanket guarantee on bank liabilities 




A key driver of this variation in ultimate fiscal costs is the speed with which governments 
act to resolve the crisis. Speed is of the essence and is often accomplished through a 
comprehensive package of simple assistance measures to borrowers and banks that is 
politically acceptable. 
Also, while the upfront cost of interventions is high, if done right, the government will 
not be left empty handed. If the government purchases bad assets, these assets may 
recover in value, and if the government takes equity stakes in banks, the value of these 
stakes may increase in the years to come. The ultimate cost to the taxpayer is likely to be 
smaller. 
Necessary but politically sensitive wealth transfer 
Surely, any bailout plan involves a transfer of wealth from creditors to debtors, from 
those that behaved prudently to those that took excessive risks. However, the 
consequence of no action is likely to be worse. What starts as a crisis of confidence in the 
financial system often quickly spreads to the real economy, negatively affecting 
household wealth. Declines in banks’ net worth, which may result in bank failures, 
reduces their ability to supply loans to households and firms, and at a minimum increases 
the cost of borrowing. At the same time, initial declines in economic activity that begin as 
a normal recession become larger as declines in borrowers’ income and net worth destroy 
bank net worth, creating a vicious cycle of wealth destruction that in the past has often 
led affected economies into deep recession. It is for this reason that financial crises call 
for swift policy responses. Sound policies today will avoid even larger fiscal and 
economic costs tomorrow. 
Little agreement on best practice 
Choosing the best way of resolving a financial crisis and accelerating economic recovery 
is far from unproblematic. There has been little agreement on what constitutes best 
practice or even good practice. Policy responses depend on the nature of the crisis. 
So let’s first agree on the underlying problem of the current crisis. Markets appear unable 
to resolve the uncertainty about the value of bank assets and associated counterparty risk 
between banks. This problem is intensified by the low levels of capital in banks. 
This market failure requires government intervention. But what kind of intervention and 
on what scale? 
Regulatory forbearance and bank liquidity support can backfire 
Governments have employed a broad range of policies to deal with financial crises. They 
typically start with regulatory forbearance and generous liquidity support to banks. 
Forbearance, however, does not really solve the underlying problems of too little bank 
capital and therefore a key component of almost every systemic banking crisis is bank 
restructuring plan. All too often, government intervention in financial institutions is 
delayed because regulatory capital forbearance and liquidity support are used for too long 
to deal with insolvent financial institutions in the hope that they will recover, ultimately 
increasing the stress on the financial system and the real economy. 
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Central to identifying sound policy approaches to financial crises is the recognition that 
policy responses that reallocate wealth toward banks and debtors and away from 
taxpayers face a key trade-off. 
Such reallocations of wealth can help to restart productive investment, but they have 
large costs. These costs include taxpayers’ wealth that is spent on financial assistance and 
indirect costs from misallocations of capital and distortions to incentives that may result 
from encouraging banks and firms to abuse government protections. 
Those distortions may worsen capital allocation and risk management after the resolution 
of the crisis. For example, government recapitalisations of insolvent banks may lead 
shareholders of the bank to “gamble for resurrection” at the expense of other stakeholders 
of the bank. 
More generally, government bailouts generate moral hazard as they increase the 
perception that bailouts will occur next time around. While policymakers should take 
these tradeoffs into account when crafting their bailout plans, they do not have the luxury 
to wait for the perfect solution. 
Conclusion 
The economic cost of no action can be enormous, making even $700 billion sound like a 
small number. Let’s hope the money will be spent wisely. 
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Kobayashi: Financial crisis management: Lessons from Japan’s failure 
27 October 2008 
Japan’s banking crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s offer critical lessons on how to 
deal with the current financial crisis. This column warns against relying on fiscal 
stimulus, stresses the importance of recapitalising viable bank but letting the ‘zombie 
banks’ go bust to boost certainty about financial firms’ solvency. In order to avoid a 
vicious cycle of steady economic decline as in Japan, the G8 and emerging economies 
should create a "Financial System Stabilisation Fund". 
The current crisis in the US and European financial systems seems to be growing 
similarly to Japan’s banking crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Although the current 
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crisis developed much faster108 than Japan’s crisis, the key mechanism is the same – 
changes in the prices of real estate that were used as collateral for bank lending. The 
further development of the crisis will crucially depend on the evolution of these real-
estate prices. Figures 1 and 2 show the land price index in Japan and the housing price 
index in the US. How far will housing prices in the US fall? If we base our projections on 
the trend line of the 1990s, they should pick up by 2011 at the latest. But this reasoning 
reminds me of a similar mindset in the early 1990s in Japan. When Japan’s real estate 
bubble burst in 1991, the trend line indicated that land prices would bottom out around 
1995, when in fact they continued to decline steadily for 12 more years. 
Figure 1. S&P Case-Shiller US national home price index 
 
Figure 2. Official land price in Japan 
                                                 
108 In February when I warned about the necessity of bank capital injections with 





Japan experienced more than a decade of continuous land-price declines and low 
productivity growth. The decade-long stagnation seems to be the result of a protracted 
external diseconomy that set in due to uncertainty and fear surrounding the payment 
system. Banks and firms in Japan felt the fear of not being paid in full when they 
expanded lending because some of their customers hid the fact that they were insolvent. 
If insolvent agents stick around, healthy agents are forced to face uncertainty and fear. 
They hesitate to start new transactions with unknown trading partners. Their reluctance 
results in the shrinkage of the economy-wide division of labour among firms and 
industries, lowering growth of aggregate productivity. The lower productivity, in turn, 
drives down asset prices even further and increases the number of insolvent agents, 
reinforcing the persistence of uncertainty and fear. We may refer to this external 
diseconomy, or vicious cycle, as “payment uncertainty.”109 
While the payment uncertainty that has spread through the global interbank market in the 
last several weeks may be contained by bank-capital injections and government 
guarantees, the challenge now is to prevent payment uncertainty from spreading to the 
real sector (i.e., businesses and households). Japan’s policy failures in the 1990s offer 
several instructive lessons. 
Debt restructuring is absolutely necessary to prevent a vicious cycle 
Debt relief and rehabilitation of viable but debt-ridden firms and the liquidation of 
nonviable firms are crucially important to wipe out the payment uncertainty from the 
economy and restore market confidence. If zombie firms stick around in the market, 
                                                 




uncertainty and business shrinkage will linger on.110 Capital injections into banks are just 
a beginning. 
Stringent asset evaluation and sufficient write-offs 
Stringent and conservative evaluation of the toxic assets should be the premise behind 
bank-capital injections and debt restructuring. I suspect that the current capital injections 
in the US and Europe may not eradicate the payment uncertainty unless they are 
accompanied by sufficiently stringent asset evaluations. Financial regulators should 
establish task forces for asset evaluation and push financial institutions to recalculate 
their asset values conservatively enough so that the market can rely on their numbers. 
The regulators may have to employ financial engineers (e.g., former employees of the 
Lehman Brothers) as investigators and let them analyse the risk and losses of the toxic 
derivative securities by “reverse engineering.’’ 
Purchase of bad assets by public asset management companies 
If bad assets are disposed of by distress selling in the market, stringent asset evaluation 
will result in a vicious cycle of debt deflation: distress selling causes asset prices to 
decline further, which in turn accelerates the distress selling of assets. To stop the vicious 
cycle of debt deflation, the governments struggling with the financial crisis should 
establish asset management companies, public entities that purchase and hold the bad 
assets. The purchase and freezing of toxic assets is necessary to stop debt deflation. The 
public entities should then restructure the bad assets and sell them off gradually after the 
market stabilises. 
Fiscal stimulus packages may not work 
One big lesson from Japan’s 1990s is that Keynesian policy per se did not work for the 
financial crisis due to the collapse of asset prices. While Japan undertook huge fiscal 
stimulus packages repeatedly in the 1990s, the government did not pursue a serious 
policy effort to make banks dispose of their nonperforming loans. As a result, a huge 
amount of hidden nonperforming loans swelled under implicit collusion between the 
government and banks. Naturally, the payment uncertainty and economic shrinkage 
persisted for years. The essential problem was the spreading of payment uncertainty, and 
policies centred on public works and tax cuts were not direct enough to attack the 
problem, though they were temporarily effective at mitigating the severity of the 
economic downturn. Direct debt relief for mortgage borrowers and distressed (but viable) 
firms, along with fiscal assistance for the liquidation of nonviable firms, are 
straightforward, cost-effective fiscal policies much more capable of wiping out the 
payment uncertainty than standard public works and tax cuts. 
Suspension of mark-to-market accounting has a long-term side effect 
The development of huge nonperforming loans in Japan was made possible by the virtual 
nonexistence of mark-to-market accounting for bank assets. Although suspension of 
mark-to-market accounting may temporarily calm the panic, it may also enable and 
seduce bankers to hide their toxic assets from regulators and market participants. If 
                                                 
110 For zombie firms, see also Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2008). 
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bankers hide bad assets, zombie firms will persist and the payment uncertainty will 
remain, setting the stage for very low long-term economic growth in the coming years. 
The global nature of the current crisis seems to posit interesting points in the arguments 
for international policy coordination. As the external diseconomy of payment uncertainty 
affects economies all over the world, the cost to eradicate this diseconomy should be 
borne worldwide. This normative argument may be justified from the following 
efficiency point of view: To minimise the prospective tax distortions caused by huge 
fiscal outlays for global financial rescues, it may be optimal for the world as a whole to 
let emerging market economies with high prospective growth and solid fiscal positions, 
such as China and India, bear a considerable amount of the fiscal cost of global financial 
rescues. (The social surplus generated by the international policy coordination should be 
shared by both developed and emerging market countries after the crisis is over.) To bear 
the cost to stabilise the world economy matches with the national interests of China and 
other emerging economies, since otherwise they should suffer from much greater 
economic and noneconomic costs for adjusting to shrinkage of the US and European 
economies. 
One idea to cement this global coordination would be the establishment of a new 
international fund, like the IMF, which could be called the "Financial System 
Stabilisation Fund" or "World Dollar Stabilisation Fund." The Fund should be established 
as a temporary organisation to stabilise the current financial crisis, and eventually be 
dissolved and merged into the IMF in the next three years or so. Emerging market 
countries would invest public money, which may be their huge stocks of foreign reserves 
and/or may be raised by issuing new bonds, in the Fund. The Fund could then make loans 
to the governments of the US and major European countries affected by the financial 
crisis. The affected governments would use the loan proceeds to make fiscal expenditures 
needed for injecting capital into their banks and restructuring the debt of their domestic 
borrowers. 
The G8 meeting with emerging market countries, scheduled to be held in New York in 
November, would be a good occasion to coordinate the global cost distribution for the 
resolution of the current financial crisis. 
References 
Caballero, R., T. Hoshi, and A. Kashyap (2008). "Zombie lending and depressed 
restructuring in Japan." American Economic Review (forthcoming). 
Kobayashi, K. (2006). "Payment uncertainty, the division of labor, and productivity 
declines in great depressions." Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 9, pp. 715—741. 
Kobayashi, K. (2008). "Subprime Loan Crisis – Lessons from Japan’s Decade of 
Deception." 
Kobayashi, K. and S. Kato (2001). Nihon keizai no Wana (Trap of the Japanese 





Eichengreen: And now the Great Depression 
28 September 2008  
The Paulson Plan, whatever its final form, will not end the crisis quickly. Unemployment 
will rise but will the most serious credit crisis since the Great Depression bring about a 
new depression? Here one of the world’s leading economic historians identifies the 
relevant Great-Depression lessons. We won’t see 25% unemployment as in the 1930s, but 
double digits are not out of the question.  
A couple of months ago at lunch with a respected Fed watcher, I asked, “What are the 
odds are that US unemployment will reach 10% before the crisis is over?” “Zero,” he 
responded, in an admirable display of confidence. Watchers tending to internalise the 
outlook of the watched, I took this as reflecting opinion within the US central bank. We 
may have been in the throes of the most serious credit crisis since the Great Depression, 
but nothing resembling the Depression itself, when US unemployment topped out at 25%, 
was even remotely possible. The Fed and Treasury were on the case. US economic 
fundamentals were strong. Comparisons with the 1930s were overdrawn. 
The events of the last week have shattered such complacency. The 3 month treasury yield 
has fallen to “virtual zero” for the first time since the flight to safety following the 
outbreak of World War II. The Ted Spread, the difference between borrowing for 3 
months on the interbank market and holding three month treasuries, ballooned at one 
point to five full percentage points. Interbank lending is dead in its tracks. The entire US 
investment banking industry has been vaporised. 
And we are in for more turbulence. The Paulson Plan, whatever its final form, will not 
bring this upheaval to an early end. The consequences are clearly spreading from Wall 
Street to Main Street. The recent performance of nonfinancial stocks indicates that 
investors are well aware of the fact.  
So comparisons with the Great Depression, which have been of academic interest but 
little practical relevance, take on new salience. Which ones have content, and which are 
mainly useful for headline writers?  
First, the Fed now, like the Fed in the 1930s, is very much groping in the dark. Every 
financial crisis is different, and this one is no exception. It is hard to avoid concluding 
that the Fed erred disastrously when deciding that Lehman Bros. could safely be allowed 
to fail. It did not adequately understand the repercussions for other institutions of 
allowing a primary dealer to go under. It failed to fully appreciate the implications for 
AIG’s credit default swaps. It failed to understand that its own actions were bringing us 
to the brink of financial Armageddon.  
If there is a defence, it has been offered Rick Mishkin, the former Fed governor, who has 
asserted that the current shock to the financial system is even more complex than that of 
the Great Depression. There is something to his point. In the 1930s the shock to the 
financial system came from the fall in the general price level by a third and the 
consequent collapse of economic activity. The solution was correspondingly 
straightforward. Stabilise the price level, as FDR did by pumping up the money supply, 
and it was possible to stabilise the economy, in turn righting the banking system. 
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Absorbing the shock is more difficult this time because it is internal to the financial 
system. Central to the problem are excessive leverage, opacity, and risk taking in the 
financial sector itself. There has been a housing-market collapse, but in contrast to the 
1930s there has been no general collapse of prices and economic activity. Corporate 
defaults have remained relatively low, which has been a much-needed source of comfort 
to the financial system. But this also makes resolving the problem more difficult. Since 
there has been no collapse of prices and economic activity, we are not now going to be 
able to grow or inflate our way out of the crisis, as we did after 1933.  
In addition, the progress of securitisation complicates the process of unravelling the 
current mess. In the 1930s the Federal Home Owners Loan Corporation bought 
individual mortgages to cleanse bank balance sheets and provide home owners with 
relief. This time the federal agency responsible for cleaning up the financial system will 
have to buy residential mortgage backed securities, collateralised debt obligations, and all 
manner of sliced, diced and repackaged paper. Strengthening bank balance sheets and 
providing homeowners with relief will be infinitely more complex. Achieving the 
transparency needed to restore confidence in the system will be immensely more 
difficult. 
That said, we are not going to see 25% unemployment rates like those of the Great 
Depression. Then it took breathtaking negligence by the Fed, the Congress and the 
Hoover Administration to achieve them. This time the Fed will provide however much 
liquidity the economy needs. There will be no tax increases designed to balance the 
budget in the teeth of a downturn, like Hoover’s in 1930. Where last time it took the 
Congress three years to grasp the need to recapitalise the banking system and provide 
mortgage relief, this time it will take only perhaps half as long. Ben Bernanke, Hank 
Paulson and Barney Frank are all aware of that earlier history and anxious to avoid 
repeating it.   
And what the contraction of the financial services industry taketh, the expansion of 
exports can give back, what with the continuing growth of the BRICs, no analogue for 
which existed in the 1930s. The ongoing decline of the dollar will be the mechanism 
bringing about this reallocation of resources. But the US economy, notwithstanding the 
admirable flexibility of its labour markets, is not going to be able to move unemployed 
investment bankers onto industrial assembly lines overnight. I suspect that I am now less 
likely to be regarded as a lunatic when I ask whether unemployment could reach 10%. 
 
Hughson and Weidenmier: Financial markets and a lender of last resort 
28 November 2008 
The current crisis raises serious questions about the role of a lender of last resort. This 
column provides historical insight into its importance. Such a lender is critical to 
containing crises, as demonstrated by the frequent autumn harvest financial crises in the 
US prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve. 
The recent subprime mortgage crisis raises serious questions about the role of a lender of 
last resort and the appropriate role of monetary policy. Academics, policymakers, and the 
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financial press have debated the extent to which central banks should intervene in the 
marketplace, provide liquidity, and even purchase the non-performing assets of troubled 
financial institutions. Although economists, Washington insiders, and the media may 
debate the extent to which the lender of last resort function should be intensified in wake 
of the current financial market meltdown, proponents and opponents of monetary policy 
generally agree that it is very difficult to identify the effect of the lender of last resort 
function on financial markets. 
Fortunately, history provides some insight into the importance of a lender of last resort in 
dealing with a financial crisis, especially the provision of liquidity by financial 
institutions to help cash-strapped firms in the short run. Following the Panic of 1907, 
which was accompanied by one of the shortest but most severe financial crises in 
American history, the US Congress passed two important pieces of legislation that 
established a lender of last resort: (1) the Aldrich Vreeland Act of 1908 which allowed 
banks to temporarily increase the money supply during a financial crisis, and (2) the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 which replaced Aldrich-Vreeland and established a public 
central bank in the US (Moen and Tallman, 2000). 
The two acts were designed to increase the elasticity of the money supply, which was 
largely fixed by the supply of gold and the requirement that banks could only issue notes 
if they were sufficiently backed by US government bonds. The money supply was 
especially inelastic during the fall harvest seasons when the financial markets tended to 
be illiquid as cash moved from the money centre banks to the interior to finance the 
harvesting of crops. The financial stringency made New York financial market vulnerable 
to banking and financial crises in the fall as financial institutions were often forced to call 
in stock market loans in response to large unexpected withdrawals of cash in response to 
a greater than expected harvest season. Indeed, several of the largest financial crises of 
the National Banking Period (1870-1913) occurred during the fall harvest season 
including 1870, 1890, 1893, and 1907 (Kemmerer, 1910; Miron, 1986; Sprague, 1910). 
A lender of last resort reduces financial volatility 
In work with Asaf Bernstein, we use the seasonal nature of financial crises during the 
National Banking Period as an identification strategy to isolate the impact of the 
introduction of a lender of last resort on financial markets (Bernstein, Hughson, and 
Weidenmier 2008). We compare the standard deviation of stock returns in September and 
October over time before and after the introduction of a lender of last resort. The 
identification strategy should isolate the effects of the lender of last resort function on 
interest-rates and stock returns from other macroeconomic shocks. Wohar and Fishe 
(1990), for example, argue that World War I and the closure of the New York financial 
markets played an important role in the change in the stochastic behaviour of interest 
rates, in addition to the founding of the Federal Reserve. Given that these events all 
occurred around the same time, they argue that it is difficult to separate out the effects of 
these different events on interest rates. Our strategy enables us to identify the effect of the 
introduction of the lender of last resort because if the lender of last resort is responsible 
for what we find – lower volatility in financial markets - the effect should be largest in 
September and October. 
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We investigate stock volatility for two reasons: (1) stock volatility typically rises prior to 
the onset of a recession (i.e., the current financial crisis) and (2) given the poor quality of 
high frequency macroeconomic data from the National Banking Period, we can use stock 
volatility as a metric to provide some insight into the chicken and egg problem: do 
financial crises have real effects or do real shocks cause financial crises? If the former is 
true, then the introduction of a lender of last resort should reduce financial market 
volatility. As shown in Figure 1, stock volatility was more than 40% lower in the pre-
lender of last resort period (1870-1908) versus the period 1908-1925. Although we find 
that stock volatility in September and October was larger than the other ten months of the 
year prior to the monetary regime change, this was no longer true after the introduction of 
a lender of last resort. We find similar results using the call loan interest rate, the interest 
rate financial institutions charged investors to buy stocks on margin. Figure 2 shows that 
interest rate volatility declined more than 70% in the months of September and October 
after the establishment of a lender of last resort. These volatility reductions are 





The dramatic decline in volatility during the months of September and October has 
several implications for today’s policymakers and the current global financial crisis. First, 
financial crises can have large economic effects. Second, the provision of liquidity by a 
lender of last resort can be very important for containing the spread of a financial crisis 
that can have significant macroeconomic economic effects. Third, the reduction in 
uncertainty associated with a lender of last resort is likely to increase investment and 
shorten the duration of recessions. Fourth, while our analysis provides some insight into 
the importance of containing a liquidity crisis, it has less to say about the role of a lender 
of last resort when the solvency of financial institutions is uncertain. 
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Duflo: Too many bankers? 
8 October 2008  
With its relatively high wages, the financial sector has, over the last two decades, 
attracted many brilliant minds, probably too many. In this column, Esther Duflo explains 
how the current financial crisis could lead to a better allocation of talent where creative 
energies would be socially more useful. 
The emergency rescue of the financial sector drew attention to the phenomenal financial 
sector wages. Nicholas Kristof reported in his column in The New York Times that the 
CEO of Lehman Brothers, one of the first banks to go bankrupt in September, had won 
45 million dollars in 2007, and half a billion between 1993 and 2007. 
This is not an exception: the series built by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez showed 
that the proportion of income of the 1% richest Americans has increased constantly since 
the early 1980s. But even compared to other rich people, the "golden boys" of finance 
have seen their incomes soar. A recent study by Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef111 
shows that at equal competence, an employee earned the same wage in the financial 
sector as in the rest of the economy in 1980. But a gap emerged in the 1980s and has 
continued to widen since. In 2000, wages were 60% higher in finance than in other 
sectors. This is partly explained by an increase in the number of highly skilled employees 
in finance, and an increased risk of unemployment, but only in part: Philippon and Reshef 
calculates that financial sector wages are 40% above what we might have expected based 
on these factors. The last time they were so high was in 1929... 
Naturally, the wage issue was part of the discussions around the Paulson plan, which 
authorizes the government to spend up to 700 billion dollars to buy shares the market 
does not want. It seems unfair for the taxpayer to pay from his pocket the mess created by 
others who earn 17,000 dollars an hour. Ultimately, no ceiling on executive 
compensation has been imposed on banks that sell shares to funds set up by the 
government, although some limits were placed on "golden parachutes". In any case, as 
Thomas Piketty pointed out in his liberation column last week, a wage cap is easily 
circumvented, and it would be preferable to tax high incomes, as the Roosevelt 
administration did. 
                                                 
111 Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef “Skill Biased Financial Development: Education, 
Wages and Occupations in the U.S. Finance Sector” NYU Stern Business School 
mimeograph, , September 2007 
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If paying the bankers (a lot) less or taxing them (a lot) would certainly be more desirable 
from a moral point of view (not to mention considerations of equity), would it be harmful 
in terms of economic efficiency, as many economists suggest? Is there a risk of 
discouraging the most talented to work hard and innovate in finance? Probably. But it 
would almost certainly be a good thing. The temptations to join the financial sectors are 
even stronger for the elite of undergraduates than what Philippon and Reshef estimate. 
The “Harvard and Beyond” survey, a survey of several cohorts of Harvard graduates 
conducted by Claudia Goldin and Larry Katz showed that in 2006 those who worked in 
finance earned almost 3 times more (195%) than others, after controlling for grades in 
college, standardized scores at entry, choice of major, year of graduation, etc.112 The 
temptation for a young talent to work in this sector is enormous: the survey showed that 
15% of males Harvard graduates of the classes 1988-1992 were working in finance, 
against only 5% of those of the 1969-1972 class. More generally, the massive 
deregulation of the financial sector, which began in the 1980s, and the opportunity to 
make extraordinary profits, has been accompanied by an increase in the number and 
qualifications of employees in this sector. Again, according to Philippon and Resheff, one 
has to go back to 1929 to see such a gap between the average education of an employee 
in the financial sector and one in the rest of the economy. The complex financial 
products, but also the evolution of standards in the social sectors over the past 30 years 
has made the financial sector particularly attractive to any graduate, intelligent as he may 
be. 
What the crisis has made bluntly apparent is that all this intelligence is not employed in a 
particularly productive way. Admittedly, a financial sector is necessary to act as the 
intermediary between entrepreneurs and investors. But the sector seems to have taken a 
quasi-autonomous existence without close connection with the financing requirements of 
the real economy. Thomas Philippon calculates that the financial sector, which accounts 
for 8% of GDP in 2006, is probably at least 2% above the size required by this 
intermediation.113 Worse, the sub-prime crisis is almost certainly in part linked to the fact 
the needs of the financial markets (the insatiable demand from banks for the famous 
“mortgage backed securities”) led to excessive borrowing and a housing bubble. 
Watching the events of the last few days unfold does make us one want to send some of 
the finance CEOs back home. More pragmatically, the disappearance of their exorbitant 
earnings may encourage younger generations to join other industries, where their creative 
energies would be socially more useful. The financial crisis could plunge us into a severe 
and prolonged recession. The only silver lining is that it could cause a more realistic 
allocation of talents. One must hope that the bail-out packages in Wall Street and in 
Europe does not convince the best and brightest that the financial sector is still their best 
option. 
 
                                                 
112 Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz “Transitions: Career and Family Life Cycles of 
the Educational Elite” American Economic Review (2008) 98:2 pp 263-269 






















December 28: Ownit Mortgage Solutions files for bankruptcy. 
February 7: U.S. Senate Banking Committee holds hearing on predatory lending in 
subprime sector. 
February 22: HSBC losses top $10.5 billion. Head of HSBC U.S. mortgage lending 
business is fired.  
March 7: The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issues a cease and desist order 
against Fremont Investment & Loan bank, which had been “operating without adequate 
subprime mortgage loan underwriting criteria.” 
March 8: Donald Tomnitz, the CEO of D.R. Horton, the largest U.S. homebuilder, tells 
investors, “I don't want to be too sophisticated here, but '07 is going to suck, all 12 
months of the calendar year.” 
March 12: Lenders to New Century Financial, a large subprime lender, cut off its credit 
lines.  Trading in its shares is suspended by the New York Stock Exchange.   
March 16: Subprime lender Accredited Home Lenders to sell, at heavy discount, $2.7 
billion of loans.  The New York Attorney General announces an investigation of 
subprime lending. 
April 2: New Century Financial files for bankruptcy. 
April 24: The National Association of Realtors announces that existing home sales fall 
8.4 percent during March, the greatest drop in 18 years. 
May 3: GMAC, the finance arm of General Motors, reports losses of $1 billion. UBS 
closes its U.S. subprime business. First comprehensive plan to help homeowners avoid 
foreclosures presented in U.S. Senate.  
June 6: The Bank of England reduces the overnight bank rate by 25 basis points to 5.5 
percent. 
June 22: Bear Stearns injects $3.2 billion into two of its hedge funds hurt by falling CDO 
prices.   
July 4: UK authorities take action against 5 brokers selling subprime mortgages.  
July 10: All three major credit ratings agencies announce review of subprime bonds. 
July 13: General Electric to sell WMC Mortgage, its subprime lending business.  
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July 18: U.S. housing starts down 20 percent from the previous year. 
July 31: The two Bear Stearns hedge funds that were under stress file for bankruptcy 
protection 
August 6: American Home Mortgage, one of the largest U.S. home loan providers, files 
for bankruptcy.  
August 9: BNP Paribas suspends three investment funds hit by subprime crisis. AIG 
warns that mortgage defaults spreading beyond subprime sector. 
August 10: The ECB provides 61 billion euros of funds for banks. The Fed said it would 
provide as much overnight money.  The interest rate on 15-day AAA asset-backed 
commercial paper hits 6.14 percent for a historically high  
August 13: Goldman Sachs to pump $3 billion to rescue a hedge fund.  The ECB and 
central banks in the U.S. and Japan continue supplying liquidity to markets.  
August 16: Countrywide draws down its $11.5 billion credit line. 
August 17: The Federal Reserve cuts the discount rate to 5.75 percent. 
August 23: Bank of America purchases 16 percent of Countrywide Financial for $2 
billion.  Four large U.S. banks announce coordinated borrowing of $2 billion from the 
Federal Reserve’s discount window. 
August 28: German bank Sachsen Landesbank is sold to Landesbank Baden-
Wuerttemberg.  The S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index for second quarter 2007 is 
down 3.2 percent from a year earlier, the greatest drop in the 17-year history of the index. 
August 31: Subprime lender Ameriquest files for bankruptcy. 
September 1-3: The Federal Reserve’s annual Jackson Hole conference focuses on the 
link between housing and monetary policy. 
September 3: IKB, German regional lender, records $1 billion loss due to U.S. subprime 
market exposure.  
September 4: Bank of China reveals $9 billion in subprime losses. 
September 6: The delinquency rate on 1-4 family mortgages reaches 5.1 percent, 
according to the Mortgage Bankers Association. 
September 13: Global Alpha, a hedge fund managed by Goldman Sachs, reveals that it 
lost 22 percent during August. 
September 14: A run on the deposits of British mortgage lender Northern Rock begins. 
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September 18: The Federal Reserve cuts the fed funds rate by 50 basis points to 4.75 
percent, its first cut since 2003. 
October 1: UBS and Citigroup announce losses of $3.4 billion and $3.1 billion 
respectively.  
October 9: The Dow Jones Industrial Average closes at 14,164, its all-time high. 
October 10: The U.S. government teams up with mortgage servicers and investors to 
launch the HOPE NOW alliance, to encourage the voluntary modification of adjustable-
rate mortgages to fixed-rate. 
October 14: Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America, with the support of the 
Treasury Department, announce a plan to form a Master-Liquidity Enhancement Conduit 
(MLEC) that would purchase asset-backed commercial paper from liquidation Structured 
Investment Vehicles. 
October 15: Citigroup and Japanese bank Nomura announce subprime losses of $5.9 
billion and $621 million, respectively.  
October 16: The National Association of Home Builders confidence index hits 19, the 
lowest since the series began in 1985. 
October 26: Countrywide Financial reports a loss of $1.2 billion for third quarter 2007.  
This is its first loss in 25 years. 
October 30: Merrill Lynch announces losses of $7.9 billion and the resignation of CEO 
Stan O'Neal.  
October 31: The Federal Reserve cuts the federal funds rate by 25 basis points to 4.5 
percent. Deutsche Bank reveals a €2.2 billion loss.  
November 1: Credit Suisse discloses a $1 billion loss. Fed injects $41 billion. 
November 5: Citigroup announces that its $55 billion portfolio of subprime-related 
investments has declined in value between $8 billion and $11 billion. CEO Charles 
Prince resigns. 
November 8: Morgan Stanley and BNP Paribas disclose mortgage losses of $3.7 billion 
and €197 million, respectively.  Insurance company AIG writes down $2 billion of 
mortgage investments. 
November 9: Wachovia announces $1.7 billion loss.  
November 13: Bank of America announces $3 billion subprime loss.  
November 14: Japan's second largest banking group, Mizuho reports full-year operating 
profit fell 13 percent. HSBC reports losses of $3.4 billion.  
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November 15: Barclays reveals $2.7 billion loss. The U.S. House of Representatives 
passes the Predatory Lending and Mortgage Protection Act.  
November 16: Goldman Sachs forecasts financial losses due to subprime crises at $400 
billion. 
November 19: Reinsurance company Swiss Re to lose $1 billion on insurance of client 
hit by subprime crises.  
November 20: Freddie Mac reports a $2 billion loss.  
November 27: Freddie Mac and Citigroup raise $6 billion and $7.5 billion of capital 
respectively. U.S. house prices record biggest quarterly drop in 21 years.   
December 5: New York Attorney General sends subpoenas to major investment banks to 
investigate subprime mortgage securitization. 
December 6: Royal Bank of Scotland to write off £1.25 billion due to subprime crisis. 
The Bank of England cuts UK interest rates.  
December 10: UBS and Lloyds TSB report $10 billion and £200m losses due to bad 
debts in the U.S. housing market. 
December 11: The Federal Reserve lowers the federal funds rate by 25 basis points to 
4.25 percent.  Washington Mutual subprime losses to reach $1.6 billion. 
December 12: The Federal Reserve announces the creation of the Term Auction Facility 
(TAF), which will auction a fixed amount of funds to the banking system, initially set at 
$20 billion.  The Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Swiss National 
Bank also announce that they will engage in currency swaps of up to $20 billion to the 
ECB and $4 billion to the SNB.  The Bank of England and Bank of Canada also 
announce that they will increase their liquidity facilities. 
December 14: Citigroup takes $49 billion worth of SIV assets back on its balance sheet.  
December 17: Federal Reserve makes $20 billion available to commercial banks. 
December 18: The Federal Reserve tightens rules on subprime lending. The European 
Central Bank lends European commercial banks $500 billion. The Bank of England 
makes £10 billion available to UK banks.  
December 19: As subprime losses reach $9.4 billion, Morgan Stanley sells a 9.9 percent 
stake in the company to the China Investment Corporation.  
December 21: The spread of 15-day AAA asset-backed commercial paper over AAA 
nonfinancial commercial paper hits 173 basis points as banks scramble for funding 
through the end of the year.  The spread is usually less than 10 basis points. 
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January 4: The U.S. unemployment rate rises from 4.7 percent to 5.0 percent.  
January 9: Bear Stearns reveals subprime losses of $1.9 billion. CEO James Cayne steps 
down. The World Bank says that world economic growth will slow in 2008 due to 
subprime crisis credit crunch.  
January 11: Bank of America buys Countrywide for $4 billion after its shares plunge 48 
percent. Merrill Lynch doubles projection of subprime losses to $15 billion. 
January 15: Citigroup reports a $9.8 billion loss for the fourth quarter, including $18 
billion loss in mortgage portfolio. 
January 17: Lehman Brothers retires from wholesale mortgage lending and will cut 
1,300 jobs. 
January 19: Fitch Ratings lowers the rating of Ambac, the second-largest monoline 
insurer after MBIA, from AAA to AA.  This is the first downgrade of a large monoline. 
January 22: In a surprise move between regularly-scheduled meetings, the Federal 
Reserve cuts the federal funds rate by 75 basis points to 3.50 percent. 
January 24: French bank Société Générale announces that it lost €4.9 billion due to the 
unauthorized activity of one of its traders.  While the bank closed out the trades during a 
holiday weekend in the United States, stock markets plunged around the world. 
January 30: The Federal Reserve cuts the federal funds rate by 50 basis points to 3.00 
percent.  Regularly-scheduled auctions for municipal debt of the state of Nevada and 
Georgetown University fail due to lack of bidders and uncertainty about monoline 
insurers.  The debt issuers are forced to pay a penalty rate. 
February 13: President Bush signs the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008.  The act 
provides approximately $100 billion of tax rebates to be distributed during summer 2008 
and $50 billion of investment incentives. 
February 14: UBS announces fourth quarter 2007 loss of CHF 12.4 billion ($12 billion). 
February 15: Problems in the auction-rate securities market continue to spread; over 
1,000 auctions fail this week.  Investment banks do not allow investors to withdraw funds 
invested in those securities. 
February 28: AIG, a large insurance company, announces fourth quarter 2007 losses of 
$5.3 billion due to more than $11 billion of losses on its credit default swap portfolio. 
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March 6: The delinquency rate on 1-4 family mortgages was 5.82 percent during fourth 
quarter 2007, up 87 basis points from a year earlier, according to MBA's National 
Delinquency Survey. 
March 11: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York announces the creation of the Term 
Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), which lets primary dealers swap AAA-rated 
securities for Treasury securities.  The Federal Reserve, European Central Bank and 
Swiss National Bank increase the size of their dollar swap lines to $30 billion and $6 
billion respectively. 
March 14: Investment firm Carlyle Capital defaults on $17 billion of debt.  The fund is 
leveraged more than 30 to 1 and invests mostly in agency-backed RMBS. 
March 16: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York announces the creation of the 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), which essentially opens the discount window to 
primary dealers, including non-depository institutions. 
March 17: Investment bank Bear Stearns is acquired by JPMorgan Chase for $2 per 
share. Bear Stearns stock had been trading at $60 the previous week before a run pushed 
it to near-insolvency.  The Federal Reserve Bank of New York agrees to guarantee $30 
billion of Bear Stearns assets, mostly mortgage-related. 
March 18: The Federal Reserve cuts the federal funds rate by 75 basis points to 2.25 
percent. 
March 24: JPMorgan Chase raises its bid for Bear Stearns to $10 per share and agrees to 
indemnify the Federal Reserve Bank of New York against the first $1 billion of losses on 
the $30 billion that it guaranteed. 
April 8: Washington Mutual, one of the largest U.S. mortgage originators, raises $7 
billion from TPG, a private equity firm.  The IMF’s Global Financial Stability estimates 
total credit losses of $1 trillion.  
April 15: Alpha magazine reports that hedge fund owner John Paulson is the highest-paid 
trader in 2007.  His fund Paulson & Co. rose more than $20 billion during the year 
shorting the mortgage market. 
April 18: Citigroup announces another $12 billion of losses related to subprime 
mortgages, leveraged loans, exposure to monoline insurers, auction-rate securities, and 
consumer credit. 
April 21: National City Corp., a large regional U.S. bank, announces a $7 billion capital 
infusion from Corsair Capital, a private equity firm. 
April 22: Royal Bank of Scotland announces that it will raise about £16 billion pounds 
from investors and by selling assets. 
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April 29: The FDIC proposes that the Treasury Department make new Home Ownership 
Preservation (HOP) loans to borrowers with unaffordable mortgages. 
April 30: The Federal Reserve lowers the federal funds rate by 25 basis points to 2.0 
percent.   
May 2: The Federal Reserve expands the range of acceptable collateral for the TSLF to 
include AAA-rated asset-backed securities, increases the amount of money auctioned 
under the TAF to from $50 billion to $75 billion, and increases its dollar swap lines with 
foreign central banks. 
May 5: The Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Survey reports tighter lending 
standards close to, or above, historical highs for nearly all loan categories. 
May 6: UBS AG announces CHF 11.5 billion ($11.1 billion) loss during first quarter 
2008.  Fannie Mae announces a $2.2 billion quarterly loss and plans to raise $6 billion of 
capital.  Home builder D.R. Horton reports $1.3 billion quarterly loss and a 33 percent 
cancellation rate on orders for new houses. 
May 8: Insurance company AIG reports a $7.8 billion quarterly loss, including more than 
$15 billion of write-downs on its investment portfolio. 
May 12: Monoline insurer MBIA announces a $2.4 billion loss during first quarter 2008. 
May 14: RealtyTrac reports that foreclosures filings are 65 percent higher than a year 
earlier. 
May 16: The University of Michigan’s Consumer Confidence Survey fell to 59.5, the 
lowest level since June 1980. 
May 23: The city of Vallejo, CA, files for bankruptcy, unable to pay rising pension costs. 
May 29: The FDIC reports that the U.S. banking industry earned $19.3 billion in first 
quarter 2008, a decline of 46 percent from a year earlier. 
June 5: The Mortgage Bankers Association that a record 6.35 percent of all mortgage 
loans are delinquent and another record 2.47 percent of mortgages are in foreclosure. 
June 16: Lehman Brothers announces a $2.8 billion quarterly loss. 
June 20: The U.K.’s National House Building Council says that new housing starts in 
May were 56 percent below a year earlier. 
June 27: The Wall Street Journal reports that Senator Charles Schumer sent a letter to 
bank regulators about the health of IndyMac bank.  The University of Michigan 




July 1: U.S. auto sales fall 18 percent during June, including a 36 percent fall of sales at 
Chrysler.   Starbucks reports that it is closing 600 stores and cutting 12,000 jobs. 
July 3: The Federal Reserve reports that it the Bear Stearns assets that it acquired have 
fallen in value by $1.1 billion so far. 
July 9: U.S. retailer Steve and Barry’s files for bankruptcy. 
July 11: The FDIC closes IndyMac bank.  With $32 billion of assets, this is the second-
largest bank failure in FDIC history.  
July 13: The Treasury Department announces emergency liquidity measures for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac. 
July 17: Merrill Lynch reports a quarterly loss of $4.65 billion, including $9.75 billion of 
write-downs.  
July 18: Citigroup announces a quarterly loss of $2.5 billion. 
July 22: Wachovia reports an $8.66 billion quarterly loss.  Washington Mutual reports a 
$3.3 billion quarterly loss. 
July 24: National City bank reports a quarterly loss of $1.76 billion.  
July 25: Ford Motors reports an $8.7 billion quarterly loss.   
July 28: Merrill Lynch agrees to sell securities with a par value of $30.6 billion to 
investment group Lone Star Funds for $6.7 billion.  It will provide non-recourse funding 
for 75 percent of the purchase. 
July 29: Retailer Mervyn’s files for bankruptcy.  Homebuilder Centex reports a $150 
million loss. 
July 30: Restaurant chain Bennigan’s files for bankruptcy. 
July 31: The Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates that U.S. GDP growth was 1.9 
percent in second quarter 2008.  It also revises down its estimate of fourth quarter 2007 
growth from 0.6 percent to -0.2 percent, marking the first GDP decline since 2001.  
August 1: GM posts a quarterly loss of $15.5 billion. 
August 4: Homebuilder WCI and department store operator Boscov’s both file for 
bankruptcy. 
August 6: Freddie Mac loses $821 million and AIG loses $5.36 billion during the 
quarter. 
August 7: Deutsche Bank forecloses on a $3.5 billion casino after the owner defaults on a 
$760 million loan. 
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August 9: Fannie Mae reports a quarterly loss of $2.3 billion. 
August 26: The FDIC reports that the U.S. banking industry earned $5.0 billion in 
second quarter 2008, a decline of 87 percent from a year earlier.  2.04 percent of all loans 
and leases were noncurrent, the highest level for the industry since 1993. 
September 2: Fitch reports that losses on securitized auto loans nearly doubled from 
June to July. 
September 5: The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the unemployment rate rose 
from 5.7 percent in July to 6.1 percent in August. 
September 7: The Treasury Department takes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into 
conservatorship. 
September 10: Lehman Brothers announces a quarterly loss of $3.9 billion, plans to sell 
its brokerage unit Neuberger Berman, and spin off its commercial real estate assets. 
September 12: The Commerce Department reports that retail sales fell 0.3 percent in 
August and were revised downward for July. 
September 14: Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy.  Merrill Lynch agrees to be bought 
by Bank of America for $50 billion.  AIG asks the Federal Reserve for aid.  The Federal 
Reserve expands the range of collateral eligible for the TSLF and PDCF. 
September 16: Money market fund The Reserve suspends redemptions as its per-share 
value falls below $1, hurt by its investment in Lehman Brothers commercial paper.  The 
Federal Reserve agrees to lend AIG up to $85 billion. 
September 17: Morgan Stanley announces quarterly earnings of $1.43 billion.  Goldman 
Sachs earns $845 million.  Three-month Treasury bill yields fall to 0.23 percent, their 
lowest level since at least 1954.  The Census Bureau reports that single-family housing 
starts are at their lowest level since 1991.  DataQuick reports that almost half of all 
southern California home sales are of foreclosed homes. 
September 18: Putnam Investment closes a $15 billion money market fund because of 
heavy redemptions.  The Financial Services Agency temporarily bans short-selling 
financial stocks in the United Kingdom. 
September 19: The Securities and Exchange Commission temporarily bans short-selling 
financial stocks in the United States.  The Treasury announces that it will insure money 
market funds for a year.  The Treasury first proposes the TARP. 
September 21: Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley announce that they will become 
bank holding companies regulated by the Federal Reserve. 
September 22: Australia, Taiwan, and the Netherlands announce temporary short-selling 
bans.  Futures prices of crude oil rise $25, the biggest recording trading gain. 
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September 24: President Bush addresses the United States, saying “our entire economy 
is in danger.” 
September 25: The FDIC closes Washington Mutual and engineers a sale to J.P. 
Morgan. 
September 28: The Benelux countries partially nationalize Fortis bank. 
September 29: The United Kingdom announces that it is nationalizing lender Bradford & 
Bingley and selling it to Spanish bank Santander for £612 million.  Citigroup acquires 
Wachovia in a deal guaranteed by the FDIC.  Mitsubishi UFJ buys 21 percent of Morgan 
Stanley for $9 billion.  The House of Representatives does not pass the bailout package. 
September 30: LIBOR hits an all-time high of 6.88 percent. 
October 1: Ireland guarantees the debt of six major banks.  French-Belgian bank Dexia is 
partially nationalized.  The central bank of India lends money to ICICI to stop a run on 
the bank. 
October 6: The Federal Reserve announces that it will pay interest on bank reserves in an 
attempt to stabilize volatility in the interbank lending market. 
October 7: The Federal Reserve announces the creation of the Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility, which marks the first time that the Fed will lend directly to corporations 
since the Great Depression. 
October 8: Central banks around the world lower interest rates in concert.  The Federal 
Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of England, Bank of Canada, Sveriges Riksbank, 
and Swiss National Bank all lower their target rates by 50 basis points.  The U.K. sets up 
the Credit Guarantee Scheme, which guarantees bank debt.  Eight large British banks 
agree to raise £25 billion in new capital. 
October 10: Trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange sets a record of almost 9 
billion shares. 
October 14: The U.S. Treasury Department announces that it will make direct capital 
injections into banks, including $150 billion immediately into 9 large banks.  The FDIC 
announces that it is creating the TLGP, which extends unlimited deposit insurance for 
noninterest-bearing transaction accounts and guarantees a variety of bank debt. 
October 16: The VIX, a measure of stock market volatility, reaches a record level of 80.   
October 20: Argentina begins nationalizing $30 billion of private pension funds. 
October 21: The Federal Reserve creates the Money Market Investor Funding Facility to 
purchase assets from money market funds. 
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October 24: The U.K. reports that GDP growth in third quarter 2008 was -0.5 percent, 
the first decline since 1992.  The IMF announces an initial agreement to lend $2.1 billion 
to Iceland.  U.S. regional bank PNC announces that it is buying troubled bank National 
City with proceeds from the Treasury’s capital injection program. 
October 26: The IMF announces a $16.5 billion loan to Ukraine.  Porsche says that it has 
accumulated almost three-quarters of Volkswagen shares through derivatives, leading to 
large losses at hedge funds.  The Nikkei 225 index falls to its lowest level since 1982. 
October 27: The S&P 500 rises 10.8 percent, the greatest one-day rise in New home 
sales in the United States unexpectedly rise by 2.7 percent in September.  The median 
price of a new home is down 9.1 percent from a year earlier. 
October 28: The IMF, the European Union, and the World Bank announce a joint 
financing package for Hungary totaling $25.1 billion.  BP says that third quarter profits 
rose 83 percent from a year earlier to $8.1 billion.  Aegon NV receives €3 billion in 
capital from the Netherlands.  The Baltic Dry Index, a measure of shipping demand, fell 
below 1,000 for the first time since 2002 and is down 90 percent from its peak. 
October 29: The IMF creates the Short-Term Liquidity Facility (SLF) with $100 billion 
to lend to emerging markets with strong macroeconomic fundamentals but short-term 
liquidity needs.  Iceland increases interest rates to 18 percent.  The Federal Reserve cuts 
the federal funds rate by 50 basis points to 1.00 percent. 
October 30: The Bureau of Economic Analysis reports that U.S. GDP growth in third 
quarter 2008 was -0.3 percent.  ExxonMobil announces quarterly profit of $13.4 billion, 
up 42 percent from a year earlier and an all-time high for any U.S. corporation.  The 
Federal Reserve opens currency swap lines with Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and Singapore.  
The Federal Reserve’s balance sheet is now over $2 trillion, more than doubling from a 
year ago.  
October 31: Global stock markets lose a total of $9.5 trillion during October.  Barclays 
raises £7 billion from investors in Qatar and Abu Dhabi.    The Bank of Japan cuts its 
policy rate 20 basis points to 0.3 percent and the Japanese government announces a new 
$51 billion stimulus plan.  According to the Nationwide House Price Survey, U.K. house 
prices are 14.6 percent lower than a year earlier.  American Express plans to cut 7,000 
jobs, or about 10 percent of its workforce. Spain reported a quarterly decline in GDP of 
0.2 percent, the first decline since 1993. 
November 1: The U.S. national debt reaches $10 trillion for the first time in history.  
JPMorgan Chase announces a plan to modify $70 billion of mortgage debt. 
November 3: Commerzbank receives €8.2 billion in new capital from the German 
government.  Spain announces a plan to let unemployed homeowners and some retirees 
postpone payment of half their monthly mortgage payments for two years starting in 
January.  The U.S. Institute for Supply Management’s ISM factory output index falls to 
38.9, its lowest level since 1982.  GM reports that car and truck sales were 45 percent 
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lower than a year earlier; Ford reported a 30 percent decline and Nissan a 33 percent 
decline. 
November 4: Italy plans to inject €30 billion to recapitalize its banks.  Brazilian banks 
Banco Itaú and Unibanco announce merger plans to create South America’s largest bank.  
The British Construction Purchasing Managers' Index falls to 35.1, a seasonally-adjusted 
record low.  The Depository Trust & Clearing Corp. says that credit-default swaps 
outstanding were more than $33 trillion, about half on individual credits and half on 
indexes.  The Reserve Bank of Australia cuts its target rate by 75 basis points to 5.25 
percent.   
November 5: GMAC, the financing arm of General Motors, reported a quarterly loss of 
$2.5 billion, its fifth straight loss.  
November 6: The Bank of England cuts the target rate by 150 basis points to 3.0 percent.  
The ECB lowers its target rate by 50 basis points.  The Swiss National Bank lowers its 
target rate by 50 basis points.  The U.S. weekly continued unemployment claims data is 
at its highest level since 1983.  Hedge fund Platinum Grove Asset Management, co-
founded by Nobel laureate Myron Scholes, suspends redemptions after losing 29 percent 
in early October.  Only one securitization deal of $500 million occurs during October, 
down from $50 billion a year earlier.  It was the first month with no credit card 
securitizations since 1993.  Australian asset manager Allco Finance files for bankruptcy 
with AUD 1 billion in debt.  Wells Fargo raises $11 billion in new capital. 
November 7: Spain announces that it will guarantee up to €200 billion of new bonds 
issued by its banks.  The U.S. unemployment rate rises from 6.1 to 6.5 percent.  Ford 
announces a quarterly operating loss of $3 billion.  
November 10: China announces a $586 billion stimulus plan. The Federal Reserve 
renegotiates the terms of its loan to AIG, lowering the interest rate and injection $40 
billion of capital.  Fannie Mae says that the $100 billion line of credit to it and Freddie 
Mac from the Treasury may not be enough.  American Express becomes a bank holding 
company in order to borrow from the Federal Reserve and access the TLGP.  Spanish 
bank Santander raises €7.2 billion in new capital.  German logistics company DHL 
withdraws from U.S. market.  Japanese factory orders fall 10.4 percent during the quarter, 
matching the largest drop in history. 
November 11: U.S. Congress member Nancy Pelosi calls for “immediate action” to 
support Ford, GM, and Chrysler as GM stock prices hit a 65-year low.  U.S. electronics 
retailer Circuit City files for bankruptcy.   
November 12: Fannie Mae reports $29 billion quarterly loss, including $21 billion 
writedown of deferred tax assets.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announce streamlined 
mortgage modification process.  The Treasury announces that the TARP program is 
officially switching focus from buying illiquid assets to injecting capital into banks.  
Hedge fund Tontine Partners, with more than $11 billion under management, shuts down 
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two of its flagship funds.  The Russian stock market falls 12.5 percent in the first three 
hours of trading before trading is suspended. 
November 13: Germany reports a quarterly decline in GDP of 0.5 percent, the second 
quarterly decline in a row.  German real-estate finance company Hypo Real Estate 
Holding AG reported a €3.1 billion quarterly loss driven by €2.5 billion in write-downs to 
its public finance subsidiary, Depfa.  Pakistan raised its target interest rate by 2 
percentage points to 15 percent to help reduce inflation rates of 25 percent.  Chinese bank 
Citic Pacific assumes $1.3 billion of currency losses from its Hong Kong affiliate.  
General Electric announces that it will have as much as $139 billion of GE Capital debt 
guaranteed under the TLGP.  China’s industrial output rises 8.2 percent from a year 
earlier, the slowest growth rate in seven years. 
November 14: Eurostat reports that GDP growth in the 15 euro nations was negative 0.2 
percent, the second decline in a row, marking a recession. Freddie Mac reports a $25.3 
billion quarterly loss due to writedowns on securities, deferred tax assets, and mortgages.  
It submits a request to the Treasury for a capital injection of $13.8 billion.  The FDIC 
proposes a loan-modification program that would have the government bear up to 50 
percent of losses if modified loans default, at an estimated cost of about $25 billion. 
November 15: Pakistan agrees to a $7.6 billion IMF loan. 
November 16: After meeting in Washington, D.C., the Group of 20 announces a set of 
plans to overhaul international bank regulation and increase financial supervision of 
member countries. 
November 17: Citigroup announces that it plans layoffs of up to 50,000. 
November 20: European countries agree to augment the IMF’s loans to Iceland, bringing 
the total to $10 billion.  The Swiss National Bank lowers its target range by 100 basis 
points to 0.5-1.5%. 
November 23: The Treasury and FDIC guarantee $306 billion of Citigroup’s assets and 
invest $20 billion from the TARP into preferred shares with an 8% yield. 
November 24: President-elect Barack Obama announces his economic team, including 
Timothy Geithner as Secretary of the Treasury; Lawrence Summers as the Director of the 
National Economic Council; Christina Romer as Chair of the Council of Economic 
Advisors; and Melody Barnes as Director of the Domestic Policy Council. 
November 25: The Federal Reserve announces the creation of the Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which will lend up to $200 billion against various types 
of asset-backed securities.  It will also, separately, begin purchasing up to $500 billion of 
GSE debt. 
November 26: The People’s Bank of China lowered its target interest rate by 108 basis 
points to 5.58 percent.  Fitch lowers Toyota’s debt rating from AAA to AA. 
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November 27: ArcelorMittal, the world’s largest steelmaker, announces 9,000 job cuts. 
December 1: Morimoto, a Japanese condominium developer, files for bankruptcy with 
$1.7 billion of debt outstanding. 
December 3: The Reserve Bank of Australia lowers its target interest rate by 100 basis 
points to 4.25 percent.  The IMF lends $77 million to Malawi. 
December 4: The European Central Bank reduces its target interest rate by 75 basis 
points to 2.5 percent; the Bank of England cuts 100 basis points to 2.0 percent, the lowest 
rates since the Bank of England was founded in 1694; and the Swedish Riksbank cuts 
175 basis points to 2.0 percent.  France proposes a €25 billion stimulus plan.  Halifax 
reports that British house prices fell 2.6 percent during November, bringing prices back 
to their July 2005 level. 
December 5: The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the United States had a net loss 
of 533,000 jobs in November, the greatest decline since 1974.  AT&T announces job cuts 
of 12,000. 
December 8: The Tribune Company, a Chicago-based media corporation owned by real 
estate magnate Sam Zell, files for bankruptcy. 
December 9: Three-month U.S. Treasury bills trade with a negative yield for the first 
time since the Great Depression.  Sony Corp. announces 16,000 job cuts.  Third quarter 
Japanese GDP growth is revised downward to an annualized rate of -1.8 percent. 
December 10: The Chinese customs bureau reported that exports in November were 2.2 
percent lower than a year earlier, the first decline in seven years.  The IMF lends $100 
million to Kyrgyzstan. 
December 11: FBI agents arrest Bernard Madoff, owner of broker-dealer Madoff 
Securities, who had been running a Ponzi scheme that may have resulted in $50 billion of 
investor losses.  The National Bureau of Economic Research announces that the recession 
in the United States began in December 2007.  The Swiss National Bank lowers its target 
range by 50 basis points to 0.0-1.0 percent.  The Bank of Korea lowers its target interest 
rate by 100 basis points to 3.0 percent and the Taiwanese central bank lowers its target 
interest rate by 200 basis points to 2.75 percent.  Bank of America announces job cuts of 
up to 35,000.  A proposed record private equity buyout of Canadian telecom company 
BCE for C$35 billion is cancelled.  S&P downgrades $5 billion of California municipal 
debt. 
December 12: Ecuador defaults on $510 million of bonds.  Japan announces a new $255 
billion stimulus plan. 
December 15: AIG sells RMBS with a face value of $39 billion to the Federal Reserve 
for $20 billion.  Citadel Investment Group, a hedge fund with about $15 billion under 
management, suspends investor redemptions, joining other hedge funds including 
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Farallon Capital Management, Fortress Investment Group, and D.E. Shaw.  The Tankan 
index of Japanese business confidence falls 21 points, the most in 34 years. 
December 16: The Federal Reserve announces that it is lowering the federal funds rate to 
a target range of 0 to ¼ percentage points, the lowest level in its history.  Housing starts 
decline to 625,000 at a seasonally adjusted annual rate, according to the Census Bureau, 
the lowest level since the series began in 1959.  Goldman Sachs announces a $2.1 billion 
third quarter loss. 
December 17: OPEC cuts its production target by a record 2 million barrels per day.  
Chrysler, the third largest U.S. car manufacturer, announces that it will close all of its 
U.S. factories for at least a month. 
December 18: Deutsche Bank surprises investors by not exercising a call option on its 
bonds, choosing to pay a penalty rate to avoid having to refinance the bonds.  Credit 
Suisse gives year-end bonuses in the form of shares in a $5 billion fund of illiquid assets.  
Morgan Stanley reports a $2.2 billion third quarter loss.  Almost half of all sales of 
existing homes in the California bay area are of previously foreclosed homes, according 
to information provider DataQuick. 
December 19: The Japanese government announces that it will buy up to 20 trillion yen 
($223 billion) of stocks held by Japanese banks as part of a larger stimulus package.  
Yves Leterme, the Belgian prime minister, resigns after accusations that he influenced a 
court case over the government’s takeover of Fortis.  Consultancy Hedge Fund Research 
reports that 344 hedge funds close during the quarter, which was the first in which there 
were more liquidations than launches since the company began tracking the data in 1996. 
December 20: The U.S. Treasury Department announces that it will lend $17.4 billion of 
TARP money to the three large U.S. automakers.  The Irish government injects €5.5 
billion into its three largest banks, taking a 75 percent stake in Anglo Irish Bank.  Japan 
increases the size of its economic stimulus plan to $716 billion. 
December 21: Canada lends C$4 billion to Canadian subsidiaries of General Motors and 
Chrysler. 
December 22: Toyota announces that it foresees its first quarterly loss in its 70-year 
history.  Japanese exports are 27 percent lower than a year ago, with shipments to the 
United States down 34 percent.  Mortgage applications double in the United States in just 
two weeks after the Federal Reserve’s announcement that it will buy mortgage bonds to 
lower mortgage interest rates. 
December 23: Third-quarter U.K. GDP growth is revised down to -0.6 percent, the 
lowest level since 1990.  U.S. new home sales in November were at a seasonally adjusted 
annual rate of 407,000, the lowest level since 1982.  El Salvador reaches a precautionary 
agreement with the IMF to borrow $800 million. 
December 24: The IMF agrees to lend $2.4 billion to Latvia.  U.S. weekly 
unemployment claims were 586,000, the highest level since 1982.  Freddie Mac reports 
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that interest rates on 30-year fixed rate conforming mortgages fall to 5.14 percent, the 
lowest level since the survey began in 1971.  Oil prices fall 9.3 percent to $35/barrel, 
down 63 percent for the year.  The Federal Reserve approves the application by GMAC, 
the financing arm of General Motors, to become a bank holding company.  GM and 
private equity company Cerberus will be required to divest their controlling shares. 
December 26: Japanese industrial output falls 8.1 percent from a month earlier, the 





ABX.HE Index: An index produced by Markit that tracks prices on credit default swaps 
on tranches of selected asset-backed securities composed of residential mortgages. 
 
Alternative-A (or Alt-A): A category of mortgage borrower, generally with FICO scores 
that qualify them for prime rates but are not eligible for prime for other reasons, such as 
lack of income documentation. 
 
Asset-Backed Security (ABS): A security collateralized by financial assets, such as 
mortgages. 
 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP): see Commercial Paper. 
 
Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) Money Market Mutual Fund (MMMF) 
Liquidity Facility (AMLF): a lending facility by the Federal Reserve that provides 
funding to U.S. banks and bank holding companies to finance their purchases of high-
quality asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) from money market mutual funds. 
 
Auction-Rate Security: A municipal bond whose interest rate is set at specified intervals, 
often two weeks, at auction.  In early 2008 a large number of auctions failed due to lack 
of bidders, causing the municipalities to pay high penalty rates. 
 
Basel II: a revision to the international rules governing bank capital allocation.  
Coordinated by the Bank for International Settlements.  It was designed to lessen the 
amount of regulatory arbitrage that occurred under its predecessor, Basel I.  European 
banks were supposed to implement Basel II rules by 2008, while U.S. banks 
implementation may occur in 2009. 
 
Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO): a structured finance product composed of debt 
instruments such as corporate and consumer loans, mortgages, and bonds.   The cash 
flows from the underlying debt are paid out to the tranches of the CDO according to their 
seniority.  CDO issuance averaged $500 billion in 2006 and 2007. 
 
Commercial Paper (CP): Bonds with maturity less than 270 days.  CP can be issued by 
corporations, banks, or trusts holding securities.  The latter is usually referred to as asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP).  ABCP was one of the first casualties of the crisis, 





Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF): a program under which the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York purchases commercial paper; the first time the Fed lent directly to 
nonfinancial corporations since the Great Depression. 
 
Conduit: a financial entity whose purpose is to buy financial assets from correspondents, 
repackage them, and sell interests in the new securities to other entities. 
 
Credit Default Swap (CDS): a type of insurance against a firm defaulting on its debt.  
According to the Bank for International Settlements, the notional amount of CDS 
outstanding was $43 trillion as of June 2007. 
 
Discount Window: The mechanism through which the Federal Reserve lends directly to 
banks, thrifts, and other chartered depository institutions.  The PDCF essentially extended 
the discount window to primary dealers. 
 
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac: U.S. government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that enhance 
the flow of credit to the mortgage market.  The GSEs purchase mortgages from banks and 
thrifts and either keep the mortgages or package them into RMBS and sell them to the 
secondary market. 
 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC): the U.S. agency that insures bank 
deposits. 
 
FICO Score: A numerical rating of the credit history of individuals, developed by the Fair 
Isaac Corporation. 
 
Government-Sponsored Enterprise (GSE): An private entity set up by the U.S. 
government to further social policy goals, usually related to credit provision.  Major 
GSEs include Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank system. 
 
LIBOR: London Interbank Offered Rate, the interest rate that banks charge each other to 
borrow money.  Denominated in various currencies.  U.S. dollar LIBOR is usually tied 
closely to the federal funds rate but diverged beginning in August 2007 due to a 
combination of credit and liquidity risk. 
 
Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF): A program in which the Federal 




Monoline Insurer: An insurance company that specializes in insuring the performance of 
financial instruments, usually mortgage-related.  Most offer private mortgage insurance, 
which is used to insure payments on mortgages with high loan-to-value ratios.  Many also 
insured AAA-rated portions of CDOs. 
 
Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS):  A security that is composed of mortgages.  Often 
separated into MBS backed by residential mortgages (RMBS) and commercial mortgages 
(CMBS).  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dominated MBS issuance in the United States 
until 2004 when private-label MBS, often of subprime mortgages, became more 
prevalent.  Payments of interest and principal on the underlying mortgages can be paid 
pro-rata (pass-through MBS) or in a “waterfall” fashion, with “tranches” getting paid in 
order of seniority.  
 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF): A new policy introduced by the Federal Reserve 
that essentially opens the discount window to primary dealers.  Normally only banks and 
other depository institutions have access to the discount window.  The PDCF was 
introduced by the Federal Reserve the same weekend that Bear Stearns was acquired by 
JPMorgan Chase. 
 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS): see Mortgage-Backed Security. 
 
Securitization: the practice of bundling securities into new securities.  Used by financial 
institutions as a way of moving assets off their balance sheets in order to lend more.  
Mortgages are most commonly securitized but other debt instruments can also be 
included.  In the United States, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac actively promote mortgage 
securitization. 
 
Short-Term Liquidity Facility (SLF): An IMF program established on October 2, 2008, to 
provide emergency to liquidity to countries with otherwise sound macroeconomic 
situations. 
 
Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV): A fund that holds long-term securities (such as 
mortgages) and funds its investments with commercial paper. 
 
Subprime: borrowers whose poor credit history does not qualify them for prime interest 
rates.  In the United States, about 20 percent of mortgage originations totaling over $1 




Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP): a program by the FDIC to offer 
unlimited deposit guarantees on noninterest-bearing transaction accounts and guarantee 
senior debt issued by banks and bank holding companies. 
 
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF): a Federal Reserve facility to lend 
up to $200 billion against asset-backed securities (ABS) as collateral.  The ABS can be 
collateralized by student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and loans guaranteed by the 
Small Business Administration 
 
Term Auction Facility (TAF): an auction held by the Federal Reserve for a set quantity of 
money.  The TAF was introduced in December 2007 in response to pressures for short-
term lending in the money markets.  
 
Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF): An arrangement by the Federal Reserve to lend 
Treasuries and accept other AAA-rated financial instruments as collateral. 
 
Tranche: A method of apportioning cash flows in a structured finance product, such as an 
asset-backed security.  Senior tranches are paid principal and interest first, and junior 
tranches are paid with whatever cash is left.  Senior tranches have more security and 
consequently earn lower interest rates than junior tranches.  Several tranches may be 
rated AAA.  The most senior of the AAA tranches is often called “super-senior.” 
 
Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP): Originally, a program under which the U.S. 
Treasury would purchase illiquid MBS and other assets.  It evolved into the Capital 
Purchase Program (CPP), in which the Treasury purchased shares in banks. 
 
